Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative,Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum

This article confronts the controversies surrounding Article 50 by analysing the relationship between statute and prerogative in the UK. The piece focuses on domestic constitutional issues and suggests a new way of classifying the relationship between statute and prerogative into two types falling under ‘the abeyance principle’ or ‘the frustration principle’. The abeyance principle means that where statute and prerogative overlap, the prerogative goes into abeyance. The frustration principle means that where statute and prerogative give rise to potential inconsistencies, but do not overlap, the prerogative cannot be used inconsistently with the intention of parliament as expressed in the relevant legislation. It then argues that Article 50 has the status of primary or ‘primary‐equivalent’ legislation which could justify applying the abeyance principle. This would mean that the trigger power would be exercised on statutory authority rather than through prerogative powers. If the courts are unable thus to construe the relevant legislation it argues EU law requires the courts to bridge the gap. Alternatively, if the abeyance principle is not applicable, it argues the frustration principle could apply but the circumstances in this litigation fall outside it. In the further alternative, EU law could require the frustration principle itself to be set aside in this case.     

Mixed Messages in Bottles: the European Union,Devolution, and the Future of the Constitution

An unprecedented eleven‐member UK Supreme Court decided R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on 24 January 2017. The Government's argument, that it could start the process of withdrawing from the EU using a prerogative power instead of an Act of Parliament, was comprehensively defeated by an 8:3 majority. However, the Government also secured a unanimous verdict that it did not need the consent from the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland before invoking Article 50 of the TEU. I explore the judicial argumentation in light of Philip Bobbitt's six modalities of constitutional argument, five of which feature, and one of which ought to have featured, in this seminal case.     

Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU. Impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

Abstract: This article analyses the development of administrative human rights in the EU. It demonstrates that the new right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights crowns a long process of constitutionalisation of basic administrative rights in the Community. The article discusses the meaning, content, and possible impact of Article 41 of the Charter. It explains, inter alia, the doctrinal basis of a ‘right to good administration’, and its more immediate origins. It also offers a textual analysis and commentary of Article 41. Other rights, which possibly come within the concept of ‘good administration’ but are not included in Article 41, are also suggested. The article concludes with an evaluation of Article 41 of the Charter. It argues that although Article 41 is a significant development in terms of individual administrative rights, it offers a one‐sided vision of the function of administrative law.     

Re-Evaluating ‘Best Interests’ in the Wake of Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust & Anors

In Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust, the latest of a number of cases concerning whether a child can travel abroad for treatment that doctors in the UK do not consider to be in their best interests, the High Court held that the hospital had acted unlawfully by failing to consider the child's rights under EU law when refusing to allow her to travel. Although this derogation could be justified on public policy grounds, as such treatment was, on the facts, in her best interests, no further interference with her rights was justified. In making this finding, the court recognised the ‘stress’ that such a case placed on the best interests test, lending weight to the argument for moving instead to a risk of significant harm threshold for judicial intervention in parental decisions, which better accounts for legitimate differences of value and strikes a better balance under Article 8 ECHR.     

Becoming a Threat: The Burqa and the Contestation Over Public Morality Law in France

Through an examination of legislative debate and court opinions, this article illustrates that the French understanding of public order policing as a bulwark of freedom and national sovereignty deeply informed the development of (and contestation surrounding) the 2010 ban on all facial coverings in public. This ban notably includes the burqa or niqab, garments worn by a small minority of Muslim women in France. This article has two aims. The first is to expand on the sociolegal argument about the contested nature of rights protections and constitutional constraints on legislative authority by highlighting how a nation's legal culture can profoundly shape that contestation. The second aim of this article is to show, through a technique called legal archaeology, how longstanding French views on rights confront current European‐inspired alternative views that would give more weight to individualistic protections against state action than has traditionally been the case in France.     

The Rule of Reason in European Citizenship

Abstract:  This article reviews the European Court of Justice's case-law on European citizenship in the light of aspects of the rights theories of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. More specifically, the free movement right in Article 18(1) EC is conceptualised as a Dworkinian principle and as a prima-facie right or 'optimisation precept' in Alexy's sense. Against this backdrop the article argues that Article 18(1) can best be interpreted by drawing an analogy with the economic free movement provisions. The central argument is that the rule of reason also applies to European citizenship, or that there is a rule of reason in European citizenship. The analogy encompasses both the definition of the scope of Article 18(1) and its limitations. With regard to the latter, it is contended that there is no conceptual distinction between the 'limitations' and 'conditions' referred to in that provision. Particular emphasis is placed on the recent case-law concerning the question of access to welfare benefits. In this regard it is suggested that the notion of a 'structural link' constitutes both a threshold criterion to trigger the prima-facie right in Article 18(1) as well as a benchmark for assessing the degree of solidarity owed to the migrant citizen. The rule of reason approach leads to the stipulation of a thin, juridical conception of European citizenship that does not rely in any way on thick, essentialist properties.     

论行政诉讼的司法变更权

行政诉讼法第54条第4项规定:“行政处罚显失公正的,可以判决变更。”这为司法变更权的行使提供了法律依据。但是司法变更权从开始设定到实施,学界和实务部门一直存在分歧和争论。本文从司法变更权的理论基础出发,界定司法变更权的内涵,分析现行法律规定的不足,从理论和实践上突破现行法律的框架,完善司法变更权介入行政诉讼的广度和深度,力求确立一个完善行政诉讼司法变更权的开放性思路。     

反对司法审查的核心理由

本文清楚地阐述了反对立法的司法审查的核心理由,适些理由是在特殊宪法体系下,封特殊决策和司法审查出现的历史的简洁讨论中得出的。本文批判司法审查基于两个基础：第一,文章主张没有理由认为由司法审查保护权利能比由民主的立法机关做得更好。第二,本文认为,除了产生的结果外,司法审查是民主但不正当的。然而,反对司法审查的理由也不是绝对或者无条件的。在本文中,这些理由以若干条件为前提,包括假定社会有着运作良好的民主机构,社会申的大部分公民认真对待权利（即使他们可能并不赞同他们拥有的权利）。文章末尾则讨论这些前提条件丧失时会出现的情形。     

The prohibition to abuse one's human rights: A theory

Supporters of communism, national socialism and radical Islamism, but also people who incite racial hatred or deny the Holocaust, see their rights severely curtailed by the abuse clause of Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights. To make sense of this provision, this paper first introduces the distinction between abusable and non‐abusable rights in order to delimit the scope of Article 17. Then, this paper suggests a “test” to spot instances of abuse of human rights by borrowing the concept of performative self‐contradiction from speech act theory. Article 17 is reconceptualised as dealing with conduct that self‐contradictorily uses rights but simultaneously denies their very idea. In this way, it becomes possible to make sense of and to unify the disparate case law that Article 17 has generated so far: it equally targets political human rights abuse, attacking liberal democracy in general; and exclusionary human rights abuse, attacking the rights of other people.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act

Under the Human Rights Act so far there has been until very recently little judicial or even academic recognition of the difference between resolving clashes of Convention rights and addressing conflicts between utilitarian concerns and such rights. This article has chosen to illustrate that failure of recognition and to consider methods of resolving the conflict between rights, by concentrating on one particular clash of rights – that between media free speech under Article 10 and the privacy of children under Article 8. It argues for presumptive equality for the two rights and for conducting a 'parallel analysis' of their application to the circumstances of a particular case. It contends that therefore the principle that the child's welfare is paramount must be abandoned in its present form, as must the presumptive priority accorded to Article 10 where that principle is not found to apply.     

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Criminal Suspect

In In re JR38, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a 14 year‐old boy who argued that the dissemination of his image, taken whilst he was participating in sectarian rioting, to local newspapers, violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the Court was divided on whether or not the measures taken by the police engaged the applicant's Article 8(1) rights at all. This case raises fundamental questions as to the scope of private life in the context of criminal investigations, and the place of the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in determining whether Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged. This case comment subjects the majority's interpretation of Article 8(1) to critical scrutiny, concluding that this interpretation may unduly restrict the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to criminal investigations.     

Güler and Öngel v Turkey: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Strasbourg's Discourse on the Justified Use of Force

This article discusses the discourse on the justified use of force in the Strasbourg Court's analysis of Article 3. With particular focus on the judgment in Güler and Öngel v Turkey, a case concerning the use of force by State agents against demonstrators, it addresses the question of the implications of such discourse, found in this and other cases, on the absolute nature of Article 3. It offers a perspective which suggests that the discourse on the justified use of force can be reconciled with Article 3's absolute nature.     

税务和解对行政和解的扩张——以案件范围为中心

《税务行政复议规则》第八十六条和《行政复议实施条例》第四十条均是对和解的案件范围的表述.通过从这两个有关和解范围的条文对比,不难看出税务和解较行政和解有扩张之趋势,税务和解作为税务行政机关纠纷解决的内部机制,其扩张必然会对司法审查和纳税人权利保护产生相当大地冲击,对其必须加以限制.     

The Special Case Thesis and the Dual Nature of Law

In this article, I take up two arguments in favor of the discursive model of legal argumentation: the claim to correctness argument and the dual nature thesis. The argument of correctness implies the dual nature thesis, and the dual nature thesis implies a nonpositivistic concept of law. The nonpositivistic concept of law comprises five ideas. One of them is the special case thesis. The special case thesis says that positivistic elements, that is, statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, are necessary for law in order to achieve legal certainty. Without this, law would not be as perfect as it could possibly be. But it says, at the same time, that this alone would not be enough to fulfill the claim to correctness. The claim to correctness refers not only to the real dimension of law, defined by statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, but also to its ideal dimension, defined, first and foremost, by justice. The special case thesis is my oldest thesis. It has remained an essential element of my system over the years. Its connection with four other theses—the Radbruch formula, the human rights thesis, the idea of deliberative democracy, and principles theory—does not change this at all. On the contrary, this connection has lent greater strength to the special case thesis.     

Citizen Led Policing in the Digital Realm: Paedophile Hunters and Article 8 in the case of Sutherland v Her Majesty's Advocate

In Sutherland v Her Majesty's Advocate, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal which argued that the use of communications obtained by a paedophile hunter group as evidence in criminal prosecution was a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case raises fundamental questions of the scope of the right to private life as regards to the content of communications and the role played by private actors in the criminal justice process. This note argues that by limiting the protection of Article 8 to private communications which satisfy a contents-based test, the Court has bypassed the Article 8(2) balancing test to the detriment of the due process rights of the accused. The note concludes that the decision opens up the prospect of the state circumventing the accused's Article 8 privacy rights by lending tacit approval to the proactive investigations of these private ‘paedophile hunter’ groups.     

The future of claims to resist removal by non-nationals suffering from HIV/AIDS

The focus of this article is to consider the difficulties facing non-nationals suffering HIV/AIDS to resist removal to their countries of origin where there is no or inadequate medical treatment. The link between HIV/AIDS and migration will be explored illustrating the vulnerability of displaced people to the virus. The current UK legal position for those attempting to resist removal in such circumstances will be explored. The article will explore two potential avenues that may prevent removal of non-nationals with HIV/AIDS to countries with limited access to the necessary treatment. In the first instance consideration of Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) will be made with particular emphasis on mother and child claims. The second argument will examine the potential for refugee claims under Article 1A (2) Refugee Convention 1951 where an applicant may be able to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution because of membership to a particular social group. The authors will particularly emphasise the argument that in certain countries sufferers will experience ostracism and victimisation where its severity may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR and persecution under the Refugee Convention. Vanessa Bettinson and Dr Alwyn Jones, senior lecturers, De Montfort University. The authors would like to thank Professor Tony Barnett at London School of Economics for his useful and invaluable thoughts and comments. We would also like to thank our colleague Gavin Dingwall and the students in our 2006/07 Immigration and Refugee Law seminars for their very helpful feedback.     

Quest for the Holy Grail—Is a Unified Approach to the Market Freedoms and European Citizenship Justified?

The case law of the CJEU on the economic free movement of people has departed from the traditional requirement that a nexus must be established between individual free movement and cross‐border economic activity, which has led to an extension of its scope. It is submitted that concerns with the protection of fundamental rights of European citizens are driving this process, and that the CJEU has sought to protect these fundamental rights through the market freedoms in two ways: by arguing that market freedoms are fundamental right themselves, and/or that European Citizenship has changed their normative underpinnings and status. This Article criticises both lines of argument, and defends a third: that the protection of these fundamental rights must be achieved at European level, if at all, through a conception of European Citizenship able to stand on its own.     

A Paradox in the Making: Detecting Something Positive in UPA Under the Ten Kate Effect

Abstract:  The European Court of Justice has persisted in adopting an unduly restrictive interpretation of Article 230(4) EC and that persistence has reached its apogee in the UPA decision, while at the same time it was mirrored in the relevant provisions of the draft Constitution. Therefore, it is surprising to see that in the aftermath of UPA , there can be something positive that can be explored further and that can be tested in order to establish whether any indirect, alas limited, liberalisation of the standing criteria is possible. The Ten Kate case established that, in principle, a Member State could be under an obligation under domestic law to challenge the validity of Community legislation. If the state, in all of its different manifestations, fails to challenge the validity of a Community measure when such an obligation arises under municipal law, then the citizen could be in a position to claim compensation. Therefore, the case introduces the doctrine of state liability and the agency analogy (with the state representing the individual or as parens patriae) as connected paths trying to circumvent the standing restrictions. The advantage is that the proceedings would take place under national law and would be detached from the Plaumann conditions. It is proposed that constitutionally entrenched human rights, like effective judicial protection, combined with the principle of legitimate expectation, could create the legal basis for an obligation of the state under national law to challenge the validity of Community norms. The paradox is that effective judicial protection was the exact argument that the European Court of Justice sidelined in UPA .     

Out of Many,One? Strasbourg's Ibrahim Decision on Article 6

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Ibrahim v United Kingdom on 13 September 2016. Relying on Salduz v Turkey, the applicants claimed, largely unsuccessfully, that denial of access to a lawyer during police questioning, and subsequent admission into evidence of statements made in the course of that questioning, violated fair trial rights protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The comment suggests that the decision's unusually emphatic statements about Article 6's ‘internal structure’ have consequences for assessing violations in future applications. Further, the decision creates greater room for public interest balancing in Article 6 cases. The decision may thus undermine the Article 6 guarantees.