Principles, Values, and Rules in Legal Decision-Making and the Dimensions of Legal Rationality

Abstract. The author singles out various conceptions of rationality used in practical legal discourse: formal and substantive rationality, instrumental goal- and means-rationality, communicative rationality. Practical rationality is expressed in decisions justified by epistemic and axiological premises according to the rules of justificatory reasoning. Five levels of analysis of this justification are identified. Rules, principles and evaluations are used as justifying arguments and their characteristics determine the dimensions of rationality of decision depending on the features of rules, various conceptions of principles, and kinds of relativisation of evaluations. The dimensions of legal rationality depend mainly on three singled out conceptions of rationality, i.e., formal rationality dealing with the deep structure of justification, instrumentally oriented rationality as content of justifiability, and communicative rationality linked with the pragmatics of human interaction. Legitimacy, according to the presented analysis, appears as a subclass of external justification dealing with axiological premisses in terms of instrumental rationality and/or communicative rationality.     

Insights,Errors and Self‐Misconceptions of the Theory of Principles

The theory of principles is multifaceted. Its initial expression contained an important argument against positivist theories of adjudication. As a legal theory, it fails in its effort to claim a structural difference between rules and principles. It also fails as a methodological theory that reduces adjudication to subsumption or balancing. It misunderstands itself when it is conceived as a doctrinal theory especially of fundamental rights. Its most promising aspect could be its contribution to a more comprehensive theory of legal argumentation.     

The Powers of Application

This paper studies the formality of law and legal reasoning. It argues that, though the law (and its application) is indeed formal in that it does not take into account a significant number of considerations that should in principle be relevant for an all–things–considered decision, this is not to be explained on the basis of some ontology of rules (i.e., rules as exclusionary reasons), but upon the nature of legal discourse when viewed as a social practice. How the law is applied to particular cases, when substantive considerations not referred to by the rules are important enough to defeat their application to the case and questions of this kind are not answered by the legal material (which includes or might include rules, principles etc.), but by beliefs that underlie legal practice, beliefs about the world and its relation to human beings and society. Insofar as these beliefs have impact upon practices we recognise as legal they are termed "images of law." Legal reasoning cannot be understood without paying due attention to the nature and evolution of images of law.     

基于法律原则的裁判

基于法律原则的裁判需依次解决以下三个问题:如何识别与个案相关的法律原则;如何处理原则与规则的适用关系,或者说在何种情况下,允许裁判者依据法律原则得出判决;如何解决原则之间的冲突问题,亦即能否籍由原则权衡获取法律上的“唯一正解”。现有的裁判理论对这三个问题作了不同回应,但欠缺可靠的操作程式。究其根源,是因为原则裁判的实质,是裁判者在规则穷尽之际,选择并依据法律体系内的价值判断为个案判决提供合理化论证;然而一旦涉及到价值判断,裁判就有主观、恣意和片面的可能。     

二元规范理论下的法律原则检讨

当下法律原则理论的论争重心,已从"法律是什么"的概念分析,转向了司法实践中的原则裁判。自德沃金以来的"规则-原则"二元规范理论,对实际的司法裁判的解说力和作用力较为有限,也未能解决原则权衡这一关键性问题。"融贯性"命题和"籍由法政策权衡进行裁判"命题,是原则裁判理论的两大基石。但德沃金对融贯性命题的回答过于抽象,而阿列克希依比例原则和权重公式对权衡命题和原则理论的最新推进,却是一种不成功的自反性进化。这种自反性进化和理论反讽,表明作为一种"过度整合式"的裁判理论,原则裁判已然走到了穷途末路。     

The internet balancing formula

The Internet Balancing Formula (IBF) is a mathematical instrument to increase the rational and transparent aspects of balancing conflicting human rights online. It is based on the relative weight and intensity of conflicting rights. The numerical value of these rights is arrived at by applying mathematical scales to various input elements. This formula is easy to use and could be applied globally by private online stakeholders. Robert Alexy has entered into debate with Susi, pointing out similarities and differences between his Weight Formula and the IBF, and advancing the concreteness thesis. Alexy views the Weight Formula as general and abstract, whereas the IBF is specific and particular. Both Alexy and Susi are of the opinion that such formula is highly needed to respond to the theoretical and practical uncertainties and divergent practices of online stakeholders. Susi replies to Alexy's critique in a separate article.     

Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality

Abstract.   The article begins with an outline of the balancing construction as developed by the German Federal Constitutional court since the Lüth decision in 1958. It then takes up two objections to this approach raised by Jürgen Habermas. The first maintains that balancing is both irrational and a danger for rights, depriving them of their normative power. The second is that balancing takes one out of the realm of right and wrong, correctness and incorrectness, and justification, and, thus, out of the realm of the law. The article attempts to counter these objections by showing that there exists a rational structure of balancing that can be made explicit by a "Law of Balancing" and a "Disproportionality Rule." These rules show, first, that balancing is not a danger for rights but, on the contrary, a necessary means of lending them protection, and second, that balancing is not an alternative to argumentation but an indispensable form of rational practical discourse.     

Expert witnesses,nonexpert witnesses,and nonwitness experts

The role and responsibilities of the expert winness is a controversial subject. This article emphasizes the legal rules (of evidence and procedure) governing the expert and the policy grounds on which they rest. As the law's policies for the use of expertise shift from stage as stage as litigation progresses, or differ between categories of legal cases (criminal vs. civil), or with a party's use of an expert (from being a nonwitness consultant to an expert witness at trial), the law expects the role of the expert to be reshaped accordingly. On some important issues, the law sends contradictory messages: What its formal rules announce is at war with its structure and practices. And these, in turn, sometimes are in tension with the demands of the expert's professional ethical codes. On other matters of importance to experts, the law is silent, because the rules were motivated by a need to control the behavior of parties and lawyers, not experts. The result of all this is to present those who would be conscientious expert witnesses with a need to resolve nearly impossible role conflicts and ethical dilemmas.American Psychology-Law Society, delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association. New Orleans, August, 1989. That address was titled Expert Witnesses: Psychology and Beyond     

Fragments of a Theory of Legal Sources

Abstract. The author discusses a number of issues in the theory of legal sources. The first topic is whether sources should be conceived of as acts or texts. The alternatives are connected with two competing theories of legal interpretation (viz., the cognitive theory and the sceptical theory), which entail different concepts of legal rules and law-making. The second topic is whether a "formal" or a "material" criterion of recognition of sources should be preferred. The third section is devoted to the analysis of rules of change. Four theories of rules of change are discussed, and five kinds of such rules are distinguished. The fourth section concerns judicial law-making, with special reference to the creation of new legal rules by constitutional courts.     

文义解释的司法操作技术规则

经过长期的法学理论阐发与司法实践尝试和检验,逐步形成了一系列指引和规范文义解释司法运用的操作技术规则,主要包括语法规则、语义学规则、概括性法律用语规则.通过运用一系列以明晰的规则表达的文义解释操作技术,法律文本的意义模糊问题得以消解,有助于提高司法裁判质量,维护司法正义.文义解释规则化操作表征着,实体正义恰以形式正义为前提条件而获保障.     

A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation

Abstract . The paper gives a formal reconstruction of some fundamental patterns of legal reasoning, intended to reconcile symbolic logic and argumentation theory. Legal norms are represented as unidirectional inference rules which can be combined into arguments. The value of each argument (its qualification as justified, defensible, or defeated) is determined by the importance of the rules it contains. Applicability arguments, intended to contest or support the applicability of norms, preference arguments, purporting to establish preference relations among norms, and interpretative arguments are also formalised. All those argument types are connected in a unitary model, which relates legal reasoning to the indeterminacy of legal systems, intended as the possibility to develop incompatible defensible arguments. The model is applied to permissive norms and normative hierarchies, and is implemented in a Prolog program.     

VOICE ALTERATIONS

The experience of divorce is difficult for everyone involved. To best help with the legal experience, we need to understand gender differences that affect the process. This article adds to the understanding of that difference by addressing women's development and the female "voice." Women have not been acculturated to the subtle rules of litigation, which are in the male "voice." The authors offer an alternative scenario to add balance to the traditional experience of divorce for women and men and to the divorce process itself.     

中国传统的司法和法学

近来祖国大陆的法学界流行着两种对于中国传统的批评:其一指责中国传统司法者不遵循法律和先例,仅仅就事论事,凭天理人情作成判决;其二声称中国传统文化里几乎没有法学可言。二者都与事实不符。第一,中国自秦汉时起,法律已极繁多,在有明文可以适用或有成案可以比照的情形下,司法者都乐于遵循,不会自找麻烦另寻判决的依据。如果没有法律或成案可用,任何法制里的司法者都该先仔细分析案情(“就事论事”),然后探索法的精义(“天理人情”)而作成一个合乎公平正义的判决;中国传统司法者的做法并非例外。第二,中国历代都有许多学者不仅以纯理性的观点和方法对于当代的法律加以注释、批详,并且从历史背景和社会经验中去深究其渊源、目的和效能,以及法与其它社会规范的关系、法的正当性,法律条文不足时应该如何补救等法学上的重要问题,留下许多著作,对于这些问题提出了精辟的见解。只因他们的观点、方法和所用的语言及陈述方式与近人习见的不同,所以被忽略了。中国传统法制自成一系,与世界另几个重要法系并立,各有短长。如要加以检讨,应该先对它作一番整体的、深入的研究;如果想用另一法系的某些规定作为他山之石以改善中国法制,则更须对那些规定甚至整个法系作一番同样的研究,看清了二者的优劣,慎为取舍,不可以轻易地将中国目前的问题一概归咎于传统,更不该盲目地仿效他人。     

法律救济的规则选择:财产规则、责任规则与卡梅框架的法律经济学重构

法律经济学上的"卡-梅框架",是从法益保护的效果模式出发,对法律规则做出的一个类型划分。其原初结构是以法益的转移自由和定价意愿为标准划分的"财产规则"、"责任规则"和"禁易规则"。通过引入法益的初始归属和限价方式两个新的划分标准,可以增添"管制规则"和"无为规则"两个新的类型,扩展和重构"卡-梅框架"的救济分类和规则结构。这五类规则构成了法律经济学上可供选择的一个"规则菜单"。一个社会在特定领域的规则选择,对应着国家权力干涉社会生活的不同程度,体现了法律背后的观念变化和权力博弈。对于法律救济规则分类与效率比较的理论研究,有助于深化对中国现行法律的学术理解和制度完善。     

Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective

The dangers that times of national stress inevitably pose for First Amendment freedoms led legal scholar Vincent Blasi to formulate what he called the "pathological perspective." Blasi argued that, because the nation is more willing to give up fundamental liberties during these periods, it is incumbent upon the courts to anticipate such times and create legal rules that will withstand such pressures. This article examines the Supreme Court's courtroom access doctrine from a pathological perspective. It concludes that the confusing legacy of the Court's decisions in courtroom access cases has increased the danger to First Amendment rights during this critical time, and it proposes a more robust doctrine of courtroom access drawn from the pathological perspective.     

西欧中世纪的城市自治——西方法治传统形成因素的社会学分析

中世纪的自治城市明显地区别于封建体制和教会所建立的社会秩序,它孕育和加强了西方社会的世俗自由权利;并且,逐渐发展出了一套理性的法律体系即城市法,使城市活动和管理行为被一套理性的法律规则调整,为西方法治传统的形成奠定了基础。     

Ought-Sentences and the Juristic Description of Rules

Abstract .
According to the normative theory of legal science, juristic ought-sentences describe rules, since legal science just deals with rules, and rules cannot be described but by means of ought-sentences. The author challenges this view. Two different constructions of "describing rules" are proposed: Namely, either interpreting or stating the validity of rules. "Interpreting rules," in its turn, can be understood in three different senses: listing all the possible meanings of rule-formulations, reporting the different interpretations a rule-formulation has in fact received by courts, or ascribing meaning to rule-formulations. However, the author argues that ought-sentences are not the proper tools to accomplish such tasks. At the same time, juristic ought-sentences cannot be understood as validity statements, since they neither mention any rule whatsoever, nor include the term "valid." Further, if validity-statements were ought-sentences, their logical behaviour would reflect the logic of rules themselves. However, as the late Kelsen argued, things do not run this way, since two inconsistent ought-sentences, if understood as validity statements, can paradoxically both be true, as well as both false. Hence, validity-statements cannot be reduced to ought-sentences iterating the rules which they (are supposed to) refer to.     

人民法院在学位撤销案件中如何进行审查——基于司法审查强度的裁判反思

通过对1998年至2020年我国各级人民法院公开发布的学位撤销案件进行爬梳可以发现,高校撤销学位的事由主要集中在学历证明伪造和科研论文造假,兼有学术性和非学术性;法院对高校撤销学位决定的司法审查强度基于事实认定、法律适用和法律程序的不同而存在差异性的界分。为了维系学术自由与司法审查之间的平衡,并实质性地解决教育行政争议,人民法院应根据学术性事由和非学术性事由、正式程序和非正式程序的区分来建构二元化的事实认定审查标准,强化对学位撤销构成要件审查的释法说理,并审慎对待学位撤销决定的程序违法、审慎适用撤销判决,避免"程序空转"和"虚置诉讼"。     

环境民事公益诉讼法律适用困境及其破解

环境民事公益诉讼在司法实践中已得到大量运用,但其存在以下法律适用上的问题:第一,在对具体个案是环境民事公益诉讼还是其他私益诉讼的性质判断上,现有裁判存在显著差异。第二,在环境民事公益诉讼与类似案件的审理中,不同案件裁判者在程序选择与裁判结果上也呈现各异的走向。原因在于该诉的法律适用中存在"公共利益"等现有民事法律体系难以评价的规范性构成要件。究其根源,是该诉的独立请求权基础尚未得到明确。因此裁判者在审案时通过"借用"环境侵权之诉等类似诉讼请求权基础进行涵摄时,其法律适用过程就容易产生混同。明确环境民事公益诉讼请求权并精细该诉的法律规则,有助于环境民事公益诉讼程序的公正运行与裁判结果的日趋统一。     

跨境证券犯罪刑事管辖及法律适用探讨

境内与境外的证券市场适用不同的法律监管体制,跨境证券犯罪的跨境特征可能使境内境外对相关证券犯罪均具有刑事管辖权,从而引发刑事管辖冲突。对于跨境证券交易的监管和法律适用,无论是在法律规定层面还是在司法实践层面,均应遵循“主场原则”。应明确监管职能上的分工以避免适用不同法律法规的混乱情况,应体现最大的监管效能并减少区际法律冲突。跨境证券犯罪的刑事管辖权归属应充分尊重行政监管原则和考虑前置性法律的适用,并与行政管辖权归属保持一致。跨境证券犯罪的刑事管辖权归属应考虑犯罪行为社会危害的主要发生地。以内幕交易为代表的跨境证券犯罪的主要行为是“交易”,根据区际刑事管辖冲突的解决规则,应由交易行为的发生地管辖,按照交易地的刑法对相关行为进行刑事评价。