Sporting Relations: Diplomacy,Small States,and Germany’s Post-war Return to International Sport

ABSTRACT

Germany’s post-war return to international sport was not uniform across all federations. The nature of each sport—summer versus winter, team versus individual—influenced the speed with which each international sport federation dealt with the issue of Germany’s return. Some federations allowed German participation even before they formally re-admitted the country to federation membership. However, sporting relations were not the only issue considered by international federations. The historical political relations between Germany and its smaller European neighbours were as important. The combination of the historical relationship amongst European states—especially memories of the Second World War—and internal sport federation dynamics affected state relations within the broader international system. The actions taken by the international sport federations provided examples—in areas that would not result in another world war or destroy Western alliances—of how Germany could return as a full member of the international community. The debates regarding Germany’s return across a number of international sport federations reveal the complex interaction among memory, politics, and practical matters.     

Conflict art: scholars develop the tactical value of cultural patrimony

Historically, empires recruited scholars to capture artworks as a complement to military victory. Over the past century, cultural scholars have integrated fine art and antiquities into campaigns of conquest and assessed the political ramifications of damage to historic sites and religious monuments in military intervention. Consequently, historians, archaeologists and legal scholars have advanced the role of cultural patrimony in international conflict from a rite of conquest to a means of combat. In World War II, art historians in the Nazi regime planned plunder of artworks and destruction of historic structures as a tactic for conquest. During the Cold War, archaeological discoveries in developing nations enabled looting of cultural artifacts, and subsequent legal studies on the transfer of cultural property developed the value of cultural patrimony in the covert battle for control of the Third World. Since the Cold War, as transnational organized crime and terrorism exploit antiquities trafficking and target cultural sites in acts of political violence, scholars in international relations have considered culture in security theories. Across the three periods of international conflict, cultural scholars have actively developed the tactical value of cultural patrimony and played a role in transforming the perception of plunder in the context of military victory.     

Reluctant Appeaser: Douglas Hailsham and the German Problem 1932–1938

This article considers the ministerial career of Douglas Hogg, first Viscount Hailsham, during the 1930s and, in particular, his attitude towards the appeasement of Germany. Although Hailsham was a leading Conservative in the inter-war period and held key posts during the 1930s, his role in Britain's policy of appeasement has been overlooked. He was consistently wary of the Nazi menace and as Secretary of State for War from 1931–1935 he urged a firm line towards Hitler's Germany. As the decade progressed, however, the inescapable realities of Britain's international predicament drove Hailsham to support the government's appeasement policy, at least until September 1938. Although he forecast the near inevitability of the Second World War, he could not devise a viable alternative to the appeasement of Germany. Hailsham's experience thus offers a significant addition to the historiography of appeasement and to understanding the distinctions between “appeasers” and “anti-appeasers.”     

Tell Me a Story: FDR,Narrative, and the Making of the Second World War

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was, by all accounts, a master orator. Yet success eluded him as he sought to make his fellow citizens aware of the threat Nazi Germany posed and to banish isolationists to the illegitimate margins. At other times, however, Roosevelt's campaigns to shift the underpinnings of national security debate were more effective. Notably, his definition of the adversary as the Nazi regime, rather than the German people, deeply shaped public discourse during the Second World War. This article explains the uneven results of Roosevelt's narrative projects—and those of other presidents—as a product of the intersection of the rhetorical mode he adopted and the rhetorical demands of the environment. During unsettled times, public demand for storytelling is elevated, and presidents who seize that opportunity can shape the narrative landscape and thereby policy. Presidents who fail to align their rhetoric to the moment—such as Roosevelt offering predominantly argument during these critical junctures—allow alternative narratives to proliferate. More broadly, this article offers an account of the structuring of legitimation in the national security arena.     

Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods �C the Swiss-bloc case

Power in the world??s preeminent international financial institutions??the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund??resides in their Executive Boards. How do governments get elected to these international committees? This study quantitatively explores whether wealthy governments provide more foreign aid to poor governments that offer them political support. The focus is on Switzerland, which is elected to the Executive Board of the Bretton Woods Institutions by a group of countries from Central and Western Asia, and Eastern and Southern Europe. Results confirm the hypothesis. Implications for governance in a multipolar world are discussed.     

Paradiplomacy of India’s chief ministers

ABSTRACT

Since the mid-1990s, state governments within India’s federal system have taken a greater interest in foreign relations. They have sought indirect influence by lobbying the central government to take account of their preferences and direct influence by seeking investment and making links with international organizations and other national and subnational governments. This article considers how chief ministers engage in parallel diplomacy noting how they draw on regional cultural resources and make connections with a regionally defined diaspora. The article finds that some chief ministers have embraced the role of “chief diplomat,” while others take a more discreet approach to international activity. Comparing the cases of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu reveals the political logic for expanding, de-emphasizing, or avoiding international engagement.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo-American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post-Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

The Commission for Relief in Belgium and the Political Diplomatic History of the First World War

During the First World War, the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) supplied occupied Belgium with food, provoking discord between military and political leaders on both sides. The CRB's work undermined the Allies' economic blockade of the enemy, attracting military criticism. In Germany, politicians favoured sustaining the food supply to prevent unrest, whilst the Army wanted to exploit Belgium's resources. From 1916 onwards, the CRB became a bone of contention in Germany in the dispute between military and political leaders about unrestricted submarine warfare. It also loomed large in the political and military debate about the attitude to neutral countries: the Allies wanted them to brave the German threat and cooperate with the blockade policy—otherwise, food imports from Allied countries would be forbidden. Tonnage and food for the CRB were incorporated into the negotiations with neutral countries about their imports and the use of home-grown produce. The debates about the CRB thus exemplify the relationship between military events and the war's economic and social significance. This study of the CRB shows that political/diplomatic historiography can bridge the gap between the military and socioeconomic history of the First World War.     

Technical discourse in defense of public virtue: Ronald Reagan's explanation of the Iran/contra affair

Contemporary political communication is marked by an evolving dialectical tension between public and technical forms of discourse. Using Ronald Reagan's explanation of the Iran/Contra arms‐for‐hostages initiative as a case study, this article explores the rhetorical uses of technical rationality and the dangers these appeals pose for public deliberation. A close reading of Reagan's March 4, 1987, Iran/Contra defense speech demonstrates that Reagan employed the Tower Commission Report's technical judgments to separate the ethical realm of the public from the nonethical realm of the technical. As a result, he was able to define the Iran/Contra affair as an instrumental problem of bureaucratic organization rather than a betrayal of the public trust. This strategy of demarcating the moral realms of agent from agency is conceptualized as both a moral dodge and an instance of what Kenneth Burke calls ironic discourse. The article concludes by contrasting Reagan's strategy with other recent political crises in which public servants did not separate their public virtue from their administrative responsibility.     

The First World War as Catalyst and Epiphany: The Case of Henry P. Davison

The experience of the First World War was central to the emergence of a trans-Atlantic elite committed to close collaboration and an international alliance, either formal or de facto, between Great Britain and the United States. The reactions to the conflict of Henry P. Davison, dominant partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, illustrate the manner in which the First World War was catalytic in the creation of an Atlanticist elite. Davison, moreover, experienced something like a personal epiphany during the war, metamorphosing from a hard-driving businessman into an international philanthropist who developed ambitious schemes to remake the world. For seven years, Davison energetically sought to affect the course, outcome, and consequences of the First World War. Fundamental to Davison's worldview were the desirability and necessity of Anglo–American collaboration, on which all his other plans were predicated. When the war ended, Davison proposed almost visionary schemes, on the one hand to provide massive American governmental and private economic assistance to finance European postwar relief and reconstruction efforts and, on the other, to establish an international Red Cross organization that would mount a massive campaign to eradicate global public health problems. Although abortive in the short term, in the longer run his plans proved prophetic, anticipating the post–Second World War Marshall Plan and World Health Organization.     

Early American Views Regarding European Unification

This article examines the origins of US foreign economic policy in the post-1945 period and the major challenges posed to US policy by European economic integration and the establishment of a multilateral trade regime. US post-war economic planning began in the early stages of World War II. The US promoted bilateral trade agreements based on reciprocity and most-favoured-nation principles. During the war, US policy makers debated the merits of various plans to provide economic and financial assistance to Europe based on the assumption that Nazi Germany would be defeated. The plans for economic reconstruction of Europe were made under the premise that US economy would benefit from the creation of export markets in Europe. However, US policy makers were also concerned that the creation of a unified European market could potentially constitute a challenge to US economic hegemony and perhaps a political threat should Europe fall under another tyrannical regime. US policy therefore pursued twin tracks: it promoted economic reconstruction and integration in Europe; at the same time, it facilitated the establishment of an international trading regime that would promote principles of liberalised trade, support US economic growth and contribute to the development of a free enterprise capitalist trading system. This article illustrates that US economic planners in the 1940s were aware of the benefits and risks of European economic integration, seeking to balance European economic reconstruction with the establishment of a robust multilateral trading system.     

A Rising Power & the Coming of a Great War

This article examines the strategic decisions that led to the struggle between Britain and Germany, exploring how a great war involving Europe's leading powers could come to pass. In 1914, there were no forces beyond the control of decision makers pushing them into the grisly war of attrition that destroyed the social and political fabric of nineteenth-century Europe and ushered in the horrors of the twentieth century. Rather, those horrors resulted from poor policy and strategic choices made by the leaders of the great powers. The war's outbreak underscores history's contingent nature, dramatically showing how errors in judgment on the part of political and military leaders can ruin great countries. One stark lesson of the Great War is that no leader sought as an outcome the conflagration produced by their decisions. Today, China's weapons programs and foreign policy assertiveness conjures up fears that Beijing seeks to establish a new international order, much as Germany's rulers tried to do a hundred years ago with such catastrophic consequences. Shaping the internal debate among China's rulers, so that they judge self-restraint in armaments and strategy as being in their best interest, will test the strategic acumen of American leaders in the years ahead.     

The Security Imperative in Counterterror Operations: The Israeli Fight Against Suicidal Terror

ABSTRACT

Israel has had a long tradition of fighting international and Palestinian terror. This article looks at how Israel counterterrorism strategy and tactics have developed since the establishment of the State in 1948. By initially providing a working definition of terrorism, the article then goes to show how Israel has sought to defend itself from different Palestinian terror tactics. This article shows how Israeli security forces have struggled safeguarding, and sometimes disregarded Palestinian human rights. This article concludes by arguing that given the responsibility of democratic governments of defending their citizens from imminent terror attacks, such governments often find themselves paradoxically violating human rights. Despite attempts to reduce such human rights abuses, governments will never do so at the expense of their own security.     

A typology of international political communication: Factual statements,propaganda, and noise

Abstract

Communication and information are important instruments of foreign policy‐making in the latter portion of the twentieth century, particularly among the superpowers. This paper seeks to present researchers and policy‐makers with a workable definition of international political communication. It also provides a typology of three categories of international political communication: factual statements, propaganda, and noise.     

The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

Multinational corporations and regional integration: Some preliminary reflections

In 1970, the worldwide affiliates of mutlinational corporations (MNCs), headquartered in Europe and the USA, numbered 27,300. Inevitably, they have had a significant effect on regional integration—economic, social, and political. Economically, production and marketing patterns of MNCs have tended to aid regional integration in developed regions. However, they have had a limited impact in the Third World.

The presence of MNCs in pluralistic societies will probably further social integration by first fostering a regionally oriented elite; this orientation may then spread to the populace at large. In the Third World, however, MNCs may actually widen the elite‐masses gap.

Social integration also has political overtones, as the socialization process will inevitably enhance attitudinal integration. The more MNC facilities in a region, the more will decision‐making powers and activities tend to be transferred from national units to regional institutions (institutional integration), and the more governments within the region will be urged to make joint policies (policy integration). However, nationalistic feelings and fears of dependence will probably impede regional political integration in the Third World.     

“阿拉伯之春”背景下的库尔德问题新动向

2011年初爆发的中东“阿拉伯之春”不仅对该地区稳定、地缘政治和国际关系带来深远影响,也使该地区的库尔德问题临当重要转机,库尔德人正迎来新的历史机遇,不过从目前情况看,一个统一的库尔德斯坦国在可预见的将来仍然不太可能出现。     

British power and stability: The historical record

What explains the persistence and proliferation of the resident ambassador? Why is the role apparently important both to the conduct of international affairs and to the work of governments? I do not try to propose a new theory of ambassadors, but I do offer conclusions about the nature of living in a globalized society of states where the economic logic of markets and the political logic of communities are at cross‐purposes. It is a world in which we depend on institutions to help us maintain order and stability. Ambassadors are one of those institutions. At one level they are the concrete day by day reproduction of the society of states. At another level they act on behalf of the members of their community, helping that community to maintain its strength and cohesion by doing what needs to be done, abroad. An increase in the intensity of interactions among states, therefore, seems to lead to an increase in diplomatic representation facilitated rather than impeded by the new technologies of transportation and communications. Ambassadors are still lying abroad, it seems, because changes in technology have brought ‘abroad’ much closer to home while the myriad effects of globalization have made much more of abroad relevant to people and their governments. Far from being in decline, the resident ambassador seems likely to continue flourishing.     

Making Room at the Negotiating Table: The Growth of Diplomacy between Nation-State Governments and Non-State Economic Entities

The study of diplomacy has traditionally focused on relationships and interactions between the governments of nation-states, empires, principalities, and similar politicies. This state-centric view has been challenged in recent times by scholars who have sought to take into account the proliferation of different types of actors in the international arena. This paper address diplomacy between governments and non-state economic entities, a broad category of bodies extending from multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and GATT/World Trade Organization to consultative and knowledge-generating bodies such as the World Economic Forum and International Chamber of Commerce.     

A ‘visionary hope’ frustrated: J.M. Keynes and the origins of the postwar international monetary order

During the 1930s and 1940s Keynes developed the vision of a world in which every country would be able to pursue its own New Deal. He believed in the Second World War that Anglo‐American partnership would provide the foundations of this benevolent new order. But his enterprise was frustrated by Washington's insistence on economic orthodoxy. It was an outcome which left Keynes pessimistic about the prospects for international economic cooperation. However the prejudices of Keynes's first biographer, Roy Harrod, in combination with the political exigencies of the early cold war period, obscured the extent of his disillusionment.