South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

Quiet diplomacy in a television era: The media and U.S. policy toward the republic of Korea

This study examines the role of television coverage in U.S. policy toward South Korea, focusing on the May 1980 Kwangji incident and the subsequent visit of South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan to the White House in February of 1981. It explores these two episodes in the context of major dimensions of U.S. policy toward Korea and the themes developed through sporadic, low‐level coverage of Korea by mainstream American media over the years. The analysis underscores the political impact of television's dramatic visual focus, its use of consistent visual images, its expansion of the geopolitical scope of the policy process, and its personalization of policy. The dramatically different public interpretations of the Kwangju incident and Chun visit in Korea versus the United States suggests that President Reagan's first major state visit, during which he declared that his administration would pursue “quiet diplomacy” on human rights in Korea, while successful within the United States and in the short term, was damaging over the long term.     

驻韩美军基地调整的多维影响

根据2003年6月美韩两国达成的协议 ,美国将在2011年前分两个阶段对驻韩美军实施基地迁移和兵力重新部署 :第一阶段 ,把分布在靠近军事分界线的美军基地集中到东豆川的开塞基地和议政府的红云基地 ,预计将有大约6000～7000名美军士兵迁出 ,实施这一计划至少需要3年时间 ;第二阶段 ,把汉江以北的驻韩美军 ,主要是第2机械化步兵师转移到汉江以南的乌山和平泽。调整后的驻韩美军军事基地将由41个减少到23个。一、动因深度透视与往次不同的是 ,美国此次对驻韩美军的调整 ,几乎完全是逆核危机持续升温之势而动。应该说 ,美国此举是在充分考虑了国…     

朝鲜半岛和平协定与和平机制

2007年以来东北亚局势的重大变化,使签定取代1953年朝鲜半岛《停战协定》的《和平协定》时机日渐成熟。签定新协定的主体应是朝、韩、美、中四方。达成新协定的主要障碍在于实现持久和平的途径,尤其是美国的立场与政策。只有从"停战机制"转向签订《和平协定》,建立和平机制,东北亚地区的和平与稳定才能得到保障。     

Sino-U.S. Cooperation in North Korean Nuclear Issue

China and the United States have cooperated closely in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis.China and the United States have worked together with South Korea, Russia and Japan to prevent the North Korean nuclear issue from spiraling out of control, and they have also tried to make progress in the six-party talks. Despite differences over the issue, both sides are maintaining the momentum of cooperation with increasing mutual understanding and trust. The current U.S.-North Korea rapprochement has progressed quickly, adding a new factor in Sino-U.S. cooperation. Apart from bilateral contact with North Korea, the United States is insisting on a multilateral approach, continuing to persuade China to share responsibility for a nuclear-free Peninsula, and jointly advancing the process in the second phase set forth in the February 13 Agreement on Initial Actions. China's role,therefore, remains indispensable.     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.     

试论中韩战略合作伙伴关系中的美国因素

中韩关系的发展已进入战略合作伙伴关系的高层次阶段,对整个东亚战略新格局的形成起着至关重要的作用。然而,韩国的对华外交却承受着美韩同盟关系的制约,韩国夹在中美之间,左右为难,面临着严重困境。2010年发生的"天安舰事件"和"延坪岛事件"以及2012年发生的"脱北者事件"等,将中韩战略合作伙伴关系中原本隐蔽着的问题暴露在世人的面前,其中之一即是美韩同盟关系与中韩战略合作伙伴关系的内在结构性矛盾。李明博执政期间,美韩同盟有趋强的趋势,导致中韩关系面临着重大考验。韩国外交的根本出路:"须在中美间找准外交平衡点","中美韩‘三国演义’演不好,半岛南北就永无宁日"。为此,韩国需要有更多的独立决策能力,保持自身在两者间的平衡,既与美国保持同盟关系,又与中国发展战略合作伙伴关系。任何倒向美国一边的政策,都会使韩国的战略决策失衡,使中韩战略合作伙伴关系受损。可以期待2012年大选后韩国政府的对美、对华政策会有新的调整,自主性、多元性、平衡性将成为韩国外交的发展方向,将有利于推动中韩战略合作伙伴关系的深化与发展。     

Deterrence by Presence to Effective Response: Japan's Shift Southward

Over the past fifteen years, a quiet strategic shift has occurred in Japan. During the cold war era, Japan's defense was oriented towards the Soviet threat north of Hokkaido. However, under the very real threat of North Korean aggression, the less tangible threat of terrorism, and the perceived need to participate more fully in international peacekeeping activities, Japan has changed the characteristics of its armed forces. Additionally, an increasingly self-confident China is testing Japan's resolve in the waters surrounding Japan, simultaneously speaking of cooperative development while laying claim to a swathe of Japanese territory and waters. An apparently ambivalent United States, in relative decline, watches these proceedings. Japan has reoriented its defense posture to face south, towards the East China Sea, trying to shape Chinese behavior and hedge against future Chinese adventurism. However, with a tangible recommitment of American attention to East Asia and a firm, public, American stand on behalf of Japan's territorial integrity, future conflict can be deterred.     

Notes on Italian foreign politics

The relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran both shapes and is shaped by a new Middle Eastern “Cold War”. The United States and the Islamic Republic should transcend the prospects for hegemonial conflict or strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, along the lines of the realignment in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China that took place during President Richard Nixon's tenure in the White House. The article examines the imperatives for a comprehensive and strategic realignment of US–Iranian relations from the standpoint of Iranian interests and foreign policy concepts as well as from an American perspective. It also evaluates the actual prospects for US–Iranian rapprochement.     

On the Brink of War: The Crisis Year of 1915 in Relations Between the US and Austria-Hungary

This article deals with the development of political relations between the United States of America and Austria-Hungary in 1915. These relations are especially marked by the pressure applied by the Austro-Hungarian government towards diminishing American support of the countries of the Entente. It was a conflict of crucial significance—the actual performance of American neutrality was at stake. The study proves that, as early as 1915, Vienna had already considered the United States as a de facto ally of the powers of the Entente, and it did not put much hope in President Woodrow Wilson's mediating efforts. Furthermore, the article disproves the generally held but erroneous view that, almost till the end of the Great War, the American administration and public felt a certain fondness toward the Danubian monarchy. This is evidenced by the harsh reactions of the American press to the scandalous activities of the Austro-Hungarian embassy in the United States. However, the relations of the United States with Austria-Hungary were less dramatic than those between the United States and Germany.     

Limiting America's Engagement: Roger Hilsman's Vietnam War, 1961–1963

This article examines the role of Roger Hilsman, an important State Department official in the Kennedy administration, in the formulation of American policy towards the Vietnam War between 1961 and 1963. Hilsman was one of the leading opponents of a conventional military escalation of the war in Vietnam, frequently clashing with the Pentagon and the American military establishment in order to limit United States' engagement. Hilsman was convinced that “victory” in Vietnam was possible if the United States adopted a counterinsurgency approach to the conflict. This perception was forged by his experiences as a guerrilla fighter in World War II. Perceived to be one of the main architects of the coup against President Diem in 1963, and vilified by elements in the United States military, he was removed from office by President Johnson early in 1964.     

Intolerant Allies: Canada and the George W. Bush Administration, 2001–2005

This analysis examines the disharmony in American–Canadian relations in the period from 2001 to 2005. Canada and the United States co-operated in the early days after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, managing their mutual border and fighting the war in Afghanistan. Yet they soon came into conflict over American plans to invade Iraq and create a ballistic missile defence [BMD] system for North America. President George W. Bush and Paul Cellucci, his ambassador in Ottawa, were insensitive to Canadian concerns. Canadian leaders sent mixed messages to Washington, hinting that they would support a war in Iraq and participate in the BMD system, but ultimately deciding against each. The article examines the limitations of the tolerant ally interpretation of the Canadian–American relationship and illuminates the role of leadership in the rupture that took place between the two countries.     

United States' strategic possibilities in the South Caucasus

South Caucasus is an area where the United States can obtain a wide number of strategic advantages if a coherent policy towards South Caucasus and the Caucasian Region is developed. This article seeks to throw light on some of the most important objectives the United States can obtain in the region, and explain how the policy of multiple outlets is a cornerstone in American policy for South Caucasus. Furthermore we look at the problems of the current policy, especially those concerning the Baku‐Ceyhan pipeline.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

The End of History: ‘Neojuche Revivalism’ and Korean Unification

This article argues that prospects for change in North Korea and, thus, reduction in threats to regional security, lay more in rising prospects for Korean unification than in scant hopes for reform inside North Korea. It identifies several factors that have made unification a more salient idea than at any time in the last decade. First, Kim Jong Il's failing health and his youngest son's and designated heir's uncertain grip on succession mean greater risk of political instability in North Korea that could bring discontinuous change, including reunification. Second, it has become clear that the Six Party Talks and other diplomatic efforts will not produce denuclearization and reduction of the regional security threat posed by Pyongyang's weapons program. Third, the current and likely future leadership in Pyongyang is incapable of reform, making regime collapse a more likely scenario and unification a more likely route to meaningful change. Fourth, the North Korean regime has become heavily dependent on Chinese support, material and political-diplomatic. Finally, thinking about how unification might occur has shifted to scenarios that are more feasible to key parties, including South Korea, the United States and Japan.     

1999——依然难以平静的朝鲜半岛

朝鲜半岛形势在不断地走向缓和 ,但并不平静 ,迭起波澜。朝、韩经济在走向好转。朝、韩都在积极发展对外关系 ,韩国金大中政府已完成了四大国首脑外交 ,朝鲜在积极改善同四大国的关系。韩、韩之间也在稳步改善政治关系 ,发展经济关系。但朝、韩之间的对峙、敌视情绪仍然存在 ,不时出现各种争执、摩擦。朝鲜形势仍处于扑朔迷离、难以把握的状态 ,值得我们密切关注和深入研究。     

The Twin Peaks of Pyongyang

The United States has been negotiating with North Korea in an effort to have it renounce its nuclear program for over a decade, since Washington negotiated an Agreed Framework in 1994. In this time, North Korea has only amassed more plutonium. The negotiations are hindered by mutual distrust and hostility, but it is doubtful whether any change in Washington's attitude toward the dprk would help solve the nuclear issue. It is the Kim regime that is the core problem. Until the regime is removed, there can be no durable peace in the region. This article suggests that with the prospect for a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue remote, and since any attempt to remove the Kim regime militarily would entail huge costs, Washington might consider a third option: directly engaging the North Korean people.