A Dive into Deep Constitutional Waters: Article 50, the Prerogative and Parliament

This article analyses the Article 50 TEU debate and the argument that for the UK Government to trigger the formal withdrawal process without explicit parliamentary authorisation would be unlawful, because it would inevitably result in the removal of rights enjoyed under EU law and the frustration of the purpose of the statutes giving those rights domestic effect. After a brief survey of Article 50, this article argues first of all that the power to trigger Article 50 remains within the prerogative, contesting Robert Craig's argument in this issue that it is now a statutory power. It then suggests a number of arguments as to why the frustration principle may be of only doubtful application in this case, and in doing so it re‐examines one of the key authorities prayed in aid of it ‐ the Fire Brigades Union case.     

Falling into Line? The Hostile Environment and the Legend of the ‘Judges’ Revolt’

In 2012 the Government made a number of controversial changes to the Immigration Rules, which it claimed would ‘comprehensively reform the approach taken towards ECHR Article 8 in immigration cases’. This paper examines the judicial response, arguing that the courts ‘fell into line’, adapting human rights law to the government's aims through unprincipled and opportunistic techniques, whilst inflicting hardship and injustice on working-class British citizens in particular. Four key moves are identified. First, the courts created an ‘incapable’ test which immunised the rules from in principle challenges. Second, Lord Bingham's Article 8 test, in which the reasonableness of any family member relocation was a central consideration, was replaced with a far less family-friendly test. Third, the courts adopted an ultra-lax rationality test at common law, even when the ‘fundamental rights’ of British citizens were engaged. Finally, the courts identified immigration policy as the ‘constitutional responsibility’ of the executive.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty?

This analysis explores in detail various aspects of the possible legal impact of ‘British’ Protocol No 30 (the so‐called opt‐out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). On the basis of a legal appraisal, it concludes that the Protocol is not in any way to be understood as a substantial derogation from the standard of protection of fundamental rights in the EU or as an ‘opt‐out’ from the Charter in a substantial sense. Nevertheless, its significance is definitely not to be underestimated. Its adoption as a source of primary law enshrines a legally binding interpretation of the Charter and, in particular, an interpretation of its horizontal provisions. In Article 1(2) and Article 2, the Protocol in fact confirms that the application of the Charter cannot lead to a change in the existing competencies framework. These provisions are of a declaratory nature and apply to all Member States. In Article 1(1), the Protocol is of a constitutive nature since it rules out an extensive interpretation of what can be considered national legal acts adopted in the implementation of EU law only for those States signed up to the Protocol. This specifically means that if, in the future, as part of the application of the Charter, the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) has a tendency to subsume a certain area of national legislation under the ‘implementation of Union law’ outside the field of implementing standards, in the spirit of the Ellinki Radiophonia Tileorassi judgment (and subsequently allow their reviewability with respect to their conformity with the Charter), such action would be admissible only for those Member States that have not acceded to the Protocol. However, the Protocol cannot exclude the continued application of the general principles of law instead of the positively constituted fundamental rights in the Charter by the ECJ.     

Brexit and Parliamentary Sovereignty

This note addresses the implications of R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union for the legal principle of parliamentary sovereignty, and argues that the strong restatement of the latter is the most significant feature of the decision. The aim here is to show how traditional principle in the Dicey tradition has been strongly applied against the competing claims of EU law, the royal prerogative, the referendum and devolution. However, the note also argues that the claims relating to parliamentary sovereignty could have produced a different result and that the most compelling feature of the case was the argument that was not forcefully put by the Government, namely that Parliament had already provided sufficient authority for the triggering of Article 50.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

Going Unnoticed? Diagnosing the Right to Asylum in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines the right to asylum. Nonetheless, despite its ‘constitutionalisation’ within primary law, asylum remains a far too amorphous right, whose axiological potential has gone virtually unnoticed in the ongoing migratory crisis. The paper will argue that this is partly due to the fact that the Court of Justice on a few occasions has declined to clarify the scope of Article 18. The provision at issue therefore remains a pathological element that requires an adequate diagnosis on which accurate prognoses can be based. In an attempt to diagnose the right to asylum enshrined in Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, this paper will compare different hermeneutical approaches and reflect on the contextualisation of the mentioned provision through the lens of domestic and EU case law and in the light of the recent EU–Turkey Statement. The article will ultimately propose to interpret the EU asylum legislation as instrumental to the effective exercise of the right to asylum.     

Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

The Emergence and Development of Statutory Process for the Compulsory Purchase of Land for Transport Infrastructure in England and Wales,c.1530–1800

Before 1539, highway improvement in England and Wales (other than the clearance of illegal obstructions) was achieved only by crown licence following a satisfactory inquisition ad quod damnum. Magna Carta chapter 39 recorded that ‘that no free man is to be?…?disseised?…?except by?…?the law of the land’, but in the wake of other wide-ranging reforms in the 1530s, amid a growing sense of the common weal and desire for ‘improvement’, parliament overcame this obstacle to economic infrastructural development by adjustment of ‘the law of the land’, assuming prerogative power and delegating by statute the authority for the compulsory purchase of land. In this case it was for river navigation at Exeter, and not until 1662 was the power extended to roads. Compensation was always to be paid, but legislation rarely stipulated the explicit outright purchase of freehold. Parliament was willing to grant these powers to trustees or other public bodies, or indeed to private individuals, but only if it was considered that doing so served the public interest.     

‘Consumer’ versus ‘Customer’: The Devil in the Detail

According to the European Commission, the objective of EU competition rules is enhancing ‘consumer welfare’. In EU competition law, however, ‘consumer’ means ‘customer’ and encompasses intermediate customers as well as final consumers. Under Article 102TFEU, harming intermediate ‘customers’ is generally presumed to harm ‘consumers’ and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. Using advances in economics of vertical restraints and, in particular, non‐linear pricing, this article shows that there are instances where the effect on ‘customer welfare’ does not coincide with the effect on ‘consumer welfare’ and the presumption can potentially lead to decisional errors. Thus, if the law is to serve the interests of ‘consumers’, the Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ‘consumer’ in ‘consumer welfare’; otherwise, it remains questionable whose interests EU competition law serves.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU. Impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

Abstract: This article analyses the development of administrative human rights in the EU. It demonstrates that the new right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights crowns a long process of constitutionalisation of basic administrative rights in the Community. The article discusses the meaning, content, and possible impact of Article 41 of the Charter. It explains, inter alia, the doctrinal basis of a ‘right to good administration’, and its more immediate origins. It also offers a textual analysis and commentary of Article 41. Other rights, which possibly come within the concept of ‘good administration’ but are not included in Article 41, are also suggested. The article concludes with an evaluation of Article 41 of the Charter. It argues that although Article 41 is a significant development in terms of individual administrative rights, it offers a one‐sided vision of the function of administrative law.     

Effet utile and the (re)organisation of national judiciaries: A not so unique institutional response to a uniquely important challenge?

The current repurposing of the principle of effet utile of European Union law can be found in the revolutionary steps taken by the Court of Justice in its application of Article 19 TEU. The implicit goal of this recent body of case-law is to equip national judges with the tools to resist domestic judicial reforms that affect their freedom to adjudicate independently. Considering Simmenthal to Unibet, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses to the latest case-law relating to the organisation of national judiciaries, this article contends that, while the case-law on judicial independence is unprecedented, the Court of Justice has gone to great lengths to ensure that the developments in EU law precipitated by its rulings are grounded in established doctrine. They follow a line of case-law that builds on the principle of primacy of EU law and the obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law in the domestic legal order. Further, the current trajectory is for Article 19 TEU to form the operational basis of review of any judicially minded reforms, whether they be organisational (Article 19 TEU, together with Article 47 CFREU), limit actually or potentially the freedom for dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice (Article 19 TEU together with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 CFREU) or where they reduce the protection of the value of the rule of law (Article 19 TEU, Article 2 TEU, Article 49 TEU and Article 47 CFREU), with potential implications for the effective application in EU law of the principle of mutual trust.     

Variations in Member States’ Preliminary References to the Court of Justice—Are Structural Factors (Part of) the Explanation?

The preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables national courts to request the Court of Justice to provide a ruling on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal act, is widely considered to be the jewel in the crown of EU law. When considering the number of references from different Member States, it will become immediately apparent that there are considerable variations. This article examines to what extent these variations may be explained by three structural factors, namely (1) population size, (2) willingness to litigate and (3) Member State compliance with EU law. It is concluded that some—but not all—of the variations in number of references from Member State judiciaries may be attributed to structural factors rather than being merely a reflection of different Member State courts’ willingness to make use of Article 267 TFEU on such references (the so‐called behavioural factors).     

Justice,Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union

What are we to make of the authority of legislation within the EU? EU lawyers have questioned the significance of legislative decision‐making within the EU. This article challenges these views and argues that the EU legislature must enjoy adequate freedom to shape EU law with the general interest in mind. Institutional accounts that seek to curtail the authority of legislation tend to rest upon ‘content‐dependent’ conceptions of political legitimacy, according to which the legitimacy of a decision depends on its moral qualities. Such conceptions overlook reasonable disagreements on justice and rest upon an overly optimistic (pessimistic) view of the Court (the legislature). The article argues for a content‐independent conception of legitimacy, following which the benefits of legislative decision‐making are more easily understood. The authority of legislation deserves wider recognition among EU lawyers for reasons of political legitimacy and because the EU legislature is better positioned to decide in the general interest.     

The Last Bite of the BITs—Supremacy of EU Law versus Investment Treaty Arbitration

According to Article 267 TFEU, national courts of the EU Member States can (and sometimes must) ask for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the interpretation and application of Community law, including international treaties and recommendations, and on the validity of Community secondary legislation. In this way, it is ensured that EU citizens are treated equally throughout the Union. However, this is not applicable when it comes to arbitral proceedings, be they commercial or investment arbitrations. The Court does not accept references for preliminary rulings from arbitral tribunals. For this reason, respondent states in international arbitral proceedings have argued that arbitration and EU law are utterly incompatible. In their submissions as respondents in arbitral proceedings, EU Member States have argued that, as a result of EU accession, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been automatically terminated. In subsidiary, they sometimes claim that, due to their incompatibility with EU law, BITs cannot apply. But if BITs are not applicable anymore, there are few remedies left for investors within the EU.     

Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Law

Being absent from work due to sickness is a critical issue for individuals and their employers, but it has traditionally fallen outside the scope of EU employment legislation. This article argues that this is changing; it examines case‐law under the Working Time and Employment Equality Directives. The article considers the justifications that the Court of Justice has advanced to explain this expansion in EU employment law. It finds that the Court has, at times, invoked fundamental social rights as a basis for interpreting employment legislation in a manner favourable to workers. Yet the way in which the Court deploys rights‐based reasoning can be difficult to anticipate, not least the countervailing weight attached to the interests of employers. The case studies indicate that fundamental rights discourse offers a possible foundation for more extensive readings of employment legislation, but it is not a simple ‘trump card’ for advocates of stronger worker protection.     

The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation & Proportionality: A Public Law Principle Adopted into the Private Law of Employment

This article examines the possible adoption of the public law principles of ‘legitimate expectation’ and the standard of ‘proportionality’ as the appropriate and cohesive legal approach to voluntary promises that are normally found in ostensibly non-contractual documents. The article argues that, allowing a further development into the principle of legitimate expectation, which has already been adopted in employment relations as a further development of the implied duty of trust and confidence, could enhance the courts’ approach to the issue of voluntary promises and avoid the unsatisfactory contractual solution that appears to produce inconsistent results. Giving particular consideration to the courts’ application of the proportionality test, thereby recognises an employee’s hierarchy of interests, when seeking to justify an employer’s decision, this article assesses how the influence of the proportionality standard can, and should, offer a more satisfactory solution when applied to resolving disputes.     

Criminal law

The close temporal coincidence of International Human Rights Day 2010 (10 December 2010) and the tenth anniversary of the Human Rights Act 1998 (2 October 2010) stimulates some reflections on the progressive scope and influence of this domestic statute of towering importance. In addition, it seems especially appropriate to examine how Article 2 of the European Convention, which protects the individual’s right to life and is a cornerstone of this treaty, has featured in the jurisprudence of both the European Court and domestic courts. This article considers the celebrated Conjoined Twins case, together with other challenging issues which have confronted the courts – termination of pregnancy, medical prolongation of life, assisted suicide and so-called ‘mercy killing’.     

Restoring Confidence: Replacing the Fixed‐term Parliaments Act 2011

This article considers both the Fixed‐term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) and the political constitution, to place the former in its political and constitutional context. It begins by setting out the background to the FTPA – which was a part of a Coalition agreement – and considers difficulties with the most commonly‐made arguments in favour of fixed‐term parliaments. The second part of the article considers the impact and potential practical legal consequences if the FTPA is repealed without any replacement, arguing that it will only be possible to revive the ‘dissolution’ prerogative by express words in a new Act. The final part of the article addresses the question of whether the prerogative should be revived, before arguing both that it should not and that a statutory power to call an election should be conferred on the Prime Minister subject to a vote by simple majority in the House of Commons.