The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?

Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western‐oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistan's role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the country's policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.     

Is there any unity to the Trans-Caspian Region? The economic relations between Central Asia and the Caucasus

Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the three states of South Caucasus or Trans-Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and the five of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) have played up their role as intermediaries between Europe and Asia and have tried to constitute the Caspian as an entity. This new Trans-Caspian road obeys political and economic logics as the states of the South Caucasus along with those of Central Asia are interested in bypassing Russia and developing their bilateral relations to acquire new markets in Europe and in Asia. Despite the existence of sometimes divergent, sometimes convergent interests, and the non-negligible political and economic risks, none of the states of the South Caucasus, nor those of Central Asia, want to undermine the dynamic of Trans-Caspian rapprochement.     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

A FAREWELL TO THE GREAT GAME? PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Long before 9–11, Russia and the United States found common ground in their efforts to undermine the Taliban government in Afghanistan, despite serious disagreements over policy in other parts of the world. The events of 9–11, however, changed Russian foreign and security policy drastically. One of the most fundamental and controversial shifts came when President Putin chose not to interfere in US negotiations with the Central Asian states to use their airbases for the US war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Putin also offered to use Russia’s oil reserves as a means to stabilize jittery world markets. In return, Russia gained US support for its bid to pipe Caspian Sea oil over Russian territory. More importantly, the US government gave Russia essentially a free hand in its war against separatist Chechnya. While there are many potential scenarios in highly unstable Central Asia that could serve to sour relations once again, Russia and the United States have an unprecedented opportunity to build trust and cooperation through peacekeeping and problem solving in the region.     

Radical Islam and the struggle for influence in Central Asia

The threat of an Iranian‐style Islamic takeover of the newly independent states of Central Asia is currently more of a potential than actual threat to the secular rulers of these countries. Nonetheless, economic, environmental and nationality problems render these rulers vulnerable to a future Islamic potential challenge. The threat of Islam has been used by local leaders to justify dictatorships and intervene in neighboring countries, while foreign governments, such as Turkey and Israel, have sought to exploit the threat of Islam in Central Asia to strengthen their support from the United States. By contrast, Iran has downplayed the Islamic factor in its foreign policy toward these new republics and as a result has enhanced its relationship with Russia, which seeks to establish its hegemony over the region.     

Israel's Deterrence Strategy Revisited

During the 2001–2009 period when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and perceived as unilateral, many states strengthened their security cooperation with the United States and facilitated the reach of the us military. This behavior spans a range of actions along a spectrum from reaffirming traditional alliances to far more subtle forms of alignment. This pattern is in large part driven by the actions of regional powers such as Russia and China whose rising power pushes neighboring states to seek the assurance of the United States, and it has distinct implications for the endurance of American hegemony. As those regional powers seek to expand their influence, secondary states may increase their contributions to the maintenance of American hegemony, thus helping to extend it well into the future. They are less prone to do so, however, if the United States follows a strategy of restraint that calls into question its willingness to defend its hegemony. Therefore, a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use it may be what sustains the cooperation from second-tier states that helps to maintain American hegemony.     

Geopolitical pluralism in the CIS: The emergence of GUUAM

This article argues that the 12 states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are evenly divided into two groups that are grouped around Russia and Ukraine. The emergence of these two groups, one of which is decidely pro‐Western and pro NATO ‐GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) ‐is a sign of what Brzezinski defined as early as 1994 as geopolitical pluralism has finally emerged in the former USSR. US policy, he argued, should be the consolidation of this geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union as the means by which a non‐imperial, ‘normal’ Russian nation‐state would emerge with whom a ‘genuine American‐Russian partnership’ could be secured. Brzezinski signalled that Ukraine was the key state that prevented the revival of a new Russian empire and therefore aided the consolidation of Russian democracy. One could add that GUUAM, as an organization led by Ukraine, should also therefore play a central role in US and Western policy towards the former USSR.     

大国安全与地区发展的悖论?——基于冷战早期美拉关系的考察

为了遏制共产主义的发展,战后初期美国积极在西半球编织反共防务安全体系。与此相比,美国对拉美国家的经济援助需求消极怠慢,对它们所面临的经济发展问题视而不见,采取了“贸易而非援助”的经济政策,激化了美拉矛盾。20世纪五六十年代,一些拉美国家实行了国有化和土改等民族主义改革,并同苏联加强贸易往来,反美反独裁的游击运动风起云涌。在美国看来,这与其在西半球的经济安全和反共战略相悖。为了化解危机,美国一方面以反共和集体安全为名,对“敌对”政权进行军事干预,另一方面也在不断调整自身政策,加大对拉美国家的经济援助力度。不论怎样,谋求和巩固在西半球的霸主地位始终是美国制定拉美政策的根本目的,安全和稳定是其维护的主要利益。在理论上,只有拉美国家的深层经济发展问题得到有效解决,才能消除不稳定的隐患,所以,美国国家安全与拉美地区发展是并行不悖的。但在现实中,由于拉美国家的既得利益集团与美国关系密切,美国不可能切实推进拉美国家的经济改革,同时美国又常以安全防务政策化解由经济发展引发的拉美问题,这种立场上的偏差注定了美国提出的经济改革方案的“无效性”,而仅仅是一种权宜之计。     

Geopolitical Implications of the US Unconventional Energy Revolution

The unconventional oil and gas revolution is certainly a game changer in the current international political setting, since it will bring the United States close to energy self-sufficiency. However, it seems unlikely that this new energy status will dramatically redefine US foreign policy and security priorities. In strategic regions such as the Middle East, US interests are expected to remain unchanged, while the new energy status will contribute only in part to modifying the US approach towards the EU’s energy posture vis-à-vis Russia. What the new American energy condition is likely to change are the tools and policy options available to Washington to cope with the strategic challenges – China’s power in primis – emerging in the multipolar international relations system.     

Projecting Confidence, Not Fear: Russia's Post-Imperial Assertiveness

Contrary to the increasingly popular image of Russia as an aggressive, imperialist state, the primary drivers in Russia's foreign policy are domestic. They include new economic confidence, new soft power, and remaining security vulnerabilities. In response to these conditions, Russia pursues opportunities for economic growth and stability, and it builds strategic alliances in the near and distant abroad in order to address increasing security threats. The often-used comparison of Russia's foreign policy assertiveness to the Soviet Cold War policy is inaccurate. A better parallel is to Russia's 1890s policy led by Finance Minister Sergei Witte: strong internal economic development through state-driven liberalization, while avoiding foreign policy adventures. The United States should follow a policy of pragmatic substantive engagement, rather than neo-containment, toward Russia.     

国际制度视角下“一带一路”与大欧亚伙伴关系的对接

中俄所提出的两大倡议分别代表了各自在国际制度竞争有所加剧背景下的本国利益需求。二者都以拓宽欧亚经济合作渠道为首要目标,但是它们在原则、方向、手段等方面的差异是相互关系的不利因素。为了协调国际规则的制定,中俄确定对接两大倡议。一方面,中俄两国希望通过制度合作制衡美国霸权;另一方面,中俄在欧亚地区的一致性和冲突性并存,双方需要一个协调关系的制度框架。中俄两国既有以制度合作在国际体系层面应对美国压力的意图,也希望在地区范围内协调彼此关系。两大倡议的对接将增强国际社会新兴力量在国际制度体系构建和全球治理中的影响力,同时也能化解中俄双方潜在的矛盾,推动欧亚区域合作的进程。     

An Economic Bridgehead: Weimar Germany's Attempt to Mediate Between Soviet Russia and the United States

Between 1919 and 1926 Weimar Germany pursued a foreign policy that sought to place Germany in a position to mediate between Soviet Russia and the United States. In particular, Berlin was eager to act as a mediator in the economic and commercial relations between these two powers. Germany hoped that such a policy would align it with two Powers that, like itself, were hostile to the Versailles order. Berlin also hoped that such a relationship would contribute to German postwar economic recovery and thereby to Berlin's re-emergence as a Great Power in the aftermath of its defeat in 1918. This policy culminated in 1925–1926 with Berlin's efforts to arrange for American financing of a 300 million Mark credit to the Soviet Union. Ultimately this and other efforts failed as result of Germany's own financial weakness, Washington's refusal to cooperate with Berlin's initiatives, and the nature of the Soviet economic system.     

Counter‐terrorism and commercial interests: Do they conflict?

This paper concentrates on whether there is an inherent conflict between commercial interests and the fight against state‐sponsored terrorism.¹ It examines the differences between US and EU policy, particularly in relation to Iran; the roles of Russia and China and the wider impact of international responses. The author concludes that symbolic sanctions and sporadic dialogue are completely inadequate instruments, but that genuine international sanctions and critical dialogue should not be viewed as mutually exclusive policy instruments.     

Notes on Italian foreign politics

The relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran both shapes and is shaped by a new Middle Eastern “Cold War”. The United States and the Islamic Republic should transcend the prospects for hegemonial conflict or strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, along the lines of the realignment in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China that took place during President Richard Nixon's tenure in the White House. The article examines the imperatives for a comprehensive and strategic realignment of US–Iranian relations from the standpoint of Iranian interests and foreign policy concepts as well as from an American perspective. It also evaluates the actual prospects for US–Iranian rapprochement.     

Re‐evaluating US strategic priorities in the Caspian Region: balancing energy resource initiatives with terrorism containment

In the aftermath of September 11, US strategy has shifted in the Central Asian region from protecting the sovereignty of the southern post‐Soviet states to ensuring their stability in light of the dual impacts of energy development and the rising threat of Islamic terrorism. Although US–Russian cooperation has made strides, particularly concerning Russian acquiescence toward US and NATO military engagement in the region, geostrategic rivalry and conflicting economic goals have hindered a joint approach to initiatives regarding the region's energy development. While both agree on the goal of maximising Russian and Caspian gas and petroleum exports, US policy is increasingly prioritising Central Asian energy prosperity as a key factor in the region's ability to contain terrorism. Development of the region's energy resources has therefore become a critical US security concern. Yet, by failing to engage with Russia in a meaningful cooperation that could encourage Moscow to diversify its own energy export prospects, competition between the two powers is likely to reduce, rather than improve, the effectiveness of either in offering the Central Asian states the kind of support they need to strengthen their domestic profiles or withstand the incursion of terrorism.     

Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism

Abstract

Despite the obvious differences over the Syrian crisis and Iran, the GCC countries do not seem to be distancing themselves from Russia politically. To a large extent that is due to Russia’s growing military role (in Syria) and military cooperation (with Iran), as well as the diminishing role of the United States under Obama. Having accepted the situation in Syria (after the fall of Aleppo) as a fait accompli, the GCC’s elites seem to be looking at Russia as a powerful player able to reduce the scope of Iran’s expansion in the region. Their approach involves a carefully established mechanism of economic interaction exploiting Russia’s need for GCC finances and arms acquisitions.     

Press content as a key to a country's alignment: The case of Ethiopia

This article examines the news content of an Ethiopian government‐run newspaper over a period of 20 years to determine how closely the present government is aligned with the Soviet Union. There are two schools of though among foreign policy scholars. Regionalists believe Ethiopia is nonaligned. They argue that since the country follows the tenants of African socialism, its international politics are shaped by indigenous factors such as nationalism and local economic and security needs, rather than by Soviet or U.S. influence. Globalists, on the other hand, believe Ethiopia belongs to the Soviet camp and is dependent on the Soviet Union. A review of a government‐run newspaper in two ten‐year periods before and after the takeover by Mengistu Haile Mariam found a dramatic shift in the nature of coverage. Under Emperor Haile Selassie before the ovethrow, the paper printed predominantly pro‐United States and anti‐Soviet news. But under Mengistu, the same paper printed vastly pro‐Soviet and anti‐United States news, and absolutely no anti‐Soviet news. These findings support the globalist view.     

Why Nuclear Smuggling Matters

Nuclear leakage from the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union is an ongoing national security concern of the United States. While little weapons-usable material and no nuclear warheads have surfaced in international smuggling channels, observed data from seizures and arrests are not necessarily representative of the wider universe of illegal nuclear deals. Political and economic upheavals and associated nuclear security problems in Russia in the 1990s accentuated the risk of serious proliferation episodes. Adversaries such as Iran and Al Qaeda have tried to exploit these vulnerabilities to further their nuclear ambitions, although with uncertain results. Improved intelligence collection on the nuclear black market—who the players are, what items they seek, how they plan to obtain them and how successful they have been—should complement the essentially reactive and stationary risk management systems now in place in Russia and elsewhere.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

论中美俄在北极的复杂关系

北极国际格局十分复杂,中美俄三国在北极的关系呈现出竞争与合作并存的复杂态势,在北极利益的争夺之中也保持着多领域的合作,在不同象限有不同的"朋友"或"敌人"的定位,任何简单化的解读都无法厘清相互之间的关系。三国不同的利益诉求和战略逻辑导致俄美合作回旋空间缩小而冲突持续存在,中美竞争导致美方伤及自身,俄罗斯虽然试图"转向自身",但中俄两国北极合作将继续深化。中美俄作为重要的北极利益攸关方,应探索北极合作新模式,维护北极地区的和平与稳定。