对“承认规则”的一些思考——读《法律的概念》有感

“承认规则”是哈特法律理论中一个极其重要的概念,可以说是哈特所描述的法律的基石.“承认规则”包含了规则和事实两个面向,但其本质是实践,由此,“承认规则”便具有了开放性,且不存在效力问题.哈特不承认德沃金的批评,认为“承认规则”同样可以识别原则,同时又划清了“承认规则”和凯尔森“基础规范”之间的界限.     

从“承认规则”展开——法律的外在视角与内在视角分析

哈特教授作为新分析实证主义法学的开创人，创立了法律概念规则说。他在保留分析实证主义法学的基本观念的同时，创新性的将当时英国盛行的牛津日常语言分析学派的语义分析方法运用到法理学中，认为法体系的核心是两种规则——初级规则与次级规则的结合。他的理论批判了奥斯丁的“命令说”，将承认规则引入其中从而完善并发展了法律实证主义。本文将从哈特的承认规则展开，分析法律的外部视角到内部视角的转化以及相关的内容。     

哈特、德沃金尚自由裁量权

法官是否拥有自由裁量权,一直是法学家争论的重要问题。20世纪著名法学家哈特和德沃金围绕自由裁量权进行了激烈的争论。哈特认为法律是一个规则体系,总体上是不完整的,法官必然拥有自由裁量权。德沃金认为法律除了规则外还包括隐含的原则,它不存在漏洞,法官也不享有自由裁量权。这场争论涉及的关键问题是自由裁量权是什么,而根本问题是法律是什么,法律与道德是否有界限。     

解读德沃金《认真对待权利》之原则模式

本文阅读了《认真对待权利》一书,分析了德沃金提出的法律原则模式。并从法律实证主义的代表观点入手,分析了德沃金对哈特法律实证主义的批判,从而进一步展现德沃金的法律原则理论体系的内容。     

原则与法律的来源——拉兹的排他性法实证主义

解读任何一位重要的法理学家,都不止需要一种解经式的典籍阅读的耐心,更重要的是,还需要对其置身的法学主流思想变迁及其背景的宏观洞见能力,所以任何重要法理学家都有被误读的可能,但也有被反复咀嚼的必要。本文志向宏大,通过选择解读法理学家拉兹的理论,意欲在当今法理学主流变迁的思想纷呈中截取一段具有象征意义的思路,加以透彻的评价,从而传递出有关当代法理学核心论域为何的一种信息。作者有意识地运用了背景分析方法,并力图在一种骨架探索的策略下点描拉兹的核心思想,因而不无启发意义。作者认为,拉兹是在“德沃金对哈特”的那场当今法学领域至关重要的学术论战的激发下,以一种回应型姿态,维护和发展正统法理学的理论。针对德沃金提出的原则理论以及由此展开的对于哈特为代表的新分析法学赋予以承认规则支撑的法律规则体系以确定性和与政治道德的区隔性的努力的颠覆式批评,拉兹认为,自己可以通过发展一种“排除性实证主义”的强硬立场(与科尔曼等人的包容性实证主义的妥协立场不同)对德沃金进行有效的反批评。这一立场的关键是,应在根本上否认德沃金有关“原则是法律的组成部分”的主张,因为通过“社会来源命题”可以发现,相当一部分原则并不具有效力因此存身在法律之外,由此可以关上德沃金试图打开的法律与政治道德沟通的大门,从而维护法律实证主义的纯粹性。     

分离命题与法律实证主义

法律与道德的分离命题是法律实证主义的一项重要主张,它包含了弱的和强的两种分离命题。哈特主张的是弱分离命题,它主张在法律的合法性标准的外在方面法律与价值的必然分离。弱分离命题需要社会事实命题的支持,它没有资格作为法律实证主义的基础命题。而在合法性标准的内在方面,法律与道德存在必然联系。内在必要联系命题可以为法律的规范性提供合理说明,并为消除自然法与法律实证主义的对立和融合两者提供了新的理论前景。     

包容性实证主义法学视野下的法律与道德的关系探究

法律与道德的关系问题是西方法哲学史上的一个经典问题。自然法学者认为法律必须符合道德要求,而包容性实证主义通过论证主张法律与道德并无必然的联系,而只是一种可能的关联,包容性实证主义法学展示了道德包容于法律的另一种可能路径,使法律与道德可能存在的关联得到了说明。     

法律实证主义的强立场——兼评拉兹《法律的权威》

在法律与道德的关系上,拉兹认为有效法律的鉴别标准完全排除道德论证,这就是拉兹的渊源论.渊源论表明所有的法律都具有渊源,渊源论的论据来自权威论.权威以理由为基础,是改变行为理由的能力.法律也要主张权威,法律主张合法性权威是它的一个本质特征.权威性理由是排他性理由,排除了道德因素的可能性,权威论支持了渊源论.权威论受到了来自包容性实证主义者和德沃金的批评,他们的争论共同推进了对法律与道德关系问题的研究.     

法律规则与法律原则:质的差别?

国内对法律原则的研究模式大量援引德沃金的相关理论,却没能突出德沃金的一个重要定性:法律规则与法律原则存在质的差别。在这种一般模式之外,国内外学者在抽象程度之别、实定性之别、形式原则之别、理由类型之别等方面试图实现对法律规则与法律原则质的差别的建构。但是,这要么不符合德沃金的基本论述,要么无法实现德沃金的理论目标——挑战法律实证主义的法律概念理论。本文尝试提出一种解读:放弃分类学模式,不把法律规则和法律原则看作两种规范类型,而将其看作两种不同的规则理论。     

关于哈特法律思想的比较研究

<正> 当代英国法理学家,新分析实证主义法学的创始人哈特(Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart,1907年生),以他精湛深刻的法律思想饮誉西方法理学界。本文试以比较的方法分析哈特的法律思想与古典实证主义法学、自然法学、社会学法学以及前苏联维辛斯基法学的主要异同,并归纳哈特法律思想的几个特征,以就教于学界师友。 哈特作为新分析实证主义法学的代表,其法律思想是对古典实证主义法学的继承和发展。 古典实证主义法学的著名代表人物奥斯丁的法律思想,在哈特看来,由三个相互联系但又可以分开的基本内容所构成:第一,法律的定义;第二,划分法律和道德,区分实在法与理想法(正义法);第三,关于一般法理学研究的范围是分析实在法的共通概念的观点。哈特     

Theoretical Disagreement,Legal Positivism,and Interpretation

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.     

包容性实证主义法学之承认规则类别研究

包容性法律实证主义者认为法律效力的判准包括两类:作为主要类别的“系谱类判准”以及作为次要类别的“内容类判准”。经由承认规则的系谱类判准,包容性实证主义法学理论论证了法律效力乃是由一些明确的社会事实决定的;经由承认规则的内容类判准,其展示了道德包容于法律的另一种可能路径,使法律与道德的可能分离论点得到了进一步说明。     

On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality*

Abstract. The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions as well as whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality.     

Enforcing Morality

In debating Patrick Devlin, H. L. A. Hart claimed that the “modern form” of the debate over the legal enforcement of morals centered on the “significance to be attached to the historical fact that certain conduct, no matter what, is prohibited by a positive morality.” This form of the debate was politically important in 1963 in Britain and America, and it remains politically important in these countries today and elsewhere; but it is not the philosophically most interesting form the debate can take. An older form of the debate appealed to natural law or critical morality. It centered on the question of whether political authorities could properly use the criminal law to enforce critical morality, including prohibitions on conduct that was not harmful or disrespectful to others. This paper engages with this older form of the debate. It offers some reasons for thinking that there is a presumption in favor of the view that it is a proper function of the criminal law to enforce critical morality, including that part of critical morality that is not directly concerned with preventing harm or disrespect to others. It then defends this presumption against some arguments recently pressed by Ronald Dworkin.     

Law,Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights*

In the debate between positivism and non‐positivism the argument from relativism plays a pivotal role. The argument from relativism, as put forward, for instance, by Hans Kelsen, says, first, that a necessary connection between law and morality presupposes the existence of absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements, and, second, that no such absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements exist. My reply to this is that absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements do exist, for human rights exist, and human rights exist because they are justifiable.     

哈贝马斯的法律“有效性”概念的四重意蕴

哈贝马斯的法律“有效性”概念具有四重意蕴：一是整合性意蕴,是对既有的法律有效性概念尤其是哈特和德沃金的法律有效性概念的总结和整合;二是超越性意蕴,哈特和德沃金将法律的事实有效性和规范有效性对立起来,而哈贝马斯的法律有效性概念则将这两个维度统一起来;三是反思性意蕴,他将现代法律理解为行动系统,是建制化和合法化的统一,揭示出现代法律的实质是“事实性和有效性之间的社会媒介”,法律之“应该”最终体现在法律之“是”上;四是批判性意蕴,哈贝马斯只是在“程序”这一维度上作出了自己贡献,现代法律的有效性应该是哈特的“形式”、德沃金的“内容”和哈贝马斯的“程序”这三者的融合。     

The Distorted Jurisprudential Discourse of Nazi Law: Uncovering the ‘Rupture Thesis’ in the Anglo-American Legal Academy

It has been remarked that the ‘rupture thesis’ prevails within the Anglo-American legal academy in its understanding of the legal system in Nazi Germany. This article explores the existence and origins of this idea—that ‘Nazi law’ represented an aberration from normal legal-historical development with a point of rupture persisting between it and the ‘normal’ or central concept of law—within jurisprudential discourse in order to illustrate the prevalence of a distorted (mis)representation of Nazi law and how this distortion is manifested within the discourse today. An analysis of the treatment of Nazi law in two major 50th anniversary publications about the 1958 Hart–Fuller debate, and a review of representations of the Third Reich within literature from the current discourse, demonstrates that the rupture thesis continues to be reproduced within jurisprudence. An examination of the role of Nazi law in the Hart–Fuller debate itself shows that it can be traced back to the debate, where it was constructed through a combination of conceptual determinism and historical omission. It concludes that the historical Nazi law has great significance for the concept of law, but neither positivism nor natural law has properly theorised the nature of the real Nazi legal system.