论根本违约

根本违约是指当事人一方完全不履行合同主要义务或预期违约致使履行不能,其结果严重影响到另一方根据合同有权期待的经济利益的情形。设立根本违约制度的目的在于鼓励交易,最大限度地实现合同的社会价值。根本违约在联合国国际货物销售合同公约、国际商事合同通则、欧洲合同法原则等中均有所体现。我国涉外经济合同法吸收规定了这一制度。在新《合同法》中也采纳了这一制度,一方面作为一种法定的合同解除权的发生事由,另一方面实际上又对解除权的行使予以了非常有必要的限制,对于促进交易、限制解除权的滥用必将发挥重要作用。     

赠与合同三题

首先 ,《合同法》的颁布并未平息赠与合同究为诺成合同还是实践合同的争论。笔者认为 ,《合同法》第 186条第 1款所指的赠与仅有诺成合同之名 ,却有实践合同之实。与其如此 ,不如直接将其规定为实践合同。这样较符中国的国情 ,而有利于重合同守信用的观念和法律意识的培养和提高 ;该条第 2款所指的赠与显然具有诺成合同之特征。其次 ,该法第 189条关于赠与人损害赔偿之规定的适用范围有待明确。最后 ,受赠人是否应有行为能力之限制 ,则应区别对待。     

劳动者预告解除劳动合同探讨

劳动者预告解除劳动合同制度作为劳动合同解除制度的重要内容,其行使直接导致劳动合同双方当事人权利义务关系的重大变更,但基于竞业禁止等后合同义务的规定,劳动者预告解除劳动合同并不能使双方权利义务归于消灭,其体现更多的是合同的实质正义.     

The inadequate legislative response to e-signatures

This article examines the two most influential international initiatives on electronic signatures (UNCITRAL’s 1996 Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the 1999 EU Electronic Signature Directive). It considers whether the legislative approaches in Australia and the United Kingdom based on these initiatives are helpful in deciding whether lower level signature methods such as simple email messages are likely to satisfy a legal requirement for a signature. The conclusion reached is that they are unhelpful. The article goes on to consider whether legislative amendments based on UNCITRAL’s 2001 Model Law on Electronic Signatures or the 2005 UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts would improve the identified weaknesses. It concludes that such an update would clarify some issues, but that overall it will not solve the difficulties. The article ends with a brief speculation on the likely attributes of a more helpful approach.     

Banking in the cloud: Part 2 – regulation of cloud as ‘outsourcing’

This paper looks at EU banks' use of public cloud computing services. It is based primarily on anonymised interviews with banks, cloud providers, advisers, and financial services regulators. The findings are presented in three parts. Part 1 explored the extent to which banks operating in the EU, including global banks, use public cloud computing services.Part 2 of this paper covers the main legal and regulatory issues that may affect banks' use of cloud services. It sets out how EU banking regulators have approached banks' use of cloud services and considers regulators' lack of cloud computing knowledge. The paper further considers how the regulation of outsourcing applies to banks' use of cloud services, including whether cloud computing constitutes “outsourcing”. It analyses the contentious issue of contractual audit rights for regulators as well as legal and practical issues around risk assessments, security, business continuity, concentration risk, bank resolution, and banking secrecy laws.Part 3 looks at the key contractual issues that arise between banks and cloud service providers, including data protection requirements, termination, service changes, and liability.All three parts of the paper can be accessed via Computer Law and Security Review's page on ScienceDirect at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02673649?sdc=2. The full list of sources is available via the same link and will be printed alongside the third part of the article.     

房屋征收补偿协议的行政诉讼问题①--以《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》第25条为视点

房屋征收补偿协议是一种行政合同,按其属性应纳入行政诉讼。但问题在于,现行行政诉讼制度不能容纳这一诉讼类型：原告资格、协议效力、诉讼竞合、证据规则、判决种类等方面都提出了新的要求。这些问题认识不清,已造成实务的混乱和理论的争议。那么,目前实务上需要哪些调整,未来行政诉讼法又需要哪些方面突破,这些都要在行政诉讼新类型制度上来解释,并且在契约行政与合作治理的理论背景下来考察。     

Local Public-Services Provision under Public–Private Partnerships: Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers’ preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers’ preferences over the service provision will change over time.     

The Laffer effects of a program of deregulation cum detaxation: the Italian reform of labour contracts in the period 1997–2001

We examine the Laffer effects of the policy of social security tax reduction cum partial deregulation of labour market undertaken in Italy in the period 1997–2001. Laffer effects of tax cut are generally delayed and governments responsible of the reform cannot benefit from the resulting increased revenues when in office. Our empirical findings show that tax cuts combined with policies of liberalization determine almost immediate Laffer effects. In terms of coherent supply-side political programs, the effects of the two measures are not separable. Reflection on our results may broaden the scope of the supply-side policies of deregulation and detaxation.

合同解释中的司法能动与克制

法官对合同的解释无法脱离其能动性,而主观性的解释须以客观性为目的。当法官在合同解释出现障碍时应恪守两个标准：理性第三人标准和社会公共利益标准。同时,必须对法官的能动性予以下列限制：法官在适用理性第三人标准时,应尽量避免以所谓的＂理性第三人＂之名而作出偏离缔约人真意的解释;法官在合同解释中的自由裁量权要受合同解释规则、合同文本内容、法官职业共同体之规则、公平、正义、诚信等基本原则的限制。