International Recognition and Religion: A Quantitative Analysis of Kosovo’s Contested Status

Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming a fully fledged member state of the international system. Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized, the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries but not others extend recognition. However, research on what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty. It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level through religious institutions and one at the international level through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide strong support for these two pathways through which religion shapes state decisions regarding international recognition.     

Engaging with the post-secular moment in post-9/11 Afghanistan: the search for a ‘humanist’ political discourse

9/11 and the subsequent war on terror in Afghanistan have severely challenged the idea of a world politics based on secular modernity. While the post-9/11 Afghan society remains troubled with the post-secular conflict between the so-called Islamic-terrorist and secular-democratic forces, the need for a ‘humanist’ political discourse that could pave the way for peace has become paramount. This paper explores the viability of ‘post-Islamism’ as an alternative humanist political discourse. It sets out to demonstrate how a post-Islamic humanist discourse, which is defined by the dialogic process of developing a hermeneutical understanding of Islamic philosophy, has the potential to not only carve the way for peace amidst perilous entanglement between politics and religion in post-secular Afghanistan, but also vindicate Islam of its unjustified denigration in the contemporary world.     

Islam and resistance: Hamas,ideology and Islamic values in Palestine

This article investigates the historical evolution, values and Islamic reference points of Hamas. A product of fieldwork in the Middle East in 2009–2010, it allows Palestinian Islamists and their supporters to explain their views on Islam, whilst analysing the implications of these in regards to Hamas’ wider programme of resistance. Interviews and surveys, as well as Hamas’ ongoing use of Islamic terminology and the Islamisation of the Gaza Strip, reveal that religion remains intertwined with the movement’s political and social activities. Secular analyses clearly demarcating political and religious spheres in such cases are inadequate. The interpretation of Islamic values is not immutable, however, but rather part of a dynamic process subject to evolution and change.     

Islam and politics in Europe and in Asia: Comparative reflections

This article compares the role of religion, and of Islam in particular, in politics in Europe and in South and South East Asia. It starts out with the policy dilemmas facing France, Europe's most secular country that also has Europe's largest immigrant Muslim community. After long debates nation-wide Muslim organisation is now sponsored by the state in order to strengthen moderate Islam in France. In contrast, explicit Christian parties are in decline in most of Europe. Those who are still electorally successful are Christian mostly in name only and have turned into centre-right conservative people's parties instead. Religious discourse in politics has hence vanished almost entirely in Europe. In difference in Asia Islamic opposition parties have managed to set increasingly the political agenda in the majority Islamic states. In those countries with an Islamic minority their public religious agitation serves to strengthen their ethnic minority identity. Meaningful bi-continental dialogue needs to be aware of this discrepancy in religious politics.     

The Malaysian “Islamic” State versus the Islamic State (IS): evolving definitions of “terror” in an “Islamising” nation-state

ABSTRACT

This article provides a study of how the Malaysian state defines and redefines “terror” as the nature of militancy changes from the Communist insurgency to present day’s Islamist jihadism. Tracing such definitional changes, the article demonstrates how the portrait of a terrorist not only is inherently political (and at certain junctures, politicised), but also reflects the changing nature of the state. While able to ethnicise and externalise the Communist Terrorists (CTs), the rise of Islamist militancy forced the Malaysian state to shelve the term “terrorist” in favour of religious “deviancy” until the advent of the “war on terror”. Advancing along a state-driven Islamisation project, the discursive ideal that is the “Islamic state”, was securitised (1980–2001), normalised (2001–2013), and resecuritised (2014–2016) as a balancing act not only to neutralise the security threat but also to augment the state’s “Islamic” credentials for domestic political gains. Following the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), I argue that the Malaysian state is now embroiled in an “Islamic state versus Islamic State” dilemma, where in the face of a far enemy it cannot decisively eliminate, the state has no choice but to defend itself as a sovereign nation-state as well as an “Islamic” one, further problematising Islam in discourses of security and violence.     

‘Provincializing’ critical theory: Islam,Sikhism and international relations theory

This article will attempt to ‘provincialize’ or ‘decentre’ critical theory by looking at the development of critical discourses from within the Islamic and Sikh religious traditions. Although important theological, philosophical and historical differences exist between the two communities, Islamic and Sikh narratives share a rejection of the subordination of the religious to the political and thus potentially challenge the Westphalian order. However, in the case of the Sikh Qaum, no clear distinction between ‘nation’ and ‘religion’ is possible given the strong attachment to a territorially defined ancestral homeland. This article suggests that both critical Islamic and Sikh discourses, particularly those emanating from the diaspora, are potentially compatible with the ‘discourse ethics’ of critical theory. This is, however, conditional on the recognition of the universality of their beliefs, a position incompatible with the ‘thin’ cosmopolitanism of critical theory.     

The Increasing Role of Religion in State Failure: 1960 to 2004

This study examines the extent of religious conflict between 1960 and 2004 in the context of all domestic conflicts in that era based on data from the State Failure dataset. The findings show that until 2002 religious conflicts were a minority of all conflicts, but from 2002 to 2004 they were a majority of all conflicts. This study also examines the extent to which groups belonging to different religious traditions (i.e., Christianity, Islam, etc.) participate in conflict. The specific results on the relative participation in conflict by Christian and Muslim groups depend on the method used to measure conflict. However, no matter how conflict is measured, the results consistently show a rise in Islamic participation in conflict since the late 1970s. Also, for nearly the entire period covered by this study, the majority of religious conflicts involved Muslims. All of this supports contentions that rather than causing religion's demise, modernity has caused a resurgence of religion.     

The Meaning of Religion and Identity for the Violent Radicalisation of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany

In the following article, factors with an effect on the radical practice of religion in diaspora communities will be examined. Three factors play a major role in the religious radicalisation of the Islamic diaspora, often referred to as Islamism or religious activism: 1. The Islamist movement in the home country of the immigrants, 2. The situation created by immigration in which religion fulfils functions beyond purely spiritual needs and 3. A personal crisis resulting in individuals being receptive to extremist ideas. After a short conceptual explanation, the development of the Islamist movement in Turkey, which had a strong impact on the diaspora communities, will be traced. Following that, the role of religion for first- and second-generation immigrants will be discussed and individual crisis situations that aid extremism and violent radicalisation will be looked at. The conclusion drawn here allows statements to be made with regard to future tendencies towards violent radicalisation and their religious embedding.     

Religious Institutionalism: A Domestic Explanation for External Support of Rebel Groups

ABSTRACT

What motivates state support for rebel groups? The literature on state support for rebel groups has made critical developments. In particular, scholarship has shed light on the impact of religious identity links. Less work, however, examines the level of religious institutionalism in external states. I argue that the impact of religious links is conditional on the extent to which religion is institutionalized in the external state. Religiously institutionalized states allow domestic religious forces more space in the political arena, which increases pressure on state leaders to support co-religious rebel groups. Using statistical analysis, I find that the interaction of religious institutionalism and religious links affects the likelihood of support. When an external state and rebel group have religious links, and the external state has a high level of religious institutionalism, the likelihood of support is high. In contrast, without a high level of religious institutionalism in the external state, religious links do not increase the likelihood of support. The relationship is driven by cases where the external and target states do not share a religion. This article contributes to existing literature by moving beyond transnational religious links and focuses on how religious institutionalism increases domestic pressure to support co-religious rebel groups.     

Political,Religious, and Psychological Characteristics of Muslim Protest Marchers in Eight European Cities: Jerusalem Day 2002

A questionnaire was completed by 650 Muslim men marching on Jerusalem Day 2002 to protest the loss of Jerusalem to the Israelis. These respondents were selected for religiosity and support for terrorism from among 2,619 marchers in eight European cities who completed a brief screening survey. Results indicate that marchers differ on four independent dimensions of religion and politics: charismatic leadership, religiosity, separate nationalism, and family commitment to the Islamic Revolution. Marchers also differed on two independent dimensions of personality: neuroticism and extraversion-impulsiveness. Respondents with a charismatic religious leader were more willing to use chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (CBN). None of the six dimensions was related to interest in martyrdom. Notably, neither religion (Sunni vs. Shia) nor religiosity was related to willingness to use CBN or interest in martyrdom. Most generally, results suggest that violence in support of Islamic causes cannot be understood as the expression of extreme religious beliefs or exceptional religious devotion. The discussion points to the importance of relationships rather than individual characteristics in understanding propensity for terrorist violence.     

The Costs of Respecting Sovereignty

Respect for sovereignty can be an effective tool to manage relations between states, drawing boundaries of acceptable behavior. But there are also clear costs of respecting sovereignty. A foreign policy based on a principled defense of sovereignty can be, in fact, morally wrong, politically illegitimate, and strategically dangerous. This does not mean that sovereignty should be broken wantonly, but only that prudential judgment must be exercised to weigh the costs and benefits of respecting the sovereignty of a state. In the end, our security and our values, not the principle of sovereignty, should be the metric by which we should judge the necessity and legitimacy of U.S. actions.     

从俄罗斯世俗学校恢复宗教课的过程看东正教会的作用

帝俄时期,东正教是俄罗斯的国教,俄罗斯东正教会承担了国民宗教教育的全部任务。宗教课不仅在教会学校开设,而且还遍及国民教育部属的各类世俗学校。如今,宗教课再次走入俄罗斯世俗学校的课堂,成为当代俄罗斯一个引人注目的现象。俄罗斯世俗学校中宗教课的恢复是俄东正教会多年努力的结果。虽然这一过程一直伴随着来自社会各界的非议,但是精神道德培养作为当代俄罗斯国家主流意识形态的一个重要组成部分,已经得到俄罗斯官方的认可。宗教课在俄罗斯世俗学校普及的趋势不可逆转。     

Religion as a Factor in Ethnic Conflict: Kashmir and Indian Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflicts with a strong religious component do not have merely domestic or foreign causes and consequences. As a result, internationalization of ethnic conflict has become an important subject of inquiry both in terms of pure research and policy-oriented studies. This article presents a case study of Indian-Pakistani relations over Kashmir, used to evaluate the role of religion and the explanatory power of the approach presented here. The aim of the study is to apply a foreign policy approach that simultaneously incorporates domestic and external factors in an analysis of how and in what ways religious elements of the Kashmir question affect India's foreign policy. The approach, an application of “systemism,” contributes to current developments in the realist school of international relations through its emphasis on the need to look at both international and state levels in combination. Earlier applications of realism, as both neotraditional and structural realism clearly demonstrate, tend to remain restricted to one level or the other. In this approach, a religious dynamic can have a domestic source yet be effectively examined in terms of international ramifications.     

东盟“伊斯兰化”与东盟10国对以关系的互动研究

冷战结束为东南亚地区一体化发展和东盟扩大创造了条件。随着伊斯兰复兴运动近年在马来西亚和文莱的深化,这两国出于宗教情感而持反以亲阿的态度,并将其变为东盟意志,无视东盟大多数成员为非伊斯兰国家且与以色列合作良好的事实。这既体现了冷战后国际关系格局发展现实在东南亚的投影,又体现了当代国际关系的“宗教转向”和东盟国家在伊斯兰问题上的分歧公开化。以色列实际上已成为东盟伊斯兰与非伊斯兰成员国之间的宗教“柏林墙”。欧盟模式应是东盟可资借鉴的方向,东盟制度建设乃至维系存在的基础在于：一是加强东盟制度民主建设,二是东盟机构的“去宗教化”。马来西亚和文莱可以通过伊斯兰会议组织等国际宗教组织发出其宗教诉求,但东盟绝非在宗教上的合适平台。     

戈尔巴乔夫“新思维”背景下苏联对宗教问题认识的转向

戈尔巴乔夫上台以后,形成了以"民主化"和"公开性"为标志的"新思维"。但是在宗教领域,他及其所领导的苏联党和政府忽略了对社会主义条件下宗教问题的理论思考,在对宗教本质问题缺乏认识的前提下,单纯地将宗教政策的调整当作是营造良好社会氛围、提升国家声誉以及谋求与西方建立共同价值基础的工具,最终导致宗教矛盾激化,宗教问题延烧到社会政治领域、民族关系领域,演变成为推倒苏联大厦的重要推手之一。     

Analysing cultural proximity: Islamic Relief Worldwide and Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

Based on fieldwork carried out on Islamic Relief's relief programme for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, this article contributes to the debate on whether Muslim aid agencies bring added value when working with Muslim beneficiaries in Muslim areas. The author explores the significance of religion in relations between actors in the aid process and argues that a common religion does not necessarily override political, social, and cultural divisions. The article questions whether it is useful to claim that Muslim solidarity exists in the aid process when in practice it is difficult to have any meaningful engagement with religion in the field.     

Measuring the Ambivalence of Religion: Introducing the Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) Dataset

Despite ample anecdotal evidence, previous research on violent conflict has found little evidence that religion is an important factor in organized violence. Quantitative work in this area has been largely confined to the interreligious character of conflict and measures of religious diversity, and has strongly neglected the peace aspect of religion. The Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) dataset helps to fill this gap with innovative and fine-grained data for 130 developing countries between 1990 and 2010. RCDC includes four types of religious violence (assaults on religious targets, attacks by religious actors, clashes between religious communities, and clashes with the state). In addition, RCDC contains data on interreligious networks and peace initiatives. This article demonstrates the usefulness of RCDC by applying our data to a preliminary analysis. The results indicate that interreligious networks are a reaction to identity overlaps and previous interreligious conflict.     

Military Dialogue in the Euro‐Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence

The summer 2006 war in Lebanon can be perceived through at least five different frames of reference. The US administration saw the war in Lebanon as a local manifestation of the global war on terror. According to this framework, Hezbollah is an Al Qaeda-type enemy, not a national group with a local agenda and constituency; bargaining with Hezbollah is not possible. This point of view makes fighting global terror more difficult and jeopardises the search for stability and peace in the region. Many Israeli and European politicians saw the war as a confrontation between radical Islam and a modern Israeli state, a clash of cultures between Islamic fundamentalists and Western civilisation. This frame of reference, however, fails to recognise the fault line within the Muslim world itself, between those who want to integrate their societies into a globalised world and those who do not. The conflict in Lebanon can also be interpreted as a consequence of the weakening of a state, a framework which underlines the need to strengthen Arab institutions, or as an asymmetrical war between an armed nation state and a guerrilla movement. Finally, the war in Lebanon can be seen as a conflict over power, land, resources and sovereignty–the classic realist perspective. If the international community fails to work toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, another framework will gain strength in the Arab world: one that interprets events according to a theory of non-negotiable conflicts between Western imperialism and radical Islamic resistance.     

Wolves in sheep clothing or victims of times? Discussing the immoderation of incumbent Islamic parties in Turkey,Egypt, Morocco,and Tunisia

This article discusses the “immoderation” of incumbent Islamic parties – defined by the pursuit of a moral agenda and by an unwillingness to compromise with the opposition – through a comparative study of four incumbent Islamic parties in the socio-politically different regimes of Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Building on literature from religion and politics, social psychology, sociology of religion, and on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, this study argues that (1) Islamic parties’ strong organizations resulted both in their success and in the absence of internal pluralism and that (2) their dominant status in the party system consolidated their majoritarian understanding of democracy. Through its discussion of “immoderation” this study aims to contribute to the interdisciplinary literature on religion and politics.