Private Law Exceptionalism? Part I: A Basic Difficulty with the Structural Arguments from Bipolarity and Civil Recourse

Contemporary discussions of private law theory have sought to divine the deep structure and content of private law by reference to two key distinctions. First, the distinction between private and criminal law has been utilized to flesh out the distinctively bipolar structure of private law (and its various departments, namely, property, contract, torts, and unjust enrichment). Second, the distinction between formal and distributive equality has served to highlight the special terms of interaction established in private law. In these pages, I take up the former distinction, arguing that its theoretical significance is overdrawn. I argue that it does not succeed in identifying private law’s precise nature.     

L’analyse comparée en traduction juridique,ses enjeux,sa nécessité

Translated texts sometimes reflect the writing tradition of the targeted law, but the equivalence of the source legal message, however, must be delivered in the target text. Translating law into a different legal culture cannot be accomplished without comparing laws, whose knowledge is essential to achieving legal equivalence. The way the target text is written should match its culture. Translating law is the moment when languages, cultures and laws meet. To materialize, this encounter has to be based on an ad hoc knowledge of the laws at stake. Then comparative law, translators’ “fellow traveler”, comes into play, preparing them for the exchange. To achieve this, “one only needs two receptions which intersect” (Carbonnier). This move is successful when concepts and notions overlap and the letter of law (substance) and its wording (form) merge, revealing “the spirit of the laws”. Comparative analysis is the way to achieve this result (I). It is conducted here under the light of jurilinguistics with an analysis of terms and concepts presenting various translation difficulties, demonstrating the necessity of comparative law (II). The lessons to be learned are aimed at all language professionals wishing to draw inspiration from the jurilinguists’comparative analysis approach to their work.     

Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy. A Critical Appraisal*

I argue in this article (i) that Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy, especially the critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, is a significant contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. I also argue (ii) that Olivecrona fails to substantiate some of his most important empirical claims, and (iii) that the distinction espoused by Olivecrona between the truth and the correctness of legal statements is problematic but not needed in Olivecrona's legal philosophy.     

The Relevance of Coercion: Some Preliminaries*

Many philosophers take the view that, while coercion is a prominent and enduring feature of legal practice, its existence does not reflect a deep, constitutive property of law and therefore coercion plays at best a very limited role in the explanation of law's nature. This view has become more or less the orthodoxy in modern jurisprudence. I argue that an interesting and plausible possible role for coercion in the explanation of law is untouched by the arguments in support of the orthodox view. Since my main purpose is to clear the ground for the alternative, I spell out the orthodox view in some detail. I then briefly sketch the alternative. Finally, I turn to Jules Coleman's discussion of the alternative.     

Habermas,Feminism, and Law: Beyond Equality and Difference?*

In this paper, I argue that Habermas' proceduralist model of law can be put to feminist ends in at least two significant ways. First, in presenting an alternative to the liberal and welfare models of laws, the proceduralist model offers feminism a way out of the equality/difference dilemma. Both these attempts to secure women's equality by emphasising women's sameness to men or their difference from men have placed the onus on women to either find a way of integrating themselves into existing institutions or to confront the so‐called question of women's difference. The proceduralist model renders this dilemma irrelevant. Instead, it proceeds from the fact of sexual difference; a fact that produces competing and conflicting needs and interests that require interpretation by both men and women. This, I argue, marks a change in the very way we conceptualise the so‐called problem of women's difference, insofar as the question is no longer framed in these terms. Second, I argue that this deliberative process over the interpretation of conflicting interests affects a fundamental shift in the nature of legal institutions themselves, insofar as law is no longer a vehicle for promoting male interests.     

Legal Order,Legal Pluralism,Fundamental Principles. Europe and Its Law in Three Concepts

The essay analyses the way in which the concepts of legal order, legal pluralism and fundamental rights have been used to describe (and decide) what European integration is (and what it ought to be) from the perspective of the law. The essay does not provide a legal theory but limits itself to investigating how certain concepts have been employed to justify legal decisions and to construct legal theories. The juridical discourse on Europe is examined to identify some trends in contemporary legal culture: the decline of a tradition of legal thought, ‘legal dogmatics,’ the vanishing of the distinction between internal and external law (between domestic law and international law, and between positive law and morality), the growing importance of fundamental rights discourse, the centrality of balancing test, the widespread criticism of legal science's claim to neutrality and the consequent normative turn affecting legal scholarship.     

The History of Genres: Reaching for Reality in Law and Literature

Genres are historical formations; their ability to generate knowledge depends on their interrelationships within a culture. Since law, too, can be viewed as a genre, studies of specific historical relationalities between law and other genres are necessary for law's own history and theory. This essay discusses differentiations between Victorian law and literature, starting out from the recent publication of Ayelet Ben‐Yishai's Common Precedents: The Presentness of the Past in Victorian Law and Fiction (2013), which reveals some of that history. I examine two points: differentiations in legal and literary approaches to probabilistic knowledge, and differentiations in the author functions in law and literature. These differentiations bear multiple implications. I discuss implications for evidence‐law debates about probabilistic evidence, for contract‐law debates about the centrality of autonomy and self‐authorship, and for understandings of legal reasoning itself—the elusive notion of “thinking like a lawyer.”     

Derrida and the Philosophy of Law and Justice

Readings of Derrida’s work on law and justice have tended to stress the distinction between them. This stress is complicated by Derrida’s own claim that it is not ‘a true distinction’. In this essay I argue that ordinary experiences of the inadequacy of existing laws do indeed imply a claim about what would be more just, but that this claim only makes sense insofar as one can appeal to another more adequate law (whether the projection of a new law or an existing ‘higher’ law). Exploring how Derrida negotiates a subtle path between classical Platonism and classical conventionalism about justice, the attempt is made to take seriously Derrida’s aim to affirm the idea of a ‘mystical’ foundation of the authority of laws by taking ‘the use of the word “mystical” in what I venture to call a rather Wittgensteinian direction’.     

Schauer on Coercion,Acceptance, and Schizophrenia

This article provides a comment on The Force of Law (Schauer 2015), which is Schauer's new and illuminating contribution to the place of law in our societies and in our lives. It constitutes a strong defence of the importance of coercion in law. First, I consider cases where the law is not able to motivate human behaviour adequately, in order to show that legal coercion is not always justified. Second, I examine the Rawlsian distinction between the ideal and the nonideal theory and its application to the theory of law. Third, I tentatively argue that coercion has no place in ideal theory, but a core place in nonideal theory. In this way, it may be plausible to reconstruct the motivation to accept the law, at least when the law is normatively justified.     

Patterns of Courtroom Justice

Any one film can sustain a myriad of compelling intepretations. A collection of films, however, sharing formal and substantive qualities, reveals a common effect more than a diversity of meanings. This essay traces the shared formal and substantive qualities of a group of films, as I name them ‘trial films’. It documents this genre of film by identifying the genre’s norms of viewing and identification. It also investigates peculiar hybrid discourse of the trial film genre that combines both filmic and legal discursive practices to show how trial films cultivate support for the American system of law through its constitution of a specific viewing audience. In so doing, I broach the following questions: how do images of law in film help sustain the power and legitimacy of legal institutions? How does the study of film genres, like the courtroom drama, reveal the way law lives beyond its formal processes?     

Critical Autopoiesis and the Materiality of Law

Autopoietic theory is increasingly seen as a candidate for a radical theory of law, both in relation to its theoretical credentials and its relevance in terms of new and emerging forms of law. An aspect of the theory that has remained less developed, however, is its material side, and more concretely the theory’s accommodation of bodies, space, objects and their claim to legal agency. The present article reads Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems in a radical and material manner, linking it on the one hand to current post-structural theorisations of law and society, and on the other hand extending its ambit to accommodate the influx of material considerations that have been working their way through various other disciplines. The latter comprises both a materialisation of the theory itself and ways of conceptualising the legal system as material through and through. This I do by further developing what I have called Critical Autopoiesis, namely an acentric, topological, post-ecological and posthuman understanding of Luhmann’s theory, that draws on Deleuzian thought, feminist theory, geography, non-representational theory, and new material and object-oriented ontologies. These are combined with some well-rehearsed autopoietic concepts, such as distinction, environment and boundaries; Luhmann’s earlier work on materiality continuum; more recent work on bodies and space; as well as his work on form and medium in relation to art. The article concludes with five suggestions for an understanding of what critical autopoietic materiality might mean for law.     

Doing,Allowing, and the State

The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state action. Sunstein, Holmes, Vermeule and others have presented influential arguments for the claim that where the state is concerned the doing/allowing distinction has no moral significance, even if it does elsewhere. I show that these arguments can be resisted. In doing so, I defend some important distinctions and principles that help us understand the state’s role in protecting people from harm.     

Hobbes on Political Authority,Practical Reason and Truth

The role of sovereign authority in Hobbes' political philosophy is to establish peace and stability by serving as a definitive and unambiguous source of law. Although these broad outlines of Hobbes' account of political authority are uncontentious, matters quickly become more complicated once one seeks its normative basis. This much is evident from recent debates on the normative status of the laws of nature and the related issue as to whether Hobbes is better categorised as an incipient legal positivist or as a heterodox natural law thinker. In this paper I argue that although the positivist and natural law commitments in Hobbes' theory of political authority can be partially reconciled, such a reconciliation points to the need for more substantive theories of practical reason and truth than are to be found in Hobbes' official statements on these topics. Section II examines the positivist and natural law dimensions in Hobbes' thought and suggests that the role of sovereign authority in providing the definitive interpretation of the laws of nature allows a partial reconciliation to be effected. In section III, I consider the tension between this reconciliation and Hobbes' instrumentalism about practical reason and equivocal separation of authority and truth.     

An Antinomy in Alexy's Theory of Balancing

This article argues that Robert Alexy's influential theory of balancing is affected by a contradiction that makes it unfeasible as an instrument by which to explain some aspects of law and legal reasoning it aims to clarify. In particular, I will show that one of the premises of Alexy's theory of balancing is incompatible with its conclusion. Alexy's theory is based upon a sharp distinction between rules and principles. However, as my analysis will demonstrate, its conclusion implies that it is impossible to distinguish between rules and principles. This is because the so-called weight formula and the law of colliding principles (i.e., the two main notions used by Alexy to explain balancing) cancel out any difference between these two types of norms.     

Having yes,using no? About the new legal regime for biometric data

The rise of biometric data use in personal consumer objects and governmental (surveillance) applications is irreversible. This article analyses the latest attempt by the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and the Directive (EU) 2016/680 to regulate biometric data use in the European Union. We argue that the new Regulation fails to provide clear rules and protection which is much needed out of respect of fundamental rights and freedoms by making an artificial distinction between various categories of biometric data. This distinction neglects the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and serves the interests of large (governmental) databases. While we support regulating the use and the general prohibition in the GDPR of using biometric data for identification, we regret this limited subjective and use based approach. We argue that the collection, storage and retention of biometric images in databases should be tackled (objective approach). We further argue that based on the distinctions made in the GDPR, several categories of personal data relating to physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics are made to which different regimes apply. Member States are left to adopt or modify their more specific national rules which are eagerly awaited. We contend that the complex legal framework risks posing headaches to bona fide companies deploying biometric data for multifactor authentication and that the new legal regime is not reaching its goal of finding a balance between the free movement of such data and protecting citizens. Law enforcement authorities also need clear guidance. It is questioned whether Directive (EU) 2016/680 provides this.     

Icons of control: Deleuze,signs, law

This paper is broadly concerned with Deleuze’s distinction between ‚la loi et les lois’ on the one hand, and jurisprudence on the other. Jurisprudence is the␣creative action of legal practice, the process by which it is forced to think constructively and anew. In such circumstances legal thought is akin to Deleuze’s concept of the event. I explore the distinction between law and jurisprudence by way of Deleuze’s comments on control societies, arguing that, under control, law ceases to be a juridical hierarchy conforming to disciplinary modes to become a regulatory practice of interminable modulation. In order to begin to explore the relations and connections between law/jurisprudence and control, the paper will look to the semiotics of C.S. Peirce (who influenced Deleuze’s work on cinema). In particular it will argue that control operates predominantly through icons. As a consequence I argue that the proper ground of the sign, the event, is co-opted and, following from this, that control functions through the confusing of sense and meaning. Thanks to Anne Bottomley, Ronnie Lippens and Jamie Murray.     

Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law

Legal positivism dominates in the debate between it and naturallaw, but close attention to the work of Thomas Hobbes – the``founder' of the positivist tradition – reveals a version ofanti-positivism with the potential to change the contours of thatdebate. Hobbes's account of law ties law to legitimacy throughthe legal constraints of the rule of law. Legal order isessential to maintaining the order of civil society; and theinstitutions of legal order are structured in such a way thatgovernment in accordance with the rule of law is intrinsicallylegitimate.I focus on Hobbes's neglected catalogue of the laws of nature.Only the first group gets much attention. Its function is tofacilitate exit from the state of nature, an exit which Hobbesseems to make impossible. The second group sets out the moralpsychology of both legislators and subjects necessary to sustaina properly functioning legal order. The third sets out the formalinstitutional requirements of such an order. The second and thirdgroups show Hobbes not concerned with solving an insolubleproblem of exit from the state of nature but with theconstruction of legitimate order. Because a sovereign is bydefinition one who governs through law, Hobbes's absolutism isconstrained. Government in accordance with the rule of law isgovernment subject to the moral constraints of the institutionsof legal order.     

Some Problems with Robert Alexy's Account of Legal Validity: The Relevance of the Participant's Perspective*

This article examines Robert Alexy's account of legal validity. It concludes that Alexy's account of legal validity lacks sufficient support given the author's methodological commitments. To reach that conclusion, it assesses the plausibility of simultaneously maintaining that the participant's perspective has conceptual privilege in the explanation of the nature of law, that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse, and that unjust considerations can be legally valid norms.     

Secret Laws

There is a thesis that legal rules need to be made public because people cannot guide their conduct by rules they cannot know. This thesis has been a mainstay of anti‐positivism and the controversy over it continues apace. However, positivism can accommodate the secret laws thesis. The deeper import of the debate over secret laws concerns our understanding of law's nature. In this regard secrecy merits attention as a candidate necessary connection between law and immorality. In addition the mediating role of lawyers as experts in ascertaining the law should be highlighted. It has been widely overlooked despite the fact that lawyers are criterial in Hart's concept of law.