Victim or injurer, small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty

In this paper we modify the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty. That is, we assume that neither party knows in advance whether she will be the victim or the injurer when an accident occurs. When the standards of care of the two parties are set at the socially optimal levels, only pure comparative negligence and the equal division rule guarantee efficiency, while the rules of simple negligence, contributory negligence, and comparative negligence with fixed division (other than a 50:50 split) may produce inefficient equilibria. Since pure comparative negligence splits liability between negligent parties according to each party's degree of fault, it makes the accident loss division independent of one's role-type. This produces its efficiency advantage.We extend the model to the choice of vehicle size, as a factor determining who will be the injurer and who the victim in motor vehicle collisions. In the extension we analyze various standard negligence-based liability rules, and tax rules, as instruments to mitigate inefficiency resulting from the vehicle size “arms race.” We also examine two strict liability rules, one of which incorporates a comparative negligence feature; this rule prevents inefficiency from both role-type uncertainty and from the “arms race.”     

A revised model of unilateral accidents

This paper suggests and justifies a revised formulation of the unilateral accident model based on relaxing two assumptions of the standard model: the precaution function and the harm function. The revised model is, therefore, more general and corresponds better to various situations. A resulting trait of the generalized model is its account for the interaction between the injurer’s care and activity levels, which was implicitly assumed away so far. The revised model is examined using a few standard issues in tort and the analysis brings new results and insights for the unilateral accident case. For example, the view that, under a negligence regime, due care can be defined regardless of the optimal level of activity holds under very restrictive assumptions. In general, due care must be defined simultaneously with the optimal activity level. In addition, the common view suggests that underestimation of the level of actual damages under strict liability would induce injurers to take insufficient care and to engage excessively in a risky activity (and vice versa, for overestimation). This paper shows that underestimation of actual damages may counter-intuitively lead to insufficient activity or excessive care levels. Similarly, the results of underestimating harm under a negligence regime prove to be different than commonly thought. In addition, the revised model questions the intuitive similarity between the underestimation of harm and the judgment-proof problem, and provides some new results for the latter problem.     

‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits

The principle of full compensation is said to restore the victim of an accident to the position he was in before the tort. The conventional pre-tort position of the victim is taken to be the one in which he bears no accident losses at all. Therefore, a negligent injurer is required to compensate his victim fully. In an interesting paper in this journal, Van Wijck and Winters (2001) have reinterpreted the pre-tort position of the victim, and proposed an alternative specification of liability for the purpose of compensation. We study the relative merits of the two compensation criteria. We show that while the alternative compensation criterion is indeed insightful from economic as well as legal point of view, at the same time it suffers from some serious limitations.     

Putting fault back into products liability: A modest reconstruction of tort theory

This paper postulates that the proper function of tort law is to provide protection from, and redress of, non-consensual invasions of individual rights of person and property. It then proceeds to analyze and criticize, in that context, several theories of the law of unintentional torts including traditional English negligence law and the models of Posner, Fletcher and Epstein. That analysis proceeds in terms of the answers of each theory to a uniform set of questions which must be answered by any theory of the law of unintentional harms. The paper concludes that none of the theories examined is rights-based or, indeed, consistent with the existence of individual rights of person and property.The paper goes on to elucidate a theory of liability which is rights-based. That theory turns out to be variant of traditional English negligence law in which reasonable foreseeability of harm to legally recognized rights or interests is the sole criterion of liability, the burden of precautions on the agent of the harm being explicitly excluded from consideration.Finally, the rights-based theory is applied to the area of products liability. It is demonstrated that this area of the law of unintentional harm does have the same moral foundations as the general law of negligence so that resort to the anomalous, and amoral, constructs of fictitious warranties, strict liability, enterprise liability and the deep pocket is neither appropriate nor necessary.     

Victim interdependence in the accident setting

This paper considers the case in which potential victims affect each other by taking care. Analyzing standard liability rules, we show that the rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is in the best position to induce the efficient outcome, i.e., this liability rule ensures efficiency if victims affect each other negatively, that is care by one victim increases the accident exposure of other victims. This rule also makes attainment likely if victims affect each other positively, that is if care by one victim decreases the accident exposure of other victims. In contrast, other standard liability rules fail to induce first-best care.     

The development of care technology under liability law

It is well known that strict liability and negligence induce pareto optimal care in a most restrictive model of unilateral accidents. The paper at hand extends this traditional theorem from its static context to an intertemporal setting where tort law induces progress in care technology. This model provides a methodological framework for a general analysis of the dynamic incentives generated by alternative liability rules. One of the many possible extensions of the basic model is to allow for incomplete information. Particularly, we drop the assumption that the authority setting the due care standard under negligence is able to assess technical progress ex ante. It is shown that the dynamic incentives of the negligence rule are distorted compared to strict liability in this modified framework.     

On judgment proofness in the case of bilateral harm

This paper defies the widely held belief concerning the unambiguous superiority of negligence in settings of judgment proofness. We analyze a set-up with bilateral harm, bilateral care, and potential judgment proofness by one party to the accident. We establish that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence can perform better than simple negligence and negligence with a defense of contributory negligence. It is shown that the former liability rule can better establish a discontinuity in individual costs conducive to inducing efficient care than the other rules.

论单独侵权致同一损害适用按份责任的例外

单独侵权不足以致全部损害时,应适用连带责任还是按份责任并无定论。连带责任将部分侵权人不能清偿的风险转嫁给其他侵权人,有利于保护受害人,却让过错比例较小的侵权人承担过重的责任;按份责任可避免过错程度与责任不相称,却将部分侵权人不能清偿的风险转移给原告。这使连带责任或按份责任作为一般规则设置例外显得必要,由此形成两种模式:连带责任为一般规则、按份责任为例外与按份责任为一般规则、连带责任为例外。多数国家采纳前者,我国采纳后者。排除政策性连带责任,网络服务提供者承担连带责任属于我国"按份责任"一般规则的例外,但其适当性欠妥,司法实践将环境侵权、医疗侵权作为例外情形有其合理性。     

Optimal agency contracts: The effect of vicarious liability and judicial error

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a deep-pocket principal is often held responsible for a third-party harm caused by a judgment-proof agent’s negligence. We analyze the incentive contract used by the principal to control the agent’s behavior when a court can make an error in determining the agent’s negligence. We show that (1) reducing the error of declaring the agent not negligent even when he was (pro-defendant or type II error) is better than reducing the error of declaring the agent negligent even when he was not (pro-plaintiff or type I error) and (2) allowing the principal to penalize the agent even when the court declares the agent not negligent improves welfare. The latter supports the argument that causing an accident (or a reliable allegation of misconduct) should be sufficient to justify a “just cause” termination of an employee.     

The reasonable person standard: a new perspective on the incentive effects of a tailored negligence standard

This paper compares the effects of a uniform reasonable person standard to a due care standard that is tailored to individual capabilities. This is done in a framework in which potential injurers can invest in developing greater capability. I show that the uniform reasonable person standard may induce better or worse investment incentives, depending on whether greater capability is represented by reduced precaution costs or reduced accident costs. In so doing, I show that recent results showing that the reasonable person standard creates better investment incentives are not general, but depend on the model of injurer capacity used. I go on to show the availability of “over-tailoring” of the negligence standard as a novel form of subsidy for investment in care technology. In some circumstances, holding an injurer to a lower standard of care than would be optimal in a perfectly static world can result in a trade-off between dynamic and static efficiency that is superior to that generated by either a uniform or tailored standard of care.     

Tortious acts affecting markets

The present paper examines an injurer causing a temporary blackout to a firm as the primary victim but also affecting customers and competitors of the firm. Reflecting existing legal practice, the paper investigates efficiency properties of the negligence rule granting recovery of private losses but to the primary victim only. The regime is shown to provide efficient incentives for precaution provided that the primary loss exceeds the social loss from accidents. The main contribution of the paper consists of an explicit analysis of markets affected by a temporary blackout of one firm. The analysis reveals that the private loss exceeds the social loss indeed if the market is less than fully competitive. Moreover, the net social loss remains positive, no matter which market structure prevails.     

Scope of liability: the vanishing distinction between negligence and strict liability

The duty-of-care requirement cannot be used anymore as the touchstone to differentiate negligence from strict liability because it can be found in many forms of the latter. Duty of care is smuggled into strict liability hidden under the scope of liability requirement (traditionally called “proximate causation”). As far as the scope of liability requirement is common to negligence and to many forms of strict liability, there is a fairly large common ground to both liability rules, and consequently the marginal Hand formula is applied to both rules. Indeed, under a negligence rule, the marginal Hand formula is applied twice: first to assess whether or not the defendant did breach his or her duty of care, and, second, to delimit whether or not the defendant’s behavior was a proximate cause of the harm suffered by the victim. However, under a strict liability rule, the Hand formula is applied only once when the proximate causation question is raised. Traditional law and economics analysis has almost always taken the normative question raised by the causation requirement as given, which is a potential major problem due to the importance of scope of liability or proximate causation in legal practice. Defining the scope of liability, that is to say, the boundaries of the pool of potential defendants, is the basic legal policy decision for each and every liability rule. In the normative model presented in this paper, the government first chooses efficient scope of liability, and given the scope of liability, the government then decides the liability rule and damages that guarantee efficient precaution. In the article, most known scope of liability rationales developed by both common law and civil law systems are discussed in order to show the substantial common ground between negligence and strict liability.     

The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence

This article questions, and in some contexts disproves, thevalidity of the efficiency justifications for the comparativenegligence rule. One argument in the literature suggests thatcomparative negligence is the superior rule in the presenceof court errors. The analysis here shows the analytical flawin this claim and conducts numerical simulations — a formof synthetic "empirical" tests — that prove the potentialsuperiority of other rules. The second argument in the literaturein favor of the comparative negligence rule is based on itsalleged superior ability to deal with private information. Thisarticle develops a general approach to liability rules as mechanismsthat induce self-selection among actors. It then shows thatself-selection can occur, not only under comparative negligence,but also under every other negligence rule. These conclusionsweaken the efficiency explanation for the growing appeal ofthe "division-of-liability" principle within tort law and beyond.     

Double Discounting: The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making

Two experiments were conducted to ascertain the effects of comparative negligence on damage awards. Participants awarded damages for a mock medical malpractice case in which the level of the plaintiff's negligence was varied. Both experiments showed that damage awards were doubly discounted for partially negligent plaintiffs. Experiment 1 also found that the responses of college students did not differ from those of people who had been called for jury duty. Experiment 2 examined four components of the damage award and showed that the reduction due to the level of the plaintiff's negligence occurred only in damages for bodily harm. Implications for the judicial system are discussed.     

Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870-1920

At the wheels of railroads and streetcars, the law of accidental personal injury, known as negligence, became a discrete body of law between 1870 and 1920. The defining component of negligence was "fault"–the notion that the individuals (injured and injurer) must have failed to act according to some minimal standard of caution. Theorists of the history of negligence have explained that the conduct of all was measured against what a "reasonable man" would have done under the circumstances. The author here challenges this fundamental assertion. Through trial records, lawyer's written arguments, and appellate opinions, she reconstructs the critical role of gender in shaping the law of accidental injury. As she argues, in 19th- and 20th-century America, injury was a gendered event. The fact that courts in these years held men and women to different standards of care undermines theorists' arguments that economic considerations drove the law of accidental injury. Moreover, the reification of gender nm in private law, in turn, vitally affected the experience of gender in turn-of-the-century America.     

Can Strict Criminal Liability for Responsible Corporate Officers be Justified by the Duty to Use Extraordinary Care?

The responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine.     

Ensuring Insurance for Foster Care: Requiring Foster Parents to Obtain Liability Insurance to Cover Harm Done to Foster Children in their Care

This Note proposes that all states should require that foster parents have liability insurance before children are placed in their care. This Note also proposes that the liability insurance needs to cover not just harm to third parties but also harm to the foster children through the negligent acts of the foster parents. This legislation will allow foster children to have standing to bring claims against their foster parents and insurance companies and give them a greater opportunity for recovery. Currently, the policies and statutes governing the policies in place do not cover all types of harm that can occur during the foster parent–child relationship. Certain policies leave children who are harmed by their foster parents’ negligence unable to recover any damages from the people who have harmed them. Because foster parents can be left to defend the actions themselves, they often become judgment proof due to their low income, leaving the children who are harmed with little chance of recovery.

Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• States need to require foster parents to obtain liability insurance, which covers harm done by the foster children to third parties, harm to the home, and any harm done to the child by the foster parents.

     

Welfare improving ignorance and negligence rule

The literature considers that the ignorance of activity levels by the courts is a major source of inefficiency to minimize the social costs of accidents. In this paper, we show that the inefficiency of the negligence rule based on a standard of care (and correlatively ignoring the activity level) is not established if certain dimensions of care are not verifiable. In other words, if care and activity levels are the only relevant variables of the injurer's set of actions to reduce the risk of accident, it is true that inefficiency arises when the court ignores one element of this set. But, considering that some dimensions of care are in practice not verifiable, it can be efficient for the judge not to take into account the activity level of the defendant. We propose a simple model with three variables: observable and unobservable precautionary measures and activity level.

论医学人体试验中的侵权责任——以比较法为视角

当前我国立法与司法未对医学人体试验侵权责任与医疗损害责任加以区分,对其归责原则和因果关系也有不同认识。在美国,法院渐趋认可人体试验侵权责任为独立诉因,在过错和因果关系的认定上,则分别有主观说和客观说等不同的观点。大陆法系国家中,法国将人体试验侵权责任作为一种特殊侵权,并区分治疗性试验和非治疗性试验分别适用过错责任原则和无过错责任原则。德国将人体试验作为一般过错侵权,并在涉及药品的案件中适用产品责任。荷兰将人体试验侵权责任作为一种独立的侵权责任,并适用过错责任原则。晚近的立陶宛《生物医学试验法》规定了人体试验侵权的无过错责任。我国应当构建独立于医疗侵权责任的人体试验侵权责任,其归责原则为过错责任原则。在因果关系问题上,应当采取相当因果关系、疫学原理因果关系以及因果关系推定理论来进行综合判断。     

Legal damages for losses of chances

Traditionally, damages for torts have been awarded on an all-or-nothing basis. In malpractice suits, however, a growing number of courts are holding doctors liable for negligent acts that reduces a patient’s chance of survival, even if the patient’s chances for recovery have already been less than 50%. For lack of a general principle, a disparate variety of loss of chance rules seems in use. To provide some more systematic guidance, the present paper proposes to look directly at the interaction between the injurer’s act and a random move of nature that captures the uncertainty. For any given move of nature, damages are still awarded on an all-or-nothing basis. If however, for lack of observability, moves of nature cannot sufficiently be distinguished, averages of correct damages over observable events are taken. While the scheme aims at compensatory goals of tort law, as a by-product, it also generates efficient precaution incentives provided that due care standards obey the Hand Formula.