Courting the Environment – A Comparative Analysis

Statutory interpretation is of central importance to the daily work of all judges. This paper explores the reasons why statutory interpretation is necessary and then considers how judges have explained the way in which they carry out this task. It examines how judges consider the text, the context and the purpose of statutory provisions. It also looks at how human rights instruments can be used as an interpretive tool. It then considers the issue of whether judges can ‘fill in gaps’ in a legislative scheme and whether there is a Rubicon which judges cannot cross in the interpretive process.     

Interpretation,Argumentation, and the Determinacy of Law

This article models legal interpretation through argumentation and provides a logical analysis of interpretive arguments, their conflicts, and the resulting indeterminacies. Interpretive arguments are modelled as defeasible inferences, which can be challenged and defeated by counterarguments and be reinstated through further arguments. It is shown what claims are possibly (defensibly) or necessarily (justifiably) supported by the arguments constructible from a given interpretive basis, i.e., a set of interpretive canons coupled with reasons for their application. It is finally established under what conditions such arguments provide single outcomes or rather support alternative interpretive conclusions, thus leading to propositions of law whose truth-value is undetermined.     

德国法学方法论

一般认为,对于一门学术型学科而言,一套方法的存在及由此而形成的方法论至关重要。在德国,法律一直以来都是一门学术型学科。作为被称之为"法学"(字面意思是法律"科学",更确切地说是有关法律的学问)的研究对象,法律以具有一套专门的法学方法论为其特征。在德国大学法学院中,法学方法论是一门非常重要的讲授科目,且围绕这门课程有大量的法学文献。这些文献所讨论的是德国法律人如何(或者更准确地说:应该如何)开展法律工作。德语文献相关讨论中的一个特殊之处在于,在概念上区分"法律解释"与"法的续造"。方法论的讨论涉及制定法解释的各种相关要素、先决条件、不同层级,以及法的续造的合法性等问题。除此之外,还应意识到,对于德国法方法论的讨论是在不同的政治发展历程下展开的。基于此,本文从以下五个一般性话题展开对方法论的讨论:第一,德国、瑞士以及奥地利在方法论上的共性;第二,方法论讨论的规范特征;第三,不同法律领域中所出现的方法论上的差异;第四,法教义学与法学方法论的关系;第五,德国所讨论问题的历史背景。     

How Successful and Distinctive is the Human Rights Act? An Expatriate Comparatist's Assessment

This article first assesses the success and distinctiveness of the Human Rights Act 1998 from the perspective of its status as an exemplar of ‘the new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism.’ This new, intermediate model attempts to straddle the dichotomy of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy by protecting rights through a reallocation of powers between courts and legislatures that brings them into better balance than under either of these two traditional, more lopsided models. As part of its assessment, the article critically examines an influential strand of commentary claiming that in practice the HRA has proven to be less distinctive from US‐style constitutionalism than initially claimed or hoped. The second part of the article seeks to contribute to current debates about reform of the HRA by proposing ways to address its main structural weaknesses, especially the problem of remedial distortion.     

法律解释及其基本特征

在法治社会中 ,如果没有法律解释理论 ,仍可能形成新的专制。法律解释应是法官按照法律的规范意旨 ,运用法律思维方式 ,在法律适用过程中 ,对与案件相关的法律和事实的意义所作的阐明。它有三个基本特征 :法律解释是站在法律的立场上 ,对法律的意义所作出的有效力的解释 ,具有合法性特征 :法律解释具有法律的部分与整体的互动、法律与事实的互动的循环性特征 ;法律解释因把一般的法律个别化而具有创造性特征     

Corpus Linguistics as a Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress,Some Questions

Corpus linguistics is becoming a respected method of statutory and constitutional interpretation in the United States over the past decade, yet it has also generated a backlash from a group of scholars that engage in empirical work. This essay attempts to demonstrate both the contributions and the risks of using linguistic corpora as a primary tool in legal interpretation. Its legitimacy stems from the fact that courts routinely state that statutory terms, when not defined as a matter of law, are to be given their ordinary meaning. Judges have responded to this challenge, with the assistance of the linguistics community, by using corpora to determine which meanings are ordinary. However, legal analysts have not determined exactly what makes one meaning ordinary and another not ordinary. This gap has led to a level of disagreement in the field. Moreover, while linguists who engage in corpus linguistic analysis typically emphasize the importance of context, the legal application is peculiarly context-free, in keeping with legal philosophies that eschew reliance on reference to a law’s purpose and the intent of the legislature that enacted it. This move adds a political dimension to corpus analysis as a means of legal interpretation. Yet, the article concludes that by relying on a blend of general and specialized corpora, the legal system can substantially reduce the problem of contextualization, as some linguists and practitioners have already recognized.

     

美国制定法解释方法向文本主义的回睚

作为美国制定法解释方法的文本主义经历了平白意义规则和新文本主义两个发展阶段。以斯卡利亚为代表的新文本主义对在制定法解释领域长期占据正统地位的意图主义解释方法进行了批判,并对早期平白意义规则进行了扬弃,将文本重新置于制定法解释的中心位置,强调制定法语词的通常、自然与客观意义,并认为文本通常意义的确定无需借助于立法者意图或立法史等文本外材料,而只须根据“普通说英语者标准”,运用词典、语法、解释准则等语言学方面的工具并考虑制定法文本的语境、结构与整体等语义性背景即可确定。     

Merger—the name of the FE game

In the Australian legal environment today the overwhelming importance of laws made by Parliament is obvious, yet many first year law programmes pay insufficient attention to the coordinated teaching of statutory interpretation (SI). This project formed part of a collaborative initiative between an educational developer and the coordinator of legal research methods (LRM) to introduce statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study. Our study used a qualitative research framework – a questionnaire was administered to students at two intervals throughout the first semester. In Week 3, 160 students participated in the questionnaire and at Week 4, a keystone module on statutory interpretation using a building block approach was introduced in LRM. Since the nature of assessment in LRM is largely reflection, this unit lent itself well to investigating the language and literacy challenges of statutory interpretation, in particular, to students monitoring their own progress in this regard. The overall aim of the project was to establish a framework for students to build on their knowledge and understanding of statutory interpretation throughout their undergraduate studies, and in the interests of improved learning and teaching outcomes, for staff to be able to document the changes in student thinking. This paper focuses on the preliminary stage of our investigation into the language and literacy challenges involved in introducing statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study.

I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”

(Alice Through the Looking Glass, c. vi.)

After all this long discussion, the question is whether the words “If a man has” can mean “If a man thinks he has.” I am of opinion that they cannot, and that the case should be decided accordingly.

(Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206)     

Quality and quantity in constitutional interpretation: the quest for analytic essentials in law

Henry Manne wrote about many topics central to the law-and-economics canon but also over a period of more than a decade later in life worked on a theory of constitutional interpretation, producing a paper and lectures on this subject. His goal was to use insights from economics to improve constitutional analysis, in particular seeking to ground constitutional interpretation in quantitative assessments he hoped would be both true to the primary goal of constitution-makers and capable of providing guidance to judges in ways less subject to the pull of political preferences. Despite his concerns with controlling constitutional interpretation in practice, the instincts Manne brought to this endeavor ran more to matters of theory than to its implementation by judges, identifying important propositions for interpretation but failing (by his own admission) to produce a test that fulfilled his aspirations. The strengths and weaknesses of this work provide an intriguing contrast with writings from Antonin Scalia, the American jurist and scholar whose approaches to both constitutional and statutory interpretation had a profound impact on jurisprudence over the past three decades. Like Manne, Scalia highly valued more determinate methods of analysis and was deeply concerned with the architecture of constitutional creation and effectuation. His focus, however, was more on the practical question of what happens when a particular sort of official has the power to implement a highly indeterminate test and what test best constrains interpretation in ways faithful to the interpretive task. Those goals undergird Scalia’s commitments to textualism and originalism. Manne’s and Scalia’s approaches to constitutional interpretation are instructive on the purposes served by analytical tools in disparate settings. In particular, they offer contrasting and complementary visions, providing insights about the domains of law-and-economics, legal analysis, practical judgment, and perspective.     

物权法定原则

物权法定原则决定了物权法的基本性质与特征,也严格地限制了当事人在创设新型物权、改变既有物权之内容等方面的意思自由。物权法定原则的内涵是指物权的种类、内容、效力以及公示方法由法律规定,原则上不能由法律之外的规范性文件进行规定,也不能允许当事人自由创设物权的种类以及确定物权的内容、效力和公示方法。作者比较了物权法定模式的表述方式和基本功能,并认为我国物权法中物权法定中的“法”应当被主要限定为法律;司法解释应当具有一定的创设物权的功能;判例不能创设物权。当事人关于物权设定的约定违反物权法定原则的法律后果,应当根据不同的情况来确定。     

Muslim marriage (non) recognition: implications and possible solutions

Differences between traditional Muslim marriage practice and the statutory formalities required for entry into a legally recognised marriage in England and Wales have resulted in serious question-marks hanging over the legal status of a seemingly significant proportion of Muslim marriages. This article places the spotlight on the vulnerability of spouses who remain unaware of the lack of legal status which may attach to their marriage or who may have been misled by their spouse as to the latter’s intention to obtain legal recognition for the marriage. The article first considers the statutory formalities required under English law for entry into a legally recognised marriage before drawing on the most up-to-date empirical research to highlight the apparently widespread non-compliance with the formalities within the Muslim community. The article then reflects on the various practical implications which may arise for parties to an unrecognised Muslim marriage before considering how the situation may be ameliorated.     

Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?

This paper examines the emergence of a new model for protecting rights (referred to as the 'parliamentary rights' model) in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Australian Capital Territory. This parliamentary model is distinguished from the more traditional, judicial-centric, approach to rights protection in at least two ways. The first is that this parliamentary rights model incorporates the notion of legitimate political dissent from judicial interpretations of rights. The second way it challenges the court-centred model is by incorporating the systematic evaluation of proposed legislation from a rights perspective. Both of these features allow for the possibility of a broader range of perspectives on the appropriate interpretation of rights or the resolution of disagreements involving claims of rights than those arising from more judicial-centric bills of rights. The paper assesses whether this alternative approach to rights protection satisfies those sceptics who doubt the virtue or prudence of conceiving of political disputes as legal rights claims for which the judiciary has the dominant role in their interpretation and resolution.     

Practical reason and the ontology of statutes

Conclusion A common working assumption of theories of statutory interpretation is that the object of interpretation is uncontroversial. It is assumed that dispute only centers on the epistemics of interpretation. The assumption is unsound. Theories of statutory interpretation are importantly different from other sorts of theories. The subject matter of other sorts of theories can be identified uncontroversially. In the case of statutory interpretation, the object of interpretation is controversial. What counts as the object of interpretation therefore needs specification. Without the required specification, criteria of evidence and warrant justifying an interpretation are not well-defined.An adequate theory of statutory interpreation must contain both epistemic and ontological components. It must provide criteria for treating information as evidence relevant to, and standards for, interpreting a statute. Providing such criteria in turn requires also giving an account of the object of interpretation — what a statute consists in. Practical reason theories fail to provide acceptable criteria and standards for interpreting a statute. These accounts therefore fail to supply an adequate epistemic components for a theory of statutory interpretation. As to the ontological component, things are less clear. I have argued in sections II and III that this component is partly a matter of substantive political theory. Although practical reason theorists fail to offer a substantive political theory for defining the proper object of interpretation, their accounts are in principle ontologically unobjectionable. At most, practical reason accounts are incomplete. Of course, practical reason accounts might still be defective for other reasons. They may invoke a defective substantive political theory. Or the constraints imposed on properties of a statute or relations between them may not in fact affectuate the goals set by the theory. Such failings would be normative, not metaphysical. Since practical reason accounts are epistemically inadequate and ontologically incomplete, legal theorists should find the accounts less attractive than they do, even putting aside the normative soundness of the accounts.I thank Barry Adler, John Harrison, George Rutherglen, William Stuntz and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I am particularly grateful to Larry Alexander for discussions and comments on previous drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Finding cover: Legal trauma and how to take care of it

As law originates in violence, it is always haunted by its constitutive trauma. Recourse to law's origin, which is implicitly or explicitly sought in (constitutional) adjudication, thus requires a way to deal with law's trauma. What is needed is a cover, to be provided through (legal) interpretation. Four such interpretive ‘cover up’ operations, all necessarily somewhat duplicitous, are discussed. The first three represent main currents in legal theory. First, the standard legal view, which denies the trauma but relies on traditional authority to cover it. Second, a ‘neurotic’ solution, in which trauma is also denied but nevertheless cover is produced through collective interpretation. In the third, ‘perverse’ solution, trauma is admitted, and even enjoyed; on the other hand, it is denied that cover can be produced by any interpretive authority. The fourth option provides an alternative: recognition of law's trauma, covering it through the collectively shared practice of interpretation. It is shown that an example of such a collective effort can be found in the Dutch practice of gedogen, the deliberate under-enforcement of law, which is capable of creating an ‘informal rule of law’ that deals with intractable social problems more successfully than attempts formally to enforce applicable law. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Strasbourg,the House of Lords or Elected Politicians: Who decides about rights after Re P?

In Re P , the House of Lords decided that art 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 which prohibited unmarried couples from being eligible to adopt, violated articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Apart from its significance for adoption law and anti-discrimination law, Re P is also important in understanding the constitutional role of the courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Re P recognizes that if Strasbourg has determined that an issue falls within states' margin of appreciation, this does not prevent municipal courts from enforcing those rights. This comment will discuss the meaning and scope of the courts' obligation under section 2 of the HRA, the status of the rights protected by the HRA and the appropriate role of the courts in a rights dispute which is subject to moral, social, religious or political controversy.     

Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu-als: Or,What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism

Riggs v. Palmer has become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue in Riggs was given by the counterfactual intention of the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light.     

The Alchemists' Search for the Philosophers' Stone: The Status of Registered Social Landlords under the Human Rights Act

Social housing in Great Britain is undergoing a radical transformation with the transfer of local authority housing to housing associations, more particularly registered social landlords (RSLs). While the former are clearly 'public authorities' for the purposes of the Human Rights Act (HRA), the status of the latter is less clear. The first part of this article addresses the increasingly important role played by housing associations in the provision of social housing, and the significant implications of the stock transfer process. It goes on to explore the meaning of 'public authority' for the purposes of claims under the HRA, taking into account available approaches to interpretation as well as the tests traditionally used to determine amenability to judicial review. It concludes that there is a strong case for acknowledging that RSLs are hybrid authorities for the purposes of the HRA, given in particular their 'publicness' and the fact that they are often carrying out the same functions as local authorities.     

Detention and treatment down under: human rights and mental health laws in Australia and New Zealand

Mental health law reform in recent decades has drawn on the international human rights movement. The entering into force of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on May 3 2008 has been hailed by some as signalling a new era in relation to how domestic mental health laws should be reformed. Both Australia and New Zealand have ratified the CRPD and Australia has acceded to its Optional Protocol. New Zealand and the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria have statutory bills of rights which have an interpretive effect, but are unable to render other statutes invalid. Drawing on the results of interviews conducted with fifty-two representatives of consumer and carer organisations, lawyers, and mental health professionals across Australia and New Zealand, this paper examines the current thinking on human rights and mental health laws in these countries and outlines what changes, if any, may be brought to domestic legislation in light of the Convention.     

论合宪性解释方法

虽然合宪性解释方法在概念上会存在些许差别,但其所遵循的合宪性推定逻辑是相通的,即都体现了司法权对立法权的谦抑。合宪性解释方法中所含括的单纯解释规则,如果不与冲突规则在学理上加以区分,则很容易对合宪性解释产生认识上的偏差。目前合宪性解释方法所模本的欧陆经验,从源流上来说,最早其实可溯及至早期美国合宪性推定的理论与实践,并与回避宪法方法一脉相承。通过合宪性推定可以发现,合宪性解释方法可以从宪法方法与法律方法两个层面展开。把握其内在理路及权力逻辑,方可使其具有本土可能性。     

Statutory interpretation and the counterfactual test for legislative intention

In this paper I examine the counterfactual test for legislative intention as used in Riggs v. Palmer. The distinction between the speaker's meaning approach and the constructive interpretation approach to statutory interpretation, as made by Dworkin in Law's Empire, is explained. I argue that Dworkin underestimates the potential of the counterfactual test in making the speaker's meaning approach more plausible. I also argue that Dworkin's reasons for rejecting the counterfactual test, as proposed in Law's Empire, are either too weak or unsound. A deeper reason for rejecting the counterfactual test as a method for the speaker's meaning approach is proposed in this paper. The difference between the counterfactual test and other tests for legislative intention which seem also to make use of counterfactual conditions in explained.