The importance of an industrial court in the interpretation of labour statutes

The paper highlights the National Industrial Court of Nigeria’s (NICN) importance over the general courts in the interpretation of labour statutes. It compares the judicial interpretation of some provisions of labour statutes by the general courts in Nigeria (represented herein by the Supreme Court of Nigeria’s interpretation of same provisions) with the interpretation of the NICN of same provisions. It argues that the NICN’s interpretation is more favourable to labour rights than that of the general courts. It makes use of the rules of judicial interpretation and Ronald Dworkin’s discussion on interpretation as a framework and adds to it by comparing the judicial interpretation of some provisions of labour statutes by the general courts with that of the NICN. It noted that the NICN’s interpretation was more purposive and promoted labour rights than that of the general courts. The Supreme Court cases used to represent the position of the general courts were those decided before exclusive jurisdiction on employment and labour matters was conferred on the NICN in 2010. Presently, even though the general courts no more have jurisdiction to hear and interpret employment and labour matters the NICN’s interpretations continues to promote labour rights.     

The Nature of the Tenancy by Statute Merchant

The tenancy by statute merchant was an interest in the lands and tenements of certain defaulting debtors taken pursuant to the provisions of the Statute of Merchants (1285). This article considers the nature of the statutory tenancy, given that the statute made the assize of novel disseisin available to the tenant, and also discusses the question of how closely the tenancy resembled a lease     

Dr Bonham's Case and ‘void’ statutes

There are two opinions on Coke's remarks in Dr Bonham's Case concerning ‘void’ statutes. Firstly that Coke was assuming a power to declare statutes void as incompatible with some form of higher order law; secondly that Coke was merely asserting a power to interpret statutes. This article suggests that the range of meanings of the word ‘void’ in early-modern English law undermines the foundations of the first position, and that there is no good evidence suggesting a natural law position. Coke's method of statutory interpretation is then explored, showing that his report accords with contemporary jurisprudence on grants of judicial power and parliamentary affirmations of earlier acts, and that the word ‘void’, in this context, had a purely inter partes meaning.     

Criminal law

The law of evidence in Nigeria has never denied the competence of a child to give evidence. The repealed Evidence Act had provisions for how the evidence of a child can be obtained, but did not define or provide a guide as to who is considered a child. As a result, the courts relied on other statutes for illumination as to who a child is. This paper examines the new Evidence Act as it relates to the evidence of a child, particularly the broadening of the scope of child evidence in Nigeria. This paper will conclude that there is marked improvement.     

The Commonwealth model and conundrum in the enforcement of foreign judgement regime in Nigeria

Nigeria, as a member of the Commonwealth, retains identical statutes to the UK and other Commonwealth countries on registration of foreign judgement. Nigeria also inherited the common law rules on the enforcement of judgement, like all other parts or former parts of the British Dominions. However, the Nigerian courts have construed these statutes very differently when compared with the way in which the statutes of other Commonwealth countries have been construed, and have sometimes approached the matter of enforcement of foreign judgement as if there are no extant common law rules on the matter. As a result, the need has clearly arisen for the attention of the Nigerian courts to be directed at the similarities between the Nigerian and other Commonwealth statutes on the matter, as well as the judicial practice of the other Commonwealth countries. This article presents a brief historical perspective and then demonstrates the identical features of the statutes, pointing out the perceived errors of the Nigerian appellate and apex courts.     

A Survey: Children’s Rights Post Termination of Parental Rights and Pre-Adoption

This survey of the statutory provisions and case law of all 50 states and the District of Columbia includes the rights of children to parental support, inheritance, and familial association remaining upon termination of parental rights. A majority of states terminate all the child’s rights at the time parental rights are severed. However, a number of states by explicit statutes or statutory construction have determined that a child’s rights to parental support survives termination of parental rights. This survey examines the prevailing law in each state and suggests statutory reforms to protect the legal status and rights of children.     

GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS

In recent years, legislators in all fifty states have given grandparents rights to petition for visitation privileges with grandchildren that can be enforced over parental objections. Grandparent visitation rights reflect an effort to protect meaningful relationships children enjoy with nonparental caregivers, enlist the assistance of extended family when the child's nuclear family is disrupted, and defend the interests of grandparents themselves. This psycholegal analysis explores the direct and indirect consequences of grandparent visitation statutes for family functioning. Statutory provisions are summarized, and the effects of these statutes are evaluated in light of what is known about the role of grandparents in child development, how courts evaluate children's "best interests" in grandparent visitation disputes, and how these statutes can alter family functioning in informal ways. The authors conclude that there are risks as well as benefits to children and families in grandparent visitation statutes, and suggest directions for procedural and statutory reform.     

明代土地租佃的法律调整

明代法律对租佃关系的调整主要是依据私契关系所确立的规则 ,一方面保护地主的收租权和产业权 ,另一方面也保护佃农的耕作权。随着商品经济的发展 ,地主与佃农之间对土地与佃权的争夺加剧了 ,传统租佃关系发生了新的变化 ,而“永佃”制、“一田二主”的出现 ,正是庶民地主为主干的中国封建地主制出现解体的征兆。     

Enforceability of foreign copyright in Nigeria: a review of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Microsoft v Franike

With globalization and the rise of information and communications technology (ICT), the protection of intellectual protection in software and indeed foreign copyright has never been more paramount. The absence of statutory provisions in Nigeria’s main copyright legislation specifically protecting the intellectual protection in software has not helped. This article examines the Court of Appeal’s recent decision dealing with the protection of copyright in Microsoft’s software. The author is of the considered view that the approach adopted by the courts in the case is not in the overall interest of encouraging foreign ICT companies and the protection of foreign copyrights in Nigeria.     

Privative clauses in special education legislative schemes: are they constitutional under the Canadian Charter?

This paper suggests that privative clauses in the enabling statutes (Education Acts) governing provincially appointed special education appeal tribunals (SET) are unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is suggested that ‘final and binding’ SET decisions about children's designation as special needs and their educational placement infringe upon the Charter rights of both parent and exceptional child. The standard for judicial review of SET decisions, given a privative clause, is whether the decision is ‘patently unreasonable’ while ‘correctness’, according to case law, is the appropriate standard when finally determining fundamental rights. Parents of exceptional children in practice have recourse to the courts regarding only procedural rather than substantive issues regarding SET decisions due to the high deference the courts afford any administrat ive tribunal protected by a privative clause. The very high judicial review standard of ‘patently unreasonable’ rather than ‘correctness’ is not consistent, furthermore, with the child's ‘best interests’ or in meeting international obligations to disabled children under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.     

Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative,Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum

This article confronts the controversies surrounding Article 50 by analysing the relationship between statute and prerogative in the UK. The piece focuses on domestic constitutional issues and suggests a new way of classifying the relationship between statute and prerogative into two types falling under ‘the abeyance principle’ or ‘the frustration principle’. The abeyance principle means that where statute and prerogative overlap, the prerogative goes into abeyance. The frustration principle means that where statute and prerogative give rise to potential inconsistencies, but do not overlap, the prerogative cannot be used inconsistently with the intention of parliament as expressed in the relevant legislation. It then argues that Article 50 has the status of primary or ‘primary‐equivalent’ legislation which could justify applying the abeyance principle. This would mean that the trigger power would be exercised on statutory authority rather than through prerogative powers. If the courts are unable thus to construe the relevant legislation it argues EU law requires the courts to bridge the gap. Alternatively, if the abeyance principle is not applicable, it argues the frustration principle could apply but the circumstances in this litigation fall outside it. In the further alternative, EU law could require the frustration principle itself to be set aside in this case.     

This Time,it's for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012

This article examines the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and associated reforms to the National Health Service in England. It focuses on the Act's policy of making the NHS market more ‘real’, by both encouraging and compelling NHS bodies to act as ‘market players’. The article considers whether the reforms are compatible with the constitutional requirements of accountability for the provision of a public service such as the NHS. It argues that the reforms threaten accountability for three reasons: they make the Secretary of State for Health's relationship with the NHS more complex, they create opaque networks of non‐statutory bodies which may influence NHS decision‐making, and (especially in relation to competition) they ‘juridify’ policy choices as matters of law. Taken together, these arguments suggest that there is force in the claim that the reforms will contribute to ‘creeping’ – and thus unaccountable – privatisation of the NHS.     

Creatures of the State: A Hard Look at the Supersession of Municipal Power in New York's Mineral Resources Law

The controversial method of gas extraction known as hydraulic fracturing has revealed a critical issue within New York's Mineral Resources Law: Can a local government prohibit the practice through its zoning power? This piece analyzes supersession clauses found in other New York statutes, as well as the statutes of other jurisdictions. It criticizes the construction of the law by two lower courts in the recent decisions concerning the towns of Dryden and Middlefield, and applies recognized principles of statutory construction to determine that towns may not effect a prohibition of gas mining through local zoning ordinances.     

The ghost that slayed the mandate

Virginia v. Sebelius is a federal lawsuit in which Virginia has challenged President Obama's signature legislative initiative of health care reform. Virginia has sought declaratory and injunctive relief to vindicate a state statute declaring that no Virginia resident shall be required to buy health insurance. To defend this state law from the preemptive effect of federal law, Virginia has contended that the federal legislation's individual mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Virginia's lawsuit has been one of the most closely followed and politically salient federal cases in recent times. Yet the very features of the case that have contributed to its political salience also require its dismissal for lack of statutory subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has placed limits on statutory subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which a state seeks a declaration that a state statute is not preempted by federal law--precisely the relief sought in Virginia v. Sebelius. These statutory limits are a sea wall; they keep out, on statutory grounds, some suits that should otherwise be kept out on Article III grounds. The statutory and constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction over suits like Virginia v. Sebelius insulate federal courts from the strong political forces surrounding lawsuits that follow from state statutes designed to create federal jurisdiction over constitutional challenges by states to federal law. This Article identifies previously neglected jurisdictional limits, shows why they demand dismissal of Virginia v. Sebelius, and explains why it is appropriate for federal courts to be closed to suits of this type.     

“With all My worldly possessions I thee wed”: Nigerian courts and the exercise of discretionary justice in property ownership disputes in marriage and divorce

The question of title to property between married couples remains intractable in Nigeria’s social context. Ownership is addressed by Nigerian courts in a discretionary framework devoid of a cohesive conceptualization. By reviewing cases in Nigeria and England the paper finds that the exercise of discretionary justice is a ‘cold legal question’ and defective in granting a realistic outcome. A different approach is germane to achieve justice in family law. It concludes that the extant judicial approach is at variance with the marital vow ‘with all my worldly possessions I thee wed’ which imports unity of assets in the social psyche of parties.     

Legislating Dangerously: Bad Samaritans,Good Society,and the Heroism Act 2015

The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 is a troublesome statute. The Act requires that, when considering a claim brought against a defendant in negligence or for breach of statutory duty, the court must assess whether that party was ‘acting for the benefit of society or any of its members’ (section 2), or ‘demonstrated a predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety or interests of others’ (section 3), or was ‘acting heroically’ (section 4). However laudable the Coalition Government's attempts to foster a ‘Big Society’ might have been, this enactment was not the proper vehicle to achieve it. Some provisions merely repeat longstanding common law principles. Others may have been intended to amend the common law to encourage ‘good citizenship’, but fall well short of that aim. And some aspects of the Act's drafting have the (perhaps unintended) potential to sit uncomfortably with established common law negligence principles.     

Law against the Rule of Law: Assaulting Democracy

This article examines how authoritarian contenders use law to advance an agenda geared to exclusive state power in light of a paradigmatic case: the National Socialists’ takeover of the German state apparatus in spring 1933. This case highlights two ways in which an office holder is able to expand his power in an authoritarian fashion through legal dispositions. A conjunctural use of law for authoritarian purposes draws on legal statutes to undercut the political capacity of opponents and competitors, hollow out institutional checks, and crucially hamper civil freedoms. Taking advantage of constitutional provisions that make institutional subversion from within possible (‘constitutional Trojan horses’), a structural use of legal statutes reorders the power structure by reallocating decisional rights. In both cases, law serves as a weapon against the rule of law. These considerations raise the question of the standards by which we are to judge the legality of such acts. Contemporary instances of democratic backsliding are cases in point.     

组织视角下的民事诉讼发回重审制度

民诉法学界和实务界有关二审程序中的发回重审存在较大争议,该制度成为本次民诉法修改的重要议题之一。为了形成共识,对这一问题从法解释论的角度进行阐释解说尤为必要。为了限制发回重审裁量权的滥用,我国司法实践中采用程序细化与加强对审判的组织管理并行的策略。不过这种"程序"与"组织"的交织并不能真正抑制裁量权滥用,反而因剥夺当事人的程序参与权而损害审判的公信力。为调整二者的相互关系,应在审判管理的组织背景下保障审判程序的自主性,恢复当事人在程序运作中的结构性位置。     

It Ain't Necessarily So: A Legal Realist Perspective on the Law of Agency Work

Analysis of UK employment and labour law is often characterised by a curious dissonance. The overarching narrative mandates that labour law is a countervailing force to the inequality of bargaining power, embedded with values and assumptions concerning the nature of employment relations and the role of labour law. And yet, labour law jurisprudence tends to treat with respect, and seeks to decipher, abstract statutory concepts and tests derived from judicial pronouncements as if they were, indeed, a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky’. This paper seeks to bridge that gap, by offering a legal realist account of the legal doctrine that governs the employment of agency workers, focusing on the ‘necessity’ and ‘sham’ tests. It assesses the legitimacy of importing legal tests from one (commercial) context to another (employment) context; questions the courts’ protestations that their use is mandated by precedent; and outlines the real implications for the status and rights of agency workers in the UK.     

Re-appraising the rules for the taxation of income of companies engaged in ‘not-for-profit’ activities in Nigeria

The rules in s 23(1)(c) of Nigeria’s Companies Income Tax Act on the exemption of income of ‘charities’ from tax appear difficult to formulate with precision, and for which reason their application has been challenging. This article contends that s 23(1)(c) is indifferently drafted, that neither of the decisions in which this provision has been applied nor the explanatory circular issued by the revenue authority aids the understanding of the law on this point, and that urgent law reform is needed in this area of the law – and in charity law in general – in Nigeria.