论刑事诉讼中的"真实"

在认识论上,只存在客观事实与客观真理,不存在主观事实与主观真理。但在判断真理与事实的真实性上,却存在着客观真实与主观真实两种不同标准。客观真实的标准适用于对现存事实真实性的判断,主观真实的标准适用于对已逝事实真实性的判断。犯罪事实都是已逝的事实,因而不可能适用客观真实的标准。“法律真实说”指出了“客观真实说”的缺陷,意义重大,但它只指出了刑事诉讼证明标准的“行业”属性,并不是对刑事诉讼证明标准的准确概括。只有“主观真实说”符合刑事诉讼证明标准的本质属性。主观不等于主观主义,主观真实也不是主观臆断,它具有坚实的客观性基础。承认这一事实,并依照自由心证的特点完善我国的刑事证据规则,不仅不会导致主观主义,相反更有利于防止主观主义。     

刑事诉讼的证明标准应为法律真实

近年来 ,刑事诉讼的证明标准成为我国诉讼法学领域乃至整个学界所普遍关注的热点问题 ,一些学者对传统的客观真实理论提出了挑战 ,认为刑事诉讼的证明标准应该是一种法律真实 (亦即相对真实 ) ①;而持客观真实论的学者也积极回应 ,《法学研究》2 0 0 2年第 4期刊登了张继成、杨宗辉二位先生撰写的“对‘法律真实’证明标准的质疑”一文 (以下简称张文 ) ,主张刑事诉讼的证明标准只能是“客观真实” ,并从逻辑学的角度对持“法律真实”论的学者进行了批判。张文的发表在法学界产生了较大的影响 ,因为无论是持法律真实观还是客观真实论的学者 …     

对“法律真实”证明标准的质疑

无论是刑事实体法律规范还是刑事程序法律规范都不具有判定案件事实是否真实的功能。“法律真实”所陈述的基本内容与判定证据是否充分的标准重复 ,所以“法律真实”证明标准是不能成立的 ,“法律真实”这个概念是一个伪概念。“客观真实”标准是判定证据是否真实和是否充分的有机统一 ,对传统“客观真实说”作一些必要的限定之后 ,客观真实标准仍然是刑事诉讼证明的基本标准。     

深度报道的美学特性浅探

本文认为新近崛起的报导形式———深度报导———具有四个美学特征：报导视角“以大观小”，新闻事件的时空领域适度拓展，挖掘潜藏在新闻事件中的底蕴，主观感情寓于客观、真实的新闻事件的叙述之中。     

2000年刑事诉讼法学研究述评

20 0 0年的刑事诉讼法学研究非常活跃 ,成果斐然 ,涉及到了刑事诉讼中的许多重大理论和实务问题 ,现仅择其要者进行介绍和简评。一、关于刑事诉讼法学基本理论的研究(一 )关于客观真实和法律真实陈光中教授认为 ,“客观真实”是指在诉讼中司法工作人员运用证据所认定的案件事实符合案件发生的客观情况 ,也就是我们通常所说的查明 (判明 )案件事实真相 ,是主观符合客观的真实。“法律真实”是指司法工作人员运用证据认定的案件事实达到了法律所规定的视为真实的标准。法律真实也可称为主观真实或推定真实。他运用辩证唯物主义认识原理对“客…     

“法律真实”的限度——兼与王刚先生商榷

“法律真实”和“客观真实”是当前法律界流行的用语,主要运用于司法裁判中关于事实认定的证明标准问题。客观真实是指法律裁判者对客观事实真实性的评价与实际相符合,即“事实判断符     

法律真实说与客观真实说:误解中的对立

目前,刑事诉讼法学界对刑事诉讼证明标准有争论。基本上可分为“法律真实说”和“客观真实说”。如何对其进行充分认识,我国的诉讼证明标准又该如何取向值得关注。本期刊登一组刑事诉讼证明标准的文章,以飨读者。     

论诉讼真实的属性、标准及其认可

从认识论的角度而言,真实的属性、真实的标准和真实的认可是三个不同层次的问题,它们分别从主客体间性、主体性以及主体间性的角度揭示了真实的不同面目。诉讼真实也包含这三个方面的内容,忽略其中任何一个方面,都会导致混淆,学界的客观真实与法律真实之争正是由此而起的。真实的三个不同层面的问题说明,任何证明标准的设定都不能确保裁判者的主观认识必然符合客观事实真相,只有通过加强程序建设,才能使裁判者对案件事实的认定得到其他人的认可,并因此而具有权威性。     

客观真实价值观是证据制度的灵魂——对法律真实观的反思

以"法律真实"价值观为指导理念,违背了证据制度最根本的价值目标,从而导致审判实践中适用证据规定的机械和错位;裁判者在理念上应当遵守"客观真实"价值观——这也是设置证据制度的最高价值目标;裁判者视域中的"真实"只能是"一元真实",即客观真实;如果存在"二元真实",就意味着裁判者同时也已形成了"客观真实"之心证,基于裁判正义的要求,理应以形成心证的"客观真实"为裁判事实基础。以"法律真实"价值观为指导理念,违背了证据制度最根本的价值目标,从而导致审判实践中适用证据规定的机械和错位;裁判者在理念上应当遵守"客观真实"价值观——这也是设置证据制度的最高价值目标;裁判者视域中的"真实"只能是"一元真实",即客观真实;如果存在"二元真实",就意味着裁判者同时也已形成了"客观真实"之心证,基于裁判正义的要求,理应以形成心证的"客观真实"为裁判事实基础。     

论“法律真实”的合理性及其意义

法律真实是与客观真实相对的诉讼真实观.在学理上,客观真实观是一种形而上的本体论思维模式,其本质决定了它不具备实用性、操作性,无法在司法实践中得到真正的实施,片面地追求更是有害无益.法律真实是符合认识论的具体现实的真实观,它将主观与客观、真理与价值、认识的绝对性与相对性等一系列认识论原理结合起来,成为现实可行的诉讼指导观念.在当前的审判方式改革和建立我国证据制度的进程中,必须更新诉讼观念,以法律真实观作为构建诉讼制度的认识论基础.     

叙述的权力：先锋小说的政治美学阐释

先锋小说以非政治化为诉求的话语变革,是20世纪中国小说中的重要现象.在先锋小说的叙事话语之中隐含着政治话语,叙述艺术表现了特殊的政治美学.先锋小说对"意识流"的发现,揭示了一个政治无法彻底统治的内心世界的存在,颠覆了政治的理性统治.存在的探索和存在感的凸显,还原了现实政治的真相,表现了特别的政治精神.先锋小说的"卑微观点",则从"小"角度解构政治意识形态的"大话".叙事视点本身的显现,构成了小说叙事话语的自赎,是对叙事权力本身的反思和反叛.先锋叙事的政治智慧,也可以反观政治美学的深层结构.     

论法律真理

一般人们认为,法律不是真理,法律与真理是分离的。但从历史的维度看,法律与真理分离的时间非常短暂。20世纪中叶之后,随着"事实与价值分离"观念的倒塌,"法律真理"这一观念不证自明起来。但何谓法律真理?是"符合论"意义上的,还是诠释学意义上的?由于"符合论"法律真理理论遇到了诸多难题,导致了法律真理的异化,因此,法律真理应是诠释学意义上的真理。法律真理是人的存在状态,是人展现自我、规划自我的一种方式,是人为实现自身本质而进行的一种制度安排。理解法律真理的路径在于法律实践。     

Epistemological Perspectives in Legal Theory

Abstract The authors deal with several important epistemological problems in legal theory. The Nineteenth century background is analyzed from the emergence of legal science freed from the constraints of natural law and built on the model of the empirical sciences. The authors show how this science of law has been influenced by the social sciences and trends in ideological criticism throughout the Twentieth century. The epistemological question central to legal science is tackled, i.e., what kind of “epistemological break” should there be with regard to the object studied? To answer this question, the authors plead for the adoption of a “moderate external point of view” which bears in mind lawyers' “internal point of view.”     

从全知视角到有限视角——论亨利·詹姆斯对小说叙事角度的创新

亨利·詹姆斯是小说叙事角度革新的先行者之一。他在许多作品中摒弃了传统的全知全能的视角 ,创造了他所称的“意识中心”的叙事方式 ,即小说中的叙述都从作品中的某一角色出发并通过其意识的过滤。他在晚期作品中又运用了类似于转换式有限视角的叙事角度 ,使读者体味作品中主要人物细致而丰富的内心活动。     

Criminology and superstition at the turn of the 19th century

Criminology, which institutionalised at university level at the turn of the 19th century, was intensively engaged in the exploration of superstition. Criminologists investigated the various phenomena of superstition and the criminal behaviour resulting from it. They discovered bizarre (real or imagined) worlds of thought and mentalities, which they subjected to a rationalistic regime of interpretation in order to arrive at a better understanding of offences and crimes related to superstition. However, they sometimes also considered the use of occultist practices such as telepathy and clairvoyance to solve criminal cases. As a motive for committing homicide superstition gradually became less relevant in the course of the 19th century. Around 1900, superstition was accepted as a plausible explanation in this context only if a psychopathic form of superstition was involved. In the 20th century, superstition was no longer regarded as an explanans but an explanandum.     

Effect of family rupture and recomposition on the children of New France

Using the biographies of nearly 10,000 children born in New France during the seventeenth century, this study looks at the phenomenon of single parenthood from the children's point of view. Since separation and divorce were uncommon during this period, marital disruptions only occurred through the death of one of the partners. In New France, half of all children witnessed the disruption of their parents' marriage before having reached emancipation. The article examines the impact on family characteristics (family size and number of emancipated children), as well as the contribution of age-ranking within the family to the likelihood that the children would live in a reconstituted family.     

Effect of family rupture and recomposition on the children of New France

Using the biographies of nearly 10,000 children born in New France during the seventeenth century, this study looks at the phenomenon of single parenthood from the children's point of view. Since separation and divorce were uncommon during this period, marital disruptions only occurred through the death of one of the partners. In New France, half of all children witnessed the disruption of their parents' marriage before having reached emancipation. The article examines the impact on family characteristics (family size and number of emancipated children), as well as the contribution of age-ranking within the family to the likelihood that the children would live in a reconstituted family.     

The Difference between Obedience Assumed and Obedience Accepted*

Abstract. The analysis of legal statements that are made from an “internal point of view” must distinguish statements where legal obedience is accepted from statements where legal obedience is only assumed. Statements that are based on accepted obedience supply reasons for action, but statements where obedience is merely assumed can never provide reasons for action. It is argued in this paper that John Searle neglects this distinction. Searle claims that a statement from the internal point of view provides the speaker with reasons for actions that are “self‐sufficient” in the sense that they are independent of the speaker's beliefs and desires. This claim is mistaken. A statement that is based on assumed obedience is self‐sufficient, but does not give reasons for action. A statement that is based on accepted obedience gives reasons for action, but these reasons are not self‐sufficient.     

Intention and Attempt

Anglo-American criminal law traditionally demands a criminal purpose for an attempt conviction, even when the crime attempted requires only foresight or recklessness. Some legal philosophers have defended this rule by appeal to an alleged difference in the “moral character” or “intentional structure” of intended versus non-intended harms. I argue that there are reasons to be skeptical of any such differences; and that even if conceded, it is only on the basis of an unworkable view of criminal responsibility that such a distinction would support a rule restricting attempts to criminal purpose. I defend instead the “continuity thesis,” according to which attempts are functionally continuous with endangerment offenses: both are legal efforts to regulate unreasonably dangerous conduct. The upshot of the continuity thesis is that there is little substantive difference between attempt and endangerment in principle, no matter how they are labeled in law.     

Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment

Abstract

I argue for the following, which I dub the “fallibility syllogism”: (1) All systems of criminal punishment that inflict suffering on the innocent are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. (2) All past or present human systems of criminal punishment inflict suffering on the innocent. (3) Therefore, all such human systems of criminal punishment are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. My argument for the first premise is organized in the following way. I define what a human system of punishment is. I offer a distinction between retributive and utilitarian approaches to punishment. I distinguish between weak retributivism embodied in the second premise and strong retributivism, which I argue is the basis for the weak version. I argue that on retributivist grounds, each case of punishment is just when it matches the seriousness of the wrongdoing of the offender and that systems of punishment are just from a retributivist point of view when there are no exceptions to this match-up. In making my case, I will use Kant's retributivism as the version of my choice, so I will spend some time showing that recent reinterpretations of Kant (arguing that he was not a thoroughgoing retributivist), even if they are correct, are consistent with my view. Ultimately, however, I argue that the better view is that Kant was a thoroughgoing retributivist.