International Conflict,International Security Environment,and Military Coups

Why do some countries repeatedly experience military coups while others seem immune? Are countries more prone to military coups when faced with external threats? The answers to these questions still remain contested: While several scholars hold that countries facing external threats are more vulnerable to coups, others argue that such countries are actually more secure from coups. I argue that by failing to distinguish between immediate and acute threats, caused by wars and militarized conflicts, and chronic threats from a state’s international security environment, the existing literature ignores the possibility that these two types of external threats differently affect the likelihood of coups. I propose that wars and militarized conflicts, infrequent and often short lived, decrease coup propensity, while a threatening security environment increases coup risk. I find strong supporting evidence that the presence of chronic international threats increases the likelihood of coups while acute international conflicts lower that likelihood.     

The common European security and defence policy and the ‘third‐country’ issue

The Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the European Union (EU) was launched in 1999 and has been perceived as a landmark step toward European security cooperation, particularly in the field of crisis management. Still in its early stages, some difficult issues have become apparent. Of these, the so‐called ‘third‐country’ issue may prove to be among the most significant. This problem refers to the necessity of associating states outside the EU with CESDP. In this regard, three states stand out — the United States, Turkey and Russia — and this article considers their concerns and the European response in detail. This is prefaced by a general overview of how the third‐country problem emerged and what the EU has done to address it. It concludes by suggesting that third‐country considerations could well determine where and how EU‐led missions operating under the auspices of CESDP are deployed.     

国际安全制度与总体国家安全：一种理论分析

一国的总体国家安全虽然涉及方方面面,但国内政治和国际政治是贯穿这些领域的两条主线。国际安全制度构成了维护各领域国家安全的重要依托：国际安全制度能够塑造各国国家安全的外部环境,影响不同领域的国家安全利益,促进不同领域的国际安全合作,从而有利于实现各国的总体国家安全。二战结束以来,主权平等、不干涉内政和不使用武力解决国际争端等基本原则已经大大改善了全球安全环境,构成中小国家主权独立和国家安全的重要保障。同时,普遍性的国际安全原则和规范也可以应用到各个具体领域的安全规则的构建,从而直接影响各国维护相关领域国家安全的能力与利益。多边安全联盟会带来高水平的国际安全合作,促进联盟成员的总体国家安全,但也可能减损其他国家的安全水平,从而导致冲突。纯粹的区域性集体安全制度在提升各成员国家安全水平的同时,也具有合作安全和共同安全的优点。各国应该积极参与国际安全制度的构建,并有效运用国际安全制度提升本国的国家安全水平。     

Interdependence,asymmetric crises,and European defence cooperation

Although international crises are often believed to represent windows of opportunity to strengthen European defence cooperation, recent crises have not seemed to produce a clear convergence of European Union (EU) member states’ security interests. This article seeks to address this puzzle by arguing that European defence cooperation is a response to crises that place European states in a situation of military interdependence. Conversely, asymmetric crises, i.e. crises that affect European states unevenly, encourage those states to maintain their autonomy of action. This theoretical argument is supported by two case studies: the failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950s and the current difficulties experienced by the EU’s military operations. These two cases illustrate a striking continuity in that, because of (neo)colonial ties in particular, European states are often unevenly affected by international crises, which tends to make defence cooperation less effective.     

The Effect of Security Alliances on Exchange-Rate Regime Choices

Because an exchange-rate arrangement by nature involves more than one country and because it has various economic and political implications, it is affected inevitably by interstate political relations. Most previous research explains the exchange-rate regime choice as a function of individual country attributes, ignoring the role of interstate political relations and the anchor-currency choice. In this paper, I examine how security alliances influence a country's choices over the flexible-fixed regime and the anchor currency. Alliances increase the ex ante attractiveness of pegging to one's ally, because security ties can reduce concerns over relative gains, motivate active collaboration by the anchor-currency ally to defend the regime, and signal to the currency market the durability of the regime. Hence, a country is biased toward pegging to its ally, relative to either pegging to a nonally or choosing the flexible regime. I test the argument for both the Bretton Woods and the post- Bretton Woods periods. I find that alliance ties affect both the anchor currency and the flexible-fixed regime choices, as expected. But these effects appear to function through the defense-pact alliance alone and are most pronounced for the developing countries.     

中国与印度能源合作的政治经济分析

近年来，由于国内能源有限和经济的高速增长，中国与印度两国的能源供给越来越多地依靠国际市场。在国际能源领域，双方加强合作与协调攸关两国能源安全和经济发展全局。尽管存在着竞争，但双方互利合作是主要的发展趋势，中印各自的发展优势也为不断拓展两国能源合作提供了广阔的互补空间。     

Natural Disasters and the Size of Nations

What is the relationship between natural disasters and country size? Is an increasing likelihood of environmental shocks linked to political integration or secessionism? We argue that natural disasters are associated with a decline in country size. This relationship arises because costs generated by disasters are higher for citizens located farther away from the political center of a country, and costs are amplified as disasters affect a larger area in a country, which in turn makes it less desirable for citizens in remote regions to remain part of a larger country. Our empirical results show that greater risks of environmental shocks are indeed associated with smaller countries, as well as smaller administrative units.     

Opportunities and Limits of EU-China Security Cooperation

In its European Security Strategy, the European Union defined the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a strategic partner and envisaged comprehensive cooperation with it, including in the security sector. China and the EU often use the same terms, but the connotation of these terms differs due to fundamentally different security concerns. This article critically assesses the possibilities, prospects and difficulties from a European point of view of pursuing Sino-European cooperation in security matters. It concludes that given basic differences in perception, cooperation is likely to be successful in such fields as environmental disasters and pandemics, but will remain limited in such areas as non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism and energy security.     

加强东北亚区域能源合作 保障我国能源安全

当前我国能源特别是石油进口持续增加 ,能源安全面临着严峻的挑战 ,存在来源风险、运输风险和市场风险 ,需要通过区域能源合作来保障我国能源安全。东北亚区域除我国外 ,既包括油气资源丰富的俄罗斯 ,又有缺乏油气资源但资金雄厚的日本和韩国 ,发挥各国优势加强东北亚区域能源合作 ,是防范我国和区域内其他国家能源风险、避免对能源资源恶性竞争的有效途径。在参与东北亚地区的能源合作中 ,我国应建立一种整体的、相互协调的战略思路 ,寻找各方的利益共同点以促进区域内能源合作 ,同时还必须增加与区域外的联系 ,实现能源进口渠道的多元化。     

核事故、能源结构调整与国际气候合作

福岛核事故将对各国能源结构调整和国际气候合作产生重大影响。从短中期来看,部分国家将对核能产业实施紧缩政策,化石能源比重可能增加,在国际气候合作中作出积极减排承诺的意愿也将降低,国际气候合作可能继续陷于僵局之中。在可预见的未来,人类需要通过追求核能安全来维护能源安全和气候安全。     

Political factors affecting cooperation between Italy,Greece and Turkey

The rise of political Islam in the EU's southern neighbourhood represents a political as well as conceptual challenge to the EU as a foreign policy actor. In the past, the EU reacted to this challenge based on its essentialist perception of political Islam and its overarching interest in regional stability and security. However, the growing salience of ‘contingencist’ interpretations of political Islam and the resolution of the EU's democratisation-stabilisation dilemma in the wake of the Arab Spring have recently provided an opportunity for greater engagement and cooperation. This has enabled a switch in EU policies from a strategy of containment to a strategy of engagement. Despite this, problems remain as the EU continues to expect Islamist actors to adjust to its own discursive framework and as intra-European divisions revive as a result of the renewal of secular-religious divisions in the neighbourhood. This will complicate EU attempts to build a new partnership with Islamist democracies and will fuel old stereotypes and animosities.     

The Sirens' Call of Relative Gains Concerns: A Critical Analysis of Their Presumed Rationality in the Prisoners' Dilemma

The notion that in international interactions state-actors care not only about their own absolute gains, but also about the size of these gains relative to what other actors receive, is one of the pillars on which rests neorealists' pessimism about the prospects of cooperation in repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) and, by extension, in international politics. Although there has been a lively debate over the impact of relative gains concerns on the prospects of cooperation, the prior question, whether states should in fact care about relative gains at all, has not been seriously confronted. This article questions the assumption that rational states should care about relative gains in PD. As the literature motivates them, relative gains concerns are best understood as a heuristic device designed to guide states toward inter-temporal optimization of their absolute payoffs. Using simulated tournaments of a model of a dynamic, multi-player PD, this article puts to the test whether relative gains concerns in fact achieve this purpose. Contrary to what has been presumed, the analysis demonstrates that in many contexts it is harmful and dangerous for states to care about relative gains. Furthermore, whenever states are in a position to tell whether, in a particular setting, it might be rational for them to care about relative gains, the heuristic of relative gains concerns is redundant. The important issues that the literature on relative gains has sought to address should continue to be discussed, but not through the lens of the problematic and misleading conceptual apparatus of relative gains concerns.     

Does Russia need a general staff?

The institutional arrangements and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts will determine the future of European security and the balance of power in a wider Europe. Russian policy and Russia‐NATO relations are anaylsed within the context of the ongoing changes at Russia's southern periphery. The embryos of three distinct security systems are developing ‐ a Russia‐led, a NATO‐led and one led by the international community. The article suggests that instability in the southern periphery in the future will require security cooperation and a joint approach by Russia and NATO countries.     

American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda

This article explores US perspectives on the new transatlantic security agenda in the context of the evolution of strategic culture. The war on terrorism and the Iraq War of 2003 serve as focal points to examine sources of divergence and convergence between US and European security policies. The article explores key questions including: Have we seen the collapse of a shared, transatlantic security culture since September 11? How have US leaders manipulated strategic cultures to achieve security objectives in the new era? Why has the Bush administration willingly engaged (and even encouraged) the intra-European divide? How significant to the United States is the shift in “old” and “new” European perspectives on the war on terrorism? The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of recent events for the future of transatlantic security ties.     

An Asian Regional Architecture for Energy Security

Introduction Non-traditional security issues such as energy security have been becoming more and more important in Asia and worldwide in recent years.It is increasingly difficult for a single country to guarantee its energy security in the globalized world of today.     

The latest Turkish–Greek détente: instrumentalist play for EU membership,or long‐term institutionalist cooperation?

The recent thaw in bilateral Greek–Turkish relations is promising, yet insufficient for future stability and cooperation in and around the Aegean Sea. The main reason lies in the prevalence of instrumental‐strategic thinking on the part of both states. Neither Greece nor Turkey has approached the settlement of their disputes from a perspective that would imply an eagerness to build a collective identity based on the institutional norms of European international society as represented by the European Union. On the contrary, Europeanisation has not been an end in itself but a means for the materialisation of their preconceived national interests. The underlying motivation behind their attempts to reach a solution appears to have arisen from instrumental concerns vis‐à‐vis both the EU and each other. The dynamics of their independent relations with the European Union seem to have compelled them to come to a modus vivendi over these issues, since otherwise their relative status vis‐à‐vis the EU would likely deteriorate. This article will discuss the main aspects of the latest Turkish–Greek cooperation process within the framework of rationalist instrumentalist and sociological institutionalist debate in international relations theory. It will be contended that a lasting and long‐term cooperation between the two countries can only follow the formation of collective identities and common national foreign policy interests, particularly as they relate to the European Union framework.     

European participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: making strategic choice and seeking economic opportunities

This paper asks why half of the members of the European Union (EU) have chosen to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in defiance of substantial pressure from Washington. If the AIIB is too good an economic opportunity for Europe to ignore, then why did the rest of the EU turn its back on this organization? To account for this apparent variation in the attitude of European countries, I argue that, ceteris paribus, changes in the strategic situation involving Europe, the USA, and China, as well as differing expectations of economic opportunities in a developing Asia, have led European countries in different directions. Those countries which are getting increasingly friendly with China, which results from increasing level of alliance security dilemma with the USA, and are highly dependent on the potentially gigantic Asian market are the most likely to follow China’s lead. Countries that are not so geared toward China or Asia are least likely to join the AIIB. Where only one of these factors is present, the country will remain hesitant. I test this argument using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. This includes probit analysis for 31 countries and three in-depth case studies involving Germany, Belgium, and Romania. These countries have a high, median, and low chance of joining the bank, respectively. The findings of both types of analysis support the proposed analytical framework.     

The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing countries

This article assesses how and to what extent the European Union (EU) uses a security perspective to define and shape its relationship with the developing world. In order to evaluate the EU's development policy and its relations with developing countries we link the concept of ‘security–development nexus’ with the concept of ‘securitization’. The article examines whether securitization can be observed with regard to four dimensions: discourse, policy instruments, policy actions and institutional framework. The analysis demonstrates a securitization of the EU's development policy and its relations with developing countries, particularly in Africa. However, paradoxically, the securitization's extent and nature suggest that the EU can also use it as a way to avoid a more direct involvement in conflict areas.     

印越关系发展及对南海问题的影响

印度与越南有传统的友好合作关系,但冷战结束后一度处于停滞状态。20世纪90年代末两国关系得以重启,各领域合作全面展开。近年来,印越双边安全合作有较大发展,尤其是印度高调介入南海争端,凸显其地区战略图谋,即对中国在印度洋和中印边界地区的战略举措进行牵制。但印度与越南的军事安全合作仍具有较大的局限性。     

Economics,security, and individual-level preferences for trade agreements

Empirical research on the determinants of individual-level support for trade liberalization has focused almost entirely on the economic effects of trade. Yet, international relations scholarship has long recognized that commerce also has a variety of security implications. This paper explores if and when security considerations influence individual attitudes toward trade. In this study, we ask two questions: First, to what extent do expectations about the security implications of trade affect individual-level attitudes toward trade agreements? Second, does the introduction of security concerns into the discussion of trade agreements influence how heavily individuals weigh their economic costs and benefits? We employ an original experiment embedded in a conjoint survey to investigate the relative impact of a variety of economic and security considerations on respondents’ support for trade. Our findings suggest that security information matters and undermines the appeal of some, though not all, economic arguments for trade liberalization among our respondents.