The Supreme Court's spring term: abortion, the right to die, and the decline of privacy rights

Wing analyzes the constitutional significance and the important long-term implications for health policy of three 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Hodgson v. Minnesota, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. Hodgson and Ohio upheld state statutes requiring parental notification of a minor's impending abortion. Cruzan upheld a state court decision refusing to allow the family of a patient in a persistent vegetative state to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. Wing argues that these decisions reach far beyond "the abortion issue" or "the right to die." Not only have they narrowed the constitutional protection of individual privacy, but they allow states to regulate activities like abortion in a manner that indicates that the Court is prepared to repeal the notion that individual privacy is entitled to enhanced judicial protection.     

NONJUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS FOR MINORS

This note will discuss end-of-life decision making for minors. Minors who suffer from a terminal illness or who are in a persistent vegetative state are "children on the edge"—they are on the edge of life and death, as well as on the edge of the law. The judicial system and legislative action have proven to be ineffective tools in helping families find a peaceful resolution to life-threatening questions. Judicial intervention is often intrusive, as well as emotionally and financially difficult for the family to endure. As a result, alternatives have arisen, such as hospital ethics committees and mediation, which address these issues. These alternatives demonstrate respect for patient autonomy and family privacy, by considering the family's wishes in addition to the minor's medical condition. If people avail themselves of the resources already in place, judicial intervention only becomes necessary in extreme circumstances. Nonjudicial alternatives provide a more appropriate forum for resolution than the courtroom by eliminating opportunities for public spectacle and family intrusion.     

Minors' rights to consent to treatment: navigating the complexity of State laws

State laws recognize that a competent adult patient has the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment. While the law is clear with regard to the right of competent adults, state statutes are more complicated when the patient is a minor. While the law should, and does, attempt to balance the rights and obligations of parents and guardians against the access and privacy rights of minors, complicated state statutory schemes often fail to simultaneously address those contrasting goals in a consistent and uniform manner. The result is a confusing set of seemingly arbitrary and sometimes conflicting provisions that require the detailed attention of healthcare providers to ensure legal compliance. With the aim of helping healthcare practitioners meet their legal obligations, this Article examines state laws governing minor's consent rights byfocusing on the instances in which a minor's parent, guardian, or other authorized adult is permitted to consent to treatment on behalf of a minor and the instances in which a minor is authorized to act independent of adult intervention.     

Parents as decision-makers--do the attitudes of Norwegian doctors conform to law?

This article studies whether the attitudes of Norwegian doctors regarding surrogate decision power in end-of-life care conform to legal rules, particularly as they apply to the protection of children. The article is based on a hypothetical scenario concerning a critically ill child, believed to be dying, presented to 406 doctors. The study indicates that doctors may permit parental/surrogate decision-making to a greater extent than justified by law, sometimes in contravention of the child's best interests, which should be a fundamental guideline in all decisions that concern children. This article suggests a need to improve knowledge of doctors concerning parents'/surrogates' right to participate in life-or-death decisions. We conclude that Norway needs a precedent decision from the Supreme Court that confirms the right of judicial review of end-of-life decisions, and which applies the principle of the child's best interests as a fundamental guideline in the final decision.     

Information Privacy Protection in the New Chinese Civil Code: Priority or Replacement?

The right to privacy has been developed through judicial practice and has evolved from “the protection of the right to reputation” to “privacy interest” then to “privacy right.” The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China (2020) clarifies the right to information privacy and the right to personal information as two independent personality rights and establishes a privacy priority protection mechanism for private information in civil law. The comparative efficiency of the right to personal information may mean that the protection of the right to information privacy is weakened or even replaced by the right to personal information. The uncertainty and fragmentation of private information also creates a wide gray space for judicial decisions. The development from traditional privacy right to information privacy right and personal information right is generally positive and shows the active legal response to the protection of private information in multiple ways. However, clarifications and systematization are required to increase the effectiveness of such protections.     

Brief for bioethicists for privacy as amicus curiae supporting appellees

Amicus, an ad hoc group of philosophers, theologians, attorneys, and physicians, believe that adults should consult their doctor when making personal decisions. The doctor-patient relationship would be protected under the Constitution. In "Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court said that a state law which forbid married couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional; that the couples should have a right to privacy. In "Roe," the Supreme Court recognized that a patient and her doctor should have privacy. In "Doe v. Bolton," the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia was violating the patients' and physician's freedom. In "Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Supreme Court said that a general informed consent provision was alright because it did not take away the abortion decision. The post- Roe state laws were ways to control doctors and patients so that a particular philosophical view could be imposed. The major question in Webster is whether personal decisions should be made by doctors and patients or the state. Both parties must agree to the decision. Section 188.205 of the Missouri law was before the Court in Webster. This section makes it illegal for public funds to be used to encourage a woman to have an abortion that wasn't necessary to save her life. There are medical conditions for which abortion is reasonable - Tay-Sachs disease, for instance. The child usually dies by 3 years of age. Without genetic screening, many at-risk couples would abort all pregnancies. 95% of all prenatal screenings are negative. State medical treatment decisions are arbitrary and impersonal. Having control over important personal decisions is necessary for freedom.     

美国隐私权的宪法保护述评

美国隐私权的宪法保护建立在其独特的司法审查的基础上,有其独特的特色,不仅体现在通过最高法院对宪法的司法解释回应了公民权利运动对隐私权保护的要求,而且宪法对隐私权的保护具有开放性,虽然美国宪法对隐私权的保护受制于社会传统伦理道德和政府的政策,但是通过消极的个案判决方式从基本人权的角度确立了宪法对自决权意义上的隐私权的保护。     

Conundrums with penumbras: the right to privacy encompasses non-gamete providers who create preembryos with the intent to become parents

To date, five state high courts have resolved disputes over frozen preembryos. These disputes arose during divorce proceedings between couples who had previously used assisted reproduction and cryopreserved excess preembryos. In each case, one spouse wished to have the preembryos destroyed, while the other wanted to be able to use or donate them in the future. The parties in these cases invoked the constitutional right to privacy to argue for dispositional control over the preembryos; two of the five cases were resolved by relying on this right. The constitutional right to privacy protects intimate decisions involving procreation, marriage, and family life. However, when couples use donated sperm or ova to create preembryos, a unique circumstance arises: one spouse--the gamete provider--is genetically related to the preembryos and the other is not. If courts resolve frozen preembryo disputes that involve non-gamete providers based on the constitutional right to privacy, they should find that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the interests of both gamete and non-gamete providers. Individuals who create preembryos with the intent to become a parent have made an intimate decision involving procreation, marriage, and family life that falls squarely within the the right to privacy. In such cases, the couple together made the decision to create a family through the use of assisted reproduction, and the preembryos would not exist but for that joint decision. Therefore, gamete and non-gamete providers should be afforded equal constitutional protection in disputes over frozen preembryos.     

当事人隐私权保护视野中的司法透明之度

我国现有的公开审判制度及其运作远没有达到现代法治对司法机关的要求,司法透明度无疑是不够的。之所以强调透明应有必要的限度,是因为人民法院在全面落实公开审判制度过程中,保守国家秘密、审判秘密,保障当事人隐私权等合法权益与公众知情权、监督权的冲突不仅存在,而且日趋多样化。有鉴于此,立足公开审判,以当事人隐私权的保护为视角,对知情权等权利与隐私权之间的特殊关系进行理性思考和法理分析,探求在二者之间作出更为合理的制度安排,从而促进公开审判制度在我国得到更为全面的落实和更为规范的运行,真正实现“司法透明,公开有度”。     

Lochner redeemed: family privacy after Troxel and Carhart

At least since its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court has differentiated its review of abortion laws from its scrutiny of other intrusions on family privacy. Whereas abortion restrictions are reviewed under the middling "undue burden" standard, incursions on other family-related liberties, including marriage, kinship, and child rearing are said to be subject to the strict scrutiny ordinarily employed in the defense of fundamental rights. This Article contends that the Court's most recent decisions in this context give reason to reconsider both sides of that equation. Stenberg v. Carhart, striking down Nebraska's ban on "partial-birth" abortions, suggests that the Court's scrutiny in the abortion context will be more aggressive and rigid than most had supposed. At the same time, its decision in Troxel v. Granville, limiting states' authority to order grandparent visitation over the objects of a parent, suggest that there is more fluidity in the Court's review of other family liberties than is conventionally assumed. Together the cases signal a convergence in both sorts of family-privacy controversies toward a common standard of "reasonableness." That standard bears, for many, an uncomfortable association with the much-maligned "natural law-due process formula" of the Lochner era, but Professor Meyer argues that it is precisely the right approach in the context of family privacy. Although more rigid doctrinal formulae are sometimes preferred on the ground that they constrain judicial judgment, here they are undesirable precisely because they obscure the value judgments that are inevitably at the core of every family-privacy decision.     

Developmental trends in adolescents' psychological and legal competence to consent to abortion

United States Supreme Court has affirmed the right of states to require parental consent or notice from minors seeking abortion. We examine an underlying presumption that minors are not competent to consent to abortion. Participants (N=75 age 13–21, seeking a pregnancy test at a women's medical clinic) completed an interview that was audiotaped and scored on four cognitive and volitional criteria of legal competence. Competence was compared in three age groups (≤15; 16–17; 18–21) for participants who considered abortion and for those who did not. Adolescents age 16–17 and adolescents ≤15, who considered abortion, appeared as competent as legal adults; only≤15-year-old adolescents who did not consider abortion appeared less competent. Regression analysis was used to identify psychosocial predictors of competence. Results challenge the presumption that minors are not competent. An alternate policy based upon informed consent and empowerment of minors as decision makers is proposed.     

反思与重构:完善行政诉讼受案范围的诉权视角

诉权是一项制度性基本人权,是一项宪法性的公法权利,具有普遍性、平等性、自主性的特点,只有基于对另一项基本人权的保护,才能对诉权作出限制。从诉权角度,所有起诉到法院的案件,法院都应当受理,只有在司法不能和司法解决无效率由法律明确予以排除的少数案件,法院才可以不受理。法院统一受理各类案件后,哪些适用行政诉讼程序,哪些适用民事诉讼程序,可以通过判例逐步予以明确。     

Criminal liability of physicians: an encroachment on the abortion right?

The Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade established that decision of first trimester abortion is left to the physician, exercising his best medical judgment, in consultation with the patient. During this period the state may not regulate abortion determination since there is no compelling state interest; therefore a physician performing abortion will be precluded from civil or criminal liability. In second trimester abortion the state has a compelling interest in the health of the mother and may regulate the procedure to protect maternal health; although a previable fetus may be able to survive the abortion, Roe v. Danforth definitively places the woman's right to an abortion above the life of the fetus during the previable stage; therefore the state cannot seek to safeguard the life or health of the fetus during the abortion. Third trimester abortion implies a viable fetus; thus, a compelling state interest in the potential life arises and the state may regulate and proscribe abortion except when necessary for the life and health of the mother. The determination of when viability has been achieved is a matter of judgment resting with the physician who has the choice of techniques and operating procedures which may or may not be fatal to the unborn. It is a question of either termination of pregnancy or destruction of the fetus. In this last case the legal responsibility placed upon the physician is very serious, and involving a risk of civil and criminal liability. Uncertainties as to the boundaries of legal abortion and the threat of criminal liability can only result in a reluctance among physicians to perform second and third trimester abortions, which is against the fundamental right to abortion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court will have to elaborate upon the scope of the abortion right, whether it encompasses fetal destruction or only termination of pregnancy, because it directly affects the extent and quality of maternal and fetal care that must be rendered by a physician. If only termination of pregnancy is included the Court must resolve whether the woman's health interests predominate, or whether the physician can be required to enhance fetal survival. Physicians have a right to know the full extent of legal ramifications and implications of legally induced abortion.     

基因隐私权的民法保护

以传统隐私权保护为基点的现行立法与司法,无法完成现代隐私权,特别是个人信息隐私权所强调和要求的保护架构.在权利配置上,无法实现对传统隐私权按照个人信息处理程序的不同阶段进行权利增设与重置.在保护机制上,无法通过司法能动主义建立个人信息隐私权,特别是基因隐私权所要求的公共监督框架.因此,在后基因组时代,应当坚持以个人信息法作为个人信息(包括基因信息)保护的基本制度框架,在个人信息法的范围内,对作为高度敏感个人信息的基因信息予以特别处理.     

Road Closed: Evaluating the Judicial Bypass Provision of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act

This paper examines the extent to which Pennsylvania county courts are prepared to implement the judicial bypass provision of the state's abortion statute. Under the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act it is illegal for physicians to perform abortions on pregnant minors without parental consent. The constitutionality of this requirement has been upheld, but only when states provide a mechanism allowing a minor to bypass parental involvement. The Pennsylvania statute includes a judicial bypass provision that is formally consistent with legal precedent. However, based on a study of how county courts respond to inquiries into the judicial bypass procedure, this paper demonstrates that most courthouses are not prepared to implement or provide accurate information on bypass proceedings. Since the constitutionality of parental involvement requirements is conditioned on the availability of a bypass option, the paper argues that the courts' lack of readiness poses a significant threat to the rights of pregnant minors.     

美国服刑人员诉诸司法之权利的宪法保护研究——以美国宪法判例为对象

在美国,服刑人员诉诸司法之权利是一项受宪法保护的基本权利。这一权利的基本权利性质并非来自于宪法文本的明文规定,而是由宪法判例加以确认的。从服刑人员诉诸司法之权利领域的案例法发展历程来看,美国联邦最高法院的司法判断决定了服刑人员诉诸司法之权利受到保护的层次、程度和范围,其中1977年的邦德斯案具有里程碑意义。虽然立法和行政对这一案例法的发展状况也产生了一定影响,但司法的独特功能是实现对服刑人员诉诸司法之权利进行宪法保护的根本保障。     

Extending the Practice of Physician‐Assisted Suicide to Competent Minors

In an effort to address the mental and physical suffering terminally ill patients endure, some states have either legalized or decriminalized physician‐assisted suicide—a practice commonly referred to as death with dignity. However, as the practice of physician‐assisted suicide becomes accepted among states, competent minors continue to be excluded from legislative and judicial decisions. Regardless of parental consent, states institute an age requirement of eighteen years old for participants of physician‐assisted suicide. This Note proposes that states amend their physician‐assisted suicide statutes to (1) remove any age restriction, (2) create a standard of competency that minors must meet to be eligible for physician‐assisted suicide, and (3) implement a procedure to determine whether a minor meets the competency standard.     

A moment in human development: legal protection, ethical standards and social policy on the selective non-treatment of handicapped neonates

Selective non-treatment decisions involving severely handicapped neonates have recently come under renewed judicial and legislative scrutiny. In this Article, the Author examines the legal, ethical and social considerations attendant to the non-treatment decision. In Part II of this Article the Author discusses the predominant ethical viewpoints relating to this issue and proposes a new moral standard based on personal interests. Part III presents a survey of the jurisprudence relating to selective non-treatment decisions. Parts IV and V of this Article provide a critical examination of the recently enacted Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, a federal legislative initiative designed to regulate treatment decisions relating to handicapped infants. The Author suggests that the ethical standards and treatment criteria proposed in this Article may prove useful to courts seeking to balance the handicapped neonate's constitutional right to privacy with the requirements of the new federal law.     

论外交保护行为的司法审查

外交保护行为属于国家特权和政治问题不足以成为其豁免司法审查的充分理由,近年来,某些西方国家的宪法法院已经开始受理外交保护行为司法审查案件,并对其实质问题进行审理。然而,外交保护行为毕竟具有很强的政治性和外交性,司法机关应当保持一定程度的司法节制,尊重行政机关的判断和自由裁量权,因而,是否将外交保护行为纳入司法审查的范围以及司法审查的范围和强度应当在尊重和保障基本人权和实现行政效能之间寻求适当平衡,在突破外交保护行为非具可司法审查性的先验假定禁区的同时,在受案范围、条件以及审查决定类型等方面予以合理限制。     

The legal construction of personal information protection and privacy under the Chinese Civil Code

Personal information protection and privacy interact in diverse ways, especially in the contemporary information age. Although books and articles have focused on this topic, the new tendencies of worldwide legislation and judicial practice bring challenges, as the legal construction of personal information protection and privacy differs from culture to culture and time to time. In 2017, the General Provisions of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (“the General Provisions of the Chinese Civil Code” hereafter)¹ (expired) addresses the legal concepts of personal information protection and the right to privacy simultaneously, to which this article refers as the dual model, differing from the one-dimensional mode of privacy protection before. Subsequently, the “The Right to Privacy and the Protection of Personal Information,” a chapter of the newly issued Civil Code of the People's Republic of China's (“the Chinese Civil Code” hereafter), ascertains the dual model and details related provisions. It has been dubbed a landmark ruling of China's personal information protection, greatly boosting the modernization of China's civil system.Despite the many articles that discuss approaches to China's civil protections, little attention has been given to the fundamental question concerning what exactly encompasses the personal information protection and privacy to which these laws refer. Based on the regulations and applicability of the General Provisions of the Chinese Civil Code and the Chinese Civil Code, this paper explores the legal construction of personal information protection and privacy under Chinese legal orders, including the differences, similarities, and interplay between the two rights. By distinguishing the legal value, contents and remedial approaches, this paper concludes that the two rights are distinct but overlap. On one side, personal information protection is elevated to the status of a separate civil right in the legal context of China, rather than part of privacy. On the other side, tailored regulations should be establish according to the criteria of the nature of information, the extent of information processing, and the elements of damage when confronted with overlaps in the two rights in judicial practice. Thus, this paper provides a perspective from which to clarify the approaches to civil protection of personal information and privacy in China and a reference model for enactment of the Chinese Personal Information Protection Law in the future.