Black Spiders Weaving Webs: The Constitutional Implications of Executive Veto of Tribunal Determinations

In R (Evans) v Attorney General, the Supreme Court quashed the Attorney General's statutory veto of the Upper Tribunal's original determination made under freedom of information legislation. The Upper Tribunal had held that so‐called ‘advocacy’ memos should be published after a full hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court split five to two, with the lead judgment of Lord Neuberger using constitutional rather than administrative language and focusing on the rule of law. This note raises four objections to the lead judgment. First, it argues that the Upper Tribunal was acting in an executive not judicial capacity and the veto was not therefore a breach of the rule of law. Secondly it suggests the veto clause is best understood as a variant Henry VIII clause. Thirdly, it suggests Lord Neuberger's judgment is founded on a paradox. Finally, it argues that the judgment undermines parliamentary sovereignty. Future implications are then considered.     

Mavericks or misconstruction? A reply to Campbell and Allan

In a jurisdiction without a codified constitution clearly demarcating the role of the courts, and given the centrality of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to the United Kingdom's constitutional framework, criticism of the courts for overstepping the mark – particularly in politically contentious cases – is par for the course. In their 2019 article, Professors David Campbell and James Allan offer a criticism of the Supreme Court for what they describe as its surreptitious creation of judicial supremacy at the expense of parliamentary sovereignty. In support of their claim, the authors examine two particularly significant judgments: R (Miller and another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review. This reply discusses several problematic aspects of the authors’ critique of those judgments, demonstrating that, contrary to the authors’ claims, these cases do not provide evidence of a surreptitious attempt by the Supreme Court to expand its power.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

Hands‐Off or Hands‐On?: Deconstructing the ‘Test‐Case’ of Re G within a Culture of Children's Rights

This note challenges the so‐called ‘test‐case’ status of Re G in so far as it attempts to overturn the principle established in Re T that courts should adopt a neutral position when it comes to weighing the merits of different upbringings and the education provided by parents of minority religions. In determining the future upbringing and education of children who had been brought up in a minority religious community, Re G applies a principle of maximising educational opportunity in order to uphold the mother's proposed educational choice and way of life. This note argues that Re G was wrong to do so, should not be regarded as establishing any new principle and that the only relevant principle, both in determining this case and future cases, ought to rest on the psychological well‐being of the child.     

The Sovereign Event in a Nation's Law

This article interrogates the relationship between the sovereign event and a legal decision that purports to place sovereignty beyond law. It argues that sovereignty cannot be regarded as unitary, and elaborates the process of iterability by which the sovereign event is split from the outset. This dynamic is examined through an interrogation of the non-justiciability of sovereignty in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2)(1992). Along with the unitary conception of sovereignty, Mabo (No. 2) deployed an absolute measure for community in the form of the ‘skeletal principle’ of the doctrine of tenure. The paper argues that a conception of the political that affirms the One sovereign source of community and law instead of the original dis-position of law, nation and community repeats the original violence, and will, at best, run aground on the righteous (mis)recognition of the ‘appropriate savage’. It concludes with an indicative rethinking of community through the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule

This article argues that the semiotics of the war on terrorism points at a significant shift in United States' discourses on security. This shift can best be described as a move from defence to prevention or from danger to risk. Whereas the notion of defence is closely connected to the state of war, this article claims that the war on terrorism instead institutionalises a permanent state of exception. Building upon Agamben's notion that the state of exception is the non-localisable foundation of a political order, this article makes two claims. First, it argues that semiotic shifts in United States' security politics point at a general trend that, to some extent, structures international American interventions. In a sense, the semiotic shifts in American security discourse declare the United States as the sovereign of the global order: they allow the United States to exempt itself from the (international) framework of law, while demanding compliance by others. Second, it claims that this production of American sovereignty is paralleled by reducing the life of (some) individuals to the bare life of homo sacer(life that can be killed without punishment). In the war on terrorism, the production of bare life is mainly brought about by bureaucratic techniques of risk management and surveillance, which reduce human life to biographic risk profiles.     

The Dual Nature of Law

The argument of this article is that the dual‐nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision‐making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation to both authoritative and non‐authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law.     

Still in Deficit: Rights,Regulation, and Democracy in the EU1

Abstract: Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights‐based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public‐interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ‘for’ the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ‘by’ the people are likewise unnecessary—indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist.     

The long slumber of Dicey’s Indian monarch

AV Dicey treated amending power in written constitutions as an adjunct of sovereignty and he treated the body charged with the power of amending the constitution as the repository of sovereignty in the system – not any different in quality from the paradigm: the British Parliament. Debates of a piece with those surrounding parliamentary sovereignty reincarnate in systems with written constitutions as debates about the amending body’s power to amend the written constitution. This essay examines the points of contiguity between the debates about sovereignty in the unalloyed form they take in the British model and that of amending power in India and the methods of limiting parliamentary omnipotence adopted by the two systems. It will be argued that although for a while the Diceyian notion of parliamentary sovereignty reigned supreme, eventually India embraced a view of implied limitations on amending power qualitatively akin to common law constitutionalism that places implied limits on parliamentary sovereignty.     

What does it mean to suffer loss? Haxton v Philips Electronics

In Haxton v Philips Electronics the Court of Appeal considered whether a widow could recover the diminution in value of her dependency claim following the defendant's tortious reduction of her life expectancy. The note outlines the development of the common law, demonstrating that Haxton is novel but not unorthodox, and tests whether Haxton's principles can provide a sound foundation for future cases. Positing three hypothetical scenarios, it argues that the disparity in outcome, rather than indicating a lack of unifying principle, as was suggested in Jobling v Associated Dairies, may be explained by combining Austin's division between primary and secondary rights with Gardner and Stevens' contributions as to how they are protected. Restitutio in integrum requires consideration of the reasons and values underlying the right in question and these are discernible in the jurisprudence. The note also considers whether Haxton could have been decided on the basis that a defendant should not profit from its own wrongdoing.     

Plurinational democracies in Europe: the quest for a profane constitutionalism

How should we understand the claims on the right to decide on status made within plurinational member states of the European Union by actors and institutions seeking to protect the self-government of sub-state nations or peoples, or at least their right to consent to their ascribed status? Peaceful solutions to conflicts involving contested claims over territory, citizenship, and national sovereignty (authority) can be found when a conceptual or cultural transformation takes place towards a pluralist and bottom-up or federal concept of plurinational democracy, recovering the centrality of self-determination as the self-assertion of a political community. Constitutional law based on the popular sovereignty of a majority nation within plurinational democracies often neglects the question of the definition of the demos as the prefigured constituency, and the existence of national or territorial minorities. If constitutions are interpreted as precluding any claim to self-determination by a constituency, and any debate about that claim, then an undemocratic, sacralized model of militant constitutionalism may emerge. That model is not so much about protecting democracy as it is about imposing a national mould, a pre-defined demos. This article revisits the claims of sovereignty made by national territorial minorities in Spain, against the background of the constitutional doctrine of the Spanish judiciary that precludes these constituencies from engaging in political debates on the right to decide. The resulting sacralization of the Constitution leads to a new version of the model of ‘militant democracy’, a militant nationalist constitutionalism, which can be countered by an alternative, secular, even profane approach to the Constitution.     

A Dive into Deep Constitutional Waters: Article 50, the Prerogative and Parliament

This article analyses the Article 50 TEU debate and the argument that for the UK Government to trigger the formal withdrawal process without explicit parliamentary authorisation would be unlawful, because it would inevitably result in the removal of rights enjoyed under EU law and the frustration of the purpose of the statutes giving those rights domestic effect. After a brief survey of Article 50, this article argues first of all that the power to trigger Article 50 remains within the prerogative, contesting Robert Craig's argument in this issue that it is now a statutory power. It then suggests a number of arguments as to why the frustration principle may be of only doubtful application in this case, and in doing so it re‐examines one of the key authorities prayed in aid of it ‐ the Fire Brigades Union case.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Lord Cooke of Thorndon (1926–2006): 51 Years in the Law

This article provides an in‐depth analysis of the landmark ‘cash for query’ judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India. The scope of parliamentary privileges in India, as well as in England and America, is examined, particularly with respect to the jurisdiction of the courts. The present position in the law of parliamentary privileges in India was laid down in the case of Raja Ram Pal v The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, &; Ors. The Supreme Court of India has extensively dwelled on the matter and has delivered a judgment, which is by far the most comprehensive decision in this field of law. The author notes in the analysis that the difference between the English and Indian constitutional systems is of crucial significance. The conflicts between the judiciary and parliament in England arose because of the sovereignty of parliament, and the judiciary had to fight for every inch of its jurisdiction in England. The judiciary had to contend with Parliament not only as a legislative body, but also by virtue of being the ‘High Court of Parliament’, as a superior court. Because of these reasons, the case law from British constitutional history does not have strict applicability in India. The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Raja Ram Pal v The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, &; Ors, is a clear expression of a very basic feature of the Indian constitutional mechanism: where the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and all governmental organs, which owe their origin to the Constitution and derive their powers from its provisions, must function within its framework.     

英国宪法中的议会主权与法律主治思想探析

“议会主权”被认为是产生英国宪法的第一条大义。20世纪以来，特别是第二次世界大战以后，随着英国行政力量的加强和欧盟法体系的加入，“议会主权”受到了来自国内行政集权和欧盟法效力的限制和冲击。尽管如此，它依然保留了其在宪政体制中的核心地位。“法律主治”是以“议会主权”为前提的，其作为“英吉利制度的要素”和英国宪法产生的第二条大义，与“议会主权”共同构成了英国宪法的重要原则。     

Rape,Defendant Anonymity and Evidence‐Based Policy Making

In 2010, the Coalition government announced in its Programme for Government, that: ‘We will extend anonymity in rape cases to defendants.’ The question of anonymity for defendants accused of rape and other sexual offences, has been repeatedly raised in parliamentary debates over several decades, and has also received frequent attention in newspapers and, to a lesser extent, in academic and professional literature. The debate includes an array of factual claims and arguments that rest on weak empirical foundations. In November 2010, the Ministry of Justice published a report entitled: Providing Anonymity to those Accused of Rape: An Assessment of Evidence, which was intended to provide an evaluation of evidence that would inform the debate over defendant anonymity. This article critically examines this report and its discussion of key issues such as false rape allegations, and considers whether its conclusions can be relied upon by policy makers.     

Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim Status,Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning

In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk of being subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. It concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of the Human Rights Watch case, and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally, against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.     

Human Dignity as a Sui Generis Principle

This paper argues that human dignity is a sui generis status principle whose function lies in unifying our normative orders. More fully, human dignity denotes a basic status to be preserved in any institution or process; it is a principle demanding determination in different contexts; and it has its most characteristic application where the legal, moral, and political place competing obligations on individuals. The implication of this account is that we should not seek to reduce human dignity to either a legal norm or a legal principle.     

The Common Law Constitution at Work: R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor

This note considers the radical significance of Supreme Court's judgment in R (on the Application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (UNISON) on the unlawfulness of tribunal fees. It argues that the decision marks the coming of age of the ‘common law constitution at work’. The radical potential of UNISON lies in its generation of horizontal legal effects in disputes between private parties. Recent litigation on employment status in the ‘gig economy’ is analysed through the lens of UNISON and common law fundamental rights. The note identifies the various ways in which the common law tests of employment status might be ‘constitutionalised’ in the light of UNISON.     

The End of Innocence: Open Justice,Free Speech and Privacy in the Modern Constitution – Khuja (formerly PNM) v Times Newspapers Limited

This case note explores the issue of open justice considered by Khuja (formerly PNM) v Times Newspapers Limited in the Supreme Court and argues that the current law is confused and incoherent. Far from settling the debate, it is suggested that the decision further undermines some of the key assumptions underpinning the current approach, especially in the light of the compelling and humane minority judgment. This leaves the area ripe for reconsideration in general terms. This note challenges many of the formulaic slogans and rhetoric in previous case law as well as suggesting that the meaning of open justice has been lost in current discourse. After summarising the facts, this note sets out the majority and minority judgments, before analysing some of the conceptual difficulties raised – particularly those of open justice, privacy, presumption of innocence and freedom of speech.