Anticompetitive Employment

Scholars, antitrust agencies, and policy makers have historically paid little attention to anticompetitive practices in labor markets. This was largely due a misconception that antitrust law is meant to govern conventional markets in which goods and services trade, rather than govern labor markets. Antitrust law may also offer a poor remedy to redress employers who enter no-poaching agreements or otherwise impair competition. The primary tension involves antitrust's purpose, which is to promote “consumer welfare.” To identify whether conduct eroded consumer welfare, courts tend to scrutinize whether prices increased. But here, lessening wages can enable firms to sell goods at cheaper prices, benefiting consumers. Another issue is that the typical restraint affects only a smattering of workers instead of lessening wages throughout the greater market. This article uses empirical analyses to show that antitrust should promote labor's welfare as it does consumer welfare, and it argues that enforcement must condemn labor cartels as per se illegal. The research demonstrates that labor cartels are more pernicious than restraints in product markets, as employers can lessen wages with less effort than in product markets. Antitrust should even proscribe no-poaching agreements formed for a legitimate purpose (e.g., to protect trade secrets) because employers could have achieved the same goals using less coercive means; the noncompete agreement, at least, provides labor with a semblance of notice and bargaining power without drawing antitrust scrutiny. The prohibition of labor cartels would thus promote competition and consumer welfare, especially in minimum wage labor markets.     

论反垄断法的伦理基础

对反垄断伦理的研究能够给反垄断提供更加深刻的解释力。竞争正义是反垄断法的伦理基石,反垄断法研究必须解答何谓正义的竞争这一问题。竞争自由是竞争正义的前提条件,竞争效率是反垄断法的核心理念,竞争公平是反垄断法永恒的价值追求。     

Antitrust, health care quality, and the courts

Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool that the United States employs to police private markets, yet it often relegates quality and nonprice considerations to a secondary position. While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, little evidence exists of the practical ability of courts to deliver on that promise. In this Article, Professors Hammer and Sage examine American health care as a vehicle for advancing understanding of the nexus among competition, quality, and antitrust law. The Article reports results of a comprehensive empirical review of judicial opinions in health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality and other nonprice concerns. Professors Hammer and Sage conclude that, although antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care, courts have been successful incorporating some nonprice factors into antitrust analysis.     

The state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act: the restructured public hospital model

This Article analyzes the development and complexities of the antitrust state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act as these doctrines apply to both "municipalities" and private entities. The restructuring of a public hospital is used as a model to facilitate the antitrust analysis. The restructuring model, which typically involves the leasing of a hospital facility by a public entity to a private nonprofit corporation, offers the unique opportunity to compare the different standards employed under the state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act. As a practical matter, the Article provides a framework for a public hospital to evaluate the impact of corporate restructuring on its antitrust liability exposure and to develop strategies to minimize antitrust risks.     

Exclusion payments in patent settlements: a legal and economic perspective

Legal context. The application of antitrust law to assess settlementsof patent litigation raises difficult issues concerning theappropriate balance of patent law and competition policy. Recentprivate and public invocations of US antitrust law to challengesettlement agreements covering pharmaceutical patents have broughtthese issues to the forefront. The agreements share the commonfeature of an ‘exclusion payment’ from a brand-namedrug manufacturer (the patentee) to a generic drug manufacturer(the accused infringer) in exchange for a promise by the genericcompany to refrain from marketing its product for some time.US federal courts that have examined these agreements have variedin their approach and conclusions regarding the appropriateantitrust analysis to be applied to these settlements. Key points. This article argues that informed antitrust analysisof such agreements must take due note of the ‘probabilistic’nature of patent property rights. Practical significance. The article concludes that exclusionpayments fall outside the scope of a patent's exclusionary scopeand thus are subject to antitrust scrutiny. It demonstratesthat barring anticompetitive exclusion payments in settlementnegotiation prevents collusive bargains that harm consumer welfarewithout discouraging efficient settlements.     

竞争政策区域合作机制探析

Regional economic cooperation and multilateral cooperation of competition policies are regarded as two of the most important topics in international communities, both of which have a very close relationship, i.e., the former is an important path to the latter, and the latter is usually a critical topic of the former. Among the existing regional cooperation mechanism of competition policies are the three most typical modes, i.e., APEC’s open cooperation, NAFTA’s procedural law cooperation and EU’s substantive law cooperation. While taking initiatives to participate in multilateral cooperation of competition policies, China shall grasp the situation of current multilateral cooperation of competition policies, and follow the orderliness of its development, i.e., a step-by-step process of cooperation from nonbinding to binding, from domestic law to international law, and from fundamental to procedural law and to substantive law. Qi Tong, Ph.D, was once a visiting scholar in the Amsterdam Center of International Law (ACIL) (2006–2007). Now, he is an associate professor at the Department of International Economic Law of Wuhan University. His research interests focus on international trade law, international investment law, international financial law, international competition policy. His main publications include Regulatory constraint on transnational mergers & acquisitions (2006), Antitrust legislation on foreign M&A investments: Analysis on the antitrust rules in the Interim Provisions for Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises (2004), Evolution of the pluralistic market regulation mechanism and its legislation (2005), On the positive comity of international antitrust cooperation (2005), International regulation mechanism and the new views of international economic law (2005), A legal perspective on the development of loan securitization in China (2006), A review on the case of Chinese measures affecting financial information services and foreign financial information supplier (2008).     

网络型公用企业竞争的法律规制

规制法治化是网络型公用企业竞争的必要前提,以事业法和反垄断法规制为其主要内容。事业法规制包括市场准入与退出规制、价格规制、互联互通与接入费规制、禁止交叉补贴与普遍服务规制、不对称规制等,其价值取向为涵盖在位生产者、潜在竞争者、交易者和消费者的福利在内的经济效率与社会公平之间的均衡;反垄断法规制包括滥用网络优势行为规制、合并与拆分规制、联合限制竞争规制、行政垄断规制等,其价值取向为“有限竞争自由→适度竞争自由→充分竞争自由”的发展。就法律位阶体系而言,反垄断法应为“基本法律”,而事业法为“非基本法律”,反垄断法应优于事业法。     

Whose trade mark rights? What the Microsoft case means for trade mark owners

Legal context. The article considers the influence of the commissionruling in the Microsoft case, forcing Microsoft to use its WINDOWS-trademark for an ‘unbundled’ version of the program inthe light of the trade mark owner's properties rights. The scopeof these rights is determined by the function of the trade markand the rights that the trade mark laws confer to the ownerin case of infringement. Key points. Trade marks are protected as property rights undercommunity law. They are the embodiment of past investments andtransform the reputation of the owner into a bankable asset.Consumers rely on trade mark owners' control over quality. Thisis mirrored by the rights of the trade mark owner to stop interferencewith quality and image, in particular in the context of resaleof altered products. Any interference that would be considereda trade mark infringement if committed by a private party shouldbe considered an interference with the protected property rightif caused by a government agency. This interference is not justifiedby the public interest because trade mark rights also embodyimportant public interests. Practical significance. If the analysis proposed in the articleis followed, intellectual property rights have to be given greaterweight in shaping antitrust remedies.     

A primer on US antitrust claims against patentees under Walker Process

Legal context: In the wake of two recent cases from the Federal Circuit onthe subject, this article provides an introduction to the WalkerProcess doctrine under US law. Under the doctrine, a patenteewho knowingly enforces a patent procured by intentional fraudon the patent office may lose its immunity to antitrust claims,should it act to enforce its patent. Key points: Walker Process fraud refers to a knowing and deliberate fraudperpetrated on the patent office as opposed to mere acts ofinequitable conduct. Proving that a patent applicant engagedin Walker Process fraud does not by itself prove liability foran antitrust violation. The accused infringer must still provethe individual elements of an antitrust claim. Antitrust claimsbased on Walker Process fraud require significant time and resourcesto litigate. Practical significance: With the allure of mandatory treble damages and attorney's fees,antitrust claims based on Walker Process fraud can serve asa potent counterclaim for an accused infringer's arsenal. Butthe legal requirements and resources needed to successfullylitigate these claims to a conclusion may temper their effectivenessfor the typical patent-infringement suit.     

Profit Neutrality in Licensing: The Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent Law

We address the patent/antitrust conflict in licensing and developthree guiding principles for deciding acceptable terms of license.Profit neutrality holds that patent rewards should not dependon the rightholder’s ability to work the patent himself.Derived reward holds that the patentholder’s profits shouldbe earned, if at all, from the social value created by the invention.Minimalism holds that licenses should not be more restrictivethan necessary to achieve neutrality. We argue that these principlesare economically sound and rationalize some key decisions ofthe twentieth century such as General Electric and Line Material.     

Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique

‘Before the game begins players should agree on a dictionaryto use in case of a challenge.’ (from the Official Rulesof SCRABBLE®)

Treaty interpretation in WTO law continues to represent a topicof highly theoretical and practical importance. The Panel’sand the Appellate Body’s reports in the recent US –Gambling dispute have critically turned on ascertaining themeaning of the United States’ GATS Schedule and ArticleXVI GATS on the basis of the public international law rulesof treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. The paper’s principal aim is toreview the interpretative approach followed in particular bythe Appellate Body in reaching its decision in US – Gambling.Its main argument is that, although the Appellate Body appearsto be trying to emancipate itself from a rigorous textual approach,it has not yet embraced a holistic approach to treaty interpretation,one in which the treaty interpreter looks thoroughly at allthe relevant elements of the general rule on treaty interpretationpursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.     

The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the Undermining Mole

On 10 April 2007, the United States requested consultationswith China regarding trading rights for publications and audiovisualproducts. Following US—Gambling, this case is likely toprovoke the next clash between free trade and public morals.This article takes an abstract approach to the scope and contentof the public morals and public order exceptions in the GATSand the GATT and, given the absence of a public order exceptionunder the GATT, analyzes how these two concepts interrelatewith one another. In this regard, the finding in US—Gamblingthat Members should individually define the scope of ArticleXIV(a) GATS is critically examined, but the article suggeststhat it deserves support based on an interpretation in accordancewith general principles of the law of treaties. Following theidentification of instruments that limit the risk for abuseof the morals and order exceptions, the article will turn tothe scope-related aspect regarding the justifiability of ‘extraterritorial’measures.     

格式条款标准化的垄断协议认定

传统的逆向选择模型将低质量格式条款的生成归因于需求端的认知缺陷;共谋模型将低质量维持原因解释为供给端的共谋,为反垄断法介入提供依据。格式条款标准化的横向垄断协议认定应满足《反垄断法》第13条规定的形式要件与效果要件,采用一般举证规则作为分析模式,由原告证明其"协议、决定或协同行为"形式及反竞争效果。形式要件以"形式与反竞争效果的尽可能耦合"为逻辑起点,应基于市场力的持久性与显著性标准加以重构。反竞争效果要件以对竞争的实质限制为标准,参照美国法实践,可通过质量或交易自由限制路径证成。     

The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective

Although the issue of trade and competition policy has beendropped from the Work Programmes of the Doha Round of WorldTrade Organization (WTO) negotiations, it continues to be discussedin other fora and may return to the WTO after the completionof the Round. This article assesses the case for an agreementfrom the perspective of developing countries. It begins by reviewingthe ‘development dimension’ of the WTO debate andthen examines three specific antitrust issues that were of considerablerelevance to developing countries but were not pursued: exportcartels, anti-dumping and intellectual property rights (IPRs).There follows a critical assessment of the empirical and theoreticalarguments for the kind of agreement that was being advocatedto deal with international cartels. Alternative proposals, involvingdeveloping countries ‘outsourcing’ antitrust enforcementto developed countries, are also sceptically examined, as isthe relevance for developing countries of the kind of competitionpolicy that is currently in place in developed countries. Finally,a general approach to international trade agreements suggeststhat developing countries had nothing to gain from the proposalthat was on the table, and the article concludes by proposinga range of more suitable alternatives.     

The economic analysis of antitrust consents

Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques.     

Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice

Since the establishment of the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice in 1922, governments have consented to, and activelyused, an ever larger number of international and transnationalcourts, quasi-judicial dispute settlement bodies and ad hocarbitral tribunals for the settlement of disputes over the interpretationand application of rules of international law. Such judicialclarification of disputed interpretations of incomplete, intergovernmentalagreements reduces not only the negotiation costs of governmentsby delegating the clarification of contested facts and legalclaims to independent third-party adjudication. Judicial decision-makingat intergovernmental, transnational, national and private levelsalso supplements rule-making and offers citizens judicial remediesfor defending their rights and interests. Modern internationaleconomic law increasingly complements intergovernmental, legislative,and administrative governance by multilevel ‘judicialgovernance’ so as to protect rule of law more effectivelyfor the benefit of citizens (Section I). This contribution criticizesthe one-sidedly power-oriented perceptions of WTO law as ‘internationallaw among states’ (Section II) and the related perceptionsof international judges as dependent agents of states (Section III).Civil society, parliaments and democratic governments shouldencourage national and international judges to cooperate intheir legal task of interpreting citizen-oriented internationaleconomic law ‘in conformity with principles of justiceand international law’, as explicitly prescribed in theVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The legal coherenceof multilevel judicial governance depends on protecting principlesof procedural as well as substantive justice and a common conceptionof ‘rule of law’ not only in intergovernmental relationsamong states, but also vis-à-vis their citizens engagedin, and benefiting from, international trade (Sections IV–VIII).     

反垄断法的终极目的及其司法保障

反垄断法的目的具有宣示性和导向性,为所有的实体规则和程序规则提供价值基础。如果反垄断法的目的设置不当或者混乱,将增大反垄断法实施的难度,削弱反垄断法的主题。传统观点认为,反垄断法的目的只在于维护有效的公平竞争秩序,但相对于保护消费者权益的终极目的而言,这种目的只是工具性的。这在立法上有明显的体现,在学理上有充分的理由并在司法上有广泛的实践。我国未来的反垄断立法、执法与司法应当将保护消费者权益作为其终极目的。     

反垄断诉讼的价值定位与制度建构

反垄断诉讼是反垄断法实施的重要机制之一,是反垄断法理论研究和司法实践中的重要问题。对此问题有两种研究思路：一是以个人权利为中心,将诉讼看作争议解决机制;二是以秩序建构为中心,将诉讼看作建构理想秩序的重要机制。反垄断法的产生、发展与有机社会的生成同步。垄断行为属于风险行为,其造成的损害具有不确定性、延伸性、难以恢复性,因而反垄断法属于现代社会规制法。与此相应,反垄断诉讼应是秩序建构诉讼,在价值上注重竞争秩序的建构,在功能上主张司法能动、积极回应社会在竞争上形成的价值共识,在构造上主张放宽原告条件,建立多元参与的诉讼机制。     

经济全球化与反垄断立法

随着经济全球化的发展,基于国内因素的考虑而制定的反垄断法不可避免地遇到了各种问题,美国和欧盟等都开始对传统反垄断法进行调整。经济全球化也促进了反垄断国际规范的发展。中国在经济全球化的背景下应该及时制定反垄断法或反限制竞争法;并且在制度安排上应注意:坚持垄断中性的认识,充分体现合理规则,中国反垄断法应以规制限制竞争行为为中心,充分考虑国际市场因素,合理安排责任制度,有克制地赋予域外效力。     

The balance between equity and efficiency; reflections on the goals of the new Nigerian competition law

In January 2019, the Nigerian Government finally enacted its first competition law after several attempts to do so previously failed. Since all competition regimes advance one or more goals, the paper provides a critical evaluation of what the goals of the Nigerian Competition Law ‘is’ or ‘are’ and/or what they should be. This paper posits that discussion on goals must relate fundamentally to the true reason(s) the nation ‘needs’ an antitrust legislation and the relationship between these reasons (as reflected in the preamble of the legislation) and the prohibitory aspects of the law.Although the goal of competition is generally thought to be relating to promoting economic efficiency, however, for developing countries (including Nigeria), competition must compose of an important equity dimension. Ironically, the work uses the ‘developed’ experience of the EU in later stages to show that the goals of an antitrust policy are never static but dynamic and may not necessarily always admit of ‘efficiency’ considerations. This paper’s argument is that Nigeria needs a welfarist approach to competition which means efficiency should sit as a top objective and that any compromise on economic efficiency as the goal must be accommodated only to the extent that basic principles of a market driven competition is not harmed. Consequently, the work reflects on how the new Nigerian law has provided a balance between market efficiency and other goals of competition and how the new Nigerian competition body can operationalise this balance in the development of the nation’s antitrust policy. In this regard, the EU also provides some important enforcement lessons.