Natural Law and Normative Inclinations

Natural law ethics holds that practical rationality consists in engaging in non‐defective ways with a range of fundamental goods. These basic goods are characteristically presented as reflecting the natural properties of humans, but the details of this picture vary widely. This article argues that natural law ethics can usefully be understood as a type of dispositional theory of value, which identifies the basic goods with those objectives that humans are characteristically disposed to pursue and value for their own sake. Natural law theories of practical rationality can then be understood as attempts to capture the principles that would govern engagement with the basic goods under ideal conditions. The article begins by offering an account of normative inclinations as human dispositions both to act in certain ways and to believe that the actions are worthwhile or required. It then explores the implications of this account for natural law ethics, discussing the role of the basic goods in practical rationality, whether the goods may change over time and the connection between the goods and human nature.     

战争法发展进程中的自然法思想探究

纵观战争法发展的历程,尽管导致近代战争法形成的原因很多,但如果从思想渊源上考察则可以发现,自然法居于极为重要的地位。如果说战争法作为社会文明中的成果,是人类对自己生存方式的一种理性选择,那么自然法是其重要的精神动力和法理基础;自然法复兴催生了惩治战争犯罪理论;新自然法学促进了国际人道法体系的完善。     

理性即自由:论斯宾诺莎的自然法观

斯宾诺莎是古典自然法学派的代表人物之一,他提出了“真观念”为认识的起点,再辅之以几何学的证明方式.斯宾诺莎认为上帝的法则就是自然规律.人是自然的一部分,所以人也要遵循自然规律,人的自然规律或者自然权利就是人努力保存自己,这是人的本性.斯宾诺莎从人性论出发,论述了在自然状态下,人的生活受到了被动情感的奴役,人们要通过理性来签订社会契约,建立国家来摆脱这种奴役,并对违约行为进行处罚.这种自由具备的伦理特征使得斯宾诺莎在古典自然法学家中的地位显得比较特殊.     

西方自然法思想的两种传统

自然法是西方历史上一个极为关键的概念,但是讽刺的是,并不存在一个统一连贯并得到广泛认同的自然法定义。在自然法思想发展过程中呈现出两条根本不同的进路,即古代自然法与近代自然法。自然法思想两条不同进路的差异表现在:从自然法的特性方面看是神圣性与世俗性的不同;在自然法的基点上自然理性与自然状态的区隔;自然法的内容区别则体现在自然义务与自然权利。     

人文主义法学引论

人文主义法学是指崇尚人的价值、尊重人的本性的法学观点或法学思想体系。人文主义法学的指导思想是将人作为目的。人文主义法学的基本原则及对法律思想的影响表现在如下方面:尊重人的需要和利益原则促进了权利、人权、自由的产生和发展;防范人的恶性原则促进了法治概念、民主政府、分权、法律程序、法律监督的产生和发展;宽容人的弱点原则主张法律对人的行为不宜提出过高的要求;鼓励人的优点原则主张法律允许人们参与法律实践活动、鼓励人的奉献行为。人文主义法学的兴起将促进法学研究和法律实践的发展。     

Equality and Marriage in Vico

The subject of this paper is the relationship between marriage and equality in Giambattista Vico. In his writings Vico gives the notion of marriage a unique importance, not framed on any oversized notion of nature or natural law but on the political fight for the right to marry (a quest for full citizenship status). The right to marry is linked with complex dynamics of human equality, and to a notion of human nature shaped by belief‐dependent institutions.     

"自然人"的社会与"自然人"的法律

现代化的法律语境之下,“自然人”还能否有存在的位置?当法律日益与人们的本性疏离的时候,这是否是一种可欲的法律?作为调整人的特定行为的规则,法律应当与人性、人的欲望与需求相联系。简单地说,法律应当为个人的自然生存留下特定的空间,为个人的自然性的保护创造条件。     

论自然法学的权利观

自然法学发展史是一部人类权利观念的发展史。自然法学的权利观的发展分为三个阶段 ,并各有其特点 :古代与中世纪自然法学的权利观是以正义为基础的 ,近代自然法学的权利观是以自由为核心的 ,现代自然法学的权利观是以平等为核心的。     

论自然权利的刑法保护

环境的刑法保护是一种重要的环境保护方法，但环境刑法的架构极富变化，传统的刑法保护客体理论存在着明显的不足，我国刑法保护的客体应为公民环境权与自然权利的综合体，兼顾对人类环境权和自然本身的权利的保护，突出自然价值的独立性，以充分全面保护自然环境不受人类环境犯罪行为的侵害。     

“自然”与“自然法”概念的古今之异——关于自然法学术史的一个初步反思

古典时代的自然法学说与近代的自然权利学说存在本质上的差异，这是由于对“自然“一词的古今理解不同导致的。古典时代的自然法是关于人本性的法则，是与形而上学不可分离的，近代以来的自然权利说是一种革命性的政治理论，与形而上学和人的本性没有必然联系。二战后对极权主义的反思导致了古典自然法的复兴。     

Natural Law: Practical Reason and Creative Information

With nine main theses that are interspersed with each other, this paper explores and articulates some of the most important questions in natural law theory. The theses include: I. In investigating facts, one finds reasons to choose an honest self-discipline; II. Deliberating, one finds reasons similarly directing one to other intrinsic goods; III. Taken integrally, these goods and principles acquire the force of moral precepts; IV. Those precepts, natural moral law, depict our nature (humanity) in its flourishing; V. Nature and natures are best explained by free, intelligent transcendent creation; VI. Creation and other gifts past and present deserve our gratitude; VII. Natural moral law and historical revelation are two channels of information; VIII. Secular and spiritual communities are distinct and respectfully self-governing; IX. Natural moral law defines human rights but rightfully extends beyond them.     

Should Law track Morality?

Does the moral status of an action provide in itself a non-instrumental, pro-tanto reason for a corresponding legal status—a reason that applies regardless of whether the law promotes a value that is independent of the law, such as preventing wrongdoing or promoting utility or distributive or retributive justice, regardless of the consequences of doing so? While the relation between morality and law is a familiar topic, this specific question is rarely discussed explicitly. Yet it seems to be controversial. The article highlights and considers this question, while focusing on the criminal law. It concludes that the answer is negative—there is no necessary relation between morality and law in this respect. Rather, there is a reason in favor of incorporating morality into the law only when this incorporation promotes a moral value that is independent of the law.     

On the Foundations of Law: Religion,Nature, Morals

Abstract. The article discusses the importance of three extra‐legal sources—divine inspiration, natural law, and morality—for a full understanding and effective application of law. Each source is seen as vital due to its ability to compensate for the shortcomings of the other two sources. No source, including belief, is seen as necessarily incompatible with the doctrinal pluralism characteristic of modern societies.     

刑法学中的当然解释

一般来说,当然解释是法条的适用方法,但在刑法中,当然解释应当作为一种解释理由。举重以明轻,是就出罪、处罚轻而言;举轻以明重,是就入罪、处罚重而言。当然解释的依据是事物的本质与法条的旨趣。由于刑法并不禁止有利于被告人的类推解释,故在适用举重以明轻的原理得出有利于被告人的解释结论时,不需要刑法的明文规定,但不能将刑法的处罚漏洞作为举重以明轻的根据。罪刑法定原则禁止不利于被告人的类推解释,故在适用举轻以明重的原理得出不利于被告人的解释结论后,还要求案件事实符合刑法规范,但是,不能将对案件事实的缩小评价当作对刑法规范的类推解释。     

康德法哲学的权利伦理视域与法治理想

康德围绕解决“一个普遍法治的公民社会如何可能”这一法哲学问题,通过权利的普遍原则论证了权利的道德哲学基础、权利对于道德的优先性以及一个公民社会的私人权利原则是如何可能的;通过法治的理想社会原则论证了人的两重性、法治国原则以及一个永久和平的伦理的世界共同体是如何可能的。康德法哲学的古典自由主义传统、自然法思想、宪政理念和法治理想对后世产生了深远的影响。     

Please Don't Use Science or Mathematics in Arguing for Human Rights or Natural Law

In the vast literature on human rights and natural law one finds arguments that draw on science or mathematics to support claims to universality and objectivity. Here are two such arguments: 1) Human rights are as universal (i.e., valid independently of their specific historical and cultural Western origin) as the laws and theories of science; and 2) principles of natural law have the same objective (metahistorical) validity as mathematical principles. In what follows I will examine these arguments in some detail and argue that both are misplaced. A section of the paper will be devoted to a discussion of arguments relying on the historical and cultural specificity (and intrinsic superiority) of Western science. The conclusion is that both science and mathematics offer little help to anyone wanting to make use of them as paradigms of universality, objectivity, and rationality. Finally, I will draw some consequences for the idea of human rights.     

On Two Distinct and Opposing Versions of Natural Law: “Exclusive” versus “Inclusive”

Abstract. This paper takes the dichotomy between “exclusive” and “inclusive” positivism and applies it by analogy to natural‐law theories. With John Finnis, and with Beyleved and Brownsword, we have examples of “exclusive natural‐law theory,” on which approach the law is valid only if its content satisfies a normative monological moral theory. The discourse theories of Alexy and Habermas are seen instead as “inclusive natural‐law theories,” in which the positive law is a constitutive moment in that it identifies moral rules and specifies their meaning. The article argues that inclusive theories of natural law are better suited to expressing an authentic “republican” attitude. *

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Trial by Slogan: Natural Law and Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex

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现代民法中自然人制度的反思与重塑

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