新一轮朝鲜核危机与日、韩、美3国协调体制

新一轮朝鲜半岛核危机正在挑战美国的反恐新战略。同时 ,朝鲜南北和谈、日朝平壤宣言 ,东北亚两大历史事件也冲击了美日、美韩同盟。在这历史性的转换中 ,日、韩、美 3国协调体制将从同盟向外交转换。构筑TCOG和KEDO的新协调体制 ,是这一转换的重要形式。     

俄罗斯总统普京的朝鲜半岛政策与朝核立场

20 0 0年普京担任总统后 ,俄罗斯对外政策开始转向以国家利益为目标的实用主义外交。在朝鲜半岛政策上 ,改变了过去“重南轻北”的方针 ,积极发展俄罗斯与朝鲜的关系 ,实行南北朝鲜等距离的平衡政策。普京通过加强与南北朝鲜的关系 ,提高俄罗斯对朝鲜半岛的影响力。俄罗斯坚持朝鲜半岛无核化原则 ,主张以和平方式解决朝鲜核危机 ,反对使用武力和各种制裁措施。建议通过对朝鲜提供安全保证的方式使朝鲜放弃核计划。俄罗斯的原则立场对于解决朝鲜核危机无疑具有建设性作用。     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.     

The U. S. Policy toward DPRK: Opportunities and Constraints

布什政府上台以来,始终未能阻止朝鲜拥核步伐.朝核试后,美对朝政策有了新的调整,六方会谈得以复会.但美朝双方受各自国家利益和政策目标的限制,在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的尖锐分歧难以解决,朝核危机仍存在再度升级的可能.     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.     

Inter-Korean relations and the roles of the US and of the EU

The North Korean nuclear standoff has escalated since North Korea let slip that it was developing nuclear weapons while James Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was visiting Pyongyang in October 2002. The Bush administration has acknowledged that the United States will not discount a preemptive military strike on the suspected nuclear development facilities, and North Korea has stood firm against any pressure to halt its nuclear development from the international community. Dialogue and meetings for international cooperation among the major countries concerned, including Korea, the U.S., Japan and China, have been activated to resolve the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula, especially after the U.S. pronounced an end to its war against Iraq in early May of this year. In the middle of the rapidly changing situation on the Korean peninsula, the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation initiated by the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae Jung administration and followed by the Roh Moo-hyun administrations Policy of Peace and Prosperity are not separable from the nuclear situation. This paper follows recent developments of inter-Korean relations, illustrates South Koreas stance on the issue and suggests the EUs role on the nuclear issue. This is a revised version of the paper presented at the Asia-EU Journalists Seminar organized by the Asia Europe Foundation and the Korea Press Foundation (KPF), held in Brussels, Belgium, May 22 2003. Financial support from the KPF is gratefully acknowledged.     

当前朝鲜对外政策的特点及走向分析

朝鲜外交政策的基本目标是通过外交手段为确保国家生存权利、巩固和扩大国家生存空间创造条件。朝鲜总体外交战略是两轴战略,基本外交战略是先军战略,安保外交战略是均衡战略加搭便车战略,对南外交战略是民族共助加追求经济实利战略,对外经济合作战略是有限制的开放战略。朝美核危机最终通过和平解决的可能性还是大于通过其他方式解决的可能性。美伊战争的进程和结果将对朝美关系产生重大影响。     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

The US role in Korean democracy and security since cold war era

This paper traces the role that US played in the developmentof Korean democracy and maintaining peace and security in theKorean peninsula. First, it looks back into the US role in theKorean political transformation from 1950s through 1980s. Itexamines why the US introduced American style democracy in thedivided country and what was the role of the US in the criticaljunctures of regime changes and transformations. The UnitedStates had two contradictory objectives in South Korea: to buildup South Korea as ‘a showcase for democracy’ andas an anti-communist buffer state. The two objectives set ‘theAmerican boundary’ to South Korean democracy. The firstobjective acted upon as an enabling condition for incipientdemocracy, while the second acted upon as a confining conditionto development of democracy in South Korea. Second, it investigatesthe role that the US played in the outbreak of financial crisisin 1987 and in the ensuing comprehensive neoliberal restructuringof the economy by the Kim Dae Jung government after the crisis.Third, it analyzes three events that put US–Korean relationsunder stress since the inauguration of Bush administration:Anti-Americanism, perception gap on North Korea, and the newmilitary transformation initiative of US. Finally, it drawspolicy rationales for stronger Korea–US alliance in thefuture from the Korean perspective: Korea–US allianceas leverages against China and Japan, means of pursuing an effectiveengagement policy toward North Korea, a cornerstone to liftSouth Korea to a hub state in Northeast Asia, and geopoliticalbalancer and stabilizer in Northeast Asia after the unificationof Korea.     

North Korea: The Case for Strategic Entanglement

North Korea is a state shrouded in secrecy, yet it receives an enormous amount of media attention. Its reclusive nature makes analysis difficult and speculative. What is certain is that a dangerous stalemate regarding nuclear weapons has persisted for far too long and is an obstacle to any real change in the political system. History, culture, and ideology all rule the state's actions; it is therefore a mistake to assume North Korean negotiators can act with autonomy. A new and dynamic means to deal with this dilemma should be developed, for the past has demonstrated that threats and demands will not coerce Pyongyang into submitting, in fact, that approach will only exacerbate the problem. An effective means to move beyond the stalemate is needed.     

The End of History: ‘Neojuche Revivalism’ and Korean Unification

This article argues that prospects for change in North Korea and, thus, reduction in threats to regional security, lay more in rising prospects for Korean unification than in scant hopes for reform inside North Korea. It identifies several factors that have made unification a more salient idea than at any time in the last decade. First, Kim Jong Il's failing health and his youngest son's and designated heir's uncertain grip on succession mean greater risk of political instability in North Korea that could bring discontinuous change, including reunification. Second, it has become clear that the Six Party Talks and other diplomatic efforts will not produce denuclearization and reduction of the regional security threat posed by Pyongyang's weapons program. Third, the current and likely future leadership in Pyongyang is incapable of reform, making regime collapse a more likely scenario and unification a more likely route to meaningful change. Fourth, the North Korean regime has become heavily dependent on Chinese support, material and political-diplomatic. Finally, thinking about how unification might occur has shifted to scenarios that are more feasible to key parties, including South Korea, the United States and Japan.     

The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea

When in October 2002 the US administration confronted the North Koreans with intelligence that the latter had a program to enrich uranium, another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula was triggered. It quickly developed into a plutonium crisis because the DPRK then started to “defrost” the nuclear facilities that had been frozen by the Agreed Framework and to revive its nuclear weapons program. North Korea told the world that it was building up a nuclear deterrent force. Though the US administration toyed with the idea of working towards a collapse of the DPRK, it ultimately decided to pursue diplomacy. The two Koreas and the four great Pacific powers got involved in the negotiations. The administration insisted on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs. The DPRK was reluctant to proceed with the talks, since it felt that its basic security interests were being disregarded. Three rounds of six-party talks held in Beijing did not surpass the stage of prenegotiations. At the end of 2004, the prospects for the talks were gloomy.¹     

Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy

International relations theory has difficulty explaining how similar policies produce different outcomes. Iraq and North Korea have been identified as members of the "axis of evil" with weapons of mass destruction programs that threaten the United States. Yet in late 2002, the United States prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea, even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the United States. Moreover, a direct comparison with Iraq shows North Korea to possess the greater material capability to threaten the United States. I argue that a language-based constructivist approach can explain these differences in U.S. foreign policy where other theoretical approaches cannot. By examining the U.S. entanglement in intersected language games—the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the enforcement of United Nations Resolutions in Iraq—it becomes possible to show how the United States could construct North Korea's nuclear program as a manageable threat that could be dealt with diplomatically.     

中国视角：朝核问题现状及解决途径

本文通过对朝鲜拥核的内外部因素分析,重新评估了朝鲜的核政策,反驳了目前西方学者在朝核问题上的6种观点,对朝鲜拥核的动机、强制弃核的效果、朝核问题解决的程序悖论、中国在朝核问题上的作用、朝鲜经济变革的可能性以及六方会谈的未来等进行了论证。本文认为朝鲜弃核进程必须与安全关切紧密联在一起,弃核的实现又与朝鲜的经济改革存在相关性。必须强化六方会谈其他五方与朝鲜的立场和政策更为有效的协调,以多边模式整合碎片化的地区安全局面。     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

Overcoming US-North Korean Enmity: Lessons from an Eclectic IR Approach

ABSTRACT

Periods of mutual enmity in US-North Korean relations are typically interrupted by more conciliatory gestures. How can the many twists and turns in this relationship be explained and hopefully overcome so that more long-lasting détente is accomplished? Drawing eclectically on realism and constructivism, we conclude that a nuclear deal should address not only North Korea’s interests in security and regime survival, but also its status concerns. Applying the same theories to the other part of the dyad – the US – we conclude that it may now have material interests in ameliorating the relationship, but that such a development requires US foreign policy discourse to cease depicting North Korea as “irrational” and “evil”.     

1999——依然难以平静的朝鲜半岛

朝鲜半岛形势在不断地走向缓和 ,但并不平静 ,迭起波澜。朝、韩经济在走向好转。朝、韩都在积极发展对外关系 ,韩国金大中政府已完成了四大国首脑外交 ,朝鲜在积极改善同四大国的关系。韩、韩之间也在稳步改善政治关系 ,发展经济关系。但朝、韩之间的对峙、敌视情绪仍然存在 ,不时出现各种争执、摩擦。朝鲜形势仍处于扑朔迷离、难以把握的状态 ,值得我们密切关注和深入研究。     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

中朝经贸关系发展的现状及未来走势分析

进入新千年后,中朝经贸关系出现了历史性的新发展,特别是2003和2004年连续取得突破10亿美元的最好业绩,使中国在朝鲜对外经贸关系中的重要地位再次得以凸现,使东亚各国对其今后的发展前景表现出极大的关注。随着朝鲜经济市场化改革的进展,中朝双边贸易未来几年还有进一步发展的余地。     

六方会谈与美朝博弈分析

朝核问题的核心是美朝关系问题，美朝之间的博弈影响并左右着六方会谈的进程。美国在既定的对朝战略目标下，在国内强硬派和务实派的政策转换中采取不断变化着的对朝策略；热衷朝美直接对话的朝鲜由于其弱势地位，不得不为应对美国变幻不定的政策措施而变换手法。六方会谈的多边性地位及其维护谈判的公正性正在受到美朝双方博弈的挑战。