认真对待软法——公域软法的一般理论及其中国实践

我国最近20多年的公域之治一直在实践着一种软硬兼施的混合法结构,这在相当程度上彰显出民主政治与法治建设的中国特色。本文认为,包含着大量本土性制度资源的“软法”,是一种法律效力结构未必完整、无需依靠国家强制保障实施、但能够产生社会实效的法律规范。软法与硬法同为法律的一种基本表现形式,它以不同于硬法的方式体现法律的基本特征、实现法律的主要功能,并具有严格区别于硬法的个性特征与独特功能。软法与硬法大致具有法律逻辑上的错综复杂、法律功能上的优势互补、法律规范上的相互转化三种基本关系。软硬兼施的混合法模式乃是我国解决公共问题的基本模式,这就要求我国公法学回应公域之治的现实需要,在对软法作用加以客观评析的基础上,研究探讨全面提升公域软法的理性品质,并按照宪政精神与法治原则的要求推动中国公法朝着软硬兼施的混合法结构方向发展,旨在全面实现公域之治与法治目标。     

A Shift in Focus: Systematisation in European Private Law through EU Law

The discourse on the Europeanisation of private law appears gradually to be moving into new territory in which the central debate on convergence of private laws in Europe makes place for structural questions on private law development in a multi‐level European legal order. With the realisation that private law is and will remain complementary regulated at EU level and in national laws, a re‐orientation is called for that, in the words of Micklitz, ‘allows one to determine which norms shall be elaborated and enforced at what level and by whom’. This article accepts that such a re‐orientation is needed in relation to substance, process, instruments and enforcement; a more fundamental question needs to be addressed, however, in order to ensure coherence in the development of private law in Europe. As can be gleaned from existing practice in EU consumer law, competition law, and financial market regulation, a deeply engrained tension between market integration and protectionist policies in Community law has resulted in incoherent regulation at EU level, which filters through into national legal systems. This puts at risk fundamental values of private law, such as certainty and fairness. A solution for this is proposed by shifting the focus from national private laws to the political and doctrinal structure of EU private law, and the normative framework it provides. General principles of EU private law, it is argued, could and should provide a counterweight to the problem of conflicting policies and set out a guideline for the future development of European private law.     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

软法与行政自制的控权机制探讨

以硬法与外部控制为代表的硬性控权管理机制主要通过法律规范和外部主体对行政权进行强制性控制;而以软法与行政自制为代表的软性控权管理机制则强调行政伦理和行政主体的主观能动性,从而对行政权进行更具柔性和灵活性的控制。尽管软法与行政自制能够有效弥补硬法与外部控制的不足,但二者相互结合、相互促进,才能达到最为理想的控权效果。     

The role of soft law in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities in the EU: A ‘hybridity’ approach to EU disability law

This article discusses the role of soft law in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities in the European Union (EU). In doing so, it revisits the emergence of the standalone, yet cross-cutting, field of ‘EU disability law’ through the lens of the ‘hybridity theory’ advanced inter alia by Trubek and Trubek. Being speculative in nature, this article construes EU disability law as a fruitful area for an enquiry into the dynamic relationship between hard and soft law. Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, soft law was crucial to attract disability within the sphere of action of the EU and to embed the social model of disability, displaying a value-setting role. In the post-Amsterdam period, soft law and hard law coexisted, being complementary to one another. Both contributed to a common objective, namely that of advancing equality of opportunities for persons with disabilities. After the conclusion of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the dynamic relationship between hard and soft law has become more complex and akin to what Trubek and Trubek define as ‘transformation’.     

Sources of Law Are not Legal Norms

Anglo‐American authors have paid little attention to a subtle distinction that has important jurisprudential implications. It is the distinction between sources of law (e.g., statutes, precedents, customs) and the legal norms which can be derived from sources by means of interpretation. The distinction might also be rendered as a threefold one, separating sources of law from legal norms and both of these from that which mediates their relation, namely, methods of legal interpretation. This paper intends to state the “source‐norm” distinction clearly and to give examples of jurisprudential insights that are missed, and mistakes that may be made if the distinction is not given its due.     

行政法上的客观法与主观法

针对如何理解行政法上客观法与主观法的关系,存在三种基本立场。主客观法分离立场认为维护公益的行政法与公民个人权利形成对峙。该立场存在无法关联违法性与侵权性、抱持无视宪法的行政法观等疑问。主客观法结合立场主张从客观法中分出一部分请求权对应行政主体法定义务。该立场存在宪法与行政法平台错位、公益与私益纵向割裂等局限。主客观法统一立场将客观法当作主观法的全部集合,权利由客观法分解得来。该立场是理解行政法主客观法关系的妥当见解。在分配行政与利害调整观念下,特定或不特定复数私人主体间基于行政法律规范的各种利益与不利益冲突、对立并交织而成的利害关系网才是行政实体法律关系的本质,行政法上的实体权利应当由此导出。遵循“利害关系→合法权益”而非“合法权益→利害关系”的逻辑顺序才是判断行政诉讼原告资格的正确方法。     

德国国际私法渊源的新发展

在传统上,德国国际私法的渊源包括制定法、德国缔结或者参加的各种国际私法条约、习惯法和判例法,但是随着欧盟国际私法统一化的深入发展,尤其是欧洲共同体在公司法、合同法、物权法、知识产权法、破产法和国际民事诉讼程序法等领域的立法不断加强,欧盟法中的国际私法规范逐渐渗入德国国际私法,从而使德国国际私法的渊源突破了传统的范围,越来越多地打上了欧盟法的烙印,呈现出“欧盟化”倾向。     

Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law,Convention, Soft Law

The Governance of Britain Green Paper continues the programme of constitutional reform begun in 1997, and appears to reinforce the juridification of the UK's constitution. Nevertheless, several key reforms will be implemented not by legislation, but by creating new conventions. This article argues that such ‘declared’ conventions are best understood as a form of constitutional ‘soft law’, which attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms. Applying a regulatory analysis, it then argues that the case for a soft, rather than hard law approach to constitutional reform is weaker than its widespread use in the UK suggests. Finally, the article challenges the thesis that the political constitution is being replaced by a legal constitution, arguing that the government's attitude to constitutional reform still exhibits basic characteristics of political constitutionalism. Moreover, there is more to contemporary constitutional developments than a bipolar contest between political and legal constitutionalism.     

European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Principles?

This article analyses whether and how competition soft law instruments are taken into consideration by the European Courts and the Advocates General. The quantitative analysis of the case‐law reveals that even if arguments based on competition guidelines or notices were brought to court since the early days of European law, it is only during the last two decades that they have been taken seriously. The results of the qualitative analysis point to the fact that soft law instruments are considered by the European Courts an important and specific part of the body of European norms that they should use when deciding cases submitted for their judgment. Legal effects are recognised to these not legally binding instruments, but only when it serves the enforcement of hard, general principles of law.     

Bounded Discretion in EU Law: A Limited Judicial Paradigm in a Changing EU

Against the background of the reinforcement of the EU executive pursuant to the post‐2008 economic and financial market regulatory reforms, this article deconstructs the prevailing distinction between an executive body's discretion to make policy choices and its discretion when conducting technical assessments. This distinction, which arises out of the current judicial paradigm for discretion, has contributed to the re‐allocation of executive authority within the EU (sanctioned in UK v Parliament and Council and Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag). The article traces the distinction's roots in legal conceptions that have shaped legal‐administrative thinking since the early days of the Etat de Droit or Rechstaat. It proposes a public‐interest‐regarding conception of discretion where, in an institutional context where courts’ reviewing role may be limited, discretion's relationship to law is a matter of how legal norms may operate in the spheres of discretion that they attribute to decision‐makers, rather than how courts may review an exercise of discretion.     

Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interactions Between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law

Abstract: This article discusses the main interactions between bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and EU law. The European Commission identified a number of incompatibilities in BITs signed by eight recent Member States with the USA, proposing solutions for their adjustment in conformity with EU law, but was this step sufficient? The risk of disputes remains, as long as the proposed adjustments do not achieve legal force and as long as other BITs still need to be harmonised with EU law. Moreover, provisions in BITs that are not in conflict with EU law could still be challenged if the application of certain EU requirements by Member States interferes with foreign investors' rights. To avoid such risks, coherence between different commitments and practices of the Member States is needed and coordination at the EU level is highly desirable.     

文本·结构·功能——软法之于欧盟宪政的地位描述与作用分析

在欧盟宪政发展进程中，在硬法发挥作用的同时，欧盟软法所占据的地位与所发挥的作用也同样值得重视与研究。在文本意义上，欧盟软法在欧盟宪法性条约中占有很大的比重，在结构意义上，欧盟软法成为了欧盟治理结构发展、变化的一个重要机制，在功能意义上，欧盟软法成为了欧盟法律秩序形成的先导性力量。     

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

Abstract. The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.     

On the Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations: Legal Dialogues between the EU and US

Law plays a significant role in contemporary transatlantic relations outside of the bilateral context which, from the perspective of EU external relations law, might seem neither conventional nor apparent. Non‐bilateral transatlantic relations increasingly deploy law as a communication tool between the two legal orders. For example, in 2011, the US intervened informally and anonymously in the formulation of EU legislation, while the US House of Representatives passed legislation to prohibit the impact of EU law upon the US legal order. Another example is constituted by EU amicus curiae submissions before the US Supreme Court in death penalty cases. The so‐called Brussels effect is also the subject of recent scholarship, assessing the perceived spillover effect of EU regulatory standards onto US rules. The paper provides many vivid examples of the variable institutional and legal components of transatlantic relations not usually accounted for in scholarship on transatlantic relations.     

Horizontal Liability for Damages in EU Law—the Changing Relationship of EU and National Law

The article focuses on damages liability between private parties—referred to as horizontal liability—that is based on EU law. Generally, this kind of liability may be based on EU secondary legislation or be derived from substantive EU law and legal principles. The article seeks to analyse the latter: liability in an area of EU law where so‐called procedural autonomy still, at least apparently, prevails. Special attention is paid to the lively interface between EU law and national remedies and to the increasing EU law requirements for the enforcement of EU law in national courts. Recent case‐law on private liability for damages caused by competition infringements is discussed as part of a more general question concerning the ways in which the relationship of EU law and national enforcement frameworks is developing.     

The EU's Private Law in the Regulated Sectors: Competitive Market Handmaiden or Institutional Platform?

The article contests the claim that EU private law is narrowly circumscribed by a market rationality. Such a claim tracks broader criticism of EU functional legal integration, although it tends to obscure the underlying transformative pressures on private law and regulation and the role EU law plays in coping with such pressures. To offer a number of counter‐narratives, the article draws on examples from the regulated sectors, including telecommunications and energy, to reveal their experimentalist features. These suggest that EU private law is constructed through a process of error‐corrections, which allows for mutual adjustment of instruments and hybridisation of EU and local policy goals. The process results in more finely grained assemblages of autonomy and regulation to respond to concrete problems or newly salient policy goals, so that markets are understood as social institutions that are always works‐in‐progress rather than convergence points. Thus, EU private law provides a platform for transnational market‐building through innovating institutions that promote various normative and policy commitments despite the interdependencies that could undermine them.     

The Current Status and Prospects of the 'Strategic Partnership' between the EU and China: Towards the Conclusion of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

Abstract: This article aims to evaluate legal aspects of the content and implementation of the ‘strategic partnership’ between the EU and the People's Republic of China. In the absence of a category of ‘emerging countries’ in international economic law, the Union must adapt its foreign policy with regard to this major economic and commercial power. Relations between the European Community and China are currently governed by a second‐generation agreement from 1985. However, a new dynamic has been set in motion since 2003, by the drawing up of preparatory documents by both parties and joint declarations at annual summits bearing on the ‘strategic partnership’. Seen in a long‐term perspective, this partnership helps provide a measure of predictability in relations between the two partners, through combining elements of ‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’. If the insertion of political dialogue into the strategic partnership seems to alter the coherence of the Union, notably with regard to the difficulties of implementing the dialogue on human rights, the added value of the partnership lies essentially in its economic and commercial aspects, through not only the putting into place of non‐binding ‘economic dialogues’ which cover a large spectrum of the relationship, but also by the multiplication of sector‐based accords in numerous areas (maritime transport, customs cooperation, etc.). This constant development has thus allowed parties, at the last annual summit, to envisage the conclusion of a new framework agreement: this is the origin of the mandate given to the Commission in December 2005 to conclude a partnership and cooperation agreement. This article will sketch out a forecast of the legal framework, measured against the yardsticks of Asiatic regional reconfigurations and the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The commercial risks of the relationship could imply the integration of the domains known as ‘WTO plus’ into the future agreement, notably in the field of investments and intellectual property rights, which would introduce a greater variety into the agreement. That being the case, the negotiations risk being equally fragile at the political level, in particular concerning the insertion of a clause of democratic conditionality in the future agreement. Also, any clash between the values and the interests of the EU would be uncomfortably highlighted during negotiations.     

Kelsen's Theory on International Law during His Exile in Geneva

Kelsen's monistic theory of international law was shaped during his exile in Geneva (1933–1940), but its deep roots are to be found in his Pure Theory of Law, centred on the neo‐Kantian notion of “system.” According to this conception, a legal system can only descend from a single principle. Consequently, Kelsen constructed a monistic theory of law, i.e., a legal system incorporating all norms into a pyramidal structure culminating in a single principle: the fundamental norm. This Kelsenian pyramid must also include international law, considering that if international law were a legal system different from national law (as the dualistic theory assumes), the theoretical construction would need two fundamental norms. This dualism is as incompatible with Kelsen's monistic vision as Schmitt's theory of “Great Spaces,” creating a hierarchical system of international relations. In the Kelsenian pyramid, international law occupies a position superior to national law: The consequences of this assumption are discussed in some documents recently published in German and French.