中国视角：朝核问题现状及解决途径

本文通过对朝鲜拥核的内外部因素分析,重新评估了朝鲜的核政策,反驳了目前西方学者在朝核问题上的6种观点,对朝鲜拥核的动机、强制弃核的效果、朝核问题解决的程序悖论、中国在朝核问题上的作用、朝鲜经济变革的可能性以及六方会谈的未来等进行了论证。本文认为朝鲜弃核进程必须与安全关切紧密联在一起,弃核的实现又与朝鲜的经济改革存在相关性。必须强化六方会谈其他五方与朝鲜的立场和政策更为有效的协调,以多边模式整合碎片化的地区安全局面。     

中朝经贸关系发展的现状及未来走势分析

进入新千年后,中朝经贸关系出现了历史性的新发展,特别是2003和2004年连续取得突破10亿美元的最好业绩,使中国在朝鲜对外经贸关系中的重要地位再次得以凸现,使东亚各国对其今后的发展前景表现出极大的关注。随着朝鲜经济市场化改革的进展,中朝双边贸易未来几年还有进一步发展的余地。     

The Twin Peaks of Pyongyang

The United States has been negotiating with North Korea in an effort to have it renounce its nuclear program for over a decade, since Washington negotiated an Agreed Framework in 1994. In this time, North Korea has only amassed more plutonium. The negotiations are hindered by mutual distrust and hostility, but it is doubtful whether any change in Washington's attitude toward the dprk would help solve the nuclear issue. It is the Kim regime that is the core problem. Until the regime is removed, there can be no durable peace in the region. This article suggests that with the prospect for a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue remote, and since any attempt to remove the Kim regime militarily would entail huge costs, Washington might consider a third option: directly engaging the North Korean people.     

韩国的外交困境:一个概括性框架的解读

近年来,韩国外交面临着一种两难选择的困境。通过对60余年来韩国外交历程的梳理,我们可以发现以政权存续为主要目标的安保外交时期,这种困境是不存在的;而进入冷战后的统一外交时期之后,韩国在包括对美外交与对朝外交、和平外交与统一外交、同盟外交与均衡外交等一系列问题的处理原则上在全社会(包括政治精英和社会大众)还没有形成广泛而稳定的共识,从而使韩国的对外政策在近年来表现出随着政府的换届而不断摇摆、缺乏稳定性的特征,整体反映出韩国在处理朝韩关系及统一问题上的不自信。韩国只有在这些重大的外交原则问题上形成广泛而稳定的共识才有可能摆脱目前的困境,进一步推进统一外交的进程。     

Overcoming US-North Korean Enmity: Lessons from an Eclectic IR Approach

ABSTRACT

Periods of mutual enmity in US-North Korean relations are typically interrupted by more conciliatory gestures. How can the many twists and turns in this relationship be explained and hopefully overcome so that more long-lasting détente is accomplished? Drawing eclectically on realism and constructivism, we conclude that a nuclear deal should address not only North Korea’s interests in security and regime survival, but also its status concerns. Applying the same theories to the other part of the dyad – the US – we conclude that it may now have material interests in ameliorating the relationship, but that such a development requires US foreign policy discourse to cease depicting North Korea as “irrational” and “evil”.     

The EU,regional cooperation,and the North Korean nuclear crisis

North Korea poses a security threat by developing nuclear weapons. To address this source of regional insecurity, institutionalized frameworks of regional cooperation have been employed. Despite its usefulness as an alternative route to deal with the North Korean case, controversies still remain in terms of its relevance and effectiveness. Even so, the regional integration, consistently promoted by the EU as an integral part of its Asian policy, still requires systematic evaluation. This paper thus examines how and under which conditions regional integration can make a contribution to the transformation of the current crisis. In answering this question, it concludes that a long-term model-setting effect is hard to disregard, in spite of the mixed view of substantial compulsory and social learning effects. The underlying reasons are the ontological-seeking activities of North Korea, along with regional and global actors’ reservations about the contributions of the EU as a key security provider in Asian affairs and in its promotion of the regional integration scheme.     

朝鲜改革开放经济发展战略研究

从近年来朝鲜借鉴中国的经验 ,走朝鲜式改革开放之路的动向看 ,对内主要体现在“7·1措施”等一系列的改革 ,对外开放主要体现在建设四足鼎立的经济特区等重大举措上。“7·1措施”是朝鲜改革进入实质性进展划时代标志 ,4大特区建设是对外开放战略的主要载体 ,这两方面的战略措施支持着朝鲜的全方位改革开放 ,但其战略能在多大程度上改善经济困境 ,除本国因素外 ,关键取决于能否获得一个和平安定的国际环境。     

The US role in Korean democracy and security since cold war era

This paper traces the role that US played in the developmentof Korean democracy and maintaining peace and security in theKorean peninsula. First, it looks back into the US role in theKorean political transformation from 1950s through 1980s. Itexamines why the US introduced American style democracy in thedivided country and what was the role of the US in the criticaljunctures of regime changes and transformations. The UnitedStates had two contradictory objectives in South Korea: to buildup South Korea as ‘a showcase for democracy’ andas an anti-communist buffer state. The two objectives set ‘theAmerican boundary’ to South Korean democracy. The firstobjective acted upon as an enabling condition for incipientdemocracy, while the second acted upon as a confining conditionto development of democracy in South Korea. Second, it investigatesthe role that the US played in the outbreak of financial crisisin 1987 and in the ensuing comprehensive neoliberal restructuringof the economy by the Kim Dae Jung government after the crisis.Third, it analyzes three events that put US–Korean relationsunder stress since the inauguration of Bush administration:Anti-Americanism, perception gap on North Korea, and the newmilitary transformation initiative of US. Finally, it drawspolicy rationales for stronger Korea–US alliance in thefuture from the Korean perspective: Korea–US allianceas leverages against China and Japan, means of pursuing an effectiveengagement policy toward North Korea, a cornerstone to liftSouth Korea to a hub state in Northeast Asia, and geopoliticalbalancer and stabilizer in Northeast Asia after the unificationof Korea.     

International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War

Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.–ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works.     

朝鲜半岛形势变化与丹东的战略抉择

自 2 0 0 0年 6月朝韩首脑会晤以来 ,朝鲜半岛形势发生了令世人瞩目的变化。尽管还存在着种种变数和外部制约因素 ,但朝韩之间通过政治对话和经济交流 ,逐步由对立走向合作的趋势已不可逆转。丹东是连接朝鲜半岛与欧亚大陆的主要通商口岸 ,是中朝经贸合作的前沿窗口。面对变化 ,应积极调整思路 ,抓住机遇 ,准确定位 ,充分发挥区位优势 ,推动地区产业升级和城市功能完善 ,向东北亚国际性城市迈进。     

冷战后韩国的东北亚安全战略构想

自朝鲜战争结束以来,韩国安全政治中一直面临着严重的安全困境问题。韩国认为,周边强国之间的均衡关系是韩国生存与繁荣的保障。从现实情况看,韩国的力量难以同周边大国中的任何一个进行抗衡,归根结底,只有在大国间的力量取得平衡并相互制约的前提下,韩国的活动范围才能得以扩大。所以,推动东北亚多边安全机制的建立,维持当前的地区力量均衡,防止因为周边大国实力的强弱变化导致的地区秩序瓦解,对于韩国意义重大。冷战后,韩国所提出的东北亚多边安全战略构想无疑将对维持该地区长期和平发挥关键性作用,韩国也能从中获得可观的和平红利。但由于其内在缺陷,这一构想并不能一劳永逸地化解韩国长期所面临的安全困境。     

影响中韩产业内贸易发展因素的实证分析

影响产业内贸易的因素主要包括各国经济发展水平、规模经济、产品差异化、国际直接投资、区域经济与地理区位等。中国与韩国的地缘优势及不断加强的区域经济合作为中韩产业内贸易的开展打下了现实基础;韩国对华直接投资是促进产业内贸易发展的关键因素;而中韩两国经济发展水平的差距和规模不经济在一定程度上阻碍了中韩产业内贸易的发展。为顺利开展与韩国间的产业内贸易,我国应采取相应的对策:实施规模经营战略、提高引进韩国FD I的档次、促进中韩间加工贸易的转型升级。     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy.¹     

Rising to the Challenge: Europe’s Security Policy in East Asia amid US-China Rivalry

ABSTRACT

China’s growing power and assertiveness towards its smaller and weaker neighbours has been a wakeup call for the European Union and its member states which, as a result, have stepped up their involvement in East Asia. EU security policy in the region shows many elements of alignment with the United States, but also differences. In North East Asia, the EU has adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea but, contrary to the Trump administration which continues to seek regime change, has left the door open for dialogue. Moreover, the EU supports the process of trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea, while Washington has traditionally been lukewarm towards a process that excludes the US and risks being dominated by Beijing. The transatlantic allies also show differing approaches with regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While EU security policy in East Asia is largely complementary to that of Washington, in some cases Europe tends – albeit inadvertently – to favour Beijing.     

Putin's foreign policy toward North Korea

Since coming to office in 2000, President of the Russian Federation,Vladimir Putin, has taken a pragmatic and calculating approachto the conduct of foreign policy in order to promote Russia'sgeopolitical and economic interests. For him, a higher profileon Korean issues has been an opportunity to show that Moscowcan influence Pyongyang and play a meaningful role in greatpower diplomacy on the Korean peninsula. As a result of activediplomacy toward North Korea, the two former communist alliesput a period to the deteriorating relations in the 1990s; afterthe September 11 terrorists attack and the launch of the waron terrorism Moscow's influence over Pyongyang reached its peak.The beginning of the North Korean nuclear crisis in October2002, however, relegated Moscow to a marginalized position inthe Korean issue. This paper examines how Putin's pragmaticdiplomacy was put into effect in Russia's foreign policy towardNorth Korea and how circumstances on the Korean peninsula haveaffected Russia–DPRK bilateral relations. An analysisof these factors shows why Russia's role in the ongoing Six-Partyprocess has become insignificant. At the present time, it iscertainly plausible that Russia will not activate diplomaticefforts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis and will besatisfied with merely securing a seat at the multilateral talksin Northeast Asia.     

US Presidential popularity and opportunities to coerce North Korea: a quantitative test 1990 2000

This paper investigates how North Korean behaviour towards boththe United States and South Korea is influenced by the popularityof the American President. The study applies theories relatingto strategic conflict avoidance and signalling to suggest thatthe American President is able to demonstrate a willingnessto use force when he is unpopular and as such is better ableto coerce Pyongyang. Using a time-series model, I demonstratethat the North Koreans become more cooperative towards the UnitedStates in response to decreases in presidential popularity andincreasing levels of US inflation. However, the study also showsthat the North Koreans do not alter their behaviour towardsthe South Koreans in response to low American President Popularityratings. The research, therefore, suggests that the North Koreansbelieve that the United States would be unable to launch a diversionaryattack in response to North Korean behaviour towards the South.This study provides a clear support for the strategic avoidanceof conflict hypothesis and suggests that the American Presidentsare best able to coerce North Korea when they are unpopularat home. Received for publication August 31, 2005. Accepted for publication December 21, 2005.     

东北亚安全秩序的困境与对策研究

东北亚地区战略地位重要,是中国的国家安全和现代化建设的战略依托地区。冷战结束后,东北亚安全机制的缺失使东北亚安全秩序问题始终未能解决。不仅朝鲜半岛和台海局势仍重兵对峙,两个热点问题呈持续升温之势,而且在大国关系结构性的矛盾之中,冷战意识仍然存在,东北亚安全秩序的构建陷入困境。要走出东北亚安全秩序的困境,必须构建东北亚地区安全与合作的共识,推动地区各国重新构建东北亚安全与合作的新理念,构建东北亚地区“多极”主导多边安全合作机制。     

俄罗斯总统普京的朝鲜半岛政策与朝核立场

20 0 0年普京担任总统后 ,俄罗斯对外政策开始转向以国家利益为目标的实用主义外交。在朝鲜半岛政策上 ,改变了过去“重南轻北”的方针 ,积极发展俄罗斯与朝鲜的关系 ,实行南北朝鲜等距离的平衡政策。普京通过加强与南北朝鲜的关系 ,提高俄罗斯对朝鲜半岛的影响力。俄罗斯坚持朝鲜半岛无核化原则 ,主张以和平方式解决朝鲜核危机 ,反对使用武力和各种制裁措施。建议通过对朝鲜提供安全保证的方式使朝鲜放弃核计划。俄罗斯的原则立场对于解决朝鲜核危机无疑具有建设性作用。     

国家安全领导体制的变革与东北亚地区安全

以国家安全委员会为代表的国家安全领导体制是现代国家安全决策、协调和咨询的最核心机构。从理论上讲,国家安全领导体制关系到国家安全战略的每个环节,可以结合外交政策分析的不同视角,同时又具有比较政治研究的重大意义。从实践上来看,美国、英国、法国等世界上主要大国都已建立起较为完善的国家安全领导体系,而东北亚中、日、韩三国从2013年开始也相继进行了国家安全领导体制的变革,建立了国家安全委员会及其常设机构。尽管从人员构成、战略目标、运行模式等方面来看,三国变革后的国家安全领导体制还有差异,但是国家安全领导体制的变化对东北亚局势还是造成了深远影响。中日关系、朝鲜半岛问题、东北亚地区的安全架构都出现了新的变化;同时,各国国内安全问题,特别是非传统安全问题已成为新的国家安全领导体制的主要涉及领域。东北亚地区国家安全领导体制改革是全球范围内国家安全转化和重构的一部分,未来的国家安全领导体制建设要从理论上探讨如何规避其中的官僚政治特别是小集团思维因素,在理念上要与国家安全观紧密结合起来,在实践上要充分考虑其长期性、复杂性,并为体制变革提供强有力的法律保障。     

“(Mis)interpreting Threats: A Case Study of the Korean War”

During the fall of 1950, many American national security officials concluded that the Chinese Communists would refrain from undertaking full-scale intervention in the Korean War. Contrary to most secondary accounts, however, officials who doubted that Communist China would intervene nonetheless drew increasingly worrisome signs from incoming verbal threats and intelligence signals. A small minority of officials in the State Department expressed considerable concern over the dangers of having United Nations forces cross into North Korea and approach the Yalu River. This growing concern and the minority of opposing voices, however, did not override the prevailing judgment—held by hawkish members of the State Department and the CIA as a whole—that China would more likely increase covert involvement in the Korean War, but would not undertake full-scale military intervention. Theories of biased assimilation and risk-taking practices have divergent success in predicting American reactions to the threat. Only further archival research can shed light on how this case of American strategic surprise comports with these theories.