国际战争与国内族群政治——伊拉克库尔德人运动的历时比较研究

以往对族群冲突的国际维度研究忽视了国际战争对国内族群政治产生的影响,因而对库尔德人运动这类深受国际政治和国际战争影响的案例难以给出令人信服的解释。鉴于此,本文提出了一个新的理论分析框架以弥补这一不足。该理论分析框架认为:国际战争将导致母国对内控制力下降、国内少数族群政治诉求更为激进、敌国干预族群政治的动机上升,进而增大族群冲突爆发和升级的可能;这一因果机制受到了敌国的干预能力、少数族群的战略价值、少数族群的动员能力以及少数族群的动员意愿等四类因素的调控。通过对比分析伊拉克在1946-2000年间经历的六次国际战争对其境内库尔德人运动的影响,本文验证了该理论分析框架的解释力。     

回溯性求偿与国际战争的诱发

既有理性主义战争成因理论认为围绕战争的预期效用计算主导着国家冲突行为的选择。将沉没成本和各类既往互动经历纳入效用计算在上述理论路径下被视为非理性行为。这种理论偏见限制了理性主义战争成因理论的解释力。事实上，对于物质和时间沉没成本的关注导致了国家行为体互动时呈现极端的相对收益敏感。为规避特定一方的相对物质收益或时间优势过度累积而使冲突双方实力失衡，自认为处于损失框架下的国家不时地采取无法被对方所接受的回溯性求偿行为，进而使冲突双方的和解方案交集被极大限缩；加之求偿国与被求偿国判断对方所持决策框架时产生的认知落差，冲突双方的风险承担意愿随之增加，同时双方也高估对方的敌意而低估对方的冲突决心，冲突升级为战争的可能性因而增加。2022年的乌克兰危机和第一次世界大战前的军事动员竞赛可以分别论证两类典型的回溯性求偿行为——围绕物质利益争夺展开的受害者—加害者战略互动和为争夺时间优势而被迫采取的后发先至策略——对国际战争的诱发性影响。     

石油在中东战争中的作用：论争、演进逻辑与现实

近百年的中东战争史是用石油串联起来的历史，这是大部分主流国际关系理论的基本共识。这种把中东地区所有战争的驱动都指向石油的话语深受资源战争逻辑和能源现实主义基调的影响，导致石油因素对中东战争抑制作用的探究被忽视。实际上，石油因素既能催化战争，亦能抑制战争。获取石油资源、石油权力的诱惑以及石油收入的支撑，增加了国家通过武力解决利益争端的意愿，而对占领成本、报复风险、外力介入的担忧和对合作收益的期许则是冲突双方放弃对抗与停止战争的重要考量因素，战争的最终走向取决于国家对石油收益与战争成本的综合权衡。石油因素在中东战争中的两种作用，体现在利比亚与乍得战争、两伊战争等催化案例，以及巴林与卡塔尔的哈瓦群岛领土争端、埃及与以色列的“六日战争”、海湾战争的抑制案例之中。鉴此，在全球能源转型和军事技术变革的今天，围绕中东石油资源控制权爆发冲突的频率是不确定的，但国家为获取该地石油资源而发动大规模战争的概率不大。未来，发动石油战争成本的边际化、石油产业相互依赖的常态化和域外大国协调机制的制度化，将有效避免利益相关方因中东石油资源而陷入“石油战争神话”的话语窠臼。     

非洲大湖地区族群政治探源

非洲大湖地区不但具有族群政治的显著特征，而且有独特的历史发展轨迹。非洲大湖地区在历史上发展出相对成熟的王权体系，素有官方“修史”和群体分类实践的传统，具体体现于内容丰富的口述传统。但当地社会群体并没有卡斯特体系中那种严重的排他性，且群体成员的身份认同呈现出明显的流动性。19世纪下半叶，西方探险家和传教士进入非洲大湖地区，对该地区诸王国和社会的认知构成了一种以“原住民主义”为本质特征的殖民话语，并对后续的殖民统治政策产生重要影响，进而重塑了非洲大湖地区原有的群体分类实践和历史进程。面对殖民主义，绝大多数非洲统治精英决心维护主权和独立，但具体应对策略不尽相同，既有军事斗争和外交斗争，又有各自的政治调适方式。19世纪末至20世纪50年代末，随着族群政治化，非洲大湖地区族群政治最终形成。族群政治未必注定会导致族群冲突，但无疑给独立后非洲大湖地区国家在处理族群关系和制定族群政策上带来巨大挑战。族群政治是20世纪90年代非洲大湖地区爆发大规模族群冲突的背景，也是今天刚果（金）东部地区冲突的根源之一。只有把族群政治纳入合理的现代政治框架下，非洲大湖地区实现政治稳定和自主发展才有可能。     

经济风险的战争效应：安全跨域外溢机制研究

巴里.布赞的新综合安全分析框架提供了安全跨域外溢的分析方法，克服了不同领域的安全研究相互割裂的局限。文章基于新综合安全观的视角分析经济风险的战争效应，提出“二阶段论”的理论框架，将经济风险促成战争的过程分为经济安全和军事安全两个阶段。第一阶段通常是线性逻辑，经济风险通过影响一国经济基本面演变为经济威胁；第二阶段是复杂的多线程逻辑，经济威胁可能通过激励和诱发两种机制作用于军事安全领域，产生或加强实力—安全困境、破窗困境、存续困境和防御困境等四种困境，最终促成战争爆发。二阶段论在现实中有五种运行逻辑，分别是直接与军事安全相关、效率与安全的矛盾、货币霸权的衰落、经济依附和(国际)金融危机，历史案例为这五种逻辑提供了佐证。由此证明，二阶段论亦可作为新综合安全观在中观层面的补充与完善。     

解释印尼的族群动员方式:理论与评析

印尼民主化和地方分权的制度变革催生了大量的族群动员现象,也提供了多种动员方式的选项。族群使用何种方式进行政治动员是一个重要但较少被关注的理论问题。本文提出印尼改革时期的族群动员方式出现4种形态,接着从文化主义视角、反应性族群视角、族群竞争视角、政治过程4个理论路径梳理了对印尼族群动员方式的研究成果,指出以上理论路径都不足以单独解释印尼族群动员的方式选择问题。目前的研究成果有以下4方面缺陷:聚焦族群动员方式的研究成果少;4种理论路径存在内生缺陷,"目的-行动"逻辑与印尼现实情况脱节;案例比较意识淡薄,缺乏机制提炼和变量转化的努力;实证研究有普遍的案例选择偏差问题。本文提出未来对印尼族群动员方式的研究方向将是基于制度条件变量和地方情境变量的逻辑框架。     

以色列少数群体政策安全化问题评析

以色列是一个典型的将少数族群问题安全化的国家。建国后，以色列少数群体政策的历史演进以重大事件为标志，大致经历了军事管控政策的实施、军事管控政策的废止至《奥斯陆协议》签订前、《奥斯陆协议》的签订与实施、《犹太民族国家法》颁布至当前4个阶段。由于极为特殊的建国经历及其所处的地缘环境，以色列的少数群体政策自始至终都渗透着一种强烈的国家安全取向，维护犹太国家安全与统一利益成为主导以色列族群政策与立法演进的内在价值逻辑。从现实效果来看，虽然以色列的以国家安全为价值取向的族群政策，有力地捍卫了其“犹太民族国家”属性，确保了国家的整体安全，但基于犹太民族自身利益的绝对安全观，也使其面临着国内族群矛盾尖锐、国家凝聚力削弱、周边关系不睦甚至恶化的威胁与挑战。奉行和合共生的政策理念与重塑包容、合作的安全机制，是破解以色列少数族群问题安全化问题之路。     

印度族群冲突成因的两条解释路径及其局限性分析

在解释印度族群冲突成因方面,既有的解释可被归类为两条路径,即政治解释路径与非政治解释路径。在政治解释路径中,既有解释主要包括精英动员论、身份建构论、政治制度和国家政策论;非政治解释路径主要从公民社会交往程度、全球化与经济竞争、人口迁移、身份差异、国际因素、现代性与反现代性出发分析印度族群冲突。印度族群冲突成因复杂,两条既定解释路径的不足是:强调单一解释因素;没有说明因果机制;缺少一个宏观的解释框架以说明各种类型的族群冲突成因;没有提出一个印度政府应对冲突的治理模式。     

美国对俄战略析论--依据、目标、框架、变化

本文试图从静态和动态两个角度把握苏联解体后美国对俄战略的大致轮廓。文章认为,基于历史联系、俄罗斯在美国全球战略中所处位置、俄在美国塑造“转型国家”中的重要作用、“第三方”因素的影响等战略依据,美确立了“民主化、西方化、后帝国化”的对俄战略总体目标,并在同俄罗斯的深刻互动中形成了后苏联时代美俄关系的基本框架。伊拉克战争后,随着美俄关系发生新变化,美对俄战略将在“耐心接触、坚定防范、悉心经营”的基本指针下做出相应调整。     

苏联与朝鲜战争

朝鲜战争有着深刻的国际背景，在众多与朝鲜战争有关的国际因素中，苏联是其中最重要的因素之一。本文从苏联与朝鲜战争这样一个相对宏观的角度，提出如下几点看法：（1）苏联是朝鲜分裂的始作俑者之一，而朝鲜的分裂直接导致了后来的朝鲜战争；（2）北朝鲜首先发动的军事进攻，事先得到了苏联的认可和支持；（3）中国出兵朝鲜承受了来自苏联施加的一些压力；（4）苏联空军的秘密参战，意味着苏联事实上参加了朝鲜战争；（5）苏联对朝鲜停战的实现也发挥了重要的推动作用。因此，苏联虽然没有公开参加朝鲜战争，但在战争的缘起、爆发、进程和结束方面扮演了重要的角色，对战争的后果负有责任。     

Does Oil Cause Ethnic War? Comparing Evidence from Process-tracing with Quantitative Results

This article contributes both empirically and methodologically. Empirically, we seek to advance our understanding of an important puzzle: does oil cause ethnic war? Methodologically, we seek to identify more precisely the different weaknesses and strengths of the quantitative approach and case studies with process-tracing by explicitly comparing results from these two approaches on the same empirical question. We thus subject the statistical association between the ethnogeographical location of oil and the onset of ethnic war to test with process-tracing. Examining several pathway cases, we find that oil has rarely been a deep cause of ethnic war. Instead, the ethnogeographical location of oil either reignites dormant conflict that has deeper roots in ethnic resentment and hatred or intensifies ongoing conflict, mostly by facilitating the operation of two interconnected mechanisms. Our study echoes the notion that quantitative exercises alone often cannot establish specific causal mechanisms or how contextual factors impact the operation of these mechanisms, and it is precisely on these two key fronts that qualitative exercises possess critical advantages. Hence, quantitative methods and qualitative methods are complementary rather than competitive. Our study also yields important policy implications for preventing and managing ethnic conflict in countries with rich mineral resource.     

Intraethnic Dominance and Control: Violence Against Co-Ethnics in the Early Sri Lankan Civil War

In some ethno-separatist wars, rebel groups direct a large share of violence against members of their own ethnic community. But why do rebels target the co-ethnics they claim to represent in the war against the government? Our aim in this paper is to provide the components for a conceptual framework that we assess using unique disaggregated casualty data on violence committed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against co-ethnic Tamils in territories claimed for the Tamil Eelam state in the early phase of the Sri Lankan conflict, 1985–88. We propose that there are two distinct processes of intraethnic violence: violence against co-ethnic civilians and violence against co-ethnic rivals. While the former aims at controlling the population to win the war against the government, the latter aims at establishing leadership dominance over the ethnic minority. We examine the role of ethnic homogeneity in shaping the use of violence directed against the two types of co-ethnic targets in the buildup phase of ethno-separatist war. We conclude that ethnic demographic structures matter for how the rebels treat co-ethnics in the early phase of war before they have established territorial control.     

The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820–1989

This article examines the extent to which cultural similarity vitiates the relationship between joint democracy and the incidence of interstate war. Previous empirical findings which suggest that cultural/normative explanations of the democratic peace are more robust than institutional/structural ones invite an analysis of the impact of broader cultural factors on the relationship between joint democracy and war involvement. The author suggests several ways that cultural factors might mitigate the democratic peace phenomenon and conducts a multivariate logistic analysis of state dyads from 1820 to 1989 to test the main query. Of the cultural variables, religious similarity within dyads is associated with a decreased likelihood of war onset, while both ethnic and linguistic similarity have the opposite effect. Democratic dyads, on average, have higher religious similarity levels than nondemocratic dyads, which, ostensibly, might play a role in reducing conflict within democratic dyads. However, the findings clearly demonstrate that although cultural factors are significant correlates of war they do not vitiate the impact of joint democracy on war. It appears that where a pair of states share a common democratic political culture it exerts a conflict dampening impact that overrides ethnic, linguistic, or religious factors.     

The public opinion–foreign policy paradox in Germany: integrating domestic and international levels of analysis conditionally

Abstract

Does public opinion influence foreign policy? International relations theory is divided on whether foreign policy outputs follow public opinion in advanced democratic countries. Using the case of cold war and post-cold war Germany, I offer an integrated realist theory of the effect of public opinion on foreign policy. I test the theory and the generalizability of the hypothesis of a public opinion–foreign policy nexus using process tracing as well as a time series analysis between the years 1973 and 2002. Using new measures, results here contradict literature on expected public opinion and policy outputs in the cold war period yet are supported after. I find that the predicted effect of public opinion on foreign policy outputs to be confounded by such factors as security threats.     

A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered

This article presents a new theory of war that is grounded in the insights of Clausewitz on the social nature of conflict. Clausewitz had argued that war is a political process; he therefore distinguished between ‘war’—understood in political terms—and warfare—understood as fighting. He then created a typology covering a spectrum of war ranging from total to limited, the political stakes of a conflict determining where it would fall on the spectrum. I develop and modify this basic framework by arguing that the social organization of the actors has a determining role in predicting the stakes of war. I then show how this framework helps us understand some key problems in the political science literature on war and conflict. I attempt to show two main things: (1) that there are different types of wars (and that these differences are not necessarily related to the standing of the actors, i.e. the presence or absence of sovereignty); and (2) that how war and warfare are related is more complicated than previously understood and that this has implications for the political science literature on order, conflict and violence.     

Power,resolve and bargaining in international crises: A spatial theory

In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establish the theoretical linkages among these variables and all possible outcomes of international crises. Among the more interesting results is that crises in which one party is much more likely to win a war should one occur and the other party is much more resolved are extremely likely to end in war. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of these findings to a number of topics in the international relations literature, including Schelling's strategy of commitment.     

Duelling and the abolition of war

Political scientists have long compared war to duelling in the hope that war could be abolished like duelling, that is, at the hands of a normative campaign. However, there has been limited investigation of duelling's past. What can the history of duelling teach us about the future of war? This paper advances two arguments. First, by refining the conventional wisdom, it argues that duelling's demise was caused less by normative campaigning than by the timing of industrialization. Second, it argues that although duelling is not an analogous institution to modern war, its ancestor, feuding, is. Writings on feuds contribute a complementary literature to the limited data on war, which is helpful for thought experiments and hypothesis testing. Further, feuding's fall was caused more by the growth of state capacity than by normative campaigning. In sum, neither the history of duelling nor that of feuding confirms the view that ideational factors played the principal role in suppressing these practices; therefore, we should reconsider how the abolition of war might occur.     

Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation of the Ethiopia--Eritrea Conflict

The 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to defy rationalist explanations. This paper contends that the escalation of the war, from an isolated border clash to the largest conventional war of the past decade, has its roots in the domestic politics of each of the two states. Quasi-democratisation in both countries created environments in which political elites were able to bolster their popular legitimacy by utilising nationalist and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric. The Eritrean leadership believed that a rapid escalation of the border clash to full-scale war would undermine domestic popular support and topple the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime. War escalation had the opposite effect, strengthening the EPRDF domestically and provoking a massive Ethiopian retaliation. War thus served nation- and state-building goals in both countries. This paper provides a theory of the domestic political roots of international conflict in transitional regimes and applies this theory to explain the escalation of a localised border conflict into a highly destructive, full-scale war.     

Campaign appeals in Nigeria's 2007 gubernatorial elections

Ethnicity has emerged as a prominent issue in electoral contests around the world, particularly in countries that have embraced multiparty elections in the past few decades. What factors influence ethnic mobilization and the politicization of ethnicity? Although a number of factors have been hypothesized to influence the politicization of ethnicity in the comparative politics literature, many of these relationships have not been established through empirical testing. This study empirically tests a number of the hypotheses derived from the literature with our unique data set on candidates' ethnic appeals in the Nigerian 2007 gubernatorial elections. We find that political parties' use of ethnic appeals is correlated with the competitiveness of the election, nature of the campaign, partisan attachments, and social, demographic, and economic characteristics of the states. Of particular note is the finding that the salience of ethnic identity in the electorate influences political leaders' use of ethnic appeals.     

The generosity moment: Ethnic politics,democratic consolidation and the state in Yugoslavia (Croatia), South Africa and Czechoslovakia

In the course of regime change in multiethnic societies there arises a critical juncture at which dominant ethnic groups must decide whether to accommodate minorities. Such critical junctures are called ‘generosity moments’. It is hypothesized that a generous, liberal approach towards minorities is the best way to ensure a peaceful transition, earn the democratic consent of minorities, and secure the legitimacy of the state. Competing ideas about the generosity moment are considered, such as the role structural factors play in determining political outcomes and the possibility that generosity will only encourage a series of unappeasable minority demands (the slippery slope thesis). This study finds that the structuring of ethnicity has a relatively stronger causal role to play than leadership variables in determining political outcomes. Czechoslovakia's ethnic structure (that is, homogeneous republics, no historical memory of interethnic war, and the absence of contested borders) inhibited the integrative effects of generosity and instead made possible a slippery slope dynamic. South Africa indicates that generosity can make a difference in some cases, but the more intense, multiple cleavages of Yugoslavia suggests limits to its effectiveness.