Security challenges in Europe's mediterranean periphery ‐ perspectives and policy dilemmas

Challenges to European security emanating from the southern Mediterranean have had a marked influence on European security policies during the 1990s. This article identifies the main themes in the debate on Mediterranean security and the policy dilemmas which these security challenges raise for European states and their multilateral security organizations. It is argued that Mediterranean security challenges cannot be fully understood without grasping the security implications of the presence of authoritarian and repressive regimes in the South. As European security policies aim at supporting ‘political stability’ in the South through development assistance, expansion of trade relations and military co‐operation, these policies also contribute to uphold an illegitimate status quo, which is often the very source of political instability and insecurity.     

Moldova and Transdniestria: Painful past,deadlocked present,uncertain future

The ethnic conflict between Slavs and Moldovans in the Moldovan region of Transdniestria is one of the lesser‐known post‐Soviet conflicts, as, mercifully, its scale never reached that of conflict in Chechnya or Nagorny‐Karabakh. Nevertheless, this conflict, which started in 1990 after the Russian‐speaking Slavic minority on the left bank of the Dniester declared its independence from the Romanian‐speaking right bank, has claimed hundreds of lives. Today, it remains unresolved; a political settlement has not been achieved. The frozen ceasefire in the region simply preserved the status quo which is virtual independence for the self‐declared, but not recognised by any other state, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), or Dniester Republic, from Moldova.

This work seeks to attempt to answer the following questions: what were the roots of the ethno‐political conflict in Moldova ? What were the circumstances that prompted the escalation of the conflict into bloodshed? To what extent did external forces influence events, and, finally, what are the prospects for a political settlement in the republic?     

The motivation of European Union mediation in civil conflicts

ABSTRACT

Since the EU has expanded its common security focus in the 1990s, this important regional organisation has become the most frequent mediator in low-level civil conflicts worldwide. Under what conditions is the European Union (EU) likely to become involved in mediation in civil conflicts? Is the participation in mediation only explained by the EU's bias toward its near abroad, or is the EU more strategic? Some scholars have suggested that the EU's regional bias for its near abroad is the key explanation for the onset of EU mediation, but we propose that the reality of EU mediation presents a more nuanced story. We posit three explanations based on mediator bias: regional bias, economic bias, and normative bias. Overall, we argue that the EU will mediate in civil conflicts that are in its near abroad, but also where the EU has economic bias and where the EU can exercise its normative power in highly intractable conflicts. We test our hypotheses using statistical analysis of the UCDP low-level civil conflicts data from 1993 to 2004 and Civil War Mediation data from 1974 to 2005. We find strong support for our hypotheses, determining key factors that reveal the EU's strategic onset of mediation.     

In the wake of revolution: Eastern Europe in the 1990s

Summary

A ‘new world order’ and a ‘Europe whole and free’ are phrases that epitomize the hopeful rhetoric born of East European revolutions in 1989. In the three years since we were awed by the courage of citizens disgusted with communist party rule, and surprised by the rapidity of such regimes’ demise, socio‐economic and political realities have dimmed hopes and constrained expectations. The work of building free governments and free markets after decades of neglect and abuse faces East Europeans in the 1990s and beyond.

The dangers suggested above are not hyperbole, and represent real and present threats to the hopes of Poles, Romanians, and the other people, for better futures. Comparisons across the region are much less valid than at any time in the last half century. Nevertheless, the goals of post‐communist leaders ‐ security, democracy and market ‐ face similar extraordinary challenges that can easily derail these processes. Americans and our longstanding allies cannot ensure the survival and further development of East European democracy, but we must certainly be more engaged in helping them help themselves.     

Promotion of democracy as a foreign policy instrument of ‘Europe’: Limits to international idealism

The promotion of democracy abroad was a much published issue in ‘European’ foreign policy during the 1990s. Based on five case studies, this article argues that the policy had very clear limitations to it. The limits were mainly imposed by the high priority given to security, and secondly they were the result of the institutional structure and the political‐bureaucratic culture of the European Community. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the policy declarations on democracy were not important to the European Community/European Union and to the member states. The issue was definitely important, but that was because it served other purposes. First, the promotion of democracy abroad was conceived as one among a number of instruments promoting European security in the post‐cold war era. Secondly, promotion of democracy internationally contributed to the higher profile in world affairs that Europe had sought since 1958. And thirdly, this international profile might have pushed the integration process forward within Europe.     

Tailoring Strategies According to Ever-Changing Dynamics: The Evolving Image of the Kurdish Diaspora in Germany

Germany might be considered as the European country that has suffered the most from the spatial diffusion of Turkey's internal conflicts. It has received the highest number of Kurdish migrants in Europe and it became the core of Kurdish mobilization in transnational space. Germany's approach to the Kurdish Question on its own soil—combined with the strategies that the Kurdish activists used—determined the scope of opportunity structures for the mobilization of the Kurdish movement. This article explains how Kurdish activism has come to be perceived in Germany, and analyzes the German political environment by focusing on the criminalization and stigmatization of the Kurdish movement, especially during the 1990s. It then describes the discursive shift and change in framing strategies that the Kurdish diaspora experienced after the capture of the the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) leader in 1999. Lastly, it touches upon the recent developments in the Middle East, especially in Kobane, and their impact on the image of the Kurdish movement. The article is based on extensive fieldwork in Germany and includes testimonies of Kurdish diaspora activists, with a focus on their own perceptions about their situation and how they respond to securitization policies in the host country.     

Russian policies on central and eastern Europe: An overview

After the collapse of both the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in 1990—91 Russia has lost highly effective instruments of (repressive) control of the East European countries and has been left without any significant influence on the economic, political and military developments in the region ever since. This can partly be explained by the deep distrust and emotional reserve vis‐à‐vis Russia on behalf of the new ruling elites in the region. A very important additional factor, however, has been the lack of a clear and coherent Russian strategy on the region in the early years of independent Russian statehood. After the initial loss of importance the region has regained prominence only indirectly as a crucial variable in Russian relations with Western countries and institutions such as NATO, the WEU, and the EU. Though deeper economic and trade relations between Russia and the region seem mutually advantageous, a major rapprochement seems to be blocked by political reservations and considerations.     

Parties,Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia

In the 1990s, early post-Cold War optimism regarding the rapid spread of democracy in the South faded, as multiparty elections in new democracies were observed to exacerbate conflicts of identity rather than ameliorating the effects of conflicts of interest. Research in Cambodia suggests, however, that the promotion by political parties of identity-based conflict offers opportunities for individuals and groups to attempt to insert a more pragmatic interest-based agenda. Party activities also offer an exemplar for political advocacy and activism, which is useful to non-party interest groups and social movements. Cambodia's electoral experience further suggests that parties attempting to respond to such interest-based agendas may be rewarded by voters at the polls. Analytical focus upon the efforts of individuals and non-party movements to make use of the opportunities offered by political parties, rather than upon the mobilizational strategies and rhetorics of party leaders, offers a more optimistic prognosis for democracy in the third world.     

泰国宪政体制多元化的进程、动力与前景

宪政体制变革的动力，源于新旧利益集团在政治博弈中对权力边界的制度化诉求。20世纪90年代以来，随着军人集团的没落，以及城市中产阶级与新资本集团的相继兴起，泰国宪政体制在各派利益集团的持续冲突与妥协中不断重构。通过完善公民政治权利、提高地方自治、加强立法权与行政权制衡、创设独立监督体系等制度建设，泰国的宪政架构开始从一元转向多元。尽管从短期来看，由于宪政体制与权力结构的错位，各派利益集团将围绕修宪议题展开针锋相对的政治博弈，从而引发社会分裂与政治动荡，但从中长期来看，随着政治权力结构日趋多极化，泰国宪政体制将在“权力制衡”的多元化道路上继续前行，进而为社会经济发展提供平稳有序的政治环境。     

Ideologies of Jihad in Europe

The article explores ideological fault lines among Sunni Muslim militants (jihadists) in Europe since the mid-1990s. It argues there have been disputes among the militants about whether to prioritize local struggles or Al Qaeda's global war, and about the legitimacy of launching terrorist attacks in European states offering political asylum to Muslims. It concludes that Europe's militants have become more ideologically unified in conjunction with the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Mohammed drawings, seeing European countries as legitimate and prioritized targets, and identifying with Al Qaeda.     

Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and civilian control over the Turkish Armed Forces

Although most scholars of Turkey’s civil-military relations argue that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency has led to a decrease in civilian control over the Turkish military from the 1980s onwards, this has not always been the case. This article argues that the presence or the degree of the PKK threat is not sufficient to explain the civil-military balance of power in Turkey throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Instead, the article shows that in the face of the PKK threat, three major factors have influenced the behaviours of both civilian and military policy-makers in Turkey and shaped the level of civilian control. These factors are first, the Turkish political leaders’ control over their political parties and these parties’ control of a majority of seats in the parliament; second, how negatively or positively the military perceives the political leadership; and third, European Union pressures for democratisation.     

Strategies,capabilities, and demands: Explaining outcomes in violent intrastate nationalist conflicts

The study of nationalist and ethnic conflict has undergone considerable growth since the end of the Cold War. Much of the effort has been focused on ascertaining the nature and origins of such conflicts, and less on their process and termination. Those studies that do focus on conflict termination have generally done so using case‐study or idiosyncratic methods. Hence, we do not yet have much large‐N or statistical evidence that might suggest broad trends in how such conflicts end, or even much experience in measuring the relevant concepts in a manner conducive to such methods. This paper will address these questions by introducing a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the outcomes of violent intrastate nationalist conflicts. It will discuss measurement issues for relevant independent variables, and present data for a group of 75 violent, intrastate nationalist conflicts from 1945–1996. This data will then be used to test propositions derived from the model. The aim is to provide a useful building block for the study of the process and outcome of conflicts which political scientists now recognize to be some of the most important for the coming century.     

Conflicts between east European states and minorities in an age of democracy

Conflict between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups in eastern Europe has greatly complicated efforts to build stable and just democratic systems in the region. Leaders of new states as well as rulers whose authority extends from the communist era have attempted to create political systems where competition is clearly along ethnic lines. Polarisation and violence have resulted from the manipulation of ethnic feeling, but there are also a range of factors which have encouraged majority and minority representatives to show mutual restraint at crucial moments.

The internationalisation of East European nationality disputes and the gradual acceptance by a number of states of group rights to stand alongside individual ones, have cooled down a number of disputes and possibly forestalled new ones. But the national question will be a troubling one for many still‐fragile democracies unless strong external incentives are offered which encourage states to conciliate internal minorities and estranged neighbours.     

Rationalist state,revolutionist EU and realist war: Austria in international society

This article examines Austria's position as a small, neutral state in the international society as framed by the English School. This examination is chiefly done in the face of the effects of great power conflicts and their impact on Western Europe's society of states. In doing so, the article provides insights to the fundamental puzzles concerning the ways power is managed between states, great and small alike. The article surveys how war (such as in South Ossetia in 2008) and war-like incidents affected Austria's position in the international society and the understanding of its place in great power conflicts between East and West. I argue that neutrality, despite European integration in the context of a peaceful international society, remains a political option for small states such as Austria. This option is especially lively if there is a domestic sentimental attachment to it and sticking to it does not undermine domestic or European and international foreign policy rationale and interests.     

Public resistance to privatisation in water and energy

Since the 1990s, development agencies and international institutions have promoted private-sector involvement in infrastructure, assuming that this would inject both investment and efficiency into the under-performing public sector. In the water and energy sectors, these expectations have not been fulfilled. Private-sector investment in developing countries is falling, multinational companies have failed to make sustainable returns on their investments, and the process of privatisation in water and energy has proved widely unpopular and encountered strong political opposition. This paper examines the role of this opposition in delaying, cancelling, or reversing the privatisation of water and energy. Local civil society has successfully mobilised highly effective political activity, its opposition being based on the perceived conflicts between privatisation and equity, and over the role of the state and community in these sectors. Such opposition has involved dynamic interactions with existing political parties and structures, including the use of existing electoral and judicial mechanisms. Its success poses challenges for the multilateral and donor community, NGOs, the opposition campaigns themselves, and the future of national systems of electricity and water.     

Boldness or caution? Dilemmas in the European Community's Ostpolitik

In the 1990s the European Community is confronted with a dilemma: further economic, monetary and political integration of the Twelve will only be successful in the context of a stable European continent; economic and political cooperation between Brussels and Central Europe is therefore imperative. The recently signed association agreements are only the first, tentative steps of the EC to foster closer cooperation, whereby the issues of Central European market access and future entry into the Community will remain major irritants. Brussels seems unable to choose between the “widening” and the “deepening” of the Community. This article argues that both options will be extremely difficult to combine. The EC will need lavish financial resources as well as abundant political statesmanship when it will handle further West European integration and the inclusion of Central Europe in the “new European architecture” simultaneously.     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.     

The ‘future’ republic of Macedonia: The last best hope

Macedonia is the last genuinely multi‐ethnic state in the Balkans. For some, this suggests the impossibility of its continued existence. As ethnic Albanian leader Arben Xhaferi would have it, however, Macedonia's incentive for success is compelled by the inevitable allure of the West. In retrospect, when the Badinter Commission of the European Union released its opinion regarding the status of former Yugoslav states on 15 January 1992, the commission found that only two former republics sufficiently met the established criteria for recognition by the European Community: Slovenia and Macedonia. Yet Macedonia, unlike Slovenia, is an ethnically diverse nation and the poorest of the former Yugoslav republics. A review of the various geographic and geopolitical influences reveals that conflicting and often competing political, economic, social, cultural, and historic forces constantly conflict in Macedonia. The absence of increased attention and support to integrate Macedonia within the fold of Europe suggests that this tiny nation‐state's future is more precarious than it ought to be, given the record of continued Yugoslav disintegration that preceded it during the 1990s.     

Effects and side effects of European Union assistance on the former Soviet republics

Since the early 1990s the European Union (EU) has been the largest donor to the post-Soviet states. In the last decade it more than doubled development assistance to the region. One of the major purposes of assistance is human rights promotion. At the same time, it is still an open question whether, and under what conditions, assistance can improve human rights in recipient countries. This study applies time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis to identify effects of external assistance. Using data from 12 post-Soviet states over 20 years, I show that conditions under which states are more likely to display a positive effect are high state capacity and political conditionality attached to economic cooperation agreements. Whereas, when state capacity is lower, assistance might cause a slight deterioration of the human rights situation. In hybrid regimes, assistance is associated with negative effects, indicating that external assistance might induce deterioration of human rights in such regimes.     

Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey–EU Relations

When European Muslim citizens are involved in social conflicts or when they contest the place that is given them in Europe, these political claims are often seen as radical and inspired by external influences. If an attempt is made to understand what part the influences of the so-called Muslim “countries of origin” play in the way Muslims contest European models of society and integration, it turns out that the roots of radicalisation are often purely European. The idea that it is the Islamic and communitarian nature of the European Muslim way of life which is at the base of their failing integration has to be challenged. Indeed, the initiatives of religious actors have failed to channel the radicalisation of European Muslims’ political demands. The role of the religious variable is of much less importance in political radicalisation than the lack of an institutional response to the demands for greater social and economic integration.