The GCC Monarchies: Perceptions of the Iranian Threat amid Shifting Geopolitics

ABSTRACT

The systemic shift triggered by a progressive retrenchment of the United States (US) from the wider Middle East region has been a fundamental game changer in the security perceptions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies. The retrenchment activated a security dilemma in US-GCC relations, especially in relation to their view of Iran. However, the impact was uneven. While the dilemma triggered fears of abandonment in the three more hawkish players – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain –, it generated fears of entrapment in the three less hawkish players – Oman, Kuwait and Qatar. The key differences between these two camps lie on their threat perceptions. Seemingly shaped by state ideology and religion, narratives of identity, socio-political demography and, finally, leadership cognition, these fears interact with domestic factors such as structural vulnerabilities, to affect the perception of Iran as an existential or non-existential risk.     

Twilight on the British Gulf: The 1961 Kuwait Crisis and the Evolution of American Strategic Thinking in the Persian Gulf

The 1961 Kuwait crisis stands as a key event in the evolution of American strategic thinking on the Persian Gulf. Following Iraqi threats to annex Kuwait, Britain despatched a sizable military force to the Emirate hoping to pre-empt an Iraqi invasion. When the Iraqi invasion failed to occur, Britain was forced to weather a political maelstrom as it struggled to withdraw its forces. Although the United States was largely an observer to the crisis, London's actions required Washington to acknowledge the limits of Britain to meet the political challenges of the Middle East and protect Western interests in the region. This realisation provided the impetus for Washington to diversify its strategy in the Persian Gulf and increasingly seek regional solutions for its security concerns.     

GCC-US Alliance-Making Reconsidered: The Travails of Dependency

ABSTRACT

Donald Trump’s presidency may have altered less in relations between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council than recent accounts suggest. Instead, power relations between the US and its Gulf allies have long been, and continue to be, asymmetrical. Dependency theory and postcolonial analysis illustrate the ways in which the US global hegemon exhibits hierarchy, exerting control over Gulf economic resources (oil) and extending its ‘security umbrella’ (e.g. weapons sales and bases) – all in highly unequal dynamics. A critical discourse analysis of American and Saudi speeches during the 2017 Riyadh summit further confirms this assessment. This raises questions about alliance-making and alliance-maintenance norms of promise-keeping and reciprocity.     

The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy

ABSTRACT

What strategies does the United States pursue when it no longer perceives overt military intervention as politically viable or desirable but the problems or issues for which it was formerly undertaken remain? This analysis identifies three such periods in American foreign policy since the United States became a World Power and draws from the work of Peter Hall to develop a typology of strategies according to the magnitude of policy change. These range from adjustment in the settings of interventionism – persistence; the substitution of alternative instruments of foreign policy – ameliorism; and the principled rejection of interventionism in conjunction with a more systematic critique of prevailing foreign policy assumptions – transformationalism. Yet each approach is beset by certain structural limits and contradictions arising from the domestic politics and constitutional-institutional system of the United States that are important in understandiing and appreciating more fully the challenges – and opportunities – of the period ‘after interventionism’.     

International cooperation in exchange‐rate management: Coordination of U.S. and Japanese intervention, 1977–1990

What are the determinants of international cooperation in exchange‐rate management? To answer this question, coordination of foreign exchange intervention by the United States and Japan from 1977 to 1990 is analyzed. An examination of the data raises two empirical puzzles: (1) Why do the periods of active intervention and high cooperation coincide?; (2) Why does Japan intervene unilaterally more often than the United States? Some hypotheses drawn from various theories of cooperation are tested, but none of them receive strong support. Instead, intervention volume and learning by U.S. administrations account for the variance in coordination. These findings resolve the two puzzles: (1) The periods of active intervention are the time of high need for cooperation; (2) Japan is obliged to intervene unilaterally while the United States is learning to cooperate.     

联合阵线与美国军事干涉

作为国际体系中的唯一超级大国,美国是冷战后海外用兵最为频繁、进行军事干涉行动次数最多的国家。研究者们通常认为,美国的军事干涉在决策和实施上具有很强的单边主义色彩,其突出特征是动辄使用或威胁使用武力,在决定使用武力时一意孤行,时常将自身意志凌驾于联合国和国际法之上。通过考察冷战后美国在伊拉克战争、阿富汗战争、利比亚战争等重大军事干涉行动中的选择可以发现,尽管美国在使用武力的决策上较少受到国际社会的有效约束,但它在军事干涉行动中既不是纯粹依靠自身力量单干,也不是依靠其缔造的多边或双边军事同盟,而是经常性地采取联合阵线的方式执行军事打击和战后维稳行动。联合阵线的目标确定性及手段灵活性为美国主导军事干涉行动提供了便利,而规避集体行动的困境、让伙伴承担军事行动的负担、为干涉行动寻找合法性以及减少美国的投入和损失等考量,也使得美国具有招募多国参与其军事行动的强烈动机。由于当前国际体系结构的制约,不少国家倾向于加入美国的军事干涉联合阵线,以便在美国主导的等级体系中获取安全保障和经济利益。     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain,the United States,and NATO, 1971–74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour – especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism – the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.     

The Race for Critical Minerals in an Era of Geopolitical Realignments

ABSTRACT

The decarbonisation of the global economy in response to the climate crisis and the fourth industrial revolution, featuring artificial intelligence (AI) and 5G networks (massively accelerated in response to the coronavirus pandemic), has triggered a race to secure uninterrupted access to critical raw minerals (CRMs) that are indispensable inputs for high-technology applications. Moreover, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which unites Eurasia and Africa and loops in South America into a seamless space of trade, infrastructure and digital connectivity, challenges the dominance of traditional industrial powers (the United States, the European Union and Japan) and requires critical minerals. Rare earths, lithium and cobalt – among the most critical of the CRMs – are found in high geographic concentration, creating hotspots of contention, especially in unstable parts of the world. As economic transformations accelerate, securing access to these materials will both impact and help shape geopolitics in the years to come.     

Strategic defense without star wars: The case for a defense‐emphasis arms control regime 1

This paper challenges two prevalent assumptions of the mainstream U.S. arms control community: first, that strategic nuclear disarmament? should be regarded as beyond the scope of serious superpower dialogue; second, that strategic defense (especially population defense) is inherently incompatible with the goals of arms control. It does so first by analyzing the events surrounding the Reykjavik summit—the occasion of the first direct negotiations on disarmament between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Next, while identifying grave flaws in the current design of the Strategic Defense Initiative, it will be argued that a defense‐emphasis arms control regime can provide the best long‐term means for addressing the problem of security in the nuclear age.     

US-Arab Gulf Relations amidst Regional and Global Changes

Abstract

The Arab Gulf has long enjoyed privileged relations with the United States. Being home to the world’s largest oil reserves, the US saw it in its strategic interest to keep Arab Gulf states in its camp during the Cold War. The relation developed over the years to include other areas of cooperation such as in the military, economic and even academic fields. However, many factors today challenge this relationship. In the face of the US’ evident retrenchment from the region, the Arab Gulf is showing more inter-GCC cooperation, and Saudi Arabia is trying to forge alliances independently from the US. At the same time, Arab Gulf countries are intensifying their lobbying efforts in the US.     

New models of negotiation,dispute resolution,and joint problem solving

The revolutionary changes sweeping the workplace, union-management relationships, and the world economy have contributed to a sharply redefined role for the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), the primary provider of mediation services to labor and management in the United States. In this article's three main sections, the authors trace the history and provide background information about FMCS; consider the changing role of mediation, driven by societal forces of change from the late 1970s to the present; and speculate on the agency's future and the expected expansion in the use of mediation. John Calhoun Wells has served as Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service since November, 1993, when he was appointed to that position by President Bill Clinton.Wilma B. Liebman is Deputy Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.     

Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities

The theory of humanitarian intervention has received new attention since the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the United States’ becoming the world's sole superpower. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention, however, has declined. It is difficult to forge the political will for it when the countries composing the global organizations that could provide the political legitimacy disagree on an intervention, and with so few countries—mainly the United States and Great Britain—capable of providing the required expeditionary forces. Moreover, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States’ political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions. In particular, those wars precluded its intervention in the current genocide in Darfur. Regional bodies such as the African Union may be the only entities that can, with aid and training, undertake effective interventions.     

The Blockade on Qatar: Conflict Management Failings

ABSTRACT

Current tensions in the Gulf region highlight the persistence of crises and conflict. A number of states within the area now regularly engage in interventionist actions that challenge previously held norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Fragmentation characterises what were once considered fairly robust structures of unity and enduring regional organisation. Theoretical norms that presuppose non-intervention are tested by new forms of coercion and interventionism among Gulf actors that exacerbate rather than resolve security dilemmas. In turn, this highlights the inadequacies of normative models of conflict management and resolution, and in particular mediation. These developments are examined in the case of the blockade against Qatar instituted by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in June 2017.     

Failed agreements and their impact on subsequent mediation onset and success in intrastate conflicts

ABSTRACT

What impact do failed mediated agreements have on subsequent mediation onset and success? The question of mediation onset and success is undoubtedly important, given that mediation is one of the international community’s preferred conflict management tools, but its voluntary nature leaves room for the conflict parties to (dis)agree to talks and possible settlements. Existing research suggests that previous mediation outcomes can affect subsequent mediation efforts positively or negatively – depending on the outcome in focus. This article argues that failed agreements – an outcome of mediation that has not been accounted for in existing literature – underscore the persistence of the commitment problem, and therefore the hazards of sharing private information. Consequently, the conflict parties question the utility of mediation, and the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset decreases. If subsequent talks take place despite the failed agreement, the conflict parties refrain from sharing private information, and reaching an agreement becomes thus less likely. Drawing on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Managing Intrastate Conflict in Africa data set and the UCDP Peace Agreement data set, the results strongly underline the negative impact failed agreements have on subsequent mediation onset, and thereby show that agreement longevity is crucial not only for peace duration but also for leaving the door open to subsequent talks.     

Making Sense of Turkey’s Reaction to the Qatar Crisis

ABSTRACT

When the Qatar crisis erupted in June 2017, Turkey quickly sided with Qatar, sending tons of food supplies and deploying troops in the Emirate. Yet, from a purely geopolitical and economic perspective, Turkey would have been expected not to take sides given its much larger trade relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and their political clout in the region and beyond. It seems that the path dependence in bilateral relations between Turkey and Qatar pre-ordained the former’s reaction. More specifically, by the time the Gulf crisis erupted, Turkey and Qatar had already developed a special relationship, which strongly affected Turkey’s pro-Qatar stance.     

America's freedom to act in the Caspian Area

After the break up of the Soviet Union the conflict over energy resources in the Caspian area has flared up again. The United States has entered the stage, but the only remaining superpower finds it hard to forward its security policy interests and interests in the economic sphere in the area. The creation of a US‐dominated hegemony in the area would be beneficial for the United States, but the policy of containment of Iran and Russia, and US policy towards Azerbaijan seriously limits this possibility. Thus it is not possible to secure American influence in the Caspian area. In the long term this leaves the area open to Russia and Iran, or new actors such as China and the EU, unless the United States is willing to soften its policy vis‐à‐vis Iran and/or Azerbaijan in order to create the needed hegemony, and in this way achieve economic and political influence in the former Soviet republics.     

“Between Two and Four”: The French Initiative and the Multi-Power Diplomatic Initiatives to Resolve the Middle East Crisis

This analysis examines one of the unknown chapters in the diplomatic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict: the French initiative of 1969 calling for diplomatic co-operation amongst the four Great Powers—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France—to put an end to the conflict. The “Forum of Four” did not just attempt to mediate and achieve a compromise between Israel and the Arabs; it also presumed to define the general envelope for the agreement and dictate the path that the sides should follow toward a peace agreement. This analaysis examines the diplomatic positions of Israel, Egypt, and their superpower patrons—which conducted a “Forum of Two”—during the first months of the War of Attrition in 1969 and presents the details of the planned agreement worked out in the deliberations amongst the Powers, especially the United States and Soviet Union. It also surveys the reactions to them and the reasons why mediation failed.     

Alignment Cooperation and Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific

ABSTRACT

Although the US-led system of formal alliances remains the main pillar of the regional security architecture in Asia, alignment cooperation – centred on the Indo-Pacific maritime conceptualisation of the region – has been on the rise. This includes informal bilateral and minilateral agreements for security collaboration between regional and extra-regional US treaty allies or close security partners, notably Japan, Australia, India, the United Kingdom and France. While the various alignments complement and address the deficiencies of the formal US-led alliances, the functional and informal characteristics of alignments allow countries to pursue security cooperation both in conjunction with the United States and independently of it. This leads to a more fluid security architecture that increasingly reflects the diversity of emerging regional ‘architects’, among which Japan is assuming a leading role, as much as the region’s array of new security challenges.     

大国战略与大国关系

力量对比决定了美国在今后一个时期内仍是惟一的超级大国，由于其他大国或国家集团的力量在增长，尤其是某些地区大国正在崛起，美国“独霸”的局面将被打破。今后一个时期的大国关系将是斗争中有合作，合作中又有斗争。