Prospects and Limits of Democratic Governance in the EU

The EU Treaty contains for the first time a title on democratic principles. These provisions emphasise the importance of national parliaments and the EU parliament for the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The new chapter on democratic principles does not address the central challenge of the EU polity to the traditional understanding of democratic legitimacy, the disjunction of political and economic governance as expressed by the important role of independent institutions like the Commission, the European Central Bank and agencies in EU governance . This is a consequence of the fact that the status of independent regulatory institutions in a democratic polity has not been clarified—neither in the EU nor in the Member States. However, such independent institutions exist in diverse forms in several Member States and could hence be understood as a principle of democratic governance common to the Member States. Such an understanding has not yet evolved. The central theoretical problem is that regulatory theories which explain the legitimacy of independent institutions as an alternative to traditional representation remain outside the methodology of traditional democratic theory. Economic constitutional theory, based on social contract theory and widely neglected in the legal constitutional debate, offers a methodological approach to understanding independent regulatory institutions as part of representative democratic governance.     

美国宪法解释:"麦迪逊两难"之消解

在美国宪法解释实践中长期存在着被学者们所称的“麦迪逊之两难”问题,即民主多数统治的自由与少数自由权利之间始终处于一种似乎不可消解的张力之中。不同的学者和法官由于基于各自不同的民主与宪政原则,而在宪法解释的理论与实践中采取了不同的解释方法与立场,主要分属两大宪法解释流派:原意主义和非原意主义。然而,认真考察和分析美国宪法与宪政原意与原则理想,则会得出“麦迪逊之两难”命题不过是一个假命题的结论,因为真正的民主自身包含着自由平等原则。     

美国疑难宪法案件司法审查的两种模式及其补充——以“个案宪法权利”的证立为视角

疑难宪法案件的形成有其思想和规范渊源。司法审查必须补充演绎正当的大前提,即证立“个案宪法权利”的正当性。宪法解释学模式通过回溯道德权利的理论渊源重构个案中的宪法权利以支持宪法裁判;恢复性民主商谈司法模式主张将制宪者达成宪法原则的民主过程嵌入宪法裁判之中,寄希望法官间通过协商方式达成低限度的理论共识支持未完全理论化司法协议作为裁判的结果。程序主义宪法观将司法审查的合法性置于民主理论的语境中,使司法审查的合法性问题能够在民主的语境中得到缓解。宪法解释学模式的一元论与恢复性民主商谈司法模式的多元论欲满足司法审查所承载的立法与裁判的双重责任,必须将司法审查视为原则的论坛、公共理性的典范,以弥合重新道德化解释与重新民主化商谈之间的裂痕。     

论授权立法的合法性

从历史的和立法理论的角度研究授权立法的合法性,指出授权立法产生的一定历史必然性以及与民主、法治等重大宪政原则相抵牾的合法性欠缺;分析了各国对授权立法合法性欠缺的补救措施及其在法理上的意义;最后文章还探讨了授权立法的合法性研究在当前我国的理论及现实意义。     

宪政民主还是民主宪政?——试论美国最高法院与民主

宪政和民主是现代政治体制中相辅相成的两个部分,如果说民主是河,宪政则是堤。为了限制民主的冲动性与盲目性,美国人制定了成文宪法,在代表制基础上实现了宪政民主。与国会、总统一样,美国最高法院也是民意代表,只不过更为间接和持久。通过解释宪法,美国最高法院不断修补宪政之堤,在尊重民意的基础上引导民意,将宪政民主转向民主宪政,维护了自身的地位与权威。     

协商民主能否成为可能——自由、平等与理性之于协商民主

20世纪最后20年,一种新型的民主理论——协商民主在西方政治学界开始兴起、发展,并成为人们讨论研究聚集的焦点。作为一种可能的新型民主,面临着许多挑战,何以成为可能或者说能否成为可能成为人们争论的焦点,这一问题值得我们认真思考。基于此,从一种自由、平等、理性分析的视角来看,协商民主能够化解自由与秩序的矛盾,维护社会的平等和正义,能够在公开的理性下实现政治的合法性,解决现有民主制度的困境与挑战,是确实能够实现的政治理想。     

论德国行政法的基本原则

德国是大陆法系国家的典范,也是近现代世界行政法体系中一股不可忽视的力量,尤其是其行政法的基本原则被誉为欧洲行政法之灵感与源泉,对各国行政法发展的影响极大。对德国行政法及其基本原则的产生最有影响的是其法治国理念与议会民主、基本权利等宪法原则。正是伴随着这些因素的作用,德国逐渐形成了依法行政、比例与信赖保护三大并驾齐驱的基本原则。这些原则体现的价值有一定的普适性,值得我国借鉴。     

论宪法原则

本文从宪法逻辑学的角度出发来研究宪法原则。涉及了宪法原则的三个法理特征,即宪法原则的正当性、确定性和有效性。作者认为,宪法原则是一个典型的价值问题,而非事实问题,因此,解释以价值形态存在的宪法原则首先要回答的问题应当是“宪法原则应该是什么”,而不是“宪法原则是什么”。作者主张,宪法原则应该是“决定‘形式宪法’形式和内容的基本价值准则”,宪法原则的功能在于“反对特权现象”,宪法原则源于立宪主义的实践和对宪法功能与普通法律功能的区分。宪法制度必须以“反对特权”为目的来设计相应的手段性措施。这是宪法制度构造的逻辑起点。由此可以产生“目的性宪法原则”与“手段性宪法原则”两类互为因果的宪法原则体系。     

Democratic Legitimacy in the Bund or ‘Federation of States’: the Cases of Belgium and the EU

Carl Schmitt developed the concept of the ‘federation of states’ (Bund) in order to characterise intermediate constitutional systems which are integrated beyond the level of a confederation (Staatenbund) without, however, acquiring the level of integration of an actual federal state (Bundesstaat). In this paper we analyse the constitutional specificity of the ‘federation of states’ and present three normative principles for assessing the democratic legitimacy of the decision‐making procedures within such a federation. We argue that both the European Union and Belgium can be analysed as instances of such a federation of states and show how this characterisation improves our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of both polities and the constitutional and democratic challenges they are facing.     

商谈民主视野下的结社自由与社团立法

商谈民主理论认为社会公众通过协商和对话参与决策能达致在公共问题上的共识并实现民主,同时强调社团等＂商谈性配置＂的关键作用。结社自由是＂商谈性配置＂发挥作用的法律基础和保障,其内涵反映了个人与社团实现该自由的具体方式和途径。我国目前在社团立法上存在着合法性与正当性方面的不足,因此,应当从转变立法指导思想、明确结社自由的权利属性、完善社团管理体制等方面加以解决。     

司法最低限度主义——评桑斯坦的《就事论事——美国最高法院的司法最低限度主义》

为证立司法审查制度的正当性,美国学界以往司法审查理论认为,代议制民主过程不可信任,必须由司法权对民主立法进行有效的宪法监督,以保障民主价值目标的实现.桑斯坦则认为,民主过程固然不可信任,但由于司法能力的有限性,最高法院应采取一种最低限度主义的裁决方法,一次一案式地裁决具体案件,避免原则性判决,将社会价值选择问题交由民意机关互动协商解决,以减少错误判决可能导致的严重社会后果,同时培养民意机关的民主协商精神和公民的参政素质,塑造一个健康民主的社会.与其他司法审查理论相比,司法最低限度主义更有效地论证了司法审查制度的正当性.不过,这一理论本身也有其缺陷.     

宪法诉讼中的审查基准

宪法诉讼中的审查基准,是指违宪审查机构在对相关法律进行审查、判定的时候,所秉持的价值评判准则.自1938年美国的"凯罗琳产品案"以来,"二元基准"逐渐被确立,并在建立宪法诉讼制度的国家产生了深远的影响."二元基准"确立的原因主要包括三个方面:首先,社会情势的发展变化内在地要求放宽对关涉经济之立法的审查;其次,基本权利的不同秉性内在地要求对不同性质的基本权利施加不同的审查;其三,维系代议民主政治和宪法裁判机构之正当性内在地要求对关涉精神自由和经济自由的立法施加不同的审查.     

司法过程与民主过程

李慧娟事件包括司法过程和民主过程两个方面。司法审查的正当性理论可分为高级法理论和民主理论两类。中国司法审查正当性的论证存在发达的行政集权、民主共和制不发达等一系列困难 ,在行政分权局面不可能很快来临的情况下 ,我国建立违宪审查制度应该考虑其他途径的可能性     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

Limits of Participatory Democracy in European Governance

The Lisbon Treaty (Article 11) recognises the provision on participatory democracy as a democratic principle of the European Union (EU), thus constitutionally legitimising the involvement of civil society in European governance. However, at least three issues relating to the democratic dimension of this practice remain unresolved. First, it is not possible to specify precisely how the participation of civil society relates to democracy. Second, having established representative democracy as the founding democratic principle of the EU (Article 10), the Lisbon Treaty does not allow assessing the provision on participatory democracy as an independent source for democracy. Third, the putative democratising potential of participation would not be construed independently, not only because representative democracy is defined as the founding principle of the EU but also because participation cannot be thought of as independent from the form of the consultation regime, the constitutional framework and the managerial and technocratic styles of policy‐making.     

Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy

This essay by Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel promotes visions of democracy, constitutionalism and institutional innovations which may help to open up new dimensions in the search for legitimate European governance structures and their constitutionalisation. Faced with Europe's legitimacy problems, proponents of the European project often react by pointing to the many institutional failings in the (national) constitutional state. These reactions, however, seem simplistic, offering no normatively convincing alternatives to the once undisputed legitimacy of a now eroding nation state. The essay by Cohen and Sabel forecloses such strategies. Summarising and endorsing critiques of both the unfettered market system and the manner of its regulatory and political correction, it concludes that the many efforts to establish new equilibria between well-functioning markets and well-ordered political institutions are doomed to fail, and opts instead for fundamental change: conservative in their strict defence of fundamental democratic ideals, such ideas are radical in their search for new institutional arrangements which bring democratic values directly to bear. How is the concept of directly-deliberative polyarchy complementary to and reconcilable with our notions of democratic constiutionalism? To this question the readers of the essay will find many fascinating answers. Equally, however, how might the debate on the normative and practical dilemmas of the European system of governance profit from these deliberations? Which European problem might be resolved with the aid of the emerging and new direct forms of democracy identified in this essay? How might direct democracy interact with the intergovernmentalist and the functionalist elements of the EU system? Although this essay contains no certain answers to these European questions, its challenging messages will be understood in European debates.     

On Law and Disagreement. Some Comments on "Interpretative Pluralism"

Abstract This paper focuses on the question: Do persisting disagreements in constitutional interpretation affect the legitimacy of “the democratic system as a whole”? According to both Michelman and Waldron, the epistemic indeterminacy of interpretation—that is, the fact that principles do not possess stable meanings beyond, and independent of, their application to concrete cases—puts its finger on a point of the contractualist and prevailing political theory. But, if neither the legitimacy of any democratic order nor the standard of internal criticism can be founded on a broad background consensus on constitutional essentials, “what else makes a deliberative process of legislation and adjudication a generator of legitimacy so that citizens are induced to accept controversial results as ‘worthy of respect’?” The route pursued goes beyond all views that require legitimacy to be based on sharing a set of “thick” ethical beliefs. In this perspective, the author argues that the performative meaning of constitution‐making “provides a thin yet sufficiently strong base,” which corresponds to the minimal requirements inherent in the very practice of framing a constitution.     

The Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing Outsiders through Freedom of Movement

This article and its sequel examine an argument that has become a shibboleth for the European pro‐attitude towards international and supranational legal arrangements. I call it the argument from transnational effects. The argument says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for one another. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state. Since the argument favours normative limitations on national political processes it seems to lend strong support to the introduction of transnational constitutional discipline. In this article and its sequel it is claimed that the argument, correctly understood, cannot support the creation of transnational democracy. Rather, in a critically recalibrated form, the argument, paradoxically, provides strong backing for the existence of bounded political communities without, for that reason, succumbing to ontologically questionable beliefs about the essence of national communities. Hence, the argument is really as much about the limits set to transnational integration as it is about their legitimacy. This explains why it is of central relevance to constitutionalism in a global age. The opening sections of this article offer an interpretation of John Hart Ely's constitutional theory. Examining the latter helps to articulate adequately the democratic sensibility expressed in the argument. It is argued that Ely's theory exceeds the scope of a mere theory of judicial review. It presents, indeed, a theory of constitutional authority, which is highly relevant to an analysis of the argument from transnational effects. The article then distinguishes and discusses two different readings of the representation‐reinforcing task that Ely attributes to constitutional legality. According to one reading, representation is secondary and only ancillary to the realisation of equality. According to another reading, equal participation is prerequisite to the success of representative democracy whose aim is to discover common ground. It is concluded that the first reading is easier to accommodate in a transnational setting. It will be seen that Ely's theory—at any rate, the first reading of it—is basically concerned with the problem addressed by the argument from transnational effects. This article's discussion of the argument distinguishes two different types of situation. A third, more general type will be dealt with in a subsequent article. The first situation affects people who realise that they would be better off if they were to benefit from the laws of a different democracy. Hence, they would like to have these laws imported. It is argued that their interests do not find support in the argument from transnational effects. The second situation concerns someone who encounters obstacles when moving from one democracy to another. Such obstacles can emerge either as a result of discrimination against non‐nationals or from the sheer fact that laws between and among bounded societies are different. The antidote against the latter is to submit national legislation to a proportionality test. Even though reinforcing representation prima facie seems to support this conclusion, the article claims that virtual representation, correctly understood, actually restricts the sweep of constitutional control to cases of behavioural discrimination. Extending the scope of control would actually violate the respect that it is owed to national democratic autonomy pursuant to the principle of virtual representation. It is also shown that only by limiting its sweep the argument from transnational effects can be prevented from endorsing neoliberal political goals.     

公众参与行政立法的理论思考

参与式民主理论和民主行政理论的兴起是行政立法发生的理论背景;公众参与行政立法既直接构建了行政立法的正当性,又通过增强行政立法有效性的方式应验并强化行政立法的正当性;获得“正当性”的行政立法具有扩张性,若没有公民参与权的制约以及立法权、司法权的监督审查,不仅不会促进公民权利的保障,反而会挑战行政立法的合法性原则,侵犯公民权利。     

法治与人性尊严——从实践到理论的反思

作为现代民主宪政社会不可或缺的生活形态,法治的意义及其核心价值,不论在具体法律实践或抽象理论阐述上,却依然存在着极大争议。"大法官会议"以人性尊严为本的法治观点,毋宁是一种"自由民主宪政秩序"的法治观点。无论是形式合法性或民主程序的法治要件,均无法在法治的具体实践上,保证执政者或立法者不会借助法治的形式要件,来追求满足其政治野心或个人私欲的不正当目的。法治理想的追求,应当着重法律实质内容的道德论证质量。就人性尊严的内涵来说,德沃金提出的两项人性尊严原则,内在价值原则与个人责任原则,确实是值得我们反思借镜的理论资源;特别是,他对人的内在价值的诠释,亦即人具有由自然与人类共同创造的神圣、不可侵犯的客观价值,适足以填补大法官人性尊严观的论述盲点。