法律是否需要道德——富勒《实证主义与忠实于法律——答哈特教授》批判性阅读

法律与道德问题的讨论,最激烈的莫过于实证主义法学家哈特同自然法学家富勒长达17年的一场论战。实证主义法学派坚持法律与道德之间的分离,即关于法律与道德的分离学说或者分离命题,而自然法学派则主张法律与道德的不可分,即关于法律与道德的不可分离的学说或结合命题。但仅以此定义并未能反映出双方论战所具有的现实意识及对待问题的态度。本文试从富勒所著文章《实证主义与忠实于法律——答哈特教授》的角度出发,解析其背后所具有的实践性意义。     

法律实证主义的强立场——兼评拉兹《法律的权威》

在法律与道德的关系上,拉兹认为有效法律的鉴别标准完全排除道德论证,这就是拉兹的渊源论.渊源论表明所有的法律都具有渊源,渊源论的论据来自权威论.权威以理由为基础,是改变行为理由的能力.法律也要主张权威,法律主张合法性权威是它的一个本质特征.权威性理由是排他性理由,排除了道德因素的可能性,权威论支持了渊源论.权威论受到了来自包容性实证主义者和德沃金的批评,他们的争论共同推进了对法律与道德关系问题的研究.     

法律的“内在道德”的两个维度——再访富勒自然法思想中的一个核心概念

法律的内在道德是富勒新自然法思想中的重要概念，也是解读富勒法律理论的重要线索之一。 作为法体系的内在道德，是现代自然法复兴的产物。理解内在道德的关键在于揭示其可能蕴含的形式维度与 接受维度。从当代自然法和法实证主义争论的情况来看，形式维度的内在道德证明了法体系中包含必然的道 德，在这个层面上打击了“分离命题”，接受维度的内在道德却可以和实证主义的“来源命题”兼容。由此，富 勒的程序自然法进路或许可以提供一种超越传统自然法和实证主义框架的新法哲学可能。     

法律实证主义的基本命题

法律实证主义具有其独特的主张，其基础主要在于三个命题，即谱系命题、因袭命题和分离命题。由这三个命题出发，可以了解其理论主张到底具有什么样的意义，以及恶法亦法和法律命令说如何有意义。     

包容性实证主义法学视野下的法律与道德的关系探究

法律与道德的关系问题是西方法哲学史上的一个经典问题。自然法学者认为法律必须符合道德要求,而包容性实证主义通过论证主张法律与道德并无必然的联系,而只是一种可能的关联,包容性实证主义法学展示了道德包容于法律的另一种可能路径,使法律与道德可能存在的关联得到了说明。     

《法律的概念》的功利主义检讨——以法律与道德的分离为中心

《法律的概念》一书在试图进行一种不带任何论证目的的描述性分析的同时,却无时无刻不被功利主义这一幽灵所萦绕。那么,鉴于功利主义的人性预设的价值判断,作为一种理想类型划分的道德与法律的分离命题就需要重新检讨检讨的过程折射出了法律实证主义的自由主义悖论,进而开放出了法律实证主义在自由主义传统下如何处理功利主义与个人自由间关系的问题。     

论实证主义法学关于法律与道德关系的自然法化

在道德与法律的关系问题上,西方实证主义法学一方面站在自然法学的对立面;另一方面在关于法律与道德关系这个问题上又由经历了奥斯丁、凯尔森的法律与道德的分离学说,到哈特的法律是最低限度内容的自然法,再到拉德布鲁赫的从实证主义到自然法的转向。这样一个不断变化的过程事实上正说明了实证主义法学在自身发展的过程中正在逐渐地向自然法学靠拢,认同了自然法学在关于法律与道德关系问题上的关于法律必须含涉道德性的观点。同时也说明法律的存在和发展与道德是密不可分的,人们对法律的道德性问题上的认知与理解也正在日益达成共识。     

两种法理学之争:如何可能与发展

对"法律是什么"的不同回答,形成了两种不同性质的法理学。哈特"法理学"的特点是"描述性"与"中立性",是关于法律的"二阶"理论,其无涉道德评价;德沃金"法理学"的特点是"评价性"与"证立性",是关于法律的"一阶"理论,其关涉道德评价。哈特"法理学"的最大问题是,从法概念中剥离道德,导致不能为法律合法性提供辩护;德沃金"法理学"的关键问题是,用道德对法律合法性进行审查,易于消解法律的独立性,丧失法律的权威性。故此,为维护法律的合法性与独立性并存与统一,可借鉴富勒的"法律内在道德"观念,尝试性地区分法律的外在道德与内在道德,将法律的合法性审查标准限缩在法律的内在道德之中,并借鉴康德的"可普遍化检验"原理,将通过普遍化检验所形成的可普遍化原则作为法律的内在道德的判断标准。     

从富勒的内在道德论看中国法制的发展

富勒的内在道德论确立了自然法中的程序自然法。通过与哈特的论战,富勒提出了的法的内在道德与外在道德这一划分,使分析实证主义主导下的法律世界重新审视自然法。在《法律的道德性》一书中富勒向我们描绘和展现了法律的内在道德这一愿望品质,同时指出"法律是使人类行为服从规则之治的事业"。本文就通过对富勒法的内在道德论的研究来分析我国法制的发展历程。     

法律权威的可能性——关于国家与法律的规范分析

法律能否主张权威？这既是法哲学思考的核心命题之一,也是政治哲学中的难题。本文通过深入当代西方实践法哲学与政治哲学的语境中,借助分析与规范的方法,以行动与理由的解释核心,阐释权威概念的哲学内涵。借助法哲学家拉兹给出的权威的服务观念,证明法律能够主张正当权威,但是法律的权威并不是道德性权威,法律的权威性并不能产生服从法律的一般性的道德理由,因此不存在服从法律的一般义务。本文试图通过以法律权威的探讨为主线,借助实证主义的分析方法,对国家与法律的含义做出规范性的解释,来廓清法哲学与政治哲学中的权威难题。     

The Weak Natural Law Thesis and the Common Good

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position.     

哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂——基于“分离命题”的考察

哈特与德沃金之争及其所开放出来的问题构成了当今英美法律哲学研究的理论坐标。哈特/德沃金之争的核心在于法律与道德有无必然的关联,哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然的关联;而德沃金认为,承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则,法律与道德存在必然的关联。法实证主义在回应德沃金的批判时,在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧,分裂为排他性与包容性的法实证主义。     

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

Abstract. The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.     

通过合法性的正当性——实证主义法学的正当性思想研究

现代性下事实与价值二分的法律实证主义割裂了法律与道德的关系,古代的正当性被转化为合法性:一个行动或公权力,只要是符合实在法的,即可称为正当。通过合法性的正当性要想成立,还必须解决法律自身的有效性问题,这样才能彻底摆脱道德的证成。以纯粹法学为代表的法律实证主义通过法律体系内的效力授权链回答了这个问题,从而完成了通过合法性的正当性的整个拼图。但是,割裂了法律与道德之间的联系,通过合法性的正当性又面临着新的正当性危机。     

Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*

In this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in event inessential to legal positivism. The second is inessential to legal positivism. The third is likely inessential to law. I then characterize the central claim of ILP in a way that relies on none of these: ILP is the claim that necessarily social facts determine the determinants of legal content. I show that ILP so conceived leaves the central debates in law largely untouched. I suggest how the most fundamental of these—the question of the normativity of law—at least can be usefully addressed. The essay closes by suggesting that even though one can distinguish the social from the normative dimensions of law, a theory of the nature of law is necessarily an account of the relationship between the two: It is a theory either of the difference that certain distinctive social facts make in normative space, or it is an account of the distinctive normative difference that law makes, and the social and other facts that are necessary to explain that difference. One can distinguish between but one cannot separate the social from the normative aspects of legality.     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States

The aim of the paper is that of discussing some recent antipositivist theses, with specific reference to the arguments that focus on the alleged incapability of legal positivism to understand and explain the complex normative structure of constitutional states. One of the central tenets of legal positivism (in its guise of methodological or conceptual positivism) is the theory of the separation between law and morality. On the assumption that in contemporary legal systems, constitutional law represents a point of intersection between law and basic moral values, antipositivists contrast legal positivism with two main arguments. First, on a more general level, the positivist theory of the separation between law and morality is questioned; then, and consequently, the neutrality thesis in the juristic study of law is rejected. The author discusses both these antipositivist arguments, and offers a brief defence of methodological positivism.     

The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti‐Positivism*

Abstract. When first I began this paper, I envisaged it as a fairly straightforward exercise in comparison between the Sheffield School’s and Discourse Theory’s varieties of legal idealism or anti‐positivism (these terms being synonymous for the types of theory that contest positivism’s separation thesis, that is, the contention that there is no necessary conceptual connection between law and morality). One obvious distinction, for example, is between the moral substance at the heart of these respective theories: the Sheffield School’s legal theory being founded on Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency, and Alexy’s theory focusing on Radbruch’s intolerable degree of injustice. However, the more I thought about the two respective theories, the more interested I became in one particular issue: the denial of the separation thesis that constitutes legal idealism. Here, I present a paper which is not so much concerned with the substance of two different types of legal idealism or anti‐positivism, but which focuses on the question of whether and in what way either or both of the theories can correctly be characterised as legal idealist or anti‐positivist. I focus in this paper on two works in particular: Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s Law as a Moral Judgment (1994), and Robert Alexy’s The Argument from Injustice (2002).     

论法的合法性来源——兼论法院的司法审查制度

法的合法性问题是法学科中一个本源性问题，其学术指向在于探究法的终极本源。法的合法性是法之所以为法的内在根据，是法之所以被遵守的原因，是法得以良性运行的基础与前提。法的合法性问题不仅仅是一个理论问题，也是一个与法律实践密切相关的现实问题。     

拉兹的法哲学趣向——将法律实证主义导向实践哲学

约瑟夫.拉兹是法律实证主义后期的重要代表人物。在研究法律时,他除了继续保持实证主义传统、使用法律实证主义惯用的分析方法以外,还试图用新的方法来替代早期的分析法学家们广为使用的方法,并使用新的哲学理论来改造法律实证主义。他的法哲学思想表现出的一个重要趣向就是：将法律实证主义导向实践哲学。这一趣向贯穿于拉兹法哲学思想的方方面面,是理解拉兹法哲学思想的关键。