Why madrassah education reforms don’t work in Pakistan

Despite global pressure and national security concerns, the efforts of the Government of Pakistan to reform the madrassah system have proven to be futile. Extant literature on madrassah reform challenges relies overwhelmingly on information provided by governments and experts situated outside of these institutions. While these studies and reports present important findings and viable analysis on madrassah systems; most of the research fails to give voice to the major stakeholders of this system itself, such as the administration staff, teachers, students and parents. Our study fills this crucial gap by conducting semi-structured interviews and field observations inside Pakistani madaris (plural for madrassah) and their professional associations. We find that these madaris have been reluctant to participate in policy interventions offered by the government due to a major trust deficit brought on by differences over financial and curriculum regulation, degree recognition and the government’s role in shaping popular perceptions about madaris. This reluctance has turned down attempts for madrassah reformation and has in turn made them vulnerable to radicalisation. We conclude with policy recommendations for more effective government reforms and a stronger relationship between madrassah representatives and the Government of Pakistan.     

Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf

This article explores the struggle for judicial power in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf focusing on two questions. First, how did pro-Musharraf regime judges expand judicial power, leading to a confrontation with the regime? Second, how did the bar and the bench mobilize in the struggle for judicial power? The author shows how, instead of blindly supporting economic liberalization in a period of economic growth, the Supreme Court expanded power by scrutinizing questionable urban development, privatization, and deregulation measures in a virtuous cycle of public interest litigation. The author also describes how a politics of reciprocity explains the social mobilization of lawyers as the bench protected the bar from regime penetration, and the bar protected the bench from regime backlash. The Pakistani case questions some of our assumptions about economic liberalization and courts in authoritarian regimes, and the study invites scholars to explore the role of courts in developing judicial support structures and the role of lawyers in social movements.