卢武铉政府“和平繁荣政策”浅析

20 0 3年 2月 2 5日 ,韩国第 16届总统卢武铉宣誓就职 ,提出旨在增进朝鲜半岛和平与实现共同繁荣的“和平繁荣政策” ,为当前半岛核危机注入了新的和平因素。“和平繁荣政策”系“阳光政策”的继承和发展 ,强调四大原则。一是韩朝通过对话解决一切悬而未决的问题 ;二是韩朝确立互相信任 ,实行互惠主义 ;三是基于“南北是当事者”的原则 ,谋求全面有效的国际合作 ;四是提高对内对外的透明度 ,扩大国民参与 ,实现超党派合作 ,努力与国民并肩奋斗来推行“和平繁荣”政策。①卢武铉政府实施对朝新政策有其深层考虑。一是服务于韩国国家总体发展…     

卢武铉对朝政策“变化”的影响分析

5月中旬 ,在国际社会密切关注美国如何应对朝鲜提出的“一揽子”提案之际 ,卢武铉访问美国 ,并就朝鲜核问题与美国达成共识 ,双方一致强调“绝不容许朝鲜拥有核武器”、“朝韩交流与合作将视核问题的进展情况进行”、“朝鲜半岛和平与稳定一旦受到威胁 ,将协商采取追加措施”。①对此 ,国际社会评称“韩国对朝鲜政策出现重大变化” ,担心北京会谈后一度平缓的朝鲜核问题将因此而再度恶化。其实 ,卢武铉此次访美的目的很明确 :弥合韩美裂痕 ,游说美国放弃对朝制裁。卢武铉就任韩国总统后 ,表示要建立“互惠平等、成熟的韩美关系”② ,拟修改…     

卢武铉将如何延续金大中的经济政策－－从金大中“求变存活”，到“新鲜希望”、更加快速进步的网络韩国

将于今年2月25日就任的韩国新当选总统卢武铉将实行何种经济政策，成为各国关心的焦点。即将离任的现任总统金大中凭借以“大家一起求变才能存活”为成功要素的“大中经济学”为韩国建立了随时变化的动因与环境，而卢武铉这位金大中的接班人、善于体察时势的“网络民粹运动家”，将会以网络的优势，带动一个更加快速变化与进步的韩国。具体而言，笔者预料卢武铉将会继续金大中总统的改革财阀集团等经济政策，但基于年轻人的支持而当选的他也深切体认到网络对他的重要性，且作为“激进改革派”的卢武铉将会提出自己的新的政策。     

韩国对朝人道主义援助及其政策

为了帮助朝鲜救灾,帮助朝鲜民众安度生活,韩国自1995年朝鲜受灾起开始对朝鲜进行人道主义援助,迄今已历15年有余。2000年以来,在金大中政府的"阳光政策"、卢武铉政府的"和平繁荣政策"引导之下,韩国对朝援助在深度和广度上都比以前有明显的进展。但是,朝鲜的粮食供应状况始终未能得到改善,并且朝鲜还在2006、2009年先后进行令韩国担心的两次核试验。为此,时至李明博政府时期,韩国对朝鲜在以前实行的包容政策上有所后退,转向实施以实用主义外交为中心的强硬政策,韩国对朝人道主义援助因此逐渐削减。     

卢武铉政府对美、对朝政策评估

对美政策和对朝政策在韩国对外政策中占据着最为重要的地位 ,卢武铉就任总统时在这两方面都面临着严峻的挑战。一年来 ,卢武铉着力弥补韩美关系中出现的裂痕 ,稳定了韩美同盟关系 ,但韩美关系中的深层问题并没解决 ;在对朝政策方面 ,卢武铉政府存在向美国靠拢的倾向 ,但在第二轮六方会谈中 ,卢武铉政府显示出更为自主推进对朝政策的趋向。     

解析卢武铉主义

卢武铉主义是卢武铉就任总统后,对韩国外交安保政策进行的大胆革新,它包括自主国防、自主外交、反对驻韩美军"战略灵活性"调整和"东北亚均衡者论"等政策理念。卢武铉主义是在个人与民族、历史与现实、国内与国际等因素综合作用下产生的,它一出台就引起了国内外的争议。面对质疑和批评,卢武铉不得不对其新外交安保政策做出调整,以致卢武铉主义的原则理念大打折扣,而其后续影响还有待观察。     

2007朝韩首脑会谈评析

2007年10月2-4日,韩国总统卢武铉访问平壤,与朝鲜国防委员长金正日举行了半岛分裂以来的第二次北南首脑会谈,并发表了《北南关系发展与和平繁荣宣言》.多方因素综合作用促成的此番北南首脑会谈不仅巩固了2000年第一次韩朝首脑会谈所开创的北南关系新局面,而且为北南关系未来的发展创造了新平台.     

评卢武铉总统的“联政”提议触礁

韩国总统卢武铉于2005年6、7月份相继提出了“小联政”和“大联政”的建议，这是卢武铉当选总统以来的又一惊人之举。总统主动提出执政党要同其他在野党联合执政（小联政）或者将执政权干脆交给在野党（大联政）的建议不仅在韩国，就是在世界上也是罕见的。因此，此举立即在韩国政坛上掀起一场轩然大波。本文深入分析了卢武铉提出“联政”建议的背景、各界对此的反应、该建议所产生的影响及造成的各种后果，以帮助人们了解卢武铉“联政”提议的来龙去脉并把握韩国政局的走向。     

评卢武铉之死

2009年5月23日凌晨，刚卸任一年多的韩国前总统卢武铉跳崖自杀。前总统自杀，这在韩国政治史上史无前例，在世界也是罕见的。在野的民主党和许多百姓指责当局对卢武铉进行“政治谋杀”、“虐待致死”，展开了全国性的超过百万民众参与的悼念活动，当局一面宣布按前总统礼遇为卢武铉举行“国民葬”，一面在此前举行过烛光示威的首尔世宗路部署两列警车长蛇阵和众多警察，防止民众集会。卢武铉之死冲击了整个韩国。     

透视朝韩南北经贸合作中的民族主义情结

冷战结束后，韩国政府超越冷战意识的民族统一、民族至上意识开始逐年上升，2000年朝韩首次历史性峰会标志着这种意识进入新的高峰，韩国政府对朝政策也由民族和解的“北方政策”阶段迈入不计代价、更具民族主义色彩的“阳光政策”和“和平繁荣政策”阶段。南北经济交流合作也由此进入民族主义情结浓重的发展时期。但是，这种政治因素影响下的非市场化运作是否可持续显然还是个疑问。     

中美在东亚安全结构中的冲突——2006年美国《四年防务评估报告》的一种解读

2006年2月6日出台的美国《四年防务评估报告》,首次称中国是“最具有与美国进行军事竞争潜力”的新兴大国,并指责中国正常的国防建设,称中国对安全事务采取了“遮掩的态度”,“中国军力扩张的速度和范围已使区域军力面临失衡的危险。”五角大楼对中国的这种战略定位,折射出中美冲突的实质,即美国作为霸权护持国,采取一切有效手段防卫“挑战者”,从而引发的竞争、矛盾和斗争。由于中国和平发展的既定战略是明确的,在这一变量确定的情况下,未来中美冲突的发展模式将在很大程度上取决于美国对华政策的走向。     

Book reviews

Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions Tobias Debiel and Axel Klein, Eds Zed Books, London, 2002, pp. 256. ISBN 184277171X Nobly, Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions seeks to address how 'deep-rooted structures of violence' can be transformed to enable development, which will 'facilitate socio-economic welfare and political participation, as well as... the realization of cultural identity'. (p. 3.) With a focus on 'concrete policy recommendations geared towards practical politics', Fragile Peace is a discussion of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building with case studies drawn from the Caucusus, Central America and the Horn of Africa. The contributors for this edited volume originally were participants in a series of five international workshops, entitled the Development and Peace Foundation's Policy Forum on Regional Conflict Management, conducted between November 1999 and 2000. Reflecting the diverse nature of the workshops' participants, the authors hail overwhelmingly from think tanks and academia in Germany and the UK, but also include contributors from South America, the United States and Georgia.     

安倍再度执政后的中日关系展望

2012年12月安倍晋三再度执政后,手中握有改善中日关系的机会,但在日本政治右倾化抬头背景下,其对华政策仍可能受到日本右翼和鹰派的影响。安倍内阁企图通过加强日美同盟,在中国周边开展所谓"价值观外交",构建针对中国的战略格局,在钓鱼岛问题上迫使中方让步。安倍最大政治目标是修改日本宪法,为日本对外使用军事力量铺路。近期在对中国采取强硬立场的同时,也会谋求缓解紧张关系,防止局势失控。若2013年7月自民党在参议院选举中获胜,很可能推动修改日本宪法。中日关系将进入新的历史阶段,前景不容乐观。2013年是《中日和平友好条约》缔结35周年。中日双方信守条约,妥善处理钓鱼岛争议,对未来的中日关系和东亚和平稳定是至关重要的。     

Meeting Hauteur with Tact,Imperturbability, and Resolution: British Diplomacy and Russia, 1856–1865

This article takes a broad view of Anglo–Russian relations in the years between the Peace of Paris, 1856, and the death of Viscount Palmerston, 1865, examining the shifts within that period in an essentially high-political diplomatic history. It traces a number of strands in geopolitics, offering a sense of the competing strategies of the European Great Powers, particularly the roles of British diplomats: the private and public communication amongst prime ministers, foreign secretaries, ambassadors, ministers-plenipotentiaries and consular officials concerning British policy towards Russia in the post-Crimean War period. It outlines the principles that underlay that policy and the ways in which the diplomatic network observed the tsar and his advisors and agents, assessed the developing situation in Russia, Central Asia, and the Ottoman Balkans, made decisions, and implemented policy. It focusses on the diplomatists’ attitudes and perceptions—how they thought about Russia and British interests and how they worked to protect them. It also analyses British policy in light of the European dimension. The years 1856 to 1865 not only witnessed Russian attempts to undermine the Crimean settlement, they also saw revisionist Bonapartist France work to destroy the constraining Vienna system of 1815—primarily in northern Italy. These policies complicated British attempts to maintain the status-quo and defend their interests in the East. The evolving situation was highly complex.     

The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939

After the Great War, Yugoslavia found her most dangerous enemy in Italy, which made every effort to destabilise its Adriatic neighbour—Albania played an important role in this policy. This analysis examines the Yugoslav stance towards aggressive Italian policy, arguing that Belgrade firmly believed it a matter of utmost importance to prevent the Italians from creating a foothold in the Balkans from which they could stir Albanian irredentism in Kosovo and menace Yugoslavia in its strategically sensitive southern regions in conjunction with Bulgaria. To prevent Italian interference, Yugoslavia championed the independence of Albania with its 1913 frontiers from the Paris Peace Conference onwards: it dropped Serbia’s—Yugoslavia’s pre-war predecessor’s—territorial ambitions centred on the town of Shkodra. Yugoslav policy-makers, however, could not maintain the allegiance of Ahmed-bey Zogu, a major Albanian chieftain, who took power in Tirana with Yugoslav support; but he then turned to Rome, which was more capable of and willing to provide financial means for the maintenance of the Albanian administration than Belgrade. There were also a number of officials who favoured a more forward policy that would put northern Albania under Yugoslavia’s control and thus more efficiently keep Italian aggressive designs in check.     

National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and Appeasement, 1930–1939

British grand strategy in the 1930s had two cardinal elements: security of the home islands and Imperial Defence. This article questions the view that Britain did not have a strategic commitment to the continent of Europe till late in the 1930s. It also provides an over-arching analysis of the two distinct but intertwined periods in the evolution of national strategy and Imperial defence in that decade: before 1930 till late 1937 built around the strategy of the balance of power; and from late-1937 till early 1939 built around the strategy of appeasement. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the high level debate within the British government over strategic issues without putting the domestic political situation into the context of the impact of the First World War on Britain's society and economy. Similarly, the development of the new international order created at the Paris Peace Conference – and its demise in the ‘hinge years’ of the early 1930s – also needs to be better understood in terms of how British grand strategy emerged in this period. A rational and realistic policy, appeasement was a tactical diplomatic manoeuvre; it had no place serving as the strategic basis of British external policy.     

Methods Meet Policy: Transnational Monitoring of the Israel–Palestine Conflict

For the past 2 years, the Kansas Event Data System project has been using event data and other web-based sources to produce quarterly reports on the Israel–Palestine conflict for the swisspeace (Swiss Peace Foundation) FAST Project, which is sponsored by Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and a number of non-governmental organizations. This paper describes the indicators that we are monitoring, the process we have developed to generate the reports, and the supplemental sources we are using. We address the issue of the differences between newspaper and news wire reports with respect to "media fatigue" effects and also analyze some of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to conflict monitoring.     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

Whither Non-Alignment? Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and New Delhi’s Selective Alignment with Great Powers during the Cold War, 1964–1979

First proposed in 1964 by the Sri Lankan prime minister, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace [IOZP] entailed eradication of foreign military bases from the Indian Ocean region as well its denuclearisation. During the Cold War, India was one of the most vehement supporters of IOZP. If some saw India’s interests in the IOZP as another manifestation of Nehruvian idealism, others viewed it as a part of its non-aligned foreign policy. This analysis argues otherwise. India’s record on IOZP reveals a policy of selective alignment with Great Powers and its adaptation to the principles of power politics in international relations. India’s support for the presence of one or the other Great Powers in the Indian Ocean region found premise on balancing those it considered hostile to its national security interests. In public, India supported the call for IOZP as dictated by its non-aligned foreign policy; privately, New Delhi remained highly sceptical and often worked to IZOP’s detriment. Under the cloak of IOZP, India not only pursued diplomatic alignment with Great Powers but also ensured that its own regional ambitions remain unchecked. In this picture, India’s role was not only supportive of the Cold War but to the extent it could use the opportunities provided by superpower rivalry in the region to further its own ends, even determinative of the process.     

The Structure of Negotiation: Lessons from El Salvador for Contemporary Conflict Resolution

During more than a decade of violent conflict (1980–1992) involving the military, rebel forces, and paramilitary "death squads," El Salvador suffered some 75,000 casualties, mostly civilians. After three years of negotiations, the government and the largest rebel group signed a historic comprehensive peace accord that brought an end to the war and instituted wide-reaching political and social reforms. This agreement, and the peace process that produced it, has been widely hailed as a successful example of a negotiated end to civil war. In order to understand the conditions that led to the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords ending the war, this article tests ripeness theory in the context of the Salvadoran peace process.
This article affirms the validity of theories of ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate as structural explanations for the initiation of dialogue and notes the role of "indicators of ripeness" in forcing the parties to recognize a hurting stalemate that may already exist. It also proposes several hypothesized explanations for the effectiveness of the Salvadoran negotiations themselves. These explanations include the presence of strong, empowered policy entrepreneurs on both sides with the political will and capability to make credible commitments; the combination of internal and external pressure for a negotiated solution that raised the cost of defection; and the active involvement, based on consent of both parties, of a neutral, empowered, and credible mediator who provided both technical assistance and vigilance to move the process forward. After analyzing the Salvadoran case through this theoretical lens, the article applies the same concepts to contemporary conflict cases such as Iraq and Colombia, discussing how the lessons learned in El Salvador do and do not provide instructive guidance for managing civil conflicts today.