Copyright Infringement in a Borderless World - Does Territoriality Matter? Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Societyof Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v CanadianAssociation of Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427 is significantfor two reasons: (a) the Canadian Supreme Court held that InternetService Providers should be exempted from copyright liabilityas long as they provide only a conduit service in transmittingcopyright materials between Internet users (a point which isconsistent with many national copyright laws); (b) the majorityof the Canadian Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion thatthe appropriate test to determine whether an infringement forthe unauthorized transmission of online copyright material hasoccurred within the Canadian jurisdiction is the ‘realand substantial connection’ test (LeBel J, however, dissentedand was of the view that the correct test to apply is the ‘hostserver’ test). This paper studies these two tests as propoundedby the Canadian Supreme Court and assesses their strengths andweaknesses, especially in light of the territoriality principlein copyright law.     

加拿大侵权法中的转承责任

加拿大侵权法中,转承责任不是一种独立的责任形式,但却采用严格责任归责,被告与侵权行为人之间必要关系的建立是转承责任的前提。这与英美法和法国法的规定相似,与德国法、日本法和我国台湾地区的规定不同。加拿大侵权法中关于雇主和雇员、本人和代理人等有关转承责任的规定,为我国转承责任归责原则的确立提供了有益的借鉴。     

Let's Get Physical: Civil Liability and the Perception of Risk

The article aims to explore the place of perceptions of riskwithin the law of tort. It examines both property-related, ‘stigmadamages’ cases and also personal injury-related ‘fearof disease’ cases. A finding of some form of physicaldamage or injury seems to be required by the courts in orderto establish liability in both instances. Having explored thecontentious issue of the precise contours of such damage orinjury, the article concludes with a suggestion for a quantifiability-basedapproach to establishing liability in the area.     

Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility

The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and moreas the ‘magic weapon’ in the prosecution of internationalcrimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptualconfusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of(international) criminal law but also invades the traditionalambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obviousif both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases againstaccused with some kind of superior position. After a short introductionon both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the articlegives some examples of their simultaneous application and triesto develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case lawand a ‘dogmatic’ analysis of both the doctrines.A reference to the theory of ‘Organisationsherrschaft’shows that there is yet another option to impute internationalcrimes to top perpetrators.     

揭开雇主“替代责任”的面纱——兼论《侵权责任法》第34条之解释论基础

我国民法学界和立法机关的主流观点认为,雇主责任的性质是替代责任,这种看法并不合理。替代责任原理及规则渊源于英美普通法,其立基于近代手工业社会,反映了当时较为简单的雇佣关系。到了现代工业风险社会,随着企业规模的扩大和雇佣关系的复杂化,这一原理及规则不能为遭受企业活动侵害的受害人提供充分的法律保护,也不能为雇主积极履行义务提供法律上的激励机制。因此,使用替代责任原理并不能对《侵权责任法》第34条作出合理、妥当的解释。目前,英美法上的"企业责任理论"和德国法上的"组织过错理论"反映了比较法上雇主责任领域的最新发展趋势。     

雇主责任的归责原则与劳动者解放

我国学界的多数观点认为雇主责任是无过错的替代责任,而我国"人身损害赔偿司法解释"第9条不以雇员的侵权责任为雇主责任的要件,并规定轻过失的雇员可以免责,与替代责任说的原理相矛盾,因而遭到学界的批判。于此相对,我国司法实务界多认为雇主责任是过错责任,学界与实务界在问题意识和基本立场上存在着明显差异。结合对德国、日本和英国的比较法研究,笔者发现,纯粹无过失的雇主责任是不存在的,替代责任并非世界法律发展的潮流。雇主责任的本质是组织过失责任,其根源在于雇主在企业组织上的瑕疵,因此雇主责任的成立无须以雇员的侵权责任为要件,倘以之为要件反而会招致诸多弊端。雇员的轻过失只是雇主组织瑕疵的衍生物,为雇主的经营行为所吸收,雇员可以从赔偿责任中解放出来。"人身损害赔偿司法解释"第9条体现的正是劳动者解放的法理。     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin

The mode of liability known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE)has emerged in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a means of assigning criminalliability to individuals for activities carried out by a collective.As a result, the doctrine must be carefully defined so as notto allow it to extend a defendant's liability beyond the appropriatelimits of individual criminal responsibility. In this regard,a recent ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Branin held that, wherea defendant is not alleged to have participated in the physicalperpetration of the crimes charged but to have contributed insome other way to the commission of the crimes by a group, theprosecution must demonstrate that the defendant entered intoan express agreement with the physical perpetrators to committhe crimes charged. The author argues that this ‘expressagreement requirement’ is both conceptually unsound andpractically unhelpful. Conceptually, it would be inconsistentwith core principles of JCE liability to require an expressagreement between a defendant and the physical perpetratorsof crimes, at least in circumstances in which it is allegedthat there existed a structure of two or more overlapping JCEs.Moreover, because this structure allows the accused and thephysical perpetrators to be operating in two separate JCEs,they need not even share a common criminal purpose. On a practicallevel, arguably in a ‘system-criminality’ contextsuch as the one that developed in the former Yugoslavia duringthe time period in question, the organizers of criminal activityare unlikely to enter into express criminal agreements withthose who physically carry out crimes, because existing organizedhierarchies provide much more efficient mechanisms by whichleaders are able to ensure the realization of their criminalplans.     

Distorting Vicarious Liability

The note considers the decision of the Court of Appeal in Maga v The Trustees of the Birmingham Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church and analyses the application of the status based risk approach to vicarious liability in that case. It considers its application outside of the area of clerical sexual abuse, and also the role in vicarious liability of job conferred status which materially increases the risk of the commission of a tort, or helps to facilitate a tort.     

Gaining confidence in the law of confidence

Legal context. The recent case of EPI v Symphony has left theUK law of confidentiality in an uncertain state: the extentto which recipients of confidential information may be permittedto ‘use’ mixtures of such information with publiclyavailable material remains unclear. The Court of Appeal in EPIfelt that it was hard to reconcile the principle that any claimin confidence must fail if the material in question is in thepublic domain with the ‘springboard’ doctrine; butis the distinction illusory? Key points. Issues raised in this case include considerationof what precisely is ‘use’ of confidential information,when mixed with public information, and whether a confider shoulddo more than rely on confidentiality obligations to protectthe fruits of his/her disclosures. This article asks how confidentialityobligations may be aligned with the control of statutory intellectualproperty rights. It considers whether the Court of Appeal inMarkem v Zipher has confused the issue and speculates as tohow far the general law of contract can assist the confider. Practical significance. Finally, this article discusses whichlegal tools will best assist the confider seeking to protectits intellectual property.     

'Unlawful Enemy Combatant': Status, Theory of Culpability, or Neither?

The Military Commissions Act of 2006 represents the United States’most recent effort to establish a forum to try detainees capturedin its ‘Global War on Terrorism’. This article brieflyexplores the Act's use of the term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’to define both subject matter jurisdiction as well as the potentialsource of criminal liability. The article highlights the term'sabsence from the positive law of war as well as confusion overits legal significance in United States domestic law. Examiningthe relationship between status and protections under the lawof war, the authors conclude the Act's use of the term ‘unlawfulenemy combatant’ reflects legal convenience more thanan objective assessment of the existing laws and customs ofwar.     

雇主替代责任在我国未来侵权法中的地位

雇主替代责任是指雇主就其雇员于职责范围内实施的侵权行为对受害人承担的侵权责任。两大法系国家侵权法都对雇主替代责任作出了规定,我国民法通则没有规定雇主承担的替代责任。最高人民法院2003年司法解释虽然规定了雇主替代责任,但其规定存在严重问题,违反了两大法系国家雇主替代责任的基本精神,无法适用我国当前社会发展的需要,对受害人保护不力。我国未来侵权法应当借鉴两大法系国家雇主替代责任方面的成功经验,对雇主替代责任作出明确规定。     

Money for nothing and your MP3s for free

The judgment of the Federal Court of Australia (‘the Court’)in Universal Music is the first judicial pronouncement in Australiaon the legality of website operators who provide hyperlinksto remote websites to allow ‘internauts’ (web users)to download MP3 music files and the liability of internet serviceproviders (ISPs) and their employees for authorizing that infringementunder Australian copyright law.     

The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law

The question of how the ‘border’ is conceived ininternational law, and how it shapes identity and peoples’lives, remains largely unexplored in the international legalliterature. This article seeks to contribute to our understandingof the meaning of the border in international law, and in thecontemporary context, by drawing on the work of the philosopherand political theorist, Étienne Balibar, and by reflecting,in the light of his work, on the recent decision of the Houseof Lords in R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport. It isshown that international law's focus on the territorial bordermay render invisible other borders which are significant forsubaltern groups, and thereby fail to address the manner inwhich borders affect lives and determine outcomes. Borders arenot stable and ‘univocal’, but instead, ‘multiple’,shifting in meaning and function from group to group. They arealso being ‘exported’ such that a person may experiencea foreign border while still within the territory of their owncountry. In highlighting the multiplicity of borders, the articleseeks to prompt further reflection on the articulation and applicationof norms of international law in a way that addresses the realitiesof the contemporary context.     

Vicarious Liability and the Private University Student Press

The lack of a First Amendment prohibition against administrative interference with the student press leaves a private university open to legal liability from the content of student publications through the doctrine of vicarious liability. To insulate a private university from such a lawsuit, commentators have encouraged the adoption of formal policy statements that give student journalists the right to make all content decisions. But given the trend in vicarious liability law, such policy statements are unlikely to protect a private university from liability for torts committed by its dependent student press. Instead, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States suggest, and this article argues, that the adoption of policies and procedures designed to prevent and correct foreseeable misconduct associated with the dissemination of student-produced content will help protect a private university from vicarious liability arising from the operation of its student press.     

Equity and Conscience

This article argues that the peculiarly ‘common law tradition’separation of common law and equity had at its origins a principledbasis in the concept of ‘conscience’. But ‘conscience’here did not mean primarily either the modern lay idea, or the‘conscience’ of Christopher St German's exposition.Rather, it referred to the judge's, and the defendant's, privateknowledge of facts which could not be proved at common law becauseof medieval common law conceptions of documentary evidence andof trial by jury. The concept of a jurisdiction peculiarly concernedwith this issue allowed the ‘English bill’ procedureto be held back to a limited subject area rather than—asin Scotland and the Netherlands—overwhelming the old legalsystem. By the later 17th century, however, the concept of consciencehad lost its specific content, leaving behind the problem, stillwith us, of justifying the separation of ‘equity’.     

Towards Efficiency in Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporations: Canadian and Brazilian Regimes Compared

This article compares Canadian treatment of corporate criminal liability with that in Brazil, examining whether there are ways in which one system can learn from the other. It is argued that the Canadian model could provide a starting point for revision of Brazilian legal principles in this area that, would encourage the public to recognize that crimes committed by corporations should be taken seriously. However, because criminal liability requires a high burden of proof and is therefore difficult to secure, the Brazilian regime of strict liability may ultimately be useful in encouraging compliance by corporations, assuming sanctions are severe enough and detection of violations by law enforcers is enhanced. The solution may therefore consist in the use of both these regimes, as is currently the case with anticorruption law in the UK.     

Vicarious liability and criminal prosecutions for regulatory offences

The parameters of vicarious liability of corporations for the conduct of their employees, especially in the context of provisions that criminalise breaches of regulatory provisions, are complex. The decision of Bell J in ABC Developmental Learning Centres Pty Ltd v Wallace [2006] VSC 171 raises starkly the potential unfairness of an approach which converts criminal liability of corporations too readily into absolute liability, irrespective of the absence of any form of proven culpability. The author queries whether fault should not be brought back in some form to constitute a determinant of criminal liability for corporations.     

The Bermuda Islands blow ‘sweet & sour’ on employers’ liability for Internet libel

The Bermudian Supreme Court (at first instance) recently ruled in Bermuda Restaurants Limited (t/a “Chopsticks”) v. Jonathan Daspin and ConvergEx Global Markets Ltd. (Civil Jurisdiction 2008: No. 134 (to be reported)) on the issue of whether an employer (here, a company) should be held liable for an allegedly libellous email publication by its employee, the managing director. The Judge was asked by the employer company to determine two issues of law which exposed the company and which centred on its vicarious liability for its employee's actions, including whether the use of the company's email system, during working hours, made it complicit in the publication. The Court held, applying principles of English and Canadian law, that the company was not vicariously liable and by extension that it was not the email's publisher.