Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals

Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views.     

Hans Kelsen's Doctrine of Imputation

First, the author examines the traditional doctrine of imputation. A look at the traditional doctrine is useful for establishing a point of departure in comparing Kelsen's doctrines of central and peripheral imputation. Second, the author turns to central imputation. Here Kelsen's doctrine follows the traditional doctrine in attributing liability or responsibility to the subject. Kelsen's legal subject, however, has been depersonalized and thus requires radical qualification. Third, the author takes up peripheral imputation, which is the main focus of the paper. It is argued that with respect to the basic form of the law, exhibited by the linking of legal condition with legal consequence, peripheral imputation counts as an austere doctrine, shorn as it is of all references to legal personality or the legal subject. If Kelsen's reconstructed legal norms are empowerments, then the austere doctrine of peripheral imputation captures the rudiments of their form, exactly what would be expected if peripheral imputation does indeed serve as the category of legal cognition. Finally, the author develops the puzzle surrounding the legal "ought" in this context. Although Kelsen talks at one point as though the legal "ought" were the peculiarly legal category, the author submits that this is not the best reading of Kelsen's texts.     

The Responsible Subject As Citizen: Criminal Law, Democracy And The Welfare State

This paper seeks to explain two problems posed by the history of criminal law doctrine by situating them in the context of the political sociology of citizenship. First, the paper outlines the logical connection between the rise to doctrinal orthodoxy of the idea of the responsible subject and the contemporaneous emergence of universal political citizenship. Secondly, it argues that subjectivist orthodoxy in doctrine may be reconciled with the apparently antithetical forms of regulatory strict liability law within the terms of 'modern democratic citizenship' as the latter were conceptualised by T. H. Marshall. Finally, by means of a comparison with Alan Brudner's recent philosophical rationalisation of the modern criminal law, it proposes that situating the criminal law in its environment of citizenship will help us to understand better the tensions that underlie contemporary challenges to its doctrine.     

The concept of free will and forensic psychiatry

This text examines how conceptions of free will impact on legal systems and forensic psychiatry: free will is generally regarded as a prerequisite for responsibility, criminal responsibility included, while forensic psychiatry to a large extent deals with the limits imposed on responsibility by mental disorder. First we discuss the question of whether there is and has been such an impact. The answer is yes: different conceptions of free will have inspired different systems of law and forensic psychiatry, as becomes clear when looking at the accountability doctrine as compared to the unique Swedish system rejecting this doctrine. However, there is no necessary connection between doctrines of responsibility and conceptions of free will, since the former primarily says something about when someone should be held responsible and the latter says something about when someone really is free in a sense relevant to responsibility. This leads to the second question: should conceptions of free will have an impact on law and forensic psychiatry? We argue: that they should not, given the implausibility the normative theory retributivism, which posits a direct connection between free will and punishment. More importantly, questions of free will are complicated and unresolved philosophical issues that are better left out of the everyday decision-making incumbent on the legal and psychiatric systems. Instead, we recommend using an empirically useful and gradual conception of autonomy to facilitate the determination of legal responsibility. This autonomy conception, being neutral on the question of free will, eliminates the need to take a stand on it.     

Entrapment Through the Lens of the Actio Libera in Causa

The entrapment defense is a puzzle of long standing. One the one hand, we are offended by the government’s subjecting someone vulnerable to extreme temptation. It seems like something anyone might fall prey to. On the other hand, it is hard to explain why someone who actually commits, or attempts a crime, and who would be liable if anyone other than the government had tempted him, should escape punishment. His blameworthiness seems the same. This essay seeks to illuminate this puzzle by showing how it parallels the long-standing debate surrounding the criminal law problem of the actio libera in causa—situations in which someone seeks to escape liability by contriving to put a certain defense in place, such as provoking his victim into attacking him, so that he can then kill him in self-defense. The parallels between the two problems do not serve to resolve either, but make them appear in a rather different light.     

Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty

Many criminal law scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a form of strict and vicarious liability. It is neither. It is merely a doctrine that supplies a duty in instances of omissions. Siding with Todd Aagaard in this debate, I argue that a proper reading of the cases yields that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is just duty supplying, and does not allow for strict liability when the underlying statute requires mens rea. After analyzing Dotterweich, Park, and their progeny, I probe the depths of this duty-supplying doctrine, including to whom the duty is owed, whether the duty is grounded in statute, cause of peril, or contract, and what the content of the duty is. Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine unveils questions we may have about duty generally, it is no more problematic than other duty-supplying doctrines in the criminal law.     

犯罪构成理论结构比较论略

在大体相当的法律结构基础上,因文化的差异,德日、英美和中俄三个不同法系的犯罪构成理论结构显著不同。三者的外在形态、逻辑结构和文化特点差异颇大,但其基本功能大体相当,各有其道理。我国的犯罪构成四要件理论经过长期的理论建构与实践检验,具有相对的合理性。我国不宜全盘移植德日三阶层要件模式或英美双层次要件模式。进一步理顺和完善犯罪构成四要件模式的内在理论结构,是我国当前相关理论争议的合理出路。推进我国刑事法治,有必要注重刑法机制之刑事一体化理论知识形态。     

论社会危害性理论与实质刑法观的关联关系与风险防范

社会危害性理论与法益理论确实可以成为实质刑法观的理论基础,但是社会危害性理论与实质刑法观的关联性比较复杂,并非如部分学者所提示的那样一一对应。就持有传统社会危害性理论立场的学者而言,他们其实并非可以简单地归入实质刑法观立场;而主张改革完善传统社会危害性理论的部分学者,反而坚持实质刑法观立场。在中国语境下,实质刑法观面临的风险与批评,主要根源就在于作为实质刑法观理论基础的社会危害性理论具有太过强大的解释功能,且实质解释论的功能表现包括了保障人权的正面功能与严重侵犯人权的负面功能的两面,呈现出矛盾属性。为了防范风险,不但需要发展实质刑法观,而且需要完善社会危害性理论。单面的实质刑法观或者保守的实质刑法观,主张通过实质罪刑法定原则的限制、实质犯罪论的限制与实质司法解释权的限制,以有效防范开放的实质刑法观可能存在的侵蚀人权保障机能的风险,因而应当成为当下中国最理想的选择。     

What Should We Say We Say about Contrived ‘Self-Defense’ Defenses?

Imagine someone who deliberately provokes someone else into attacking him so that he can harm that person in defending himself against her attack and then claim “self-defense” when brought to court to defend himself for what he has done to her. Should he be allowed to use this defense, even though it’s clear that he has deliberately manipulated his attacker into attacking him precisely in order to be able to harm her with impunity (assuming he were allowed to use the defense and thus escape legal penalties)? This question is the focal point in the paper that follows. I argue first that the case described above is indeed an instance of an “actio libera in causa,” albeit arguably one at the margins of this controversial class of cases. Then, using a view about the justification of self-defense that I have defended elsewhere, I show why I believe that, while the manipulator should not be deprived of the legal right to defend his self-defensive actions in such cases by claiming they were a legitimate matter of self-defense, there is good reason to enact laws that will allow him to be prosecuted, independently of his “self-defense” defense, for manipulating his attacker as he did, thus allowing him to harm her in self-defense and then defend his actions as purely a matter of “self-defense.”     

原因自由行为可罚性之论证

原因自由行为,是指行为人由于故意或过失使自己陷于无责任能力状态,并在此状态下实施的危害社会的行为。根据刑法中的行为理论,在原因自由行为中,结果行为不具有刑法意义,原因行为与结果行为之间存在直接的因果关系,原因行为才应当被认定为实行行为。     

法益理论的发展源流及其启示

法益概念的产生对大陆法系国家刑法理论的发展有重大的意义。法益理论在不同的历史时期被赋予不同的内容。自由主义始终是法益概念的精神内核,坚持法益论就必须坚持刑法的个人主义与规范主义。基本法实现了法益概念规范性与非规范性之间的平衡,现代刑法必须强调宪法的重要作用。宪法和刑法规定是对刑法保护客体的规范限制,此外,刑法的谦抑性原则及实害原则也是对刑法保护客体的重要的限制原则。     

不纯正不作为犯罪中先行行为引起的义务研究

引起作为义务的先行行为应当是对法益安全造成了现实、具体、紧迫危险的行为,先行行为具有直接性、高概然性、临近性三个特征。原则上,先行行为应当以违反法律规范为前提。但是,在对行为人施加作为义务不与刑法的其他更高价值追求相违背的前提下,合法的先行行为也能够引起作为义务。在不违反禁止重复评价原则的前提下,应当肯定犯罪行为引起的作为义务。引起作为义务的先行行为自身既可以是作为,也可以是不作为;既可以是故意或者过失行为,也可以是无责任行为。     

Intoxication and Culpability

I tackle the difficult problem of specifying how voluntary intoxication affects criminal culpability generally and recklessness in particular. I contend that the problem need not be conceptualized as an instance of actio libera in causa, namely the situation in which persons do something at t1 to culpably create the conditions of their own defense at t2. Instead, I argue that we need only consider intoxicated defendants at t2 in order to justify their punishment. In the course of defending my view, I challenge conventional wisdom about both the nature of recklessness and the effects of intoxicants. I conclude by discussing a possible ground on which involuntary intoxication might be treated differently.     

论过失犯形态的原因自由行为

相对于认定故意犯形态的原因自由行为有诸多疑难而言,在过失犯形态的原因自由行为之中承认原因行为的实行行为性并没有太多争议。但无论如何,过失犯形态的原因自由行为至少在表象上有别于一般的过失犯,其特点就在于可以划分为原因行为和结果行为这两个阶段,而在结果行为阶段又的确是丧失了责任能力甚至是行为能力。相关判例印证了在自陷无责的情形中构成要件模式的正确性,即原因自由行为实质上并不是一种需要特殊归责的构造,而只是一种现象上有独特之处,但完全可以被包括在一般的归责形态(无论是过失犯还是故意犯)之中的说明形式(说明实行行为到底在何处)而已。要成立过失犯形态的原因自由行为,关键在于如何在具体情况下认定行为人的过失心理,它可能有三种表现形式。     

论刑法的公众认同

保持刑法与市民感觉、国民规范意识之间的一致性 ,以保持刑法的亲和力 ,并使之获得公众对刑法的认同感 ,在我国是一个比较突出的问题。刑法理论在因果关系、不作为犯、违法论、故意、共犯、责任论等问题上都充分考虑了公众认同感问题。公众对刑法的认同包括对“生活利益的重要性”和“规范有效性”的认同两个方面。作者进一步指出 ,今后我国刑法理论与实践要更多地考虑公众认同 ,就必须注意三方面的问题 :理论总体思路的调整 ;在具体问题上的理论创新和反思 ;鼓励市民介入刑事司法裁判过程。     

论不能未遂的处罚依据——主观危险理论之再提倡

对于不能未遂的处罚依据的认识,当下中国学界主要存在客观危险说、经验的危险感说以及主观危险说三种理论。客观的危险理论及其修正与经验的危险感说在理论本质以及判断逻辑方面都存在一定的问题。与之相对,主观的危险说具有与规范判断紧密相关的正当性依据,能够和我国本土刑法学理论与法律制度衔接,并且能构建逻辑自洽的着手概念。从正当性依据的角度来讲,法益侵害的危险是行为对规范的违反,通过行为哲学与刑法构成要件理论的双重证明,主观危险理论的正当性通过其与规范违反的紧密关联被体现出来;从与本土法律制度的衔接来看,我国刑法的故意概念包含的“认知”与“意欲”要素,为主观危险理论的“规范违反事实认知”要件与“规范违反行为推动”要件提供了刑法理论与制度的土壤;从着手概念的构建来看,结合主观危险理论的上述两个要件,行为着手的时点也能够合理地被构建出来。从主观危险理论中可以提炼出不能未遂案件司法判断的“三步走”的方法论,从而在分析实际案例中最终达到说理的科学性与结论的妥当性。     

论犯罪过失中注意义务的实质标准

注意义务的实质判断标准在刑法理论上分歧较大。英美法系存在着客观说与主客观统一说之分,大陆法系存在着主观说、客观说和折衷说之分,而中国刑法学则存在着主观说与主客观统一说之分。上述学说均存在不妥之处,应采取客观注意的主观化标准学说。     

Criminal and Procedural Fairness: Some Challenges to the Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence (POI) requires all judges, juries, and other officials in a trial, to presume and treat any accused of criminal wrongdoing as innocent, until he or she is proven guilty. Although a POI lacks an authoritative definition, this overarching principle of procedural fairness is so robust and vital for the exercise of legal power in matters of criminal law that one rarely finds anyone questioning its standing. In this article I examine the rationale behind the POI from a different perspective. The basic assumption is that this procedural standard captures the tenor of a broader principle which seeks to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings as well as in criminal law doctrine. I argue that honouring a principle of fairness is not exclusively a matter of criminal procedural law but also something that is deeply rooted in other areas of criminal law doctrine. Hence: not maintaining a principle of fairness in criminal law doctrine could lead to the POI being compromised or even undermined. In the article, I draw attention to three areas in which I believe that criminal law policies threaten a principle of fairness: criminalising remote harm, doctrine of ignorance of law and inversed presumptions of guilt. My conclusion is that some solutions to so called doctrinal problems in criminal law, are questionable and their practical consequences (on a general level) are, at least partially, equal to treating an individual (in a trial) as guilty for something for which he or she ought not to be accountable. Hence: gaining the support of a POI could thus work as principle for keeping the use of criminal law moderate and in accordance with a principle of fairness.