关于西部开发的价值思考——对社会主义本质理论的再认识

一 .关于价值的一般理论价值是当前相当热门的话题。通常而言 ,人们在社会生活中 ,最基本的存在的两种关系 ,一是主体反映客体的认识关系。二是客体满足主体需要的价值关系。所以 ,价值关系是社会实践中的一种基本关系 ,是指外界物 (即客体 )所具有的满足人 (即主体 )的需要的特性和功能。所谓有价值 ,就是客体满足主体需要所具有的用途和积极的作用 ,其积极效用的程度越高 ,满足主体需要范围愈大 ,其价值也就越大。反之 ,价值也就越小。当然 ,如果某一种存在物不能满足的需要 ,甚至对主体产生消极的作用 ,那么 ,它对主体就无价值而言。由此…     

生态权利主体之基本问题初探

一般来说,生态权利的主体包括国家、自然人、国家机关、企事业单位和其他社会组织,然而,生态危机的严重性和可持续发展的伦理观让我们不得不思考将后代人以及非人类存在物也纳入生态权利主体的范围之内。本文即从生态权利的概念、理论基础以及对各类主体所享有生态权利的角度进行论述,强调了动植物、生态系统等等这些平时没有为人所足够重视的非人类存在物也应被赋予生态权利,法律应拟制其法律地位。     

现实人与虚拟人的对话—网络时代教育主体的交往方式

网络时代的现实人和虚拟人是有其特殊内涵的,建立在对话基础上的交往关系是他们相互生成的根本,现实人与虚拟人的对话关系与现实世界中主体与主体之间的对话关系有着本质差异,它可以超越一定的时空限制,将客观世界、社会世界和主观世界有机地结合起来,并弥合现实和虚拟的界限,现实人与虚拟人的对话主要是通过对网上本的选择和解读而发生的,这种对话有利于促进网络教育主体的人格平等与共进,进而达到教育主体的生成与发展。     

关于生命法的定义、调整对象及法域定位的再探讨

生命法是指调整以生命科技活动与伦理矛盾为中心,涉及人的生命延续、终结乃至人的生命创设、修缮、改造等社会关系的法律群。生命法调整的对象虽然主要是人与人的社会关系(这是核心),但并不止于此,它还延伸至人与动物的关系、人类与地球生物圈的关系,即人与自然的关系。考虑到与高新生命科技关系的远近和与人的生命健康关系的远近,把生命法的调整对象大致分成"主体部分"和"延伸部分",共有15分项。生命法也应归入社会法,属于第三法域。大量事实表明,生命法推动生命科技和生命伦理从冲突走向和谐互动。这一点彰显了生命法的社会法的本质。生命法是现代社会法中非常重要又颇具特色的一个组成部分。     

司法考试与统一职前培训价值论

法的价值是法律科学研究不能回避的重要问题。法的价值是指:“在人(主体)与法(客体)的关系中体现出来的法律的积极意义或有用性。①”这表明法的价值具有双重属性:一方面体现作为主体的人与作为客体的法之间需要和满足的对应关系,另一方面又体现了法所具有的对主体有意义的、可     

从“非人类中心主义”看动物权利的理论基础

非人类中心主义环境伦理学的兴起,标志着伦理道德价值的时代转向.在人类中心主义看来,人是自然其他存在物的目的,人类对自然其他存在物并不负有直接的道德义务.这在非人类中心主义看来是狭隘的,也是当代环境问题的根源.由于非人类中心主义突破了人类中心论把"道德"理解成调节人与人之间的关系.把道德关怀的范围扩展到人以外的物种,这就意味着将动物吸纳到"道德顾客"的范围之内.当代动物权利论的理论基础.正是源自于此.     

我国反垄断法的价值取向

一、我国反垄断法价值取向的定位价值是标志客体与主体关系的范畴。马克思说:“‘价值’这个普遍的概念是人们对待满足他们需要的外界物的关系中产生的。”①毫无疑问,法具有其自身的价值。法的价值是法作为客体对主体——人所具有的意义,是法作为客体对人的需要的满足。     

经济法首要价值浅析

价值是一个表示客体对于主体之有用性,揭示主体实践活动的动机和目的的哲学范畴。研究法律价值的意义在于:通过对法的应然性研究,为法的运行、操作确立正确的价值标准,使法以其特有功能在具体社会形态中发挥作用。同一般价值概念一样,法律价值具有两重性特征。一方面,法律价值是一个表征关系的范畴,它表示的是作为主体的人与作为客体的法律之间特定的需要和满足关系,即价值关系。其中人是价值主体,法律是价值客体。另一方面,法律价值又是一个表征意义的范畴,它表     

试论依法治国与法律价值

实行依法治国,建设社会主义法治国家,必须追求法律的最大价值。所谓法律价值是指在人与法的关系中,法所包含的满足人的需要的内在属性,即法对人的积极意义或有用性。可见,法律价值从人的需要与法的有用性之间形成的特定价值关系中,进一步揭示了法的本质和功能。法律价值由法的价值取向、法的价值目标和法的价值评判标准三大要素组成。法的价值取向,实质上是一定社会的主体对法的有用性的选择。其宗旨是,立法所产生的后果对谁有利、有什么利等。法的价值目标,实质上是一定社会主体根据需要而对法有用性的“界定”。法的价值评判,指的是在不同…     

现代法律中的平等--平等的主体条件、法律平等的本体及价值

平等关系的形成有赖于社会成员主体意识的普遍提升 ,在人的关系中 ,任何一方失缺该意识 ,都不可能有平等存在。法律平等是绝对平等与相对平等的统一 ,立法平等是法律平等的本体 ,没有立法平等就没有适法平等。平等是最基本的法的价值 ,也是贯通于其他法价值之中对之具有纠偏、定向作用的价值。     

中国传统法之和谐价值考察

和谐是人与社会存在及发展过程中的一种状态。中国传统文化以"和谐"为最高追求。中国古代传统法律文化中蕴涵着忠孝、诚信、贵和求安、关注生命、化解争端等内容丰富的和谐精神。通过对以"天人合一"、"贵和"、"以德配天"为原点的和谐思想的产生与发展进行梳理,发现中国传统法的传承,均以和谐作为价值追求的首要目标。中国传统法律文化的精神,所追求的乃是实现人与人、人与自然之间的和谐。中国传统法中,和谐价值内涵是通过礼治、德治来体现的。中国传统法之和谐价值的基本体现就在于,既肯定冲突与不和的现实存在,又在不和中求和,在维护君主专制政权长治久安的前提下,整合一个个对立的矛盾关系,以天理、国法、人情的融合来定分止争,谨慎用刑,息讼止讼,分配社会资源,稳定社会秩序,值得我们关注和借鉴。     

The Powers of Application

This paper studies the formality of law and legal reasoning. It argues that, though the law (and its application) is indeed formal in that it does not take into account a significant number of considerations that should in principle be relevant for an all–things–considered decision, this is not to be explained on the basis of some ontology of rules (i.e., rules as exclusionary reasons), but upon the nature of legal discourse when viewed as a social practice. How the law is applied to particular cases, when substantive considerations not referred to by the rules are important enough to defeat their application to the case and questions of this kind are not answered by the legal material (which includes or might include rules, principles etc.), but by beliefs that underlie legal practice, beliefs about the world and its relation to human beings and society. Insofar as these beliefs have impact upon practices we recognise as legal they are termed "images of law." Legal reasoning cannot be understood without paying due attention to the nature and evolution of images of law.     

动物法律地位之探讨——兼析我国民事立法对动物的应有定位

动物保护是一个全球性的话题。对动物的保护是否必须通过改变动物的客体地位 ,使其人格化、主体化的方式方能实现 ?笔者通过对《德国民法典》的相关规定和国内外学说的考证 ,以及对动物主体化观点的剖析 ,认为动物不可能成为人类道德和法律的主体 ,动物在法律上仍是特殊的物 ,动物保护立法是动物商品价值与非商品价值、当代人利益与后代人利益冲突的产物 ,对动物的区别对待 ,实质上体现的仍是不同动物对人类的不同利益。     

The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism

Abstract.  The jurisprudential movement known as Scandinavian Legal Realism was founded by the Swedish philosopher Axel Hägerström and the Danish philosopher and jurist Alf Ross in order to destroy the distorting influence of metaphysics upon legal thinking and to provide the secure philosophical foundation for scientific knowledge of the law. I shall present Hägerström's philosophical theory and argue that he is committed to the metaphysical view that the world in time and space consists of causal regularities between things and events devoid of any values that is related to his epistemological view that what there is can be known by experience. Hägerström's philosophy advances a naturalistic approach that conceives the positive law as a system of rules in terms of behavioural regularities among human beings and legal knowledge as an empirical inquiry into the causal relations between legal rules and human behaviour. This approach is followed by his pupils, the Swedish lawyers A. V. Lundstedt and Karl Olivecrona, whereas Ross appeals to logical positivism. The naturalistic approach should be taken seriously since it leaves no room for the normativity of the law and for legal knowledge in terms of reasons for belief and action.     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

人文主义法学引论

人文主义法学是指崇尚人的价值、尊重人的本性的法学观点或法学思想体系。人文主义法学的指导思想是将人作为目的。人文主义法学的基本原则及对法律思想的影响表现在如下方面:尊重人的需要和利益原则促进了权利、人权、自由的产生和发展;防范人的恶性原则促进了法治概念、民主政府、分权、法律程序、法律监督的产生和发展;宽容人的弱点原则主张法律对人的行为不宜提出过高的要求;鼓励人的优点原则主张法律允许人们参与法律实践活动、鼓励人的奉献行为。人文主义法学的兴起将促进法学研究和法律实践的发展。     

Patenting human beings: do sub-human creatures deserve constitutional protection?

The availability of patents for genetically altered animals raises questions about the patentability of human beings. Genetic research will produce beings who fall halfway between what we currently think of as "animal" and "human." It is unclear on which side of the legal line these creatures will fall. In April 1988, Congress revised the Patent Act with a statement that human beings are not to be considered patentable subject matter. Congress, however, failed to supply a definition of the term "human being." A definition will clarify the legal status of sub-human creatures. The author addresses this problem and proposes a definition of "human being" as an amendment to the Patent Act.     

法律异化研究

法律异化是指法律这种人类创造出来的本用于服务人类的社会规范,因为一些原因反而成了走向人类对立面的一种异己力量的法律变化。其表现为依＂法＂迫害、合法伤害、非法侵害、人们对法律的异己感和积极寻求法律的替代品等多种形式。法律异化的人为因素是人的异化,客观因素是法律本身的悬空与不切实际、法律规范限制性的僵化、司法的＂证据中心主义＂和法律运行的程序主义等。克服法律异化的路径有以人为本,确保良法的产生;加强民主法制建设,防范主体的自我异化;运用宏观、全面的社会治理手段防范法律的异化等。     

Legal pragmatism and the pre-birth continuum: an absence of unifying principle

The common law has historically been clear - the rights of the unborn do not exist prior to birth. A child becomes a legal person and able to enforce legal rights upon being born alive and having a separate existence from her or his mother. This article assesses whether new developments in biomedical technologies have left this legal principle inviolate and explores what the state of law is in relation to pre-birth. It argues that there is a pre-birth continuum where the law punctuates points in a lineal timeline fashion as to when a pre-birth "non-entity" becomes a legal entity. The article concludes that there is no singular rule of law with respect to being or becoming a human but rather a collection of discrete and increasingly divergent legal categories. This recognition of a pre-birth continuum or timeline as to the legal recognition of this "non-entity" has significant ramifications for the future development of law and impacts on legal thinking about what it means to be human.     

论税收之债的确认

税收之债的确认是指依法享有税收确认权的主体对纳税人的法律地位、税收法律关系或税收法律事实进行甄别,给予确定、认定、证明(或否定)的行为。二战以后,在税收之债的确认原则上,出现了由课税机关中心主义向纳税人中心主义转变的发展趋势,具体表现就是普遍确立了纳税申报制度。我国现行税法主要规定了纳税人自主确认、行政确认和司法确认三种税收之债的确认方式,但从实际执行的效果来看,这方面的制度尚需进一步完善,而完善的方向就是在根本依赖全体纳税人纳税意识普遍提高的基础上,确立真正意义上的民主纳税制度。