U.S.Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy and China's Coping Strategy

Deterrence and coercion are two kinds of strategies,the latter being more aggressive than the former.The U.S.Asia-Pacific Rebalancing strategy is an important diplomatic legacy of Obama's administration.For the issues involving the Diaoyu Islands,the South China Sea,cyber security,DPRK's nuclear program,and Iran's nuclear program,the U.S.has carded out military deterrence and non-force coercion against China.But generally,these are low-level coercive measures and distinct from the severe economic sanction and diplomatic isolation imposed by the U.S.on Russia,Syria,DPRK and Iran in recent years.Concerning issues where the U.S.and China hold distinct views,there would be less strategic leeway for the two countries.If the U.S.is to strengthen deterrence and coercion towards China,China can respond more actively and effectively,but it will be more difficult to build a new model of China-U.S.major-country relationship.     

New Relations Between Major Powers

In recent years, the ＂new-type relationship between major powers＂ ,has become a hot-topic term in the studies of internationalpolitics and international relations. Why is it necessary to build a new-type relationship between major powers？ What are the essence and the connotation of such relationship？ How to build it against the backdrop of a rapidly changing world that is undergoing a profound structural reform and the evolving balance of international forces in international relations in all fields and at all levels？     

ID with IE foreign debt——by Mr. Gao Zhikai,Center for China and Globalization

正This is Victor Gao, on behalf of CCG(Center for China and Globalization). It is our great pleasure to attend this important meeting. In today's world,many developing countries have the utmost need to develop economy to build up their capacities. I would urge all countries in the world to provide as much support as possible to the economic development of these developing countries, including both equity and debt. I think nation-building and capacity-building is a very important way to create more jobs and to lift people out of poverty in many parts of the world.     

The Status Quo and Prospect of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation System

The current international financial crisis is posing a grave threat to the security of the world, and has brought about deep-going and complicated changes to the area of international nuclear non- proliferation. Generally speaking, the existing international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism is still functioning, nonetheless, it is also facing severe challenges and the situation is worrying.     

Consolidating International Nuclear Safety System

The international community has been growing more concemed about the safety of nuclear power as the sector has expanded rapidly.Worries about nuclear terrorism have also surfaced.Current international nuclear safety mechanisms still has some shortcomings because they cannot effectively prevent nuclear proliferation or nuclear accidents.The world is now considering how to build an effective and comprehensive international nuclear safety mechanism.     

China-U.S. Economic Symbiosis Moving toward Symmetry

The symbiotic relationship between the Chinese and U.S.economies determines that the two countries have mutual strategic needs. For a long time, the United States has played a dominant role in this relationship, yet it has also been developing in a direction favorable to China. The current financial crisis has accelerated the development of this trend, which gives China more say and makes the United States give up its previous dominant posture and seek to build a more reliable and new pattern of relationship in which the two are in the same boat.     

Considerations of the Respective Parties

Yang: There has appeared a tendency of “Peaceful resolution“ and “multilateral cooperation“ in the process of resolving the Korean nuclear issue. By the way, with regard to topic of our present discussion, I think that “multilateralism“ is more proper than “regionalism. “ Multilateralism usually means, “several countries (at least three countries) work out common rules of behavior in order to jointly resolve international issues“ through long cooperation and in institutional patterns. Its concept is not in contradiction with regionalism. Instead of taking geographic factors and scale as standards, it considers the number of participating countries, their interactive pattern and process as the center.Northeast Asian security can‘t excludes the participation of USA-the only outside party. Although Mongolia, the only Northern Asian country, is most close to Northeast Asia, it has not been included in the framework of the Six-Party talks so far.……     

The Dual Situations of China-U.S. Relations

In recent years, the U.S. administration is, out of its capability and interests, more and more inclined to accept, to a greater extent and from a long-term perspective, a realistic trend that China is rising to one of the world leading powers in a peaceful way. Accordingly, it is continuing its military containment against China, increasing its trade protectionism toward China and stepping up its diplomatic rivalry with China.     

Engaging China in Nuclear Disarmament Debates： Is There a Role for Australia？

China has demonstrated some interest in the resurgence of nuclear disarmament debates over the past few years,but because its own nuclear arsenal is relatively small,because this capability is predicated on a very specific Chinese posture and security concerns,and because it believes firmly that the responsibility for moving towards a world without nuclear weapons belongs in the first instance to the United States and Russia-who between them possess 95% of the world’s existing nuclear weapons-it has displayed a somewhat limited contribution to this debate so far.     

Foreign Policy Readjustments by the Abe Government And Their Limitations

The Shinzo Abe cabinet took on some new thinking in its foreign policy when it started to function: it made some readjustments to the foreign policy of his predecessor Junichiro Koisumi. Abe tends to be more moderate and pragmatic in concept and action in diplomacy. He has made a good beginning with some initial achievements. As Abe and Koizumi are from the same Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that is getting more and more     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

The US–India nuclear deal: the beginning of a beautiful relationship?

The United States (US)–India nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India's credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order. The nuclear agreement creates a major exception to the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. Given its far-reaching implications, the Indo-US nuclear agreement has sparked off a heated debate in India, the US and the larger international community. This article examines the debate surrounding the nuclear pact. It argues that the nuclear agreement is about much more than mere nuclear technicalities: it is about the emergence of a new configuration in the global balance of power and a broader need for a new international nuclear order in the face of a global nuclear non-proliferation regime that seems to have become ineffective in meeting the challenges confronting the international community today.     

AUKUS核潜艇合作如何冲击国际核不扩散规范体系？

核潜艇合作是美英澳三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS)的核心内容。关于这一核潜艇合作项目是否有悖国际核不扩散规范体系,国际社会存在尖锐的争论。既有研究主要探讨三边安全伙伴关系核潜艇合作与国际核不扩散规范的合规问题,但忽视了其对正在成长中的国际规范的冲击。从规范演化的角度看,违反规范的国家影响力越大,对既有规范的打击越沉重,规范退化的可能性越大。规范的正式程度越低,规范越脆弱,受到冲击后规范退化甚至衰亡的可能性也越大。美英澳核潜艇合作最主要的影响在于,三国利用其独特的影响力破坏了成长中的核不扩散规范。长期以来,由于已有的核潜艇合作活动都没有利用国际核不扩散规范体系中的军用核动力装置漏洞,使得规避利用该漏洞已经成为一个惯例或成长中的规范。然而,由于美英澳的核潜艇合作涉及大量武器级高浓缩铀的转让,且高调引用了军用核动力装置漏洞,这将对军用核动力装置转让、军民两用物项管制和核“突破时间”这三项成长中的核不扩散规范产生严重冲击。     

Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons

This article analyses the potential motivations behind the opposition of a number of Central and Eastern European States (CESs) to the withdrawal of US deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) from Europe. It shows why CES governments obtain no military benefits from the deployed NSNW; it argues CES are unlikely to truly see them as a promising bargaining chip; it suggests CES can derive only limited prestige from US-deployed weapons and the contrasting norm of ‘nuclear disarmament’ likely offers a more attractive option; and it assesses potential bureaucratic interests as improbable to play a decisive role. In contrast, the article proposes a more nuanced elaboration of the transatlantic ‘linkage’ argument. It maintains CES have significant motives to keep the United States involved in Europe, shows how they are likely to mistrust US commitment pledges, and argues they are prone to use the NSNW debate as a convenient instrument (within a limited toolbox) towards locking in the US foothold on the continent.     

朝鲜的核、导战略态势及其影响

朝鲜实施导弹发射和地下核试验,意在实现核拥有,籍以提高对美战略的筹码。朝鲜开展核战略角逐由来已久,先后展开过以守为攻;“边缘”对应;将计就计;以硬对强四个回合。角逐结果虽不乏战术上的小胜,却丧失了战略上的大胜。此番的导弹试射与地下核试验可视为第五个回合,是朝鲜核、导角逐战略“以攻为守”的转换。朝鲜执意实现核拥有纵有多种原因,却因核、导本身所拥有的“双刃剑”作用,带来于己、于他都不利的负面影响。包括:自食其言,愈加难以取信于国际社会;产生连锁反映,引发新一轮的军备竞赛;挑战核不扩散条约,难免遭到更大封杀;破坏合作气氛,延缓统一进程;置中国于尴尬境地,动摇中朝关系基础。朝鲜的“自行其事”难免遭到国际社会更加严厉的抵制。     

Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?

Is the nuclear domino theory historically valid? Despite its longstanding centrality to thinking on nuclear proliferation amongst scholars and policymakers, in recent years a revisionist consensus has emerged in opposition to this traditional view. Based on an analysis of historical evidence from the aftermath of the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, this article argues that scholars have gone too far in rejecting the nuclear domino theory. Reactive proliferation has been more prevalent than commonly believed, and while it is true that only India acquired a nuclear arsenal in response to the Chinese test, to a significant extent this is precisely because the United States was aware of the danger of reactive proliferation and worked to stop it. Finally, the historical evidence suggests that the nuclear domino theory is compatible with both domestic and prestige motivations for proliferation in addition to the security motives normally associated with the theory.     

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: An Historical Perspective

As the twenty-first century appears to be entering a more intensified globalised nuclear age, nations and academics alike consistently criticise the frameworks and foundational agencies created to ensure non-proliferation, security, and multi-lateral negotiations. Notwithstanding the significant reductions in nuclear arsenals made over the last several decades, thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the numerous nuclear agencies and watchdogs, it is evident that the risks emanating from nuclear weapons and their associated materials have continually expanded. By ensuring that the global community has protections and safeguards in place to promote international dialogue and nuclear non-proliferation—including the Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Program, International Atomic Energy Agency, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, as well as nuclear free zones and review processes—the nuclear non-proliferation regime can arguably ensure that the devastating threat to humankind is reduced. However, as countries scramble to once again refine and modernise their nuclear stockpiles, the necessity to review, re-shape, and re-think these foundational safeguards is more vital than ever.     

Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11: Assessing the Risks

This paper discusses, with an emphasis on the technical issues involved, some of the possible forms that nuclear terrorism might take, loosely referring to all forms of terrorism involving radioactive materials, such as crude nuclear weapons, radiological dispersal devices, and attacks on the nuclear infrastructure, including nuclear reactors. The first two forms of terrorism necessarily depend on terrorists' obtaining suitable materials, so the problem of nuclear smuggling, especially from the former Soviet Union (FSU), with its huge and decrepit nuclear complex, is addressed, as is the region's reservoir of unemployed or underemployed nuclear expertise. The West, however, is not ignored. As one observer remarked, Osama bin Laden might soon have more luck shopping for nuclear materials there than in the FSU. The paper concludes that although it is most unlikely that terrorists will detonate a true nuclear weapon, the other forms are real and pressing threats.     

A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture

This article examines the implications of Scottish independence for the UK's nuclear posture. It is argued here that a vote for independence will critically undermine this posture. Since the UK nuclear force operates entirely out of Scotland, and since the Scottish government continues to assert its intention to see nuclear weapons removed from an independent Scotland, it is overwhelmingly likely that a ‘Yes’ vote will prompt a demand for the drawdown of the UK nuclear force in Scotland. If it wished to maintain its nuclear capability, the UK government would then have to make alternative basing arrangements. It is argued here that a host of legal, financial and political difficulties may preclude any such relocation and that Downing Street may ultimately be left with little option but to surrender the UK's nuclear capability. This article concludes that far from weakening the UK, a surrendering of its nuclear posture would result in a stronger and more functional UK military footprint and would bolster the UK's standing in the international arena.