故意犯罪形态的原因自由行为探究——以所谓“双重故意”为中心

在陷于无责任能力状态的情形中,成立故意犯形态原因自由行为的主观条件是行为人在原因行为之时就希望或放任犯罪结果的发生,并且在原因行为之时希望或放任自己陷入无责任能力状态。但不宜使用双重故意这一用语。无责任能力状态下行为人的客体错误,在归责层面上属于打击错误。原因自由行为故意犯没有中止形态存在的空间。它不仅可以存在于纯粹结果犯之中,而且也能在限定行为模式结果犯、单纯举动犯甚至自手犯之中存在。     

过失犯的实行行为性与规范构造

关注于行为在规范上偏离“一般人”标准的新过失论思考模式助长了当前司法认定当中过失犯、行政犯的过度扩张趋势。应该回归修正的旧过失论，夯实对行为人主观心态的证明。基于修正的旧过失论的立场，可以将结果回避义务视为承认或阻却实行行为与结果之间因果关系的前提条件，而结果回避可能性的不存在具有将实行行为止于未遂的机能。故意犯未遂与过失犯未遂在行为构造上可以相同，两者不同的可罚性由责任阶段的评价所决定。故意与过失只能通过责任阶段行为人主观上的认识与认识可能性进行区分。在社会行为论的基础上，实行行为理论不仅实现了构成要件行为的实质化，而且具有与客观归责理论同样的效果。在此前提下，故意与过失的区分应该围绕行为人的认识问题而非行为问题展开，故意所要达到的程度是“对结果发生具体可能性的认识”，达不到这一程度的有认识的过失依然只是一种“认识可能性”。无认识的过失要上升为刑法规范所苛责的恶，需要在认识能力的形成过程中考察认识可能性，并在证明上严格达到“应当预见”的程度。     

原因自由行为可罚性之论证

原因自由行为,是指行为人由于故意或过失使自己陷于无责任能力状态,并在此状态下实施的危害社会的行为。根据刑法中的行为理论,在原因自由行为中,结果行为不具有刑法意义,原因行为与结果行为之间存在直接的因果关系,原因行为才应当被认定为实行行为。     

过失共同正犯否定论

二人以上共同过失实施实行行为,导致犯罪结果发生的,就是过失共同正犯问题.过失共同正犯与结果加重犯是两种结构并不相同的犯罪类型,不能以肯定结果加重犯的共同正犯为由,进而肯定过失的共同正犯;过失共同正犯与过失同时犯在因果关系上存在重大差异,在过失同时犯中,所有行为人的行为均和结果存在因果关系,但过失共同正犯并非如此,不能将过失共同正犯转换为过失同时犯.犯罪共同说以“违反共同注意义务”和行为共同说以“一般意义的意思联络”为由肯定过失犯可以成立共同正犯的说理逻辑不能成立.肯定过失共同正犯会与民法共同危险行为的责任原理相冲突.作为共同正犯主观成立条件的意思联络只能是由客观违法构成要件所决定的共同犯罪故意,过失犯不能成立共同正犯,对于过失共同正犯不能适用部分实行全部责任原则.     

论原因自由行为中实行行为的着手问题

对于原因自由行为中实行行为着手的认定,应当坚持"实行行为与责任能力同时存在"为内容的责任原则。"结果行为说"与"两分说"因与责任原则存在冲突而具有明显的不合理性。"利用行为说"基本上是妥当的,应将原因行为认定为原因自由行为中的实行行为。并可以将原因自由行为作与间接正犯相似的理解,原因自由行为类似于将自己的身体当作工具实施犯罪的间接正犯,对其实行行为的着手,需要能够看出实现犯罪的现实危险性。     

论过失犯的实行行为

应站在法益侵害的角度对实行行为进行实质性的解释。中国传统理论对过失犯的实行行为关注不够,需要检讨。应当承认过失犯的实行行为,但传统的"注意义务违反说"不足取;基于客观归责理论,可将过失犯的实行行为定义为"创设并实现法不容许的风险的行为"。     

论实行行为的存在范围与归责原则的修正

实行行为是指对法益侵害有紧迫危险性的定型性行为,“责任与行为同在”原则是指责任与实行行为同在。但并非所有犯罪的成立都需要实行行为。在预备犯、独立教唆犯、过失犯、原因自由行为、间接正犯等特殊情形中,都没有实行行为。这就需要对归责原则进行修正,而以因果归责原则为补充原则,只要行为人主观上有过错,客观上其行为给法益造成了损害或有造成损害的现实危险,就可令行为人承担刑事责任。     

结果加重犯本质探究

结果加重犯在客观上是一种双行为双结果的结构.其加重结果是由基本行为与后续行为累积造成的,且基本行为本身蕴含发牛重结果的风险;主观上则存在基本犯罪是故意而对加重结果是过失或故意,及基本行为是过失加重结果也为过失的情形.而刑法上的结合犯,如果从广义理解,即结合两个单一的犯罪为一个犯罪的类犁.可见,结果加重犯在本质上,应当归属为结合犯的一种,两者都是以单一的刑罚规定来取代刑法总则竞合规则的适用,即以重刑取代轻刑.     

过失基准行为论:过失犯刑事责任范围的限定

我国传统过失犯理论无力对抗片面地从危害结果引出的处罚要求,具有鲜明的结果归责倾向。引进＂注意义务＂和＂注意能力＂这两个概念,虽然有助于使过失心态认定更为精确,但显然不能彻底解决传统理论的上述问题。要实现过失刑事责任范围的合理限定,必须借助＂过失基准行为＂这一理论工具,在过失犯认定过程中赋予＂行为＂以实质作用。过失基准行为则是指包含法不容许的危险的行为。     

结果加重犯复杂罪过形式研究

结果加重犯是指实施故意犯罪行为,发生基本犯罪构成结果以外的加重结果,刑法规定了加重刑罚的犯罪形态.结果加重犯的基本罪的罪过形式只能是故意.危险性理论是从整体和规范的角度认定结果加重犯的正当化根据,而复合形态论则是从局部和事实层面分析结果加重犯的结构,两种理论并非不可协调,反而可以相融共生.在事实层面上,结果加重犯在基本罪和加重结果上存在着“故意+故意”和“故意+过失”两种不同罪过形式,两种罪过形式同时存在.当然,从规范立场来看,这样的罪过形式最终可能被认定为故意,但这不能成为否认这种特殊罪过形式在事实层面上存在的理由.     

Actio Libera in Causa

The actio libera in causa doctrine, as originally formulated by various Enlightenment philosophers, concerns the imputation of responsibility to actors for actions unfree in themselves, but free in their causes. Like our Enlightenment counterparts, contemporary philosophers of criminal law, as well as most Western legal systems (both common law and civil), allow that persons can be responsible for acts that are not free when performed, provided they were free in their causes. The actio libera doctrine allows us to impute unfree actions to persons, provided they were responsible for causing the conditions of unfreedom that characterizes those actions when performed. This doctrine seems to be instantiated in a great many actual legal practices. But I argue that we must distinguish between two importantly different understandings of the doctrine itself and its application in law. On the one hand, the actio libera doctrine allows us to waive the voluntariness requirement that is generally needed for criminal liability. On the other hand, it disallows defendants to appeal to defences they would otherwise be entitled to use to block liability, if they culpably created the conditions of their own defence. The first case involves rules of imputation, while the second concerns culpability, and justifying the actio libera doctrine therefore faces different challenges in the two cases.     

共同过失犯罪行为理论研究——兼论行为理论的重构

两人或者两人以上基于相同的过失共同造成损害结果即为共同过失犯罪,但现有的共同犯罪理论和行为理论并不能合理解决这类行为的定罪量刑问题。重构行为理论,将行为理解为"行为人运用一定的主客观条件作用于特定的人或物的存在状态的过程",过失共同犯罪就是行为人之间在相互利用对方行为之际,应当控制而没有控制,最终造成了实际损害结果,所以应当分别按照过失犯罪定罪处罚。     

Entrapment Through the Lens of the Actio Libera in Causa

The entrapment defense is a puzzle of long standing. One the one hand, we are offended by the government’s subjecting someone vulnerable to extreme temptation. It seems like something anyone might fall prey to. On the other hand, it is hard to explain why someone who actually commits, or attempts a crime, and who would be liable if anyone other than the government had tempted him, should escape punishment. His blameworthiness seems the same. This essay seeks to illuminate this puzzle by showing how it parallels the long-standing debate surrounding the criminal law problem of the actio libera in causa—situations in which someone seeks to escape liability by contriving to put a certain defense in place, such as provoking his victim into attacking him, so that he can then kill him in self-defense. The parallels between the two problems do not serve to resolve either, but make them appear in a rather different light.     

Provocateurs

When a provocateur intentionally provokes a deadly affray, the law of self-defense holds that the provocateur may not use deadly force to defend himself. Why is this so? Provocateurs are often seen as just one example of the problem of actio libera in causa, the causing of the conditions of one’s defense. This article rejects theories that maintain a one-size-fits-all approach to actio libera in causa, and argues that provocateurs need specific rules about why they forfeit their defensive rights. This article further claims that provocateurs need to be distinguished from their cousins, initial aggressors, as initial aggressors engage in conduct that grounds the permissibility of the defender’s behavior whereas the provocateur’s behavior does not justify the respondent’s use of force against him. In addition, this article rejects that the basis of this forfeiture can be found in the doctrines surrounding when and why mitigation for provocation is appropriate for the respondent. Provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights for the very simple reason that they start the fight. This forfeiture occurs when they behave culpably, meaning that they subjectively appreciate that they are running the risk of causing force to be used against them and they engage in this behavior without justification or excuse. The question of when the provocateur’s behavior is justified is incredibly complex. It requires analysis of when it is that one is justified in increasing the risk of another’s wrongdoing. Any analysis of this justification must take seriously the liberty rights of the potential provocateur to engage in otherwise permissible behavior. Moreover, the determination of whether the provocateur is justified will turn on whether the later acts that he puts into motion are themselves justified. Thus, when Charles Bronson in the movie Death Wish presents himself as a victim so that muggers will attack him, the justifiability of his conduct in appearing as a vulnerable victim will turn on whether he is entitled to engage in this conduct, intending to later defend himself. This article argues that in Death Wish-type cases, the reason that the provocateur is not justified is because he becomes a vigilante, thereby usurping the role of the state and undermining rule of law values.     

论共同过失犯罪的立法完善

我国刑法明文规定:“共同犯罪是指二人以上的共同故意犯罪;共同过失犯罪,不以共同犯罪论处。”这一方面在立法上承认有共同过失犯罪行为,另一方面又不确认其为共同犯罪,这与现实情况及共同犯罪的法理极不相称。因此,我国刑法在立法上确认共同过失犯罪为共同犯罪,并完善共同犯罪人和刑事责任的规定,确属十分必要。     

累犯的前提条件：犯罪还是刑罚？——对《刑法修正案（八）》第6条的解读

《刑法修正案（八）》第6条的用语特征能引发我们反思通说对累犯前提的界定。通过语义分析,《刑法》第65条的＂但书＂仅对后罪起限制作用。从实质层面分析,主观恶性、人身危险性都不是累犯的本质特征,累犯的本质在于行为人的自由刑钝感。因此,累犯前提条件的重心是受刑的经历,累犯并不关心前罪的罪责类型与主体年龄。作为过失犯罪或未成年人犯罪结果的刑罚执行,也可以作为累犯的前提。     

错位与归位:滥用职权罪立法的检讨与重构

对于修订后的刑法所新设的滥用职权罪,目前主流的观点认为其是故意犯罪,但相关的论证实难令人信服。合理的思路或许是区分不同的层面进行解读:从实然的角度分析,现行刑法中确立的滥用职权罪是过失犯罪;但从应然的角度反思,滥用职权罪的正确定位应是故意犯罪。为此,应当通过立法修正的形式对其进行理性重构。     

论《刑法》第133条之1的规范目的及其适用

醉酒型危险驾驶罪是过失犯罪,其成立要件是,行为人故意在道路上醉酒驾驶了机动车,但对其醉酒驾驶行为所引起的公共安全的抽象危险仅仅存在过失。对故意在道路上醉酒驾驶机动车并故意引起公共安全的抽象危险的行为,应当认定为以危险方法危害公共安全罪的未遂犯。在确定拘役的期限时,要以血液里的酒精含量为基准,同时考虑案件的各种具体情节;在计算罚金的数额时,要以行为人的税后月收入为基准,同时考虑行为人血液里的酒精含量。在道路上醉酒驾驶机动车而成立的危险驾驶罪,完全可能由于发生了严重的实害结果而转化为其它犯罪,或者由于行为人主观意思的质变而被其它犯罪所吸收,从而需要按照发生了转化或者吸收结果的重罪来处罚。     

Intoxication and Culpability

I tackle the difficult problem of specifying how voluntary intoxication affects criminal culpability generally and recklessness in particular. I contend that the problem need not be conceptualized as an instance of actio libera in causa, namely the situation in which persons do something at t1 to culpably create the conditions of their own defense at t2. Instead, I argue that we need only consider intoxicated defendants at t2 in order to justify their punishment. In the course of defending my view, I challenge conventional wisdom about both the nature of recklessness and the effects of intoxicants. I conclude by discussing a possible ground on which involuntary intoxication might be treated differently.