四级两审制的发生和演化

司法体制改革的一个重要举措是设立最高人民法院巡回法庭,这一改革举措可能意味着我国法院层级或审级变化的新动向.从建国以来的历史经验看,法院层级和审级变化并非彼此孤立,且都从属于国家政治形态设计.1954年中共中央取消大区分院,促动了法院审级由三审制改为两审制.两审制带来的法院功能和案负变化,导致中级人民法院层级的设立.为了保障四级两审制平滑运作,民事调解制度扩大,基层法院派出法庭普遍设立.这一法院层级和审级制度的设立,契合了扩大省级地方权力的政治目标.1983年以来“地改市”运动、民事调解制度的萎缩以及撤销部分派出法庭,使得四级两审制的基础发生松动,法院层级和审级方面的新变化由此产生.     

How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial Independence

Why do authoritarian rulers establish special courts? One view is that they do so to insulate the judiciary from politically oriented cases and allow it continued, albeit limited, independence. In this article I present a contrary case study of an authoritarian regime in Burma that used special courts not to insulate the judiciary but to defeat it. Through comparison to other Asian cases I suggest that the Burmese regime's composition and character better explain its strategy than does extant judicial authority or formal ideology. The regime consisted of war fighters for whom the courts were enemy territory. But absent popular support, the regime's leaders could not embark immediately on a radical project for legal change that might compromise their hold on power. Consequently, they used special courts and other strategies to defeat judicial independence incrementally, until they could displace the professional judiciary and bring the courts fully under executive control.     

The Right of Citizens to Appeal Acts by Officials to Courts

The increased role of the courts and enlarged judicial protection of citizens' rights enunciated in the USSR Constitution constitute a further development of Soviet socialist democracy. As we know, the notion of appealing to courts the acts of administrators was propounded by the founders of Marxism-Leninism themselves. (1) In the USSR, the foundations of the institution of judicial supervision of the functioning of the executive were established in the earliest years of Soviet power and were developed in the decree of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and Council of People's Commissars of April 11, 1937 - establishing judicial supervision over the activities of financial bodies in recovering from citizens arrears of federal and local taxes and levies, compulsory salary insurance, and local-option taxation - and in the Statute on Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR affirmed by decree of the USSR TsIK of July 9, 1937, granting citizens the right to appeal to courts decisions of executive committees of soviets on refusal to make corrections in lists of voters. (2) This institution was subsequently developed in the Principles of Civil Procedure of the USSR and Union Republics and the corresponding codes of the union republics establishing procedural rules for trial by courts of cases arising out of relationships at administrative law.     

The “Production” of Corruption in China's Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a One‐Party State

Despite its rampant presence, judicial corruption in China has often been regarded as the idiosyncratically deviant behavior of a few black sheep eluding prescribed judicial conduct. This entrenched assumption has both discouraged in‐depth investigation of the phenomenon of judicial corruption and inhibited proper understanding of the functioning of China's courts. This article, based on an empirically grounded examination of the processing of court rulings tainted by corruption, showed that judicial corruption in China is an institutionalized activity systemically inherent in the particular decision‐making mechanism guided by the Chinese Communist Party's instrumental rule‐by‐law ideal. In investigating what has contributed to the institutionalization of judicial corruption, the interplay between law and party politics in China's courts was also examined. The findings, therefore, also shed light on behind‐the‐courtroom judicial activities and on the enduring perplexity of the gap between the law in the book and the law in action.     

Less Democracy, More Courts: A Puzzle of Judicial Review in Russia

This article explores why, throughout the 1990s, some Russian regions created their own constitutional courts and others did not. Contrary to current theories that assert that politicians create a strong and independent judiciary to protect them from the tyranny of election-winners in the context of political uncertainty, my analysis finds that constitutional courts emerged only in those regions where governors virtually guaranteed their re-election by consolidating their political power vis-à-vis federal and local governments. The article argues that both federal and regional politicians used the process of creating subnational constitutional courts to legitimize their federalism and judicial reforms. The changes in the balance of power between those governors, who aspired to have their own judicial system, and the federal government that insisted on a single federal judicial system, determined the variation in the process of court-building across Russian regions.     

Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the Constitutional Court of Turkey

During the past two decades, scholars have noted a global expansion of judicial power and court‐led rights revolutions. Far from leading a rights‐revolution, the Constitutional Court of Turkey became renowned for its restrictive take on civil liberties during this period. Why are some high courts more activist than others in protecting and expanding civil rights and liberties? I argue that judicial power and judicial independence offer incomplete explanations of judicial activism on questions of rights. Even powerful courts are activist only selectively, using their clout to protect some groups while suppressing the demands of others. Building on perspectives on legal mobilization and judicial entrenchment, I argue that the sociopolitical alliances in which high courts and judiciaries participate explain the selective nature of their activism. The initial parameters of these alliances are set during critical junctures when formerly dominant coalitions are displaced and new institutions entrench new alliances. Such alliances are not static, however, and struggles within alliances can transform high courts' orientations on rights questions.     

人民法庭地位与功能的重构

近十余年来,在法院现代化、正规化、规范化建设过程中,人民法庭的角色在一定程度上被边缘化。然而,我国基层社会纠纷的有效解决正逐步凸显出对人民法庭功能的需求,人民法庭自身的条件也发生了重要变化。在新的历史条件下,应当重新审视人民法庭的地位与功能,把适当增加人民法庭的设置,合理调整人民法庭的区域布局,充实人民法庭的审判力量,强化人民法庭的功能,作为我国基层法院当下发展与改革的重要内容和路径。这既可以从S省P县法院相关实践中部分得到证明,更可以从司法辖域的相对限缩、人民法院发展的主导思路以及基层法院审判工作主要特性等三个维度得到理论阐释。     

农村多元化纠纷解决机制中的司法救济

现代司法作为西方法治的舶来品对中国固有的司法传统带来了一定的冲击。在依法治国的今天,现代司法与中国传统的接触更多地表现在当下的农村社会。设置在乡镇中的人民法庭代表着司法权在基层社会中的渗透,作为一种权利救济途径的司法救济将民众与人民法庭联系到一起,将传统的纠纷解决模式与现代司法联系到一起。在这个传统与现代相互交错的时代,我们应当关注于司法救济如何落实抑或人民法庭如何在基层扎根。     

Tactical Balancing: High Court Decision Making on Politically Crucial Cases

This article advances a new account of judicial behavior: the thesis of tactical balancing. Building on existing models of judicial decision making, the thesis posits that high court justices balance a discrete set of considerations—justices' ideologies, their institutional interests, the potential consequences of their rulings, public opinion, elected leaders' preferences, and law—as they decide important cases. Variation in a high court's balancing of those considerations as it decides different cases leads it to alternate between challenging and endorsing the exercise of government power. The way in which high courts carry out this “tactical balancing” reflects their broader strategy for prioritizing the different roles they can play in a polity, and thus has significant implications for the rule of law and regime stability in developing democracies. The thesis is illustrated through a detailed analysis of the Brazilian high court's rulings on cases concerning crucial economic policies (1985–2004).     

Judicial empowerment expanded: Political determinants of national courts' cooperation with the CJEU

Scholars in EU studies have developed diverse justifications for explaining why national judges cooperate with the Court of Justice of the European Union. In this regard, judicial empowerment theories have stressed the strategic importance of cooperation for empowering national courts vis‐à‐vis high courts and political actors. Nevertheless, these explanations have been restricted to the use of preliminary references by lower courts. This contribution expands the explanatory power of these approaches by exploring other potential scenarios and instruments that national judges can use to challenge the position of their governments and judicial superiors, for example, by emphasising the importance of CJEU precedent for their strategic behaviour. By offering new data collected from case‐law and surveys, this article offers a more systematic assessment of the relevance of cooperation for national judges to reinforce their authority against other institutions. The findings call for a revision of the traditional understanding of judicial empowerment theories.     

Law's Allure and an Interbranch Perspective on Law and Politics

This essay views Gordon Silverstein's book Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (2009) from the perspective of the burgeoning interbranch literature on law and courts, which seeks to place judicial decision making within the context of ongoing political and policy-making processes. It argues that Law's Allure reflects the strengths and weaknesses of this literature. On the plus side, it compellingly reinterprets the concept of legal precedent in political terms, showing how the content of judicial decisions serves as an iterative framing mechanism within and across various policy areas. On the downside, it struggles to provide a rigorous framework for analyzing the risks of the juridification of American politics. Despite any weaknesses, its attempt to map different pathways of legalistic court-based policy development in diverse settings represents a useful step for those interested in bringing the study of law and courts back into the core of analyzing American politics and policy making.     

Rethinking Law and State Building in Sub‐Saharan Africa

Massoud, Mark Fathi. 2013 . Law's Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan . Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. x–277. ISBN: 9781107440050. Paper $34.99 This essay is a response to Mark Massoud's Law's Fragile State, and through comparative inquiry argues that highly contextualized analysis of courts is critical to gaining an understanding of judicial decision making and judicial empowerment. As Massoud demonstrates, focusing on the legal complex is a particularly worthwhile endeavor in fragile states. Although we may understand the sociology of the legal profession, we do not fully understand how professional networks, career paths, and identities truly impact the institutional pathways of the courts and the legal system as a whole.     

Law and Politics in the Reign of Charles I: The Case of John Prigeon

The case of John Prigeon (1634) was an important precedent in the development of administrative law, and the control of local agencies by the central courts. This article shows that its apparent simplicity is misleading. The case was relevant to a major conflict between two powerful personalities, Archbishop Laud and Bishop Williams, over the religious policies of the Caroline regime, and over patronage in the church and the royal court. It also raises issues of the independence of the judiciary in Charles I's reign and the common law judges' understanding of their role both in their own courts and in Star Chamber. This latter is the particular focus of this article.     

Mavericks or misconstruction? A reply to Campbell and Allan

In a jurisdiction without a codified constitution clearly demarcating the role of the courts, and given the centrality of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to the United Kingdom's constitutional framework, criticism of the courts for overstepping the mark – particularly in politically contentious cases – is par for the course. In their 2019 article, Professors David Campbell and James Allan offer a criticism of the Supreme Court for what they describe as its surreptitious creation of judicial supremacy at the expense of parliamentary sovereignty. In support of their claim, the authors examine two particularly significant judgments: R (Miller and another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review. This reply discusses several problematic aspects of the authors’ critique of those judgments, demonstrating that, contrary to the authors’ claims, these cases do not provide evidence of a surreptitious attempt by the Supreme Court to expand its power.     

Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case

Under what circumstances do courts act in ways that challenge the political hegemony of the military in countries with weak democratic institutions? This article addresses this question by focusing on a critical case of judicial activism in Turkey. It argues that lower courts unexpectedly can be centers of judicial activism that contributes to expansion of civil liberties and restrictions on arbitrary state power when the high judiciary supports the political status quo. This is because lower courts provide greater access to legal mobilization pursued by civil society actors. At the same time, judicial activism in lower courts is sustainable only when political power is distributed among elites with conflicting interests, and the civilian government offers support and protection to activist members of the judiciary.     

Reason for Hope? The Spotted Owl Injunctions and Policy Change

Under what conditions can US courts contribute to policy change? This article shows how a case study can be used to test and develop a theory of judicial policy making answering this question. In The Hollow Hope (1991, 2008), Gerald Rosenberg theorizes that judicial policy making is constrained by the limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence, and the judiciary's inability to implement its rulings. Ninth Circuit injunctions protecting the Northern Spotted Owl and orders to manage ecosystems in the Pacific Northwest invalidate and help reformulate Rosenberg's theory. These rulings show how judicial interpretations of statutes, regulations, precedent, and facts allow judicial policy making if these interpretations are accepted by the legal and political culture when Congress and the presidency are too divided to override them. The owl rulings also show how statutes facilitate the implementation of judicial rulings, a point not developed by Rosenberg, while additionally providing further evidence for Rosenberg's specification of conditions allowing implementation.     

Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf

This article explores the struggle for judicial power in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf focusing on two questions. First, how did pro-Musharraf regime judges expand judicial power, leading to a confrontation with the regime? Second, how did the bar and the bench mobilize in the struggle for judicial power? The author shows how, instead of blindly supporting economic liberalization in a period of economic growth, the Supreme Court expanded power by scrutinizing questionable urban development, privatization, and deregulation measures in a virtuous cycle of public interest litigation. The author also describes how a politics of reciprocity explains the social mobilization of lawyers as the bench protected the bar from regime penetration, and the bar protected the bench from regime backlash. The Pakistani case questions some of our assumptions about economic liberalization and courts in authoritarian regimes, and the study invites scholars to explore the role of courts in developing judicial support structures and the role of lawyers in social movements.     

Falling into Line? The Hostile Environment and the Legend of the ‘Judges’ Revolt’

In 2012 the Government made a number of controversial changes to the Immigration Rules, which it claimed would ‘comprehensively reform the approach taken towards ECHR Article 8 in immigration cases’. This paper examines the judicial response, arguing that the courts ‘fell into line’, adapting human rights law to the government's aims through unprincipled and opportunistic techniques, whilst inflicting hardship and injustice on working-class British citizens in particular. Four key moves are identified. First, the courts created an ‘incapable’ test which immunised the rules from in principle challenges. Second, Lord Bingham's Article 8 test, in which the reasonableness of any family member relocation was a central consideration, was replaced with a far less family-friendly test. Third, the courts adopted an ultra-lax rationality test at common law, even when the ‘fundamental rights’ of British citizens were engaged. Finally, the courts identified immigration policy as the ‘constitutional responsibility’ of the executive.     

司法的限度：在司法能动与司法克制之间

我国法院从司法改革初期积极扩张司法权的一端,转变到面对社会矛盾复杂性而采取自我限缩策略的另一端,暴露出司法权运作边界模糊的问题。社会需求决定了司法的供给,但司法权的能力是有限的,其机能的发挥有赖于一定的条件,而且当事人人数的多少、案件的复杂程度等都会影响司法权的能力。司法权应当恪守自己的边界。对超越自身能力的事情保持克制,是司法权威的必要保证。     

Challenging Civil Contempt: The Limits of Judicial Power in Cases Involving Journalists

Despite their assertion of a First Amendment or common law reporter's privilege in federal courts, journalists continue to face jail sentences and exorbitant fines for refusing to divulge their confidential sources when subpoenaed. Efforts to pass even a limited federal shield law have failed so far. This article offers another avenue to protect journalists—examining the roots of contempt law and policy to highlight limits on the contempt power of judges. It argues that because journalists are part of a group resting on steadfast moral and professional convictions, they may validly argue that confinement and excessive fines are improper sanctions. The article also suggests refinements in shield law proposals and other legislation to clarify the extent of judicial contempt power.