网络安全的战略选择

随着网络空间的迅速扩张及其对社会各领域的全面渗透,网络空间不断增长的财富、战略价值以及世界经济社会运行对网络空间的深度依赖,使网络空间整体安全问题的重要性日益凸显,网络安全已成为国际社会面临的又一全球性公共问题。网络安全问题虽然属于国家安全范畴内的非传统安全领域,但国家对于安全的偏好没有改变,对安全追求的逻辑路径依旧。从理论的角度看,由于体系压力以及国家对于安全的追求,国家会选择制衡的战略,但在现实中,制衡经常缺位或迟到。受到非传统安全环境影响,地缘战略中分而治之、领土补偿、加强军备、联盟以及平衡手的存在等制衡方式和作用、意义同时发生了变化。细分到网络安全领域,沟通机制的不同、威慑效果不同、行为体的多样、行为判断的困难等特殊性,导致在网络安全领域,国家选择追随或合作将成为更优选择。     

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the context of South Caucasus regional security issues: An Armenian perspective†

For more than a quarter-century, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the most important factors influencing the political map of the South Caucasus. On 12 May 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan signed a cease-fire agreement that ended military operations in the conflict zone and has been observed until recently. Negotiations for a peaceful settlement have been underway within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and France since 1992, but society and the elite in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan remain largely unprepared for compromise. Considering the settlement process a zero-sum game, they have generally accused one another of escalating the conflict and of a lack of willingness to restore peace. Other countries and international organizations involved in the negotiations do not share a vision of the future and frequently pursue their own interests. Accordingly, the Karabakh conflict could remain unresolved for decades more. The aim of the paper is a general assessment of the current stage and dynamic of this conflict and the impact of new trends and old obstacles on the prospects for further settlement.     

Preparing NATO for the Future – Operating in an Increasingly Contested Environment

The global proliferation of precision-strike systems may be challenging the foundations of Western military-technological supremacy. Relatedly, the development of so-called Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities across the globe threatens to complicate Western freedom of military movement and access, and could give way to a more contested military-strategic environment. The twin challenges of precision-strike proliferation and A2/AD strongly impact NATO’s agenda, which revolves around strengthening deterrence and defence in Eastern Europe, and addressing the different threats emanating from the so-called Southern European neighbourhood. In order to address or mitigate such challenges, the Alliance needs to produce operational concepts and capabilities able to deliver deterrence and expeditionary warfare in a maturing precision-strike environment, one characterised by the emergence of A2/AD capabilities.     

The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

It has sometimes been argued that one way to reduce the costs of law enforcement would be to reduce the probability of detection and conviction (hence saving those costs), while at the same time increasing the size of the punishment. Following this strategy would keep the expected costs (to a risk neutral criminal) of committing a crime constant and hence keep the deterrence level constant; it would have the benefit, though, of reducing costs to the rest of society.There are some well-known objections to such a policy. One such objection deals with marginal deterrence: A convicted murderer serving a life sentence with no chance of parole in a jurisdiction which bans capital punishment has nothing to lose from killing a prison guard—there is no marginal deterrence to the commission of a more serious crime or any additional crime for that matter. In fact, so long as there remains any upper limit to the amount of punishment that can be inflicted upon a convicted criminal, the only ways to create some type of marginal deterrence are to reduce the punishments for less serious crimes, which will either reduce the deterrence of those less serious crimes, or alternatively to require the use of more of society's scarce resources to increase the probabilities of apprehension and conviction.It is possible to reduce this marginal deterrence problem, however, by practicing cruel and unusual punishment on perpetrators of serious crimes, i.e. by raising the limits of allowable punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is followed unofficially with child molesters and killers of prison guards and hence provides some additional deterrence against these crimes.Despite the theoretical validity of this argument, our society has chosen to impose a constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, over time we seem to have lowered the threshold of what is considered cruel and unusual. Following Dr. Pangloss, the concluding section of the paper examines why rational maximizers would choose to give up this additional potential deterrence. The explanations depend upon an assumed positive income elasticity of demand for humanitarianism or for insurance against the costs of punishing the innocent. While there are some reasons to accept the humanitarianism argument, the insurance argument seems more persuasive.     

我国民法中惩罚性赔偿制度新探

惩罚性赔偿的思想不仅仅只存在于普通法系之中,它是一种世界性意义的赔偿规则(罚则)。一般民事责任与惩罚性赔偿责任的社会功能相差甚远,且适用范围不一。我国历来民事立法中就有惩罚性赔偿的法律文化传统,当前在我国民事立法中的几个惩罚性赔偿条文不仅不能为当前市场诚信程度不高的信用环境起到充分的弥补作用,而且它们本身设计上也不尽合理。我们应当秉持开放的眼光,对惩罚性赔偿制度进行结构上的重构,这也是我国法学理论和司法实践亟待解决的问题。     

The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict

Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight terrorist groups? This essay proposes an explanation to address this question using current theoretical and empirical research on terrorism and interstate violence. Recent work indicates that while terrorists appear weak compared to states, terrorists can wield significant coercive power in smaller geographic areas. I argue that if these areas are strategically crucial to the government, such as areas with oil wells or mineral deposits, terrorist activity may precipitously weaken states relative to their rivals. I therefore argue that even if groups are only capable of killing at low levels, terrorism may lead to macrolevel power shifts, which may contribute to interstate violence.     

Judicial enforcement deputies: Causes and effects of Chinese judges enforcing environmental administrative decisions

This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment.     

美国对华拒止性威慑战略论析

拒止性威慑的思想源远流长,作为一种军事战略的拒止性威慑具有广泛性、实时性和受挑战性三个主要特点。拒止性威慑的思路相比惩罚性威慑更具操作性,在信息化战争时代也更具优势。美国战略学界认为,在西太平洋地区中美实力日渐接近的情况下,对华拒止性威慑战略是较优选项。美国对华拒止性威慑战略兴于特朗普政府时期,其主要特点是加强军事系统弹性能力建设与发展新战区导弹防御体系。拜登政府则在“一体化威慑”框架下应用对华拒止性威慑,发展深度防御能力。美国对拒止性威慑战略的理解与应用已经突破了传统意义上偏重防御的拒止性威慑模式。该战略的目标是联合盟友阻止中国在西太平洋地区的快速军事行动,维持和巩固在该地区的军事主导权。虽然美国对华拒止性威慑战略的实践受到了诸多内外因素制约,但其给中美带来的负面影响仍在不断加深,并对地区安全构成巨大挑战。中国需要主动培塑有利于军力发展的良好环境,发展新技术装备,应对美国对华拒止性威慑战略实践造成的军事胁迫,降低各类战略风险。     

进攻性联盟、模糊性威慑与AUKUS的战略性扩张

2021年9月15日,美国、英国和澳大利亚建立三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS)。美英澳三国基于追求权力最大化、改变既有国际秩序的扩张性动机,构建进攻性联盟。美国企图巩固印太地区霸权;英国试图提升印太地区影响力,推动“全球英国”构想;澳大利亚希图扩张在印太地区的威慑力,强化南太平洋区域强国地位。AUKUS的威慑功能具有模糊性,主要体现在威慑对象及触发条件的模糊性。其模糊性威慑主要包括模糊性威慑的信号功能、震慑功能、作战功能、信息和情报共享功能、军工合作功能。AUKUS通过模糊性威慑功能实现美国在印太地区的战略性扩张;威胁中国国家安全和阻挠中国统一进程;诱使印度深化与三国战略合作;引发东盟国家意见分歧;加速欧盟防务自主进程;削弱国际核不扩散机制,恶化地区安全形势,对全球及地区安全局势产生消极影响。     

Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel

This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States.