Giovanni Battista Ratti's Critique of Principles Theory

Ratti has attacked principles theory in two respects. The first is that it is impossible to distinguish between rules and principles. The second is that the main thesis of principles theory, which says that balancing is the specific way of applying principles, is wrong. The result of Ratti's critique is his thesis that principles theory founders on a contradiction or, as Ratti calls it, an antinomy. All of this is based on two arguments: Ratti's disapplication argument and his law of concretization. I attempt to reject this analysis, for it is incomplete. It claims to be an analysis of balancing, but it misses the decisive point of balancing. Informed by this background, I defend the distinction between rules and principles as a distinction of the real and the ideal “ought.”     

The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

Some Problems with Robert Alexy's Account of Legal Validity: The Relevance of the Participant's Perspective*

This article examines Robert Alexy's account of legal validity. It concludes that Alexy's account of legal validity lacks sufficient support given the author's methodological commitments. To reach that conclusion, it assesses the plausibility of simultaneously maintaining that the participant's perspective has conceptual privilege in the explanation of the nature of law, that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse, and that unjust considerations can be legally valid norms.     

从法律原则到个案规范——阿列克西原则理论的民法应用

司法中针对某具体个案适用法律原则的通常情形是,没有既有规则可以适用(即"穷尽规则"),或者尽管有规则,但因其与原则相冲突而被排除适用。这两种情形的规范表现在实质上均可理解为原则之间的冲突。在相冲突的原则中确定何者最终适用于该具体个案,恰是阿列克西原则理论(尤其是其"竞争法则")所要解决的问题。适用"竞争法则"的核心在于找寻与确立优先条件或变量,相较于阿列克西的比重公式,参照生活常情或"事物本质"能为其找寻与确立提供更为具体的实践操作路径,因为优先条件或变量的确立由此转变为找寻连接基本案件事实与优先原则的中点(此即"裁判案件要确定的核心要素")。以"竞争法则"为理论根基,再辅之以确立优先条件或变量的具体路径,原则的规则化便水到渠成:即通过具体的优先条件或变量确立相冲突原则中优先适用的原则(即优先原则),适用优先原则的结果便是创设一个规则(即个案规范),优先条件或变量进而成为该个案规范的构成要件。个案规范才是裁判该具体个案的直接依据。     

Robert Alexy and the Dual Nature of Law

Robert Alexy's claim that law of necessity has a dual nature raises many interesting philosophical questions. In this article, I consider some of these questions, such as what the meaning of the correctness thesis is, whether Alexy's discourse theory supports this thesis, and whether the thesis is defensible; whether Alexy's argument from anarchy and civil war supports the claim that law of necessity has a real dimension; and what the implications are of the use of moral arguments, such as the argument from injustice, for the status of Alexy's inquiry.     

二元规范理论下的法律原则检讨

当下法律原则理论的论争重心,已从"法律是什么"的概念分析,转向了司法实践中的原则裁判。自德沃金以来的"规则-原则"二元规范理论,对实际的司法裁判的解说力和作用力较为有限,也未能解决原则权衡这一关键性问题。"融贯性"命题和"籍由法政策权衡进行裁判"命题,是原则裁判理论的两大基石。但德沃金对融贯性命题的回答过于抽象,而阿列克希依比例原则和权重公式对权衡命题和原则理论的最新推进,却是一种不成功的自反性进化。这种自反性进化和理论反讽,表明作为一种"过度整合式"的裁判理论,原则裁判已然走到了穷途末路。     

Mos Geometricus and the Common Law Mind: Interrogating Contract Theory

Euclidian theories have it that there exist one or a small number of apex principles from which the entire fasciculus of rules of contract law can be logically deduced. Two arguments are marshalled against the Euclidian project. First, that it has been unsuccessfully attempted before – in the form of the nineteenth century contract law treatise which emulated the civil lawyer's rationalistic model, mos geometricus – cautioning us against setting much store by its present reincarnation. Second, that the common law's methodology makes it resistant to this form of theorising. Euclidian theory presupposes a picture of rules on which: a) cases involve an application of logically prior rules; b) rules are reliably identifiable by different actors in the legal system; and c) rules normatively range over an indefinite spectrum of future cases. It will be argued that the common law defies this picture of rules thus rendering Euclidian theory analytically impossible.     

Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals*

Robert Alexy has built his original theory of law upon pervasive claims for “necessary” features of law. In this article, I show that Alexy's claims suffer from two difficulties. First, Alexy is never clear about what he means by “necessity.” Second, Alexy writes as if there have been no challenges to claims of conceptual necessity. There have been such challenges and Alexy needs to answer them if his project is to succeed.     

法律原则在法律推理中的地位和作用——一个比较的研究

我国关于法律原则的讨论一般集中在立法过于笼统与立法所规定的法律基本原则这两个方面。这种意义上的法律原则与德沃金所说的法律原则存在重要区别。德沃金关于法律原则的讨论其目的是强调法律的确定性 ,而我们关于法律原则的讨论却在强化法律的模糊性。法律原则的讨论主要涉及法律推理过程中原则与规则之间的关系。基于法治的原因 ,法律推理必须坚持将法律规则作为法律推理的大前提 ;在法律规则含义不明确、模糊或者相互矛盾时 ,可以使用法律原则 ,但是 ,必须经过一定的法律原则的认定程序。     

Remarks on the Normativity of International Legal Rules and Global Constitutionalism

The article reflects on the possibility of conceptualising the complex problem of the normativity of international legal rules, including in particular the phenomenon of “relative normativity.” The author utilises the critical potential of Ronald Dworkin's proposal for a new philosophy of international law to reflect on the classical accounts explaining normativity of international law. By building on Dworkin's argument, the author argues for a constitutional account of international law. The far‐reaching constitutional proposals may provide a more complex and coherent set of possible rationalisations of international legal rules. International law is in great need of a comprehensive theory that could better explain its normative character as well as its sources, and it is argued that international constitutionalism has the potential to serve this purpose.     

When Is a Regime Not a Legal System? Alexy on Moral Correctness and Social Efficacy

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness.     

Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality

This paper criticizes Alexy's argument on the necessary connection between law and morality. First of all, the author discusses some aspects of the notion of the claim to correctness. Basically, it is highly doubtful that all legal authorities share the same idea of moral correctness. Secondly, the author argues that the claim to correctness is not a defining characteristic of the concepts of “legal norm” and “legal system”. Hence, the thesis of a necessary connection between law and morality based on such claim cannot be accepted. 1 Abstract by Antonino Rotolo.
     

History in the Law of the Constitution

This article addresses the diminution of historical understanding in English constitutional law by reconsidering Dicey's approach to history in his foundational work. It argues that Dicey's approach was inconsistent and unconvincing – separating a historical view of an evolving constitution from a legal view, discounting history's legal significance and nonetheless repeatedly evoking a whig history to enhance the appeal of the constitution's rules and principles. It recalls the features or deficiencies of whig history, famously characterised by Herbert Butterfield from a modern historical perspective. To Butterfield's characterisation it adds an elaboration on their constitutional significance and a neglected comparative dimension. From those features, it develops, in conclusion, methodological suggestions for a history that might yet serve constitutional legal purposes.     

Insights,Errors and Self‐Misconceptions of the Theory of Principles

The theory of principles is multifaceted. Its initial expression contained an important argument against positivist theories of adjudication. As a legal theory, it fails in its effort to claim a structural difference between rules and principles. It also fails as a methodological theory that reduces adjudication to subsumption or balancing. It misunderstands itself when it is conceived as a doctrinal theory especially of fundamental rights. Its most promising aspect could be its contribution to a more comprehensive theory of legal argumentation.     

The Intensionality behind Legal Concepts and Their Extensional Boundaries: Between Conventionalism and Interpretivism

This article constitutes an attempt to reexamine a crucial issue of legal theory from the perspective of philosophy of language and of social ontology: by analyzing a jurisprudential case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, we explain how Searle's account on rules in The Construction of Social Reality constitutes an important starting point for the clarification of the old jurisprudential debate between conventionalism and interpretivism. In a nutshell, we show that Searle's framework, while strictly conventionalist, makes it possible to conceive of the distinction between the semantic content of rules (their intended purpose) and their extension, by drawing a parallel with the idea of “deep conventions” (and “essential rules”) as well as with the semantic conventions in natural language. The paper thus touches on the broader problem of the relations between legal concepts and nonlegal values (law and morality).     

行政审判中的规则阐明问题研究

规则阐明是司法活动的一项主要内容。法官在审理案件的过程中,解决一系列事实和法律问题,都遵循着一定的规则,发现和阐明这些规则,对提高案件质量、提升司法权威都具有十分积极的作用。行政审判有自身的特点,其纷繁的法律关系和复杂的行政管理活动,为行政法官进行规则阐明提供了广阔的空间,同时也提出了更高的要求。规则阐明是指法官对所要适用的规则进行解释,阐述其涵义,解释规则适用的情境、适用于本案的合理性,包括事实规则、法律规则、法理规则阐明。阐明基础有:行政法基本原则、行政行为构成、行政权与司法权关系、经验政策。阐明方法包括利益权衡、依法解释、区别与类推。中国应当构建现代司法规则阐明制度,完善裁判说理制度,设立规则阐明的激励机制,借鉴判例法制度合理因素,建立规则引用制度。     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part II

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis - in the sense of rational reconstruction based on alleged moral principles - for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous ones by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victim's claim to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

Dworkin and Phenomenology of the “Pre‐Legal”?

Ronald Dworkin states in his preface to “Law's Empire” (1986) that he is doing a phenomenology of law. In regards to a phenomenology of law, I wish to investigate Dworkin's theory of law, and subsequently, what is left out in order for it to be considered a phenomenological account. In doing so, I will compare Dworkin's phenomenology of law to Schütz's phenomenology of the social world. The comparison between the two will illuminate what I believe is necessary for law, and that is a Phenomenology of the Pre‐Legal.     

The internet balancing formula

The Internet Balancing Formula (IBF) is a mathematical instrument to increase the rational and transparent aspects of balancing conflicting human rights online. It is based on the relative weight and intensity of conflicting rights. The numerical value of these rights is arrived at by applying mathematical scales to various input elements. This formula is easy to use and could be applied globally by private online stakeholders. Robert Alexy has entered into debate with Susi, pointing out similarities and differences between his Weight Formula and the IBF, and advancing the concreteness thesis. Alexy views the Weight Formula as general and abstract, whereas the IBF is specific and particular. Both Alexy and Susi are of the opinion that such formula is highly needed to respond to the theoretical and practical uncertainties and divergent practices of online stakeholders. Susi replies to Alexy's critique in a separate article.     

法院地国家国内法中的冲突规则与国际条约的关系

法院地国家国内法中的冲突规则和已对该国生效的国际条约中的冲突规则同属该国国际私法的渊源。多数国家的国际私法制定法均有优先适用国际条约中的冲突规则的规定,但其国际私法分则对国际条约中的冲突规则的处理方式则主要有三种不同的立法模式。在裁判涉外民事案件的实践中,实体法解决办法有别于冲突法解决办法,仅在案件不符合国际统一实体私法条约的适用条件的情形下,才能依法院地国家国内法的冲突规则确定准据法。涉外合同的双方当事人选择已对法院地国家和其他缔约国生效的国际条约并不等于选择了合同准据法。而如果涉外合同的双方当事人选择了尚未对法院地国家生效、但已对两个或两个以上其他国家生效的国际条约,则只能视为对无法律约束力的“非国家规则” 的选择。由于“程序问题适用法院地法”,涉外民事案件的程序事项既不适用冲突规则,也不适用实体私法规则。法院地国家国内法的冲突规则不会同国际条约中的国际民事程序法规则发生抵触。