Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality,the Freedom of the Seas,and the Myth of the “Civil War Precedents”

This analysis shows the importance of a problem of maritime law in an on-going debate between two interpretations of Wilsonian neutrality that have competed in various guises since the end of the First World War: can British blockade actions in that war be justified by American Civil War precedents? It proves that reliance on the “Civil War precedents” to justify Britain’s blockade measures was disingenuous from the beginning. British diplomats first used it in October 1914, and Woodrow Wilson embraced it to defend his mild response to British violations of neutral rights to incensed American citizens despite continuous protests from the State Department. Whilst all politicians involved knew the comparison was wrong, historians have embraced it as a justification of Britain’s illegal blockade ever since Arthur S. Link claimed it as the key to understanding Wilson’s neutrality policy.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Progressive Era Diplomat: Lloyd C. Griscom and Trade Expansion

The Progressive Era, from the late 1890s to the entry of the United States into World War One, was marked by a professional commitment to global trade expansion on the part of the State Department and the McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. Philosophically, the United States embraced the belief that a liberal, democratic, free-enterprise political and economic system would advance human progress on every continent, and that global free trade would remove many causes of war and conflict. Such a policy position attracted young and talented foreign service officers to serve in the American diplomatic corps. One young man was Lloyd C. Griscom, heir to one of the great American shipping fortunes. Griscom's career as a diplomat in Turkey, Persia, Japan, Brazil, and Italy between 1899 and 1909 revealed much about American political and economic interests during a period when the United States emerged as a major power.     

Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation

I propose that special interests are particularly influential in international cooperation because they are able to enact pressure on the government already during the negotiations while the issue is not yet salient for the general public. In my formal model, special interests can offer political support to the government in exchange for a discriminatory implementation commitment that benefits them. The government colludes with the special interests if the value of political support exceeds the cost. However, if the government colludes with special interests in country A, the payoff to the government and special interests in country B also decreases because the probability of successful international cooperation decreases. In equilibrium, special interests create a collective-action problem that complicates international cooperation. In addition to providing a new explanation for the power of special interests in international cooperation, the article illuminates how international negotiations and domestic treaty implementation interact. The analysis also reveals a new dimension of flexibility in international cooperation.     

High and Low Tide: Sino–American Relations and Summit Diplomacy in the Second World War

Studies of Chinese involvement in Allied relations during the Second World War tend to focus on the Cairo Conference of November 1943 and see it as the high point for China’s wartime diplomacy. This analysis argues that the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference, held just prior to Cairo in late October–early November, was more important for the achievement of China’s longer-term interests. The participation at Moscow of Cordell Hull, the American secretary of state, was unique as the State Department was absent from almost all the Allied wartime summits. President Franklin Roosevelt liked to conduct his diplomacy personally. In Moscow, however, Hull represented the United States, and his patience and persistence led to the inclusion of China in the Four Nation Declaration that resulted from the meeting. That, in turn, meant that China was eventually included as a permanent member of the eventual United Nations Security Council and seen as a post-war Great Power. It was a more significant outcome than those resulting from the Cairo Conference.     

Ministers,Markets and Missiles: The British Government,the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treaty's discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britain's application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.     

An analysis of news sources used in reports on slavery in the Sudan in the New York Times and Washington Post between 1986 and 2001

Abstract

For over 25 years the Sudan and the United States have had a contentious relationship. In 1986 several international human rights organisations pointed to the re-emergence of the practice of slavery in the Sudan. Past research by American media has shown that journalists tend to use routine channels and American government officials, especially those from the ‘golden triangle’ (the White House, Pentagon and State Department) when covering stories related to foreign countries. However, in the case of the Sudan there was no clear American foreign policy for an extended period of time. Consequently, there was a stark absence of reporting on the slavery issue in the two elite American newspapers (the New York Times and the Washington Post) examined in this study. Furthermore, even when the topic was covered the sources used defined the issue through an American perspective, rather than within an historical and geopolitical context.     

Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1941: The American State Department and Propaganda on the Sino–Japanese Conflict

From 1931 to 1941, when China and Japan were at undeclared war, China's propaganda was fairly well-circulated in America through her American friends who played a leading role in shaping American opinions on the Far Eastern crisis. But the United States State Department maintained a neutral stance toward the Sino–Japanese conflict until after 1939 and considered the pro-Chinese opinion not so much a national consensus for policy consideration as a partisan view propped up by propaganda groups. Thus, the State Department guarded its Asian policy from the pressure of propaganda activities and partisan opinions on the Asian conflict, whilst utilising them occasionally as tools of diplomacy toward China and Japan. This article examines the State Department's attitude toward public opinion and propaganda on the Far Eastern conflict from 1931 to 1941 to illustrate how American officials handled partisan opinions on a foreign crisis when most of the information on foreign policy was privately initiated and circulated.     

EUGENE SCHUYLER,THE ONLY DIPLOMATIST

Eugene Schuyler (1840–1890), little known today, was America’s best-qualified diplomat, one of its first PhDs, and a friend of Tolstoy, translator of Turgenev, and biographer of Peter the Great. Schuyler spent a decade in Russia; his first book describes a nine-month trip through Central Asia which Russia was then subjugating. Schuyler’s subsequent reports from Bulgaria on Turkish atrocities helped to make Bulgaria the modern world’s first “fashionable cause.” Schuyler was American minister to Greece, Romania, and Serbia, but was refused confirmation as the State Department’s number two because of his frank criticism of a former secretary of state. He died after some months as diplomatic agent in Egypt.     

Simulating the Creation of a New International Human Rights Treaty: Active Learning in the International Studies Classroom

This article details a simulation of formulating a new international human rights treaty designed for an introductory international studies course. Student understanding and interest in a range of international relations topics—including diplomacy, two –level games, international law, human rights, and group decision making—are reinforced by actively engaging the students in policy formulation and state –to –state negotiations. The article is structured around the four key components of active learning approaches—educational objectives, design parameters, procedures, and assessment and debriefing—in order to provide a full understanding of the goals, set –up, process, and advantages of the simulation. The simulation has been successfully run multiple times at both a large state university and a small liberal arts institution. Supportive student feedback and an interesting variety of outcomes indicate that this simulation is a positive addition to the course and reinforces the use of active learning approaches in the international studies classroom.     

论国家民族主义对普京执政以来俄罗斯外交政策的影响

民族主义是俄罗斯在历史嬗变中形成的独特思想文化.西化改革失败后,俄罗斯国力和国际地位日趋衰弱,以追求国家利益为核心的国家民族主义迅速兴起,它压倒包括自由主义在内的各种意识形态,成为当代俄罗斯最具影响力的政治思潮.当代俄罗斯国家民族主义作为一种文化,对俄罗斯的外交政策起到了重要作用.本文主要论述了国家民族主义对普京执政以来的俄罗斯外交政策产生的影响.     

Recognition,diplomacy, and international law: The curious case of the United States and China

Political necessity required President Jimmy Carter to terminate, effective 1 January 1980, the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Prior to the effective termination date, the President's action was challenged by Senator Barry Goldwater who sought to prevent termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty unless and until the Senate, or the whole Congress, gave its consent. Neither the United States Constitution nor the historical record could provide clear guidance on the proper means to terminate a treaty. Recognizing the unavoidable interrelationship between diplomacy and domestic‐as well as international‐law, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the case of Goldwater v. Carter as a political question best resolved by the two political branches of government involved. In taking this action, the Court was able to preserve its image of objectivity while implicitly supporting the President's action.     

Boomerangs and Superpowers: International Norms,Transnational Networks and US Foreign Policy

The complex relationship between international norms and transational networks of non-state actors is gaining increasing attention in international relations theory. This paper argues that transnational networks of non-state actors gain greater access to and influence over states when they identify with international norms that the states themselves have formally accepted--even if that formal acceptance did not initally reflect any serious intention to implement or monitor the norm in question. This process has been called the 'boomering effect'. The resulting redefinitions of state interests raise the diplomatic salience of the norm in question, and thereby increase its effectiveness. The article illustrates this process with a study of changes in the US foreign policy towards Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the human rights norms of the Helsinki Accords in the mid-late 1970s.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

The Reputational Impact of Investor-State Disputes

To what extent do alleged violations of international commitments damage state reputation? This article explore this question with specific reference to investor-state disputes arising under the protection of international investment agreements. Its main contributions are threefold. First, building on the political institutions literature, the study places the theoretical importance of information about the rules of the game, and the actions of the participants at the center of analysis. Second, in contrast to prior empirical research, the study systematically analyzes the costs of state involvement in investment treaty arbitration by examining all known disputes. Third, the study addresses the impact of investment disputes on both foreign investment flows and state reputational rankings. We show that the consequences of investment disputes vary with the transparency of the investor-state dispute settlement process. The central implication of these findings for the broader body of literature on international institutions is that reputational mechanisms for effective treaty enforcement cannot be taken as given but instead need to be explored on the basis of a nuanced approach that addresses the pivotal issues of institutional design and information costs.     

Personality and policy preference: Attitudes in the arms control and disarmament agency and the state department

This is a report of the results of a small project intended to determine what relationships there are between the personality trait of authoritarianism and variations in arms control‐related policy preferences held by bureaucrats in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department. Several moderately strong correlations are found. A major implication of this finding is that as international relations scholarship assumes a greater “policy analysis” focus, it will be advisable to remember that policymaking is embedded in a psycho‐cultural milieu and that therefore the potential substantive and methodological contributions of psychology to policy studies should not be overlooked.     

Labor Diplomacy: A Revitalized Aspect of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Era of Globalization

This article analyzes how and why labor diplomacy has become an important element of American foreign policy in recent years. "Labor diplomacy"—a term coined by practitioners in the Department of State—refers to the work performed principally by labor officers (also called labor attachés) at American embassies around the world and, more specifically, the advocacy and promotion of core labor standards within the context of U.S. human rights and international trade policy. The five internationally recognized core labor standards, as developed by the International Labor Organization (ILO), are: freedom of association; the right of collective bargaining; the elimination of forced labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. The article explores the economic, political, and bureaucratic factors that contributed to the revitalization of labor diplomacy during the 1990s. These include: a growing appreciation for the linkage between labor standards and trade in the globalized economy; the Clinton administration's decision to pursue a closer relationship with the AFL-CIO, particularly after the 1997 "fast-track" debacle; and the changing bureaucratic dynammics within the Department of State. The article also reviews U.S. initiatives, both through the ILO and unilaterally, to strengthen respect for core labor standards around the world, and how these efforts have helped shape American policy toward the World Trade Organization. The article concludes with an analysis of the outcome of the recent WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle and a prognosis on the future of labor diplomacy.     

浅析威尔逊主义对新殖民主义形成的影响——基于威尔逊政府对菲律宾政策的分析

学术界目前对威尔逊主义和新殖民主义的专门研究比较深入[1],但关于威尔逊主义与新殖民主义的关系的探讨尚需继续开展.笔者拟在充分利用现有研究成果的基础上,以威尔逊政府对菲律宾政策为例,梳理威尔逊主义对美国新殖民主义的影响.     

Non-compliance by design: Moribund hard law in international institutions

States often create international institutions that impose legally binding rules on member states, and then do not even attempt to enforce these rules. Why? In this article, we present a game-theoretic model of moribund hard law in international institutions. We show that if some states face domestic pressure to negotiate a hard law treaty, their incentive to insist on hard law in the negotiations is maximized when less enthusiastic states expect that the hard law will probably not be enforced. Domestic proponents of hard law reward states for negotiating a hard law treaty, while states that oppose hard law can accept it because they expect no enforcement. As a form of informal governance, moribund hard law allows non-compliance by design.     

“Driven to Tears”: Britain,CS Tear Gas,and the Geneva Protocol, 1969–1975

This analysis considers a controversy over whether the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, covered CS “tear gas.” Widespread deployment of tear gases by American forces in Vietnam after 1964 attracted much international criticism as many believed the Protocol banned such agents and pressure gradually built on the British government to clarify its interpretative position. Its tabling a disarmament initiative to prohibit production and possession of biological weapons in July 1969 exacerbated the situation, provoking allegations of diverting attention from chemical weapons as a favour to America and the “Special Relationship.” Meanwhile, the outbreak of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland earlier the same year, where British forces also used CS, presented further difficulties. Britain rejected inclusion of CS under the Protocol in February 1970 but wrestled at great length over the decision and its consequences under the Harold Wilson and Edward Heath governments. Largely absent from historical accounts, this episode allows an examination of a complex, convoluted issue that had potentially wide-ranging ramifications for the interpretation of international relations and treaties. Similarly, re-creating confidential inter-departmental decision-making processes, particularly comparing scientific and legal interpretations, the processes of governmental bureaucracy and the role played by civil society demonstrates why an element with little immediate linkage to British overseas affairs proved such a conundrum.