Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy

This article explains the establishment of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (esdp) in 1998–99 and its institutional design. I argue that both the soft balancing explanation and the “second wave” of approaches fall short. In contrast, the article shows that liberal-institutionalist thought and transaction costs economics offer a heuristically promising perspective. Most crucially, the pivotal concept of asset specificity provides explanatory leverage. The combination of risks of opportunism and the non-specificity of esdp's ultimate assets explains why and how the major European powers designed the eu's security and defense pillar in 1998–99. Empirically, I trace how the United Kingdom and France were gradually confronted with not fully credible commitments within nato for crisis management in Europe. Based primarily on the signals sent by us domestic politics, they were increasingly concerned about isolationism and questioned the American commitment to European security. Therefore, they were searching for another institutional option for providing security on a long-term basis. Although this assessment of ex post transaction costs triggered the initial establishment of esdp, ex ante transaction costs were responsible for its more specific design. Given the indirect American threat of disengagement when faced with Europe's aspirations for autonomy, esdp had to be designed in a compatible way with nato. Non-specific, and thus redeployable, military assets represented the institutional solution to the conflict between European autonomy and NATO's primacy. In other words, asset specificity as the key analytical concept of transaction costs economics is what differentiates this argument from previous accounts and provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding both the establishment and design of esdp in 1998–99.     

Soft Power,Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction

This article highlights and analyses a hitherto largely neglected dimension to the growing agency of large developing countries in global affairs: their hosting of international sports mega-events. Why are large developing countries hosting sports mega-events and what does this contemporary phenomenon tell us about the significance of, for example, the Olympics and the World Cup in global affairs? We explore these questions through brief examination of the cases of the three most active sports mega-event hosting states in recent times: Brazil, China and South Africa. The 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, and the upcoming 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil provide interesting examples with which to explore developing country agency in the international system and in particular the discursive basis of that agency. We see the hosting of sports mega-events as the practice of public diplomacy by states to both demonstrate existing soft power capability as well as pursue its further enhancement.     

Causes of the US Hostage Crisis in Iran: The Untold Account of the Communist Threat

This article provides a revisionist account of the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979, one of the most conspicuous manifestations of anti-Americanism in recent history. Drawing solely upon primary documents, largely from various Iranian communists and Islamists, it questions the conventional wisdom that the Islamists' takeover of the embassy was a grassroots reaction to American policies, particularly after President Carter admitted the ailing Shah. It also challenges the argument that the radical students stormed the embassy primarily to bring down the nationalist provisional government. Instead, I introduce a critical overlooked factor and argue that the Hostage Crisis can be better explained as a preemptive act by the Islamists to outbid the leftists' anti-American activities. I demonstrate that the United States and the Islamists were seeking to maintain normal relations during and even after the 1979 revolution. However, various communist organizations that surfaced after the revolution posed an existential threat to the new Islamist-nationalist government, quickly dominating universities, labor unions, and intellectual circles throughout the country and accusing the Islamists and their nationalist allies of collaborating with the United States. In this climate, the Islamists strategically adopted the Left's anti-imperialist language and eventually occupied the US embassy to establish their anti-American credibility.     

Interpretations of political violence in ethnically divided societies

This article challenges traditional interpretations of political violence in Northern Ireland. Based on a series of ethnographic studies undertaken in republican and loyalist communities in Belfast, Northern Ireland, I argue that it is the question of state legitimacy, not materialism, culture or religion, that is core to understanding the underpinnings and history of political violence in Northern Ireland. Research findings suggest that communal support for and tolerance of paramilitary groups and their tactics are underpinned by security‐related concerns and a crisis of legitimacy which renders the state unable to claim a monopoly on the use of force. In contradistinction to counter‐insurgency theorists, I argue that the basis for paramilitarism is not created by fear of reprisal or intimidation. Rather, intra‐communal fears of identity loss and threats (both perceived and real) from the outgroup have created a space for republicanism and loyalism in both its political and paramilitary forms.     

A Bear in the Woods? Threat Framing and the Marketplace of Values

To many scholars, the Bush administration's ability to convince a majority of the public to favor war with Iraq represents a dangerous failure of the marketplace of ideas. A healthy marketplace, they argue, would have produced a more robust debate over the administration's justifications for war, revealing their weakness. In this paper I argue that these scholars have based their arguments on a poorly specified model of the marketplace of ideas and that Iraq does not represent a failure of the marketplace. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the strength of the marketplace lies not in its ability to move the nation toward truth via debate and deliberation, but in its tendency to divide the public into countervailing factions based on competing sets of values and competing frames of the issues at hand. I develop this argument first by elaborating a model of the “marketplace of values” and redefining threat inflation as a process of efforts to frame security issues for the public. I test my model first against public opinion data regarding American threat perceptions and then use it to explain the Bush administration's successes and failures in building and maintaining public support for the war in Iraq.     

Criminalising Academia: The Protection of State Information Bill and Academic Freedom

This article assesses the implications of the controversial Protection of State Information Bill for academic freedom in South Africa, specifically for communications, media and journalism studies. The Bill requires the security cluster to classify sensitive documents on national security grounds. Academic teaching and research can help citizens to understand whether the security cluster is acting in the universal interest, rather than the interest of a political elite; it can also be used to assess media performance in reporting on national security matters. Using a critical approach to the concept of national security, I argue that the Bill favours secrecy over openness, and South Africa’s embrace of the human security definition of national security has contributed to the problem. This overemphasis on secrecy is likely to reduce the few spaces that exist in academia for critical, emancipatory work on security issues, which could hobble the sector’s attempts to understand the deeper processes at work in the security cluster. If such enquiry is marginalised, then the higher education system risks becoming an instrument for continuity rather than change in South Africa’s existing, highly unequal power relations: relations that are being maintained increasingly by force.     

Unfinished business: the Catholic Church,communism, and democratization

Although history has shown us that the church plays a role in the political liberalization of non-democratic countries, the nature of the church's role and how it participates in politics has yet to be fully revealed. By revisiting the Polish Church's historic role in the collapse of communism, I argue that we have overestimated the church's effect on political liberalization in that case, which has led us to neglect or be prematurely disappointed in its role in the remaining communist countries such as in Cuba. Drawing from the Polish case, I conclude that the church's moral, self-limiting, and transnational character needs to be recognized and incorporated into a general theory of democratization. It is this aspect of the church that has helped it to remain active within remaining communist societies, and provide the moral support that is an integral part of political liberalization processes.     

Simulating terrorism and insurgency: video games in the war of ideas

This article analyses several video games created by Hezbollah and Afkar Media which simulate recent conflicts in Israel and Lebanon. These games are representative of an important new means of waging ideological warfare which is increasingly a part of the media strategies that states, violent non-state actors and media corporations employ in their efforts to persuade audiences. I argue that video games allow their developers to address players as though they were participants in ongoing conflicts, rather than passive observers, and that this style of presentation is extremely useful to efforts to create an attractive image of people who are frequently described as ‘terrorists’. Video games also enable their developers to carefully construct media narratives that appear to be realistic depictions of contemporary conflicts even when those narratives show signs of bias. Through these mechanisms, video games provide violent non-state actors and organizations sympathetic to them with a means of presenting their grievances and displaying their fighting prowess in ways that advance the organizations' strategic goals.     

Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence

How does the way in which a group organizes change the lethality of the group's attacks? In this article, we argue that groups organized vertically as hierarchies are likely to conduct more lethal attacks. We build our argument around three advantages inherent to centralized structures: functional differentiation, clear command and control structures, and accountability. We argue that each of these characteristics positively impacts an organization's ability to deliver an effective lethal blow. To test our argument, we use a mixed method approach, drawing on empirical evidence and support from a time-series case study. Our large-N analysis examines the trends in more than 19,000 attacks. In this test we develop a novel proxy measure for hierarchy based on a group's bases of operation and non-violent activities. To complement the empirical work, we examine the history of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist group. Over several decades of violent operations, this group's structure has changed dramatically. We analyze how these shifts impacted ETA's ability to maximize the effectiveness and damage of their attacks. In both the case study and large-N analysis, the more hierarchically organized the group, the more easily the group can orchestrate lethal attacks.     

The Four Pillars of Russia’s Power Narrative

The Winter Olympic Games in Sochi and the annexation of Crimea were two major international events in which Russia engaged in early 2014. In spite of all the divergence in the logic underpinning each of them, four concepts strongly resonate in both cases. First, in hosting the Olympics and in appropriating Crimea, Russia was motivated by solidifying its sovereignty as the key concept in its foreign and domestic policies. Second, the scenarios for both Sochi and Crimea were grounded in the idea of strengthening Russia as a political community through mechanisms of domestic consolidation (Sochi) and opposition to unfriendly external forces (the crisis in Ukraine). Third, Sochi and Crimea unveiled two different facets of the logic of normalisation aimed at proving – albeit by different means – Russia’s great power status. Fourth, one of the major drivers of Russian policy in both cases were security concerns in Russia’s southern flanks, though domestic security was also an important part of the agenda.     

Creating stability in the New Europe: The OSCE high commissioner on national minorities and the socialization of risky states

In “Protecting ‘The Prize': Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press present an important counterargument to many common but overwrought worries about energy security. Yet they themselves go too far in the opposite direction. Gholz and Press argue that only three types of potential oil market disruptions could induce “particularly painful” adjustments and hence rise to the highest level: consolidation of a large fraction of Persian Gulf reserves under a single power, domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, and blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. I argue in this response that Gholz and Press confine the second and third scenarios too narrowly, and hence understate the security risks stemming from U.S. dependence on oil.     

Understanding the Problem of Northeast India

The first wave of feminism in India was closely connected to electoral politics, while the second wave turned away from party politics. This resulted in a growing marginalization of feminist concerns from the public agenda. There is a strong relationship between movement success and electoral engagement. This article reviews the history of feminist interventions in electoral politics and demonstrates that early victories for women depended on their participation in party politics. I argue that the creation of the autonomous women's movement has had a diminishing effect on women's progress in recent years. A number of paths remain available to the women's movement to engage with political parties and political leaders. Staying outside the electoral arena has not served Indian feminism well.     

International conflict,military rule,and violent authoritarian breakdown

ABSTRACT

Why do some transitions of power from military rule occur violently while others do not? What effect, if any, does the international security environment have on how violent breakdowns of authoritarian rule are? I argue a conflict-prone security environment ameliorates the commitment problem by ensuring an influential role for the military out of power. Therefore, when facing a domestic crisis in a threatening security environment, military leaders are more likely to peacefully cede power rather than wield violent measures to stay in office. Perhaps counter-intuitively, international conflicts thus lead to transitions of power from military rule that minimize violence and human costs. International conflicts do not have this moderating effect on other types of authoritarian rule.     

International Migration as Criminal Behaviour: Shifting Responsibility to the Migrant in Mexico–US Border Crossings

* I would like to thank Brent J. Steele for his valuable insight on the theory of governmentality as it pertains to this article. I would also like to thank Rob Topinka and Franziska Jung for their feedback on earlier versions of the article, and participants on the panel “Political Economy of Migration in Latin America” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention 2011 in Montreal for helpful insight on this work as a burgeoning research project. View all notesThe increasing criminalisation of immigration procedures has the effect of shifting responsibility from the state to the individual migrant for alleged “criminal” behaviour. This shift represents a form of disciplinary power as it is enacted over “deviant” populations who are unable to self-govern according to the tenets required in a system of global governmentality. In this article, I use Foucault's governmentality to examine the “responsibilisation” of undocumented migrants who are perceived as making a rational choice to cross the border. I argue that the criminalisation of immigration shifts the emphasis to individuals as rational actors who have rejected paths to legal immigration, choosing “illegal” immigration, which carries the connotation of criminal behaviour. This constructs a population of always already criminal subjects who are understood to disregard the rule of law. In this research I carry out a critical discourse analysis that looks at the performative conceptualisation of “illegal immigrants” and the production and reproduction of the understanding of migrants as criminals. I look at the example of Mexico–US border crossings from the perspective of a system of global governmentality and I posit that international undocumented migration is criminalised and migrants are “responsibilised”, which effectively controls the movement of peoples, contributing to a geopolitical discourse that represents population management at the global level.     

The realism debate and the politics of modern art in early postwar Japan

This article examines the realism debate (riarizumu ronsō) that took place between 1946 and 1950 as a forum in which ideas on artistic form, the role of the artist in society, and the social relevance of art come into focus in a way that allows us to see how questions such as Japan's modernity, the recent experience of fascism, and the challenges of rebuilding culture during the early cold war were taken up by leading cultural figures in the field of the visual arts. Occurring alongside discussions of how the art world could be reformed to avoid the failures of fascism, the debate served as an occasion to re-examine the history of modern art in Europe and Japan and to consider the question of artistic representation in a way that opened the most fundamental question of art's relationship to the world and promised to begin the process of envisioning it anew. The debate involved three camps which I label social realism (represented by Hayashi Fumio and Nagai Kiyoshi), modernist realism (Hijikata Tei’ichi), and avant-garde realism (Uemura Takachiyo, Okamoto Tarō, and Hanada Kiyoteru). While assessing their points of agreement and disagreement, I argue that the debate set the stage for debates in the 1950s and beyond.     

Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

Neorealism,Security Cooperation,and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma

Most neorealists argue that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive for European security cooperation. Although this claim is broadly accepted, I argue that the relationship between relative decline and European security cooperation is complicated by a number of factors. First, European calculations about relative decline bear both a global and a regional (that is, intra-European) component. If a European country is to effectively mitigate relative decline, cooperation is not sufficient. It is just as important that cooperation develops in a way that underscores that country's comparative strengths and minimizes its weaknesses. In this regard, European countries are often in direct competition with each other. Secondly, when Europeans are thinking about their relative power position, some countries matter more than others: a given European country may accept to incur a relative loss vis-à-vis another country (European or otherwise) but not others. These calculations are further complicated by issue linkage. Some countries may accept relative losses on some issues (for example, security) in exchange for gains on others (economic). This article examines how intra-European considerations of relative gains affect the way in which Europe's main powers seek to cope with relative decline and assesses how those considerations affect security cooperation in a European Union (EU) framework. In doing so, it aims to unpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline and European security cooperation.     

“No More War?” Belgian Reception of the League of Nations and Arbitration After the First World War

After the horrors of the First World War, different initiatives were taken to introduce and institutionalise principles of international organisation such as collective security and arbitration in international relations. The League of Nations was founded, and different bilateral and multilateral arbitration treaties were concluded. This article studies the reception of these internationalist principles by Belgian policymakers and diplomats. I will argue that this reception initially ranged from cautiousness to clear scepticism. Although an evolution towards increased trust in collective security and arbitration can be observed between 1919 and 1929, Belgian policymakers' and diplomats' views during this period remained predominantly based on realist premises and beliefs.     

Human Security: The Making of a UN Ideology

Inspired by the conclusions of the United Nations Intellectual History Project, this article seeks to enrich the ongoing discussion on the role of ideas in UN activities. The focus here is on security, an issue often regarded as the organisation's raison d'être. The article argues that over the past two decades the ideology of human security has been the driving normative force behind the global policies advocated by the UN in the area of security. The first part analyses the UN's official discourse, and demonstrates the political importance that it ascribes to the concept of human security. The second section examines a set of global policies that illustrate how the world body has sought to put the principles of human security into practice. While recognising that these policies fall short of the ambitions articulated in UN rhetoric, the article suggests that they have opened a small but very real breach in the epistemic framework underlying the traditional conception of security.