排序方式: 共有52条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Scholars have recently debated whether non-recognition is a blessing or a curse for democracy. Some suggest that lack of recognition forces political elites to democratize and acquire internal legitimacy to compensate for the lack of external legitimacy. Others suggest that democratization is used as a strategy by which to acquire international recognition. Still others claim that non-recognition obliges unrecognized states to rely on a patron state which, in turn, hinders the quality of democracy. To contribute to this discussion, we have conducted an in-depth case study. Focusing on democratic quality in Northern Cyprus from 2010 to 2016, it is observed that reliance on a patron state leads to dynamics of tutelage, in turn hindering the quality of democracy. 相似文献
2.
周西云 《河南公安高等专科学校学报》2001,(4)
本文从文理的角度,对《刑法》使用“的字结构”的多样性、明确性和规范性特点作了论述。认识这些特点对刑事司法实践活动有着极其重要的指导意义。 相似文献
3.
梅宏 《中国井冈山干部学院学报》2008,1(4):38-43
今年是朱毛两军会师井冈山八十周年。回顾这一重大历史事件,给我们提出了许多思考。其中之一就是,朱毛两军为什么会在井冈山会师?笔者认为,这不是偶然的,有其历史必然性:中国革命敌强我弱的形势,是朱毛两军会师偏远农村的必然方向;朱德、毛泽东在创建人民军队上的一致性,成为他们会师井冈山的内在必然;秋收起义和湘南起义的失败,为朱毛两军会师井冈山提供了历史契机。 相似文献
4.
张新华 《中国延安干部学院学报》2010,(6):92-95
为解决陕甘宁边区财政经济严重困难,朱德提出了独立自主发展边区经济的新方略,指导发展边区工业,首倡"军垦屯田"政策并领导开发南泥湾,对边区经济建设和革命胜利作出了独特而重要的贡献。 相似文献
5.
原军良 《中共山西省委党校学报》2008,31(1):17-19
朱德军事教育思想是其建军思想的重要组成部分,主要包括以下内容:一是人才论,即军事教育要担负为国家培养劲旅的任务;二是灵魂论,即军事教育要突出政治,坚持正确的政治方向;三是中心论,即军事教育要强化军事训练,不断提高战斗力;四是求实论,即军事教育要从实际出发确立求实的态度。 相似文献
6.
黄少群 《中国井冈山干部学院学报》2014,(3):30-36
毛泽东曾指出:"因为有了白色政权间的长期的分裂和战争,便给了一种条件,使一小块或若干小块的共产党领导的红色区域,能够在四围白色政权包围的中间发生和坚持下来。"本文以井冈山和中央革命根据地的成功开创为例,阐述在上世纪30年代前后的国民党新军阀混战的空隙中,中国共产党通过以毛泽东、朱德为代表领导的工农武装割据,实现红军和农村革命根据地发展壮大的历程。借国民党新军阀混战之机实现工农武装割据,体现了中国共产党领导人审时度势寻找发展机遇的高超战略思维。 相似文献
7.
Applying the Strategies of International Peacebuilding to Family Conflicts: What Those Involved in Family Disputes Can Learn from the Efforts of Peacebuilders Working to Transform War‐Torn Societies 下载免费PDF全文
Intractable international conflicts and difficult or intractable family conflicts have much in common. Relationships are damaged or destroyed, escalation causes parties to become polarized and make bad decisions, communication is strained or nonexistent, and competition and coercion take the place of collaboration. Similarities also exist in the realm of solutions, and those caught in (or intervening in) difficult family conflicts can learn much from the strategies and tactics of international peacebuilders. This article describes eight steps that peacebuilders at both the family level and the international level can take to make very damaging conflicts more constructive.
- Key Points for the Family Court Community:
- Limiting escalation is important in both contexts.
- Preventing or correcting misunderstandings is key to resolution in both contexts as well.
- Be sure you are focusing on the real problem(s).
- Get the facts straight (and agreed upon) before making agreements.
- Healing past wrongs is important for long term stability.
- Working both within and beyond the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) is essential in both contexts.
- Working to improve relationships helps all parties and improves the outcome.
8.
Reina C. Neufeldt Mary Lou Klassen John Danboyi Jessica Dyck Mugu Zakka Bako 《Third world quarterly》2020,41(7):1103-1121
ABSTRACTThe emphasis on local or hybrid efforts in peacebuilding literature brings front and centre the importance of being rooted within a particular context, with leadership and vision for social change and justice proffered by local actors. This is the same emphasis found in development literature and a necessary foundation for transformation. Scholars and practitioners nevertheless also note a role for outsiders in supporting local efforts (eg Lederach in 2005). Yet a significant challenge arises for outsiders, and to some extent local actors: how do you know what was tried or is underway that you might support or from which you might learn? This paper reports findings from a collaborative research project that examined the gap between the practice of peacebuilding locally and internationally available ‘knowledge’ via publications produced on local peacebuilding in Jos, Nigeria, between 2001 and 2008. It identifies a staggering gap between efforts and knowledge in the form of publications. The paper discusses the implications of the findings in terms of what it means for outsiders when thinking about helping resource local transformation efforts. 相似文献
9.
Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative,Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum 下载免费PDF全文
Robert Craig 《The Modern law review》2016,79(6):1041-1063
This article confronts the controversies surrounding Article 50 by analysing the relationship between statute and prerogative in the UK. The piece focuses on domestic constitutional issues and suggests a new way of classifying the relationship between statute and prerogative into two types falling under ‘the abeyance principle’ or ‘the frustration principle’. The abeyance principle means that where statute and prerogative overlap, the prerogative goes into abeyance. The frustration principle means that where statute and prerogative give rise to potential inconsistencies, but do not overlap, the prerogative cannot be used inconsistently with the intention of parliament as expressed in the relevant legislation. It then argues that Article 50 has the status of primary or ‘primary‐equivalent’ legislation which could justify applying the abeyance principle. This would mean that the trigger power would be exercised on statutory authority rather than through prerogative powers. If the courts are unable thus to construe the relevant legislation it argues EU law requires the courts to bridge the gap. Alternatively, if the abeyance principle is not applicable, it argues the frustration principle could apply but the circumstances in this litigation fall outside it. In the further alternative, EU law could require the frustration principle itself to be set aside in this case. 相似文献
10.
Gavin Phillipson 《The Modern law review》2016,79(6):1064-1089
This article analyses the Article 50 TEU debate and the argument that for the UK Government to trigger the formal withdrawal process without explicit parliamentary authorisation would be unlawful, because it would inevitably result in the removal of rights enjoyed under EU law and the frustration of the purpose of the statutes giving those rights domestic effect. After a brief survey of Article 50, this article argues first of all that the power to trigger Article 50 remains within the prerogative, contesting Robert Craig's argument in this issue that it is now a statutory power. It then suggests a number of arguments as to why the frustration principle may be of only doubtful application in this case, and in doing so it re‐examines one of the key authorities prayed in aid of it ‐ the Fire Brigades Union case. 相似文献