US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

美国因素在两岸关系和平发展进程中的影响

美国对两岸和谈的政策立场,是出于维系台海“不统、不独、不战”局面的战略考虑,以保证自己在台海地区的最大战略利益。美国既不希望两岸举行统一谈判又希望两岸达成和平协议的复杂心态,表现在一方面希望两岸进行谈判,降低敌对状态,另一方面又长期对台提供军售,使其增加与大陆相抗衡的资本。此一“双轨政策”对两岸和平关系的构建,有着不同方向的影响,往往起了互相抵消的作用。由于中国政府对台湾当局谋求“法理台独”的强烈反应以及台海紧张局势的升高,美国政府在20世纪90年代后期开始对两岸政治谈判采取较为积极的态度,反对台湾单方面改变现状。美国的上述战略考虑,在反对台湾“独立”、维系两岸和平这一点上,与中国政府的立场有相通之处,客观上为构建两岸关系和平发展框架提供了较好的外部条件。     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

马英九上台后美国对台政策调整的背景分析

马英九上台执政后，美国对台政策的着力点由反对单方面改变台海现状转向正面评价台湾当局调整大陆政策和两岸关系的改善。美国的上述调整虽然有其现实的国家利益需求，但决策环境的变化也在对美国传统的对台思维和战略产生深刻的影响。未来四年，美国会继续发展美台关系，保持对台海局势的影响力，但随着两岸对话的不断深入，美国对台海局势的关注度可能会有所降低，台湾问题对中美关系的负面影响也可能趋于弱化。     

台海危机管理:战略险情与模式选择--以陈水扁当政时期为例

台湾问题长期以来是中国国家安全面临的一个巨大战略挑战。陈水扁执政时期，由于民进党当局顽固坚持激进的分离主义路线，“台独”分裂活动给两岸关系带来了极大的战略险情，使台海局势多次走到爆发危机的危险边缘。本文全面分析民进党八年执政期问，陈水扁当局的“台独”分裂活动对两岸关系的破坏，以及中国政府管理台海危机的模式选择。     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

Constructing Peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making.     

海峡经济区竞争性区域体系构建研究

竞争性区域是拥有独特“地方品质”的区域，以创新和知识作为其发展的催化剂，成为国家乃至全球最具发展活力的区域。竞争性区域的构建过程集中体现为提升区域竞争力的战略政策要点和与此相配套实施的多级治理措施的高效统一。从竞争性区域构建理论视角考察，海峡经济区作为两岸经济整合的独特区域，其基础设施网络连接性、产学研互动合作、产业集群培育、城市经济协同发展方面亟待推进，竞争性区域特质尚不发育。今后应从基础设施的协调与衔接、区域产业分工协作体系建立、厦金特区和福马特区创建、经济运行机制衔接、台湾海峡城市联盟缔结、开展以政府政策协调为中介的公私合营等方面着力推进，以构建海峡经济区竞争性区域配套体系，推动海峡经济区迅速崛起成为中国乃至世界新兴的竞争性区域。     

The Taiwan strait crisis of 1996: Implications for US security policy

The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 was the greatest challenge to Sino‐American relations in several decades. This study examines the crisis and its implications for US security policy. It outlines US policy toward the defense of Taiwan, discusses the US response to Beijing's military intimidation of Taiwan and analyzes several of the major lessons gleaned from the crisis. The paper suggests that, while China's aggressive behavior should not lead to a dramatic shift in the American position toward Taiwan's defense, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted.     

The Economics of Power Transitions: Australia between China and the United States

This article examines Sino–Australian economic relations, and their impact on the ties between the United States and Australia. First, drawing on power transition theory, it is argued that in a post-Cold War environment, economic ties play as great a role as strategic relations in determining the orientation of third-party states. Second, it is also argued that Australia's deeper economic and commercial ties with China have usurped a role previously held by the United States. This has forced Australia to pursue a bifurcated foreign policy—one split between its economic and national security needs. Third, these deeper ties with China have generated a degree of alliance drift between Australia and the United States. As a result, there is now a significant debate in Australia over the future of both bilateral relations—even as its space for policy innovation remains limited.     

新时期的美国涉台关系及其制约因素

中美关系与两岸关系的大格局,决定了美国涉台关系的变化趋势.在政治上,美国乐见国民党连续执政和两岸关系的和平发展,但对于台湾被迫走向统一,存有疑虑,希望及时把握两岸和谈的具体进程.美方对台湾在“国防”、“外交”等领域予以多方面支持的目的,从短期看是同步强化美台关系,维护美国在台海地区的既有利益;从长期看则是增加台湾在两岸谈判中的筹码,谋取美国在台湾问题最终解决方案上的主动权.     

Comparing Jiang Zemin's Impatience with Hu Jintao's Patience Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989–2012

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations under the Post-'11 September' Strategic Settings

Sino-US relations and cross-Strait relations are always interrelated and so is the US policy towards cross-Strait relations. The United States has taken its global strategic and fundamental national interests as points of departure. The Bush Administration has undergone a cycle of being tough towards China and titling towards Taiwan first and then readjusting towards the middle ground. There are many reasons to explain this change and the events of 11 September stand out very prominently. This change once again proves that once the US put strategic consideration first it will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Taiwan issue should not be a damaging and/or diverting factor. However, there still exist fundamental differences over the Taiwan issue and the Bush Administration's military-to-military relations with and arms sales to Taiwan are matters of great concern.     

The United States and China in the Age of Obama: looking each other straight in the eyes

Though the United States remains atop the world's power hierarchy, it is becoming less dominant, both because of the rise of new power centers and because the problems are becoming larger. The United States now must function in a world of relatively greater power equality and ever-larger problems springing from interdependence. The United States and China now have to look each other straight in the eyes, with the core of their relationship resting on the strategic foundation of stabilization—stabilization of the global economy, global ecosystem, and global security. This essay makes several additional points: (1) China has made some wise domestic and foreign economic policy decisions in the context of the great economic downturn of 2007–2009 that probably will increase the PRC's relative capacities coming out of the downturn; (2) US–China relations are more fundamentally sound than they have ever been before. Both nations' leaders should seize this opportunity to recast their relationship as partners in the effort to build coalitions to address the global system's most pressing challenges; and (3), even with a relatively sound strategic foundation for bilateral relations, when one moves from the general to the specific in important policy domains, it will be exceedingly difficult for Beijing and Washington to reach agreements on how to proceed on many key issues.     

Hong Kong in United States‐China relations: The international politics of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty

This article examines the implications of the political transition of Hong Kong on US‐China relations in strategic, political and economic dimensions. It evaluates the impact of Hong Kong's changing status in the context of the engagement‐containment debate on China policy in the US. It suggests that US concerns over questions such as democracy and human rights and China's rejection of foreign interference’ in Hong Kong would turn the territory into a source of political conflict between the US and China. Finally it points out that any major trade confrontation between the two countries would have serious implications for the territory. The article concludes by arguing that if Hong Kong could continue to be a prosperous and free society with a global outlook, it would facilitate China's integration with the global community, but if a reversion to authoritarian rule occurred in Hong Kong, US‐China relations will be aversely affected.     

The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress,problems, and prospects

This article offers an overview of China's evolving nonproliferation policy over the past decade. It documents the key developments during this period and identifies both the internal and external factors that have brought about significant change in Chinese policy. It argues that China's growing recognition of the threats posed by WMD proliferation, image concerns, its interest in maintaining stable Sino-US relations, and the US policy initiatives aimed at influencing Chinese behavior are largely accountable for Beijing's gradual acceptance of nonproliferation norms, pledges to adhere to selected multilateral export control guidelines, and the introduction of domestic export control regulations. It suggests that the future direction of China's nonproliferation policy to a large extent will depend on how Beijing and Washington manage their increasing differences over missile defenses and the Taiwan issue.     

发展闽台现代农业物流，促进台湾海峡经济区的形成

现代物流是优化区域间资源配置和经济合作的重要桥梁及纽带,比其他产业更能消弥 两岸之间的时空距离,对于海峡经济区的形成和发展至关重要。连宋大陆行之后,两岸农产品贸易 出现持续热络态势,发展闽台现代农业物流,不仅是促进福建农业产业化、提高农业生产效率的需 要;而且是纾解台湾农产品产销矛盾,拓展台湾农业发展空间以及推动台湾海峡经济区的形成和发 展的重要举措。发展闽台现代农业物流,可以通过建立不同类型的农产品物流生产基地,加快农业 物流园区建设,发展多层次、多形式的农产品物流市场,加大物流基础设施建设力度以及实施相应 的优惠政策予以推动。     

The origins of conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The problem of differences in perceptions

In 1995 and 1996, the Taiwan Strait became an area of considerable tension. Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated as a result of perceptions by leaders in the People's Republic of China that Taiwan was moving toward independence, especially after President Lee Teng‐hui made a widely publicized trip to the US in the summer of 1995. An assessment of the differences in perceptions by scholars, officials and the populations on the two sides, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, are instructive. The author looks at five areas where disparate views are noticeable and divisive: the history of Taiwan (especially its ties with the mainland), Taiwan's legal status, views of the ‘Taiwan issue’ espoused by Beijing and Taipei, current relations between Beijing and Taipei, and the stance of the international community and the nature and structure of international politics. Scenarios are presented regarding the future of the conflict.