Struggling on the World Scene: An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran

Abstract

In 2003, the EU was hopeful to convince Iran to give up its nuclear programme. Five years later, most signals point to an accelerated nuclear programme in Iran. This article first aims to sketch an overview of the EU efforts, and secondly to make an interim assessment of the effectiveness of the EU's approach vis-à-vis Iran. While the final assessment may be different, the current evaluation is disappointing from the point of view of the EU. The Iranian case does not enhance the EU's strategic reputation in the world.     

The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran

Abstract

This paper explores EU policy towards Iran to challenge the common implicit or explicit notion that the EU's ‘actorness’ in the international system rests primarily, or solely, on its Pillar I external relations. Utilising criteria developed to examine the ‘actorness’ of the EU, the article explores this policy area to demonstrate that the EU's ‘actorness’ resulted not only from the ‘Community’ aspects of foreign policy, but also from its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).     

The convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran

Between 1996 and 2012, cooperation between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) on Iran sanctions underwent a dramatic shift from open disagreement to almost unanimous consensus. Whereas the US preferred negative sanctions throughout this period, the EU opted at first for using economic incentives and dialogue. The EU’s diverging approach exemplified the overall preference for multilateralism and engagement strategies over unilateral coercive measures. Beginning in 2005, however, European sanction policy towards Iran converged with that of the US. In this article, I argue that the convergence of transatlantic sanction policy against Iran cannot be understood without the pressure employed by Washington. The US pressure campaign consisted of secondary sanctions against European companies. As necessary condition, US pressure has been a key external factor that complemented the EU’s internal developments fostering a more coercive approach towards Tehran after the revelation of the Iranian nuclear programme in 2002 and the breakdown of the E3 (Great Britain, France and Germany) negotiations in 2005.     

The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing countries

This article assesses how and to what extent the European Union (EU) uses a security perspective to define and shape its relationship with the developing world. In order to evaluate the EU's development policy and its relations with developing countries we link the concept of ‘security–development nexus’ with the concept of ‘securitization’. The article examines whether securitization can be observed with regard to four dimensions: discourse, policy instruments, policy actions and institutional framework. The analysis demonstrates a securitization of the EU's development policy and its relations with developing countries, particularly in Africa. However, paradoxically, the securitization's extent and nature suggest that the EU can also use it as a way to avoid a more direct involvement in conflict areas.     

EU Foreign Policy in the Italian Parliament: The Debates on China and Iran

Governments have always been more reluctant to accept parliamentary oversight in foreign policy than in any other domestic policy field. This examination of the recent performance of the Italian Parliament in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) scrutiny and control in the two case studies of the EU's arms embargo against China and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program shows that institutional arrangements concerning parliamentary control in this field have significant shortcomings. Although limited, the reforms under discussion in the new intergovernmental conference could contribute to improving the performance of parliaments and to creating a common awareness of the problem of democratic deficit in CFSP among the parliamentarians of EU member states.     

‘We care about you,but …’: the politics of EU trade policy and development

The European Union (EU) is one of the most important markets for developing countries, and trade policy has long been one of its most important instruments for promoting development. There is, however, a paradox at the heart of the relationship between the EU's trade policy and development. On the one hand the EU's trade as development policy has undergone a paradigm shift, the objective shifting from supporting the former colonies of the EU's member states to addressing poverty and with a greater emphasis on reciprocal liberalization. On the other hand, the EU's conventional trade policy initiatives—particularly its market access objectives in the Doha Round and in commercially motivated bilateral trade agreements—have adverse consequences for developing countries, as does its tendency to adopt stringent product regulations. We argue that this paradox is explained by differences in how much traction the emphasis on the development implications of trade has had in the EU's various trade policy subsystems.     

EU power and armed humanitarianism in Africa: evaluating ESDP in Chad

This article analyses the European Union's (EU's) largest European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military mission outside Europe to date; Eufor Tchad/RCA was a 3700-strong force involving personnel from 23 states, deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic for 12 months from March 2008. Far from this mission achieving EU ‘supremacy’ or projecting an ‘imperial’ reach, an evaluation of its objectives and achievements reveals acute limitations in the EU's ability to project power. The article analyses the context in which Eufor was conceived and deployed. It notes that the mission's weaknesses, like those of the United Nations mission to whom the EU transferred its security role in 2009, reflected its convoluted origins and objectives. Finally, the article examines whether the EU as a unitary actor has the desire or the ability to ‘replace’ individual European nations—in this case France—in their post-colonial military and ‘humanitarian’ roles in sub-Saharan Africa.     

Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.     

Counter‐terrorism and commercial interests: Do they conflict?

This paper concentrates on whether there is an inherent conflict between commercial interests and the fight against state‐sponsored terrorism.¹ It examines the differences between US and EU policy, particularly in relation to Iran; the roles of Russia and China and the wider impact of international responses. The author concludes that symbolic sanctions and sporadic dialogue are completely inadequate instruments, but that genuine international sanctions and critical dialogue should not be viewed as mutually exclusive policy instruments.     

欧美科技制裁协作的动力与分歧：基于欧盟的视角

科技制裁在持续的军事冲突中发挥着关键作用,在和平时期的地缘政治中也从未消失。欧盟与美国是最大的制裁实施者,双方的制裁协作在多个地区和领域产生了重要影响。虽然欧美科技制裁协作较为频繁,但欧盟和美国在制裁政策上仍存在诸多分歧。文章从欧美价值观、安全威胁和二级制裁这三个维度出发,剖析欧盟与美国进行科技制裁协作的动因与诱发分歧的因素,并选择俄罗斯、伊朗和中国这三个具有代表性和差异性的案例进行比较。欧盟与美国对俄罗斯的制裁协作水平最高;在伊朗案例中,二级制裁因素带来的欧美分歧较为突出;在中国案例中,欧美尚未达成明显的制裁共识。共同价值观、安全威胁的紧迫性、二级制裁压力等要素是促使欧盟参与美国科技制裁的重要动因。然而,不同的外交政策理念、安全认知的错位和二级制裁的反作用力也使欧美分歧难以弥合,大大削减了制裁效率。     

EU's Fight Against Terrorist Finances: Internal Shortcomings and Unsuitable External Models

This article offers an analysis of the European Union's (EU) efforts in the fight against terrorist finances. Following the 9/11 attacks, the EU has adopted the relevant United Nations counterterrorism resolutions as well as the special recommendations of Financial Action Task Force. In addition, the EU has developed its own measures spanning across all of its three pillars. There is, however, a cause for concern that some of these measures have not been properly implemented, while others have been criticized on legal, transparency, legitimacy, and efficiency grounds. These shortcomings are not only due to EU's own internal obstacles, but also result from the EU's uncritical adoption of the prevailing smart sanctions and money-laundering regimes, which are based on a number of unwarranted assumptions that do not reflect the nature of contemporary terrorist threats in Europe.     

The European Union and Latin America: ‘Transformative power Europe’ versus the realities of economic interests

Relations between the European Union (EU) and regional subgroups in Latin America (Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central America) are clear examples of ‘pure interregionalism’ and provide evidence of the EU's active promotion of regional integration. Within the context of these cases, this article explores what type of international power the EU wields, how interregionalism is embedded in that power, and how it is deployed. Combining strands of literature on EU–Latin American relations, interregionalism, EU external policy and power provides a framework within which interregionalism can be understood as an important normative and practical tool for the EU's external power projection. Drawing on official documentation and interviews with key individuals, the paper highlights the EU's articulation of power in interregional relations and reflects upon its mixed success. It concludes that, while imperial qualities and aspirations can be observed in the EU's penchant for interregionalism, the transformative power of the EU remains limited.     

The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

This article analyses the US–EU transatlantic dialogue on the Iranian nuclear dossier with a particular view to the implications for EU foreign policy on Iran. Doing so, it uses neo-Gramscian scholarship to put the EU’s “over-compliance” with Iran sanctions into perspective. Constrained by the imperatives of hegemonic coercion in the form of US financial Iran sanctions against third country entities and with the hegemonic consent of a Western US-led “historic bloc”, Europe was relegated to a subaltern below its mediatory potential. It will be shown how this finding complicates the EU’s ambition to renew relations with Iran. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with experts and delegation members from the P5+1, this article thus analyses “the normative element” in the transatlantic security dialogue on Iran at a time where the latter is undergoing a sea change in the wake of the implementation of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” of July 2015.     

International development and the European Union's external policies: changing contexts,problematic nexuses,contested partnerships

This special section explores and explains how the European Union's (EU's) overall approach to international development has evolved since the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the international level, the rise of a group of emerging economies has not only provided developing countries with greater choices, but has also further enhanced their agency, thus questioning the EU's leadership and even relevance in international development. At the European level, the various (paradigmatic) shifts in each of the three key external policies—trade, security and foreign policy—and the EU's aspiration to project a coherent external action have collided with the EU's commitment to international development. Numerous tensions characterize the various nexuses in EU external relations, which ultimately challenge the EU's international legitimacy and (self-proclaimed) identity as a champion of the interests of the developing world. Nevertheless, the EU has made more progress than is generally acknowledged in making its external policies more coherent with its development policy. Moreover, the EU's relationship with developing countries has gradually become less asymmetrical, though not because of the EU's emphasis on partnership and ownership but more because of the increased agency of developing countries.     

The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?

The G20 has emerged as the premier forum for international economic policy coordination. For small EU states, the EU's participation in the G20 represents a particular challenge as they may be faced with decisions in which they had no say. This article looks at the possibilities for small state involvement in the G20 process and analyses the extent to which they can influence the EU's participation in the G20. The article suggests two sets of variables to explain the possibilities for influence of small states in the EU's external relations. Looking into four financial and economic policy dossiers, the article explores the conditions of success of small states' strategies. The article does not contradict that the big member states dominate the EU presence in the G20, but it does argue that small states may successfully use the EU as a foreign policy platform to pursue national objectives. Their influence varies strongly and is bound to a number of conditions.     

Imperial re-bordering of Europe: the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy

Debates on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) pivot on questions about what kind of political community the EU is becoming and what are the limits of its power projections in the EU's Neighbourhood. Indeed, with this new ambitious and ambiguous policy the EU's external relations are expanding from purely economic to cultural, political and security functions. The EU's desire and need to export its values and norms beyond its borders raises a set of ontological questions about the nature of the EU.     

Are European Union sanctions “targeted”?

The emergence of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s was due to the humanitarian impact of embargoes, which were deemed unacceptable and compelled senders to shift to measures designed to affect only wrongdoers. Twenty years on, the present paper considers the extent to which autonomous sanctions are designed to affect those individuals and elites responsible for the behaviour the EU aims to condemn. How faithful has the EU remained to this concept in its sanctions policy? The enquiry scrutinizes diverse practices in three established sanctions strands of the EU, development aid suspensions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions and Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) withdrawals. It shows that it has been more faithfully implemented in some strands of EU sanctions than in others. Specifically in the flagship CFSP sanctions practice, the due process motivated court challenges of its blacklists have led the EU to modify selection criteria in a way that renders them potentially less targeted.     

Maritime security in the Black Sea: can regional solutions work?1

The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been seen by some as key to giving the EU greater international influence, by others as a threat to the EU's strengths as a civilian power. This article finds that, as of 2002, the EU's new military dimension could not be conceived as a fundamental threat to its civilian power acquis. Concerns have justifiably been raised over the possible diversion of resources into the military sphere, the emergence of a less transparent policy‐making culture and ESDP's effect on the way the EU is perceived from outside. However, force levels have remained limited and most policymakers see the new EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as an instrument for complementing civilian elements of crisis management. This article measures ESDP more specifically against the substantive approaches towards security challenges that the EU has elaborated. It argues that European strategies suffer most notably from political‐level conceptual weaknesses that cut across both civilian and military domains and that the incipient ESDP has yet to address.     

New EU Members in Europe's Security Policy

What impact will the 2004 round of enlargement have on the European Union's common foreign and security policy? This article argues that the new members' arrival in theory strengthens the Euroatlantic camp within the EU. This impact has, however, been limited by the accession states' difficulty in exercising effective influence in Brussels so far, and their foreign policy is also coming under pressure at home because of the unpopularity of the Iraq War. The newcomers hold distinct views on the EU's policy toward Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. On this point, their efforts have begun to slowly but demonstrably transform the European Union's own involvement in countries on the EU's eastern frontier. In addition, the first signs are becoming apparent of the new members' effective imprint on the EU's common foreign and security policy.     

Once a member,always a member? Assessing the importance of time in the relationship between the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee

This article examines the European Union's (EU's) full membership of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). More specifically, we address (1) why the EU became a full member of the DAC in 1961, long before the EU was granted legal competences for development policy, and (2) why this membership status has remained unaltered over the past half-century, despite persistent dissatisfaction among both EU and non-EU members of the DAC. By applying historical institutionalism, we find that the initial decision on the EU's membership status in the DAC created a path dependence that was impossible to reverse afterwards, despite changing internal and external circumstances.