德国法学方法论

一般认为,对于一门学术型学科而言,一套方法的存在及由此而形成的方法论至关重要。在德国,法律一直以来都是一门学术型学科。作为被称之为"法学"(字面意思是法律"科学",更确切地说是有关法律的学问)的研究对象,法律以具有一套专门的法学方法论为其特征。在德国大学法学院中,法学方法论是一门非常重要的讲授科目,且围绕这门课程有大量的法学文献。这些文献所讨论的是德国法律人如何(或者更准确地说:应该如何)开展法律工作。德语文献相关讨论中的一个特殊之处在于,在概念上区分"法律解释"与"法的续造"。方法论的讨论涉及制定法解释的各种相关要素、先决条件、不同层级,以及法的续造的合法性等问题。除此之外,还应意识到,对于德国法方法论的讨论是在不同的政治发展历程下展开的。基于此,本文从以下五个一般性话题展开对方法论的讨论:第一,德国、瑞士以及奥地利在方法论上的共性;第二,方法论讨论的规范特征;第三,不同法律领域中所出现的方法论上的差异;第四,法教义学与法学方法论的关系;第五,德国所讨论问题的历史背景。     

Is There a Modern Legal Culture?

Abstract . This essay argues that there are certain traits which, taken together, characterize modern legal systems, and are reflexes of modern legal culture. Modern law is rapidly changing; it is dense and ubiquitous; the basis of its legitimacy is instrumental; it stresses fundamental human rights and is strongly individualistic; lastly, the globalization of law leads to a process of convergence among legal systems. These traits also produce structural changes in legal systems, for example, an increase in the power and activism of courts.     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

The Limits of Institutionalised Legal Discourse*

Abstract. One of the most powerful accounts of the necessary connection between law and morality grounded on the openness of communication is provided by Robert Alexy, who builds a discourse theory of law on the basis of Habermas’ theory of general practical discourse. In this article I argue that the thesis based on the openness of legal discourse is problematic in that it does not provide a convincing account of the differentiation of legal discourse from other practical discourses. I offer an understanding of the institutionalisation of legal discourse as the tacit commitment of the participants to their shared normative experience and in particular in: 1) the possibility of containing normative force in space, 2) the possibility of transforming word into deed, 3) the possibility of grasping and controlling time and 4) the possibility of transforming deed into word. That commitment of participants in legal discourse is revealed as a set of fundamental assumptions embedded in all legal utterances, which provide the necessary bedrock that makes communication possible. It also provides a basis for the institution of legal discourse, to the effect that their problematisation signifies a departure from the latter.     

Legal pragmatism and the pre-birth continuum: an absence of unifying principle

The common law has historically been clear - the rights of the unborn do not exist prior to birth. A child becomes a legal person and able to enforce legal rights upon being born alive and having a separate existence from her or his mother. This article assesses whether new developments in biomedical technologies have left this legal principle inviolate and explores what the state of law is in relation to pre-birth. It argues that there is a pre-birth continuum where the law punctuates points in a lineal timeline fashion as to when a pre-birth "non-entity" becomes a legal entity. The article concludes that there is no singular rule of law with respect to being or becoming a human but rather a collection of discrete and increasingly divergent legal categories. This recognition of a pre-birth continuum or timeline as to the legal recognition of this "non-entity" has significant ramifications for the future development of law and impacts on legal thinking about what it means to be human.     

Legal ethnography: Exploring the gendered nature of legal method

Beginning with the idea of law as discourse, this essay examines the ways in which legal method is gendered. Texts, such as affidavits and court forms, and local ‘mundane’ practices are part of the production and affirmation of the law as a producer of truth. A possible methodology for exploring legal method, ‘legal ethnography,’ is introduced as a means by which wemight explicate how legal method works to support and reify legal discourse, in the process silencing the voices of women. The essay also explores how legal method comes to be accepted as a ‘tool of the trade’ by lawyers, who then use it to translate the primary narrative of the client into a cause of action that is comprehensible to lawyers, judges, and other actors in the legal system. Finally, the limitations of the proposed methodology are considered.     

Creating Legal Space for the Unborn

This article explores how the unborn moved from inhabiting an implicit mother-centric space, tacitly expressed in the Irish constitutional order, to a separate legal space created first by the Eighth Amendment and later through public discourse, judicial interpretation and failed constitutional referenda. The article opens with a brief examination of the relationship between law and space in recent scholarly works. It goes on to assess the impact of post-colonial and gender discourse in producing the first legal space in which the unborn was tacitly understood. This is followed by an exploration of how cultural and gender rhetoric gave birth to a definite legal space in which the right to life for the unborn was protected by the Constitution and the government’s subsequent attempts to solve the legal limbo by shifting the debate to the social policy space. The paper concludes by discussing the extent to which a wider, more universal space, that of human rights discourse, may have an impact on the legal space created for the unborn, by either protecting or weakening its right to life.     

The Commons as a Legal Concept

Scientific debates about the political, economic and even legal aspects of commons have circulated wherever commons are perceived to pose a challenge to the increasing commodification of people’s lives. Indeed, a wide range of commons has emerged worldwide. Emerging commons pose a challenge to the law which is now requested to provide legal tools to resist the dispossession of the common wealth. Nevertheless, commons do not embody a reality which is external or unfamiliar to the law. This paper is an attempt to reframe the commons as a legal concept. In this article I argue that commons are not just a marginal element of contemporary legal systems. Rather, they embody the premises for important transformative practices and discourses and represent a subversive site in the legal order. I maintain, first, that the law of the commons is consistent with the law in force and the current legal regimes of private property and, second, that the current stage of globalization is most favourable to the establishment of a law of the commons both in the peripheries and at the core of the capitalist system. However, given the persistent dominance of the individual-based property paradigm, the legitimacy of the commons on legal grounds remains problematic. Certainly the recognition and protection of the commons challenge the legal regime of property in force and query about the possible limits that the law may impose upon property rights. It is evident that the true core of the commons discourse as a legal discourse rests upon its relation with property and depends on the notion of property that we assume as normative. The Hohfeldian idea of property as a bundle of rights offers a good starting point for articulating a legal theory of the commons under positive law.     

The Logic of Time in Law and Legal Expert Systems*

Abstract. Research on an expert system regarding unemployment insurance law has pointed to the difficulties of explicitly representing temporal relations. The question has been addressed in the artificial intelligence literature with respect to planning systems and linguistic analysis. The approaches adopted do not appear to be directly transposable to legal discourse. The problem seems so far to have escaped notice amongst researchers attempting to develop legal expert systems. The paper explores in a preliminary way how lawyers use temporal concepts. It is submitted that “legal time” only partly overlaps with real time. A sketch of a formalization of temporal relations in law, following J. F. Allen's approach, is presented.     

行政法律关系基本理论问题研究

行政法律关系是行政法的基本范畴之一。对行政法律关系进行全方位、多角度的研究 ,有利于确立现代行政法观念和行政法制度。从分析行政法律关系的概念入手 ,可将行政机关在行政活动中所具有的不同法律身份和法律地位以及它与其他法律主体之间形成的法律关系分为四类 ;在对传统行政法律关系理论批判的基础上 ,行政法律关系的特征可归纳为六个方面。     

Challenging Corporate 'Humanity': Legal Disembodiment, Embodiment and Human Rights

This article interrogates the corporate use of human rightsdiscourse. It does so in light of concern surrounding corporatedistortion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)paradigm,¹ and in light of the fact that corporations can claimshelter under human rights documents, particularly—asrecently discussed by Emberland²—the European Conventionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The authoroffers a critical exploration of corporate human rights claims(and some arguments advanced in their favour), and identifiesthe phenomenon of legal disembodiment (or ‘quasi-disembodiment’),linking it to both a genealogical account of human rights andthe nature of liberal legal personality. This reading of humanrights genealogy invites the reader to focus on a series ofparadoxes surrounding human rights, including their nature asa form of sacral construct, and locates human rights at an entrenchedand challenging interface between historical and contemporarypatterns of inclusion and exclusion. Quasi-disembodiment emergesfrom the analysis as a key conceptual conduit for the legalreception of corporate human rights claims. Linking the ECHRto the liberal human rights tradition, the author suggests thatnotwithstanding judicial protection of corporations as beneficiariesof ECHR protection, it remains essential to engage in a normativecritique of the very notion of corporate human rights. Beneathhuman rights law (and the related closures of legal discourse)it is possible to trace a human rights-oriented critique thatadopts human embodiment (and its quintessential link with humanvulnerability) as the ethical foundation of human rights.³ Emphasisingembodied vulnerability as the foundation of human rights yieldsa significant and ethically relevant distinction between corporationsand human beings—a distinction with intriguing possibilitiesfor the future theorisation of human rights—and one thatarguably problematises the corporate use of human rights discourse.     

Universal Legal Concepts? A Criticism of “General” Legal Theory

Abstract. General theory of law (general jurisprudence, allgemeine Rechtslehre) has often claimed to deal with general or universal concepts, i.e., concepts which are deemed to be common to any legal system whatsoever. At any rate, this is the classic determination of such a field of study as provided by John Austin in the nineteenth century—a determination, however, which deserves careful analysis. In what sense, indeed, can one assert that some legal concepts are common to different legal systems? And, above all, in what sense can one assert that some concepts are common to different languages and cultures? My paper sets out to discuss such questions—although, obviously, they are too complicated to be answered in a single paper. The first section reconstructs the Austinian argument for general jurisprudence by placing it in its historical context. The second section tries to apply to legal concepts some suggestions derived from the contemporary debate on conceptual relativism. The third section, returning to the Austinian problem, comes to the following conclusion: Even if conceptual relativism were true and there were no general or universal legal concepts, this would not invalidate in any way the didactic and scientific value of (general) theory of law.     

法律方法与几个相关概念的比较

在我国法学研究中,法律方法、法学研究方法、法学方法论、法律方法论等概念经常被混淆。文章通过比较法律方法与法学研究方法、法律方法与美国的法律方法课程、法律方法与法学方法论(法律方法论)等概念及其所对应的研究领域,阐明我国的法律方法研究,与世界各国法学界与法律界所关注的法律方法,都是围绕法律人实施法律的工作技艺与思想方法而展开的,重点是研究和探讨法律实施中的各种有效且有益的具体制度与思想方式,这一特点决定了它不同于更为宏观的法学研究方法与法学方法论(法律方法论);同时,由于我国开展法律方法研究迫切需要解决的是与我国法律实施相关的问题,因此,我国的特殊性,决定了我国有关法律方法的研究,主要是针对我国法治建设所面临的具体问题,故而,又不同于美国的法律方法课程。正是在与相关概念的区别中,展现出法律方法研究独特的价值。     

Legal Concepts as Mental Representations

Although much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of (at least) three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts.

     

The Constitution of Violence Through the Language of Law: Legal Hermenutics in Second‐Century Roman Egypt

Bryen, Ari Z. 2013. Violence in Roman Egypt: A Study in Legal Interpretation . Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Pp. 376. $75.00 cloth; $75.00 eBook. This essay examines the linguistic anthropological themes emergent in Violence in Roman Egypt (2013). Viewing law as a discourse, it explores how language is constitutive of law and is the primary modality of acting upon, and enacting the world(s) that it shapes, giving meaning to the lives of people who engage each other in and through it. Violence petitions in second‐century Egypt are a fundamental mode of sense making and problem solving, calling on legal authorities to interpret claims of iniuria, or legal battery, into a language that they understand and remedy. In doing so, law changes the discourse of violence, specifically, and social life, more broadly.     

L'impact du discours des droits des détenus et des normes d'équité sur le tribunal disciplinaire carcéral

Over the past two decades, the prisoners rights movement and active judicial intervention in prison law have widely expanded in Canada. This movement has had a significant impact on the emergence of new norms of correctional justice. The recentCorrections and Conditional Release Act, (November 1992), inserts notions of human dignity; due process of law; and to a certain extent, the fundamental rights of prisoners. The aim of this essay is to measure the impact of prisoners rights discourse, and the legal obligation to act fairly towards prisoners, on the practices and quality of disciplinary decisions. Based on observations made at disciplinary hearings in various penitentiaries and interview data derived from the main actors, the author assesses how the ‘judiciarization’ of social relations and the ‘legalization’ of discipline in the prison have contributed to the birth of a more humanized prison and the promotion of human dignity for those people who are incarcerated.      

The Hysterical Attorney: The Legal Advocate Within Lacanian Discourse Theory

In this essay, I apply Jacques Lacan'sfour discourses to the legal profession. A lawyer –i.e. a legal expert – engages in the Master'sdiscourse when he writes the law; he engages in theUniversity discourse when he interprets or attempts tojustify the law. In contrast, an attorney – i.e. a legal advisor – engages in the Analyst'sdiscourse when she counsel's her client; she engagesin the Hysteric's discourse when she represents herclient. From a Lacanian perspective, the two lawyer'sdiscourses are masculine, while the two attorney'sdiscourses are feminine. I divergefrom Lacan's view that the Analyst's is the mostradical discourse. The insight gained throughanalysis can only challenge and change the law iftranslated through the Hysteric's discourse. Consequently, despite dominant sexual stereotypes tothe contrary, to be an effective advocate should takeon a radically hysteric femininity.     

Workers with Disabilities Between Legal Changes and Persisting Exclusion: How Contradictory Rights Shape Legal Mobilization

It has become commonplace within disability sociolegal scholarship to argue that, in the last 30 years, a new legal and policy approach to disability has emerged, leading to a paradigm shift from a social protection framework to an antidiscrimination model. Some authors have stressed, however, that the new model has not fully replaced the older social protection approach. Yet little is still known about how the coexistence of these different models impacts on the everyday experience of disability in the workplace and on potential legal mobilization. Based on interviews with workers with disabilities who mobilized the law to obtain reasonable accommodation in Belgium combined with an analysis of evolving Belgian legal schemes relating to disability, this article explores how interactions between social, labor, and antidiscrimination rights shape legal mobilization of persons with disabilities in the workplace. We find that individual's initial self‐identification as workers or persons with disabilities influences how they frame their claim and the kind of legal norms they refer to in a first stage but that both their identification and their rights consciousness evolve and change through the course of legal mobilization as they interact with various professionals and navigate between the different concepts and rights available in current law.     

Claiming "Victim" to Harassment Law: Legal Consciousness of the Privileged

Sociologists of law have long been concerned with the effectiveness of rights; the emergence of diversity training in the 1990s spurred renewed attention to questions of how laws are enacted in daily life. Much scholarship has constructed the managerialization of civil rights law and popularization of diversity concepts as diluting efforts to redress structural discrimination. In studying diversity and antiharassment trainings in practice, I argue that these are sites where civil rights find expression of their obligations, and I find that much of the "dilution" of content stems from diversity trainers' efforts to negotiate with the resistance of trainees to their new obligations under civil rights law. The trainees evince a variable legal consciousness in relationship to this legality of rights-promotion, to which they are being exposed in these trainings; the findings suggest further research is needed into the legal consciousness of the privileged.     

Islamic Law,Women's Rights,and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia

Drawing on original survey research, this study examines how lay Muslims in Malaysia understand foundational concepts in Islamic law. The survey finds a substantial disjuncture between popular legal consciousness and core epistemological commitments in Islamic legal theory. In its classic form, Islamic legal theory was marked by its commitment to pluralism and the centrality of human agency in Islamic jurisprudence. Yet in contemporary Malaysia, lay Muslims tend to understand Islamic law as being purely divine, with a single “correct” answer to any given question. The practical implications of these findings are demonstrated through examples of efforts by women's rights activists to reform family law provisions in Malaysia. The examples illustrate how popular misconceptions of Islamic law hinder the efforts of those working to reform family law codes while strengthening the hand of conservative actors wishing to maintain the status quo.