Whither Non-Alignment? Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and New Delhi’s Selective Alignment with Great Powers during the Cold War, 1964–1979

First proposed in 1964 by the Sri Lankan prime minister, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace [IOZP] entailed eradication of foreign military bases from the Indian Ocean region as well its denuclearisation. During the Cold War, India was one of the most vehement supporters of IOZP. If some saw India’s interests in the IOZP as another manifestation of Nehruvian idealism, others viewed it as a part of its non-aligned foreign policy. This analysis argues otherwise. India’s record on IOZP reveals a policy of selective alignment with Great Powers and its adaptation to the principles of power politics in international relations. India’s support for the presence of one or the other Great Powers in the Indian Ocean region found premise on balancing those it considered hostile to its national security interests. In public, India supported the call for IOZP as dictated by its non-aligned foreign policy; privately, New Delhi remained highly sceptical and often worked to IZOP’s detriment. Under the cloak of IOZP, India not only pursued diplomatic alignment with Great Powers but also ensured that its own regional ambitions remain unchecked. In this picture, India’s role was not only supportive of the Cold War but to the extent it could use the opportunities provided by superpower rivalry in the region to further its own ends, even determinative of the process.     

Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis

This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically considers the implications for its evolution as an international security actor. Employing role theory, the paper reviews the historical development of the Union's security actorness and sheds specific light on the balance between self-conception and external expectations in the case of the Libyan crisis. Its central argument is that, despite external expectations and European narratives of a ‘comprehensive power role’, the Libyan crisis showed that the Union still acts in line with its traditional role as a civilian power. The inability to go beyond civilian power stemmed from internal dissonance on a potential hard power role and a corresponding lack of material capabilities. The growing gap between expectations about comprehensive actorness on the one hand and performance on the other is likely to damage the Union's future credibility as an international security actor.     

印度海洋安全环境:新变动与新挑战

印度海洋安全战略的制定与调整深受外部安全环境影响,后者既有延续性也有变动性。近年来,印度海洋安全环境变动加速,主要涉及四方面:首先是印度洋战略地位持续提升;其次是传统安全与非传统安全交织,大国角逐等传统安全问题回归;再次是非安全问题的战略重要性凸显;最后是地区治理结构破碎,多个海洋合作倡议呈竞争性发展,不确定性加大。这些环境变动促使印度对其海洋安全战略进行了较大调整,包括持续更新战略文件;积极确立新型海上安全观,主动回应新型特别是非传统海上安全挑战;进一步细化各子战略,全面回应新的海洋安全环境;积极推动海军国际交流合作,援引外力提升本国安全。     

Commercial Diplomacy and Statecraft in the Context of Economic Reform: The Indian Experience

It is almost a decade since India began its economic reforms. Apart from the purely domestic economic objectives that the reforms were expected to achieve, there was a recognition that reform was imperative if India wanted to become an economic power of consequence within and beyond its region. This had important foreign policy implications. Official pronouncements reflected the concern that the balance of fiscal power as opposed to military power was the key factor in determining a country's international standing. This called for an integrated strategy to bring economic and foreign policies closer. The implementation of a vigorous foreign economic policy could not be undertaken without sharpening the commercial diplomatic tool. Indian foreign policy over the last decade has been grappling with this challenge. This article analyses the reorientation in Indian foreign policy, assesses the efforts undertaken so far to make commercial diplomacy viable and highlights the challenges that multi-layered diplomacy poses for a country like India.     

中美在亚太地区的安全矛盾：演变与逻辑

近年来,中美在亚太地区的安全矛盾持续发酵,逐渐形成安全利益、理念和地区安全秩序构想的全面对立态势,成为影响中美和平共处的重要因素。秩序疑虑与热点问题的对立是中美在亚太地区安全矛盾的主要表现。中美亚太安全矛盾的全方位突显,根本上源于两国力量对比的变化以及由此引发的权力转移态势,是中美总体力量差距背景下局部力量平衡的表现。这种力量平衡表现为:中国作为地区经济中心与美国作为地区安全中心的“二元结构平衡”;中国作为陆权大国与美国作为海权大国的“陆海权力平衡”;在中国近海区域,中美权力均衡态势初步形成。在此过程中,中美对既有安全矛盾管理的失效以及彼此安全威胁认知的反复塑造,客观上增强了矛盾对立的烈度,安全困境逐步形成。随着权力消长和政策互动,中美在亚太地区的安全困境,逐步呈现出从经典安全困境转向“国家引导型的安全困境”加剧的趋势。未来,中美亚太安全矛盾仍然会受到结构性因素的影响,而经济相互依存趋势、技术发展引发的军事威慑变化、意识形态竞争以及非传统安全合作等因素,则将决定既有安全矛盾是否会走向冲突。     

Geopolitical perceptions of the world today

Abstract

This article is based on the author's study of geopolitical perceptions of the power of nations made during the last decade.

He describes the thinking of scholars, especially Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman, as they have related geopolitics to international affairs.

He cites the Soviet domination of Afghanistan as one of the primary current examples of a classical geopolitical objective of the USSR to obtain access to territory opening the way eventually to the Indian Ocean.

He points out that the Soviet Union, dominating much of the landmass of Eurasia, the Mackinder “Heartland,” has polarized world politics and military security alignments because of its totalitarian political system and its expansion into other crucial areas of the world.

For fifty years, the author explains, the United States has been forced to take defensive measures against totalitarian states, in recent times principally the USSR, to prevent their domination of the economic resources and peoples of the world.

The author proposes that the United States, destined geopol‐itically to be a sea power, must have sufficient military strength to develop and protect global maritime and trading links with other seafaring nations on the periphery of Eurasia and in the Southern Hemisphere. The U.S. forces would constitute a peacetime constabulary of the sea to insure the security and prosperity not only of Americans but of their friends and allies.     

“Security and growth for all in the Indian Ocean” – maritime governance and India’s foreign policy

ABSTRACT

In a March 2015 speech delivered in Mauritius, India’s current Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined what he described would be India’s vision for the Indian Ocean Region. Under the acronym, SAGAR or “Security and Growth for All in the Region,” five key points were elucidated. At the time, the speech was praised for articulating a proactive approach to the Indian Ocean and the various visits to, and agreements that followed with, littoral and island countries, appeared to confirm this. This paper seeks to assess the extent to which India has been able to deliver an agenda of security and growth for the maritime region. Despite the enthusiastic reception to SAGAR, the critique is often made that India is slow to deliver on the promises made as part of the country’s maritime and naval diplomacy. The paper highlights a selection of decisions and actions taken since 2015, which have contributed to maritime governance in the region and argues that there is a substantial change in the way SAGAR provides a framework for strategic action.     

India’s fitful quest for seapower

Building on several years of research, and many interviews of Indian naval officers and government officials, both serving and retired, this article aims to provide a deeper understanding of the context and ramifications of India's naval rise. In particular, it seeks to explain a troubling paradox: the relative neglect of the navy vis-à-vis the other services, and the seeming misalignment of New Delhi's military strategy with its maritime geography. Indeed, the country's enviable position at the heart of the Indian Ocean, along with its peninsular formation, large exclusive economic zone, and extensive coastlines, would seem to suggest a natural predisposition towards the exercise of naval power. In reality, however, India's navy since independence has consistently been the most poorly funded of its military services, and has frequently struggled to make do with limited resources. The core question this article endeavors to address is whether this trend will persist, or whether various factors will combine in order to provoke a gradual rebalancing of the nation's military strategy and force structure.     

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20^th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europe's position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.     

Indian Strategic Thinking About the Indian Ocean: Striving Towards Strategic Leadership

It is sometimes claimed that India has ambitions to become the leading power in the Indian Ocean. This article examines the different streams of Indian strategic thinking about the Indian Ocean and how they will likely contribute to future Indian strategic behavior. It argues that although many among its elite aspire for India to eventually become the leading power in the Indian Ocean, there is little conceptualization as to what India needs to do to achieve this. For several reasons, including an attachment to ideas of non-alignment and strategic autonomy, Indian strategic behavior in the Indian Ocean will likely continue to be relatively reactive and constrained.     

Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

巴基斯坦瓜达尔港对国际安全态势的影响

巴基斯坦政府大规模开发瓜达尔深水港有利于巴经济发展及国内局势稳定,牵动着国际战略博弈的大局。瓜达尔港可望成为地区枢纽港,激活巴地缘优势,全面促进巴经济发展。从长远来说,这些都可望促进俾路支省局势的积极发展,但在短期内也加剧了当地人对人口、就业、经济受益三方面的疑虑。从国际战略博弈来观察,瓜达尔具有重大价值。它有利于巴扩展战略纵深,可望促进中国西部与外界的交通,可望促成部分替代马六甲航线的油气通道。中关印等国高度关注瓜达尔的战略价值。瓜达尔开发前景广阔,但仍面临着地缘因素牵制、基础设施不足、安全局势不稳等不利因素。     

印太战略视域下的印法印度洋地区海洋安全合作探析

印度洋地区的海上战略通道价值为世界所公认。世界上一些主要国家提出了相应的印太战略,印度洋地区的海上战略通道价值更为显著。在法国与印度的印太战略框架中,双方都把印度洋地区的海洋安全视为重点。基于印太战略,印度洋地区海上战略通道的安全成为法国与印度共同的战略关注。由于印度洋地区的海洋安全威胁日益复杂,合作是法国与印度维护海上战略通道安全的最好方式,符合双方共同的利益。面对印度洋地区复杂的海洋安全威胁,法国与印度意识到了海洋安全合作的必要性与可行性,并初步建立了海洋安全合作机制。     

US and India: Emerging offshore balancing in Asia

ABSTRACT

The US and India have become closer in recent times. Compared with the last century, the relationship between the two countries is in steady growth. Under both the Bush and Obama administrations, and now the Trump administration too, India is receiving significant importance in US’ strategic policy toward the Indo–Pacific. India’s emergence as a credible power in the Indian Ocean region has brought both countries much closer. The relationship has also steadily progressed as result of China’s emergence as a potential hegemon in Asia. The US faces difficulty in maintaining its preponderant position across the Indo–Pacific and requires strong allies in the region to help share the burden. In this regard, India could be the offshore balancer in Asia to counter China’s emergence as a potential hegemon in the region.     

European perspectives towards the rise of Asia: contextualising the debate

To what extent can we speak of a distinctively ‘European’ security approach towards the Asia-Pacific region? In order to address that timely question, this article examines how Britain, France, Germany and the European Union (EU) are framing their evolving security roles in the Asia-Pacific region, and how those individual perspectives intersect with each other. The article identifies a number of important common features in Europe’s approaches towards security in the Asia-Pacific, namely the tendency of most European actors to emphasize the economic and diplomatic nature of their contribution to regional security, their promotion of regional multilateral security fora, their rejection of the notion that China’s rise is inherently challenging for regional and global security, and their willingness to signal their differences towards Washington’s emphasis on military power and alliance-based approach. However, and despite the existence of common traits, individual European actors show different degrees of closeness vis-à-vis the US and China and feature different perspectives regarding which security relationships they should prioritize in the region (if any), or the appropriate balance between diplomacy and security and defence cooperation. Such divergences prevent Europeans from developing a coherent security profile in the region and preclude us from speaking of a distinctively European security approach towards the Asia-Pacific.     

The changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATOs) changing role was debated in the face of the Strategic Concept adopted in late 2010. Two main roles can be identified in the debate; that of NATO as a defence organisation and a security organisation. The article analyses the implications of these roles for security governance and the Alliance's legitimacy – with emphasis on the novelties associated with the role of NATO as a security organisation. This development suggests an increasing need for security governance, something which is reflected in the debate. However, how for instance decision-making and implementation function in a more fragmented environment is unclear. If NATO develops its role as a security organisation new audiences are introduced that determine its appropriateness and the basis of the Alliance's input and output legitimacy changes.     

A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy

As India seeks to become a major player on the international political stage, it will face two major internal constraints. First, India will have to recognize the need to exploit the extant structure of international system to its advantage more effectively. Structural constraints are the most formidable ones a state encounters in its drive towards the status of a major power. Yet, Indian foreign policy continues to be reactive to the strategic environment rather than attempting to shape the strategic realities. While such an ad hoc response to the structural imperatives carried little costs when India was on the periphery of global politics, it holds grave risks now that India seems poised to play a significant role in global politics. Second, India must come to grips with its discomfort with the very notion of power and in particular its wariness of the use of “hard power.” Throughout history, all major powers have been required to employ the military instrument skillfully. India's reluctance to accept a more sophisticated understanding of power, in general, and military power, in particular, will continue to undermine Indian foreign and security policy.     

Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers than to balance against them. In this article, we suggest that state- and individual-level variables can play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy behavior of small states and that small states sometimes choose to balance rather than bandwagon, especially when elite ideology is deeply embedded in formulating foreign policy. We develop this claim in terms of elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the state and examine its plausibility using primary sources and exclusive interviews with the security and foreign policy elite in Georgia. We find that this approach offers a more plausible explanation for Georgia's otherwise puzzling foreign policy behavior than frameworks that focus on the international or regional system. Although Georgia may be the exception that proves the rule, it can advance an understanding of the conditions under which standard explanations of small-state foreign policy behavior may miss their predictive mark and when incorporating the role of elite ideas can provide additional explanatory leverage.     

The EU and the Gulf monarchies: normative power Europe in search of a strategy for engagement

The Persian Gulf region is of strategic importance to the European Union (EU). Yet, different political realities of authoritarian government in the Gulf challenge crucial parts of EU foreign policy that are based on normative power Europe concepts. Cooperation with the ruling dynasties appears beneficial for EU decision-makers if one looks at the comprehensive agenda of common interests in the Gulf region. In 2004, the EU aimed to build a strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East; in this the EU emphasized its commitment to advancing its partnership with the Gulf countries. Yet, from the perspective of 2012 the results are bleak. Despite some signs of improvement in deepening the political, economic and security interactions with the region, there is still no concerted EU policy in the Gulf beyond the thriving bilateral activities of some EU member states. The events of the Arab Spring have increased the challenges even further. The EU, on the one hand, is trying to support forces of liberal and democratic reform in some neighbouring countries. On the other hand, it seeks close partnerships with authoritarian family dynasties in those Gulf countries in which a democratic opening is not around the corner. This article suggests an alternative explanation for this dichotomy. While there is an inherent tension between the EU's reformist agenda and its own interests, whether security or trade interests, this article argues that much of the EU's relationship with the Gulf countries can be explained through a misperception of the specific settings of government in the region. Despite a substantial agenda of interests on both sides in areas such as trade, energy, regional security, terrorism and irregular migration, the EU's foreign policy outputs remain rather limited.