法治的法律:人化的道德

本文以探讨法治条件下法律与道德的关系为宗旨，提出了法治之法律是人化的道德这一新的命题。文章认为，一方面，法治是一种人化的道德需要，另一方面，法治也是主体普遍道德需要的制度安排和规范表达。人化道德的基本要求是公平、普遍、人权、自由、秩序、公开、程序和发展等，相应地，法治之法律必须以记载并确保主体的这些道德精神需求为宗旨。文章还结合我国国情，提出以“以法治推进道德，可否？”这一问题，并给予相关的回答     

法律与道德的一致性和互补性是德治法治并举的理论基础

正确认识和理解法律与道德的关系 ,是把握和贯彻德治法治并举方略的关键。通过分析法律与道德各自的优劣 ,阐明了法律与道德互补的可能性 ;从对法律与道德的一致性和互补性的分析中 ,得出“法律与道德的一致性和互补性是德治法治并举的理论基础”的观点。     

法治与德治互动结合发展研究——以对欧美法学家论法律与道德关系的评析为视角

法律与道德的关系,在法哲学的范畴,就是实然法与应然法之间的关系。这是法学、特别是法哲学的一个重大而艰巨的问题。在当代西方法哲学中,对法律与道德的关系这一论题的争论主要集中在:法律与道德的关系;道德的法律强制;如何处理法律与道德的矛盾和冲突。通过对欧美法学家对法律与道德关系的评析,便于正确理解法律与道德的关系,实现法治与德治的互动结合。     

论法治推进道德建设的基本途径

本文立足于法律与道德关系理论的基础之上,从法治与道德建设的相互作用入手,深入研究了法治推进道德建设的基本途径。文中指出法治推进道德建设的基本途径主要在于法律运行的四个基本环节,即立法、执法、守法与司法。假设国家(政府)能够做到立法的公平、执法的正义、守法的道德使命与司法的道德保障,就能够实现法治对道德建设的推进。     

论法与道德的关系

本文通过从对道德的特点和功能的分析入手,论述了法治社会中法律和道德的辩证统一性以及讨论法律与道德之间关系的现实意义。     

富勒和法律的“内在道德”——浅析富勒的法律内在道德性观点

富勒是美国著名的法理学家,也是新自然法学派的主要代表人物之一.他提出了法的本质的目的性和法律必要的发展方向,使“法律事业”的特殊性体现在或者归因于具体的法律形式.他强调,法律与道德是紧密相连的,而且开创性地提出了法律的“内在道德”这一观点,指出法律的存在必须遵循一定的标准.富勒的新自然法理论阐明了法律与道德的关系以及法治的基本原则,将永恒不变的自然法变成了可变的活法,从而使我们对相关的问题有了更为深刻的理解和认识.     

关于法律的道德支撑问题的几点思考

法治这一治国方略的核心内容是树立法律权威，培养法律信仰。法律权威的树立，法律信仰的形成，不仅要求法律从形式上具有严密而完整的逻辑体系，而且要从内容上寻找法的道德支撑，从运行过程中寻求道德支撑。本文阐释了道德如何为法律提供心理基础，并就如何改善道德环境，减小道德与法律之间的冲突，促进法治发展提出了自己的看法。     

论道德法律化与法律道德化

法治，既意味着善法之治，更蕴含着人类对普遍的道德理念价值与终极关怀目的之追求；法治，不仅仅是冷冰冰的规则体系与制度的客观组合，而且还包容了人类在认识与改造主客观世界过程中对自身生活目的和价值理想的情愫记载。道德法律化，既是将人类的道德理想、原则、规范铸为法律的过程，也是善法由此产生并存在的过程；法律道德化，则是使法律内化为更高的道德权利与道德义务的过程，更是法律得以被社会主体普遍遵守乃至信仰的过程。由是观之，由道德法律化到法律道德化，当是人类由人治走向法治的自然历史过程     

法律与道德的关系问题的评析

古往今来,道德与法律作为调整人们权利义务关系的社会规范,伴随着人类社会从野蛮逐步走向文明.尽管道德与法律在调整人们行为的手段上存在诸多的不同,但在大多数情况下,二者在作用发挥上是相互促进、互为补充的,但在实践中,彼此发生冲突的情况也时有发生.如果说道德是唤醒人们心中的那份良善,法律就是震慑人们心中的恶念,而处理好两者之间的关系对我国法治社会的现代化建设举足轻重.关于法律与道德关系的论证存在着丰富的理论渊源,在本文中,笔者将以古典自然法学派与分析法学派的论战的解读为视角,通过将国内外理论界关于法律与道德关系的不同观点进行阐述,在总结的基础上提出一些可行性建议.     

论法律与道德的冲突

法律与道德的关系是一个亘古的法哲学问题,众多的法学思想家对其二者关系中的冲突问题,更是展开了旷日持久的大争论,本文拟从论证法律与道德是有联系的这一问题入手,并适当概括地否定了自然法学派恶非法的这一观点后,就较多的论述了法律与道德的冲突所产生的原因,表现的方面,冲突的意义以及解决冲突的手段和方法等。在文章的第四部分也适当地谈了一些法律与道德冲突之下人们对法律的遵守和对道德的默守等等。     

刑法和道德的界限考察

刑法和道德之间存在一定程度的联系,两者都是调整人类行为的社会规范,如果能在两者之间划出一条清晰的界限作为调整犯罪行为或道德行为的标准,显然非常重要。应从刑法理论、司法实践及几种道德分类等方面去剖析道德和刑法的界限问题。     

论冲突中的道德和法律

道德和法律的冲突来源于道德的多元化。在专制主义下 ,道德和法律的冲突的调整方式是取消冲突或放任冲突。这两种方式被历史证明是行不通的。适度冲突论是解决道德和法律冲突的设想 ,目的就是要在二者适度的冲突中推动法治不断地进步。     

法与德的冲突及其法理思考

作为社会调整的基本规范,法与德冲突与互补同在,矛盾与互动并行。透视该种态势存在的根据,把握两种规范的社会定位,缓解乃至部分消除法与德的冲突,建立两者之间的协调互动关系,正是本文主旨所在。实践中的执法、司法的道德化倾向不仅混淆了法与德的界限,而且背离了法治社会的本质要求。     

法与道德关系模式的历史反思

西方学者在法与道德关系的争论中提出了许多模式 ,著名的有康德模式、富勒模式、哈特模式等。这些模式虽然在某种程度上能揭示法与道德的关系 ,但都不够理想。法和道德都有观念、规范或制度、秩序三个层次 ,二者的观念层次是相通的和深藏于现在一般所说的价值观念之中。另外 ,在秩序层次二者也是很难区分的 ,因为它都落实在人的行为中 ,而一个行为 ,如果符合秩序的要求或构成社会秩序的话 ,可能同时具有法律意义和道德意义。这样 ,法与道德的区别主要存在于规范或制度层次。     

Should Law track Morality?

Does the moral status of an action provide in itself a non-instrumental, pro-tanto reason for a corresponding legal status—a reason that applies regardless of whether the law promotes a value that is independent of the law, such as preventing wrongdoing or promoting utility or distributive or retributive justice, regardless of the consequences of doing so? While the relation between morality and law is a familiar topic, this specific question is rarely discussed explicitly. Yet it seems to be controversial. The article highlights and considers this question, while focusing on the criminal law. It concludes that the answer is negative—there is no necessary relation between morality and law in this respect. Rather, there is a reason in favor of incorporating morality into the law only when this incorporation promotes a moral value that is independent of the law.     

论法和道德的现实与未来的冲突及构造

道德是法的价值核心．法是基本道德的国家强制。以建立社会主义法治国家为目标的中国应完成的任务不能仅仅只是法律体系的完备与转型,即停留在道德的法律化阶段,更重要的在于实现法律的道德化,即法与道德的和谐。     

On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality*

Abstract. The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions as well as whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality.     

The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl‐Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory.     

The Nature of Law and Potential Coercion

This paper argues for a novel understanding of the relationship between law and coercion. It firstly refutes Kenneth Himma’s claim that the authorisation of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a conceptually necessary feature of law. It then claims that the best way to understand the law is as coercion‐apt. The “coercion‐aptness” of law is clarified, in part, by appealing to an essential distinction between law and morality: Whereas it can be reasonable for the law to appeal to coercive means in order to motivate compliance, it seems decidedly unreasonable for morality to do so.     

The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?*

Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status accorded to morality in debates about the grounds of law. The claim I seek to advance is that very often judicial engagement with morality is not different in kind to judicial engagement with other diverse objects of legal reasoning. What the comparison tends to show is that instances of “moral reasoning” in law do not obviously challenge our account of the grounds of law. Rather these instances can be viewed as central case examples of legal reasoning. Conventional grounds of law are left untouched.