1958年印尼内战与艾森豪威尔政府的政策

美国对1958年印尼内战的干涉是美国与第三世界关系史上一个有代表性的事件。艾森豪威尔政府从美苏两极对抗的角度认知和处理美国与新兴的民族主义国家的关系，将美国对亚非民族主义国家的政策附属于美国对苏冷战战略。正是基于这样一种政策思维，美国对印尼内战采取了干涉政策。干涉行动的失败，迫使美国决策当局重新检视对印尼政策的基本构架，并着手制定一项更为可行、更能反映印尼政治经济和社会现实的政策。     

卡特政府与伊朗巴列维国王的倒台

伊朗巴列维国王在第二次世界大战后美伊亲密关系建立和发展过程中起到举足轻重的作用.不过到20世纪70年代后期,巴列维的独裁统治陷入严重危机.1977年入主白宫的卡特起初并没有意识到伊朗局势的严重性,所以仍把巴列维国王视为唯一可以稳定伊朗的国家领导人.随着伊朗危机的日益加剧,伊朗国王的地位摇摇欲坠,对此,美国各部门围绕对伊朗政策产生激烈纷争,并最终坐视巴列维国王倒台.美伊长达近30年的友好关系也宣布终结.     

Yeager,M. P. and Carter,C. (Eds) (2012). Pacts and Alliances in History. Diplomatic Strategy and the Politics of Coalitions

This article disputes the assertions of the new Reagan literature. Drawing upon radio broadcasts, speeches, correspondences, and documents from his presidential library, as well as recently published diaries from his White House years, it argues that Ronald Reagan had no grand strategy in the years 1976–1984. Indeed, throughout this period, he possessed two less-than-grand strategies I label “peace through strength” and “a crusade for freedom.” Each of these contained its own respective set of goals and employed its own corresponding set of tactics. Yet there was no grand strategy for ending the Cold War.     

Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy

How should we explain the recent unilateralist turn in U.S. foreign policy? Some accounts treat growing American unilateralism as a passing aberration attributable to the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration. This paper, by contrast, traces U.S. unilateralism to the structural effects, at home and abroad, of the end of the Cold War. Internationally, the removal of the Soviet threat has undermined the "institutional bargain" that once guided relations between the U.S. and its major allies. Absent Cold War imperatives, the U.S. is less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions and other states are less likely to defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal multilateral constraints. Domestically, the end of the Cold War has weakened the ability of presidents to resist the appeals of powerful veto players whose interests are threatened by multilateral commitments. These factors suggest that American unilateralism may have deeper roots and more staying power than many expect.     

美日同盟的转型与东亚安全秩序的建构

美日同盟是冷战时代的产物,在冷战中发挥了反苏反共的重要作用。冷战结束后,美日同盟在国际社会的角色转型、性质定位正逐步发生演变,并出现日益强化的趋势。冷战后时代,美日同盟的调整对东亚安全秩序产生了重要影响,一方面,它遏制和防范中国的发展;另一方面,它在一定程度上发挥了制衡作用,有利于防止东亚地区危机的爆发。以美日同盟为核心的东亚安全秩序并不利于东亚地区的和平与稳定,因此,要构建良性的东亚安全秩序,必须把以美日同盟为核心的美国同盟体系和作为新兴大国的中国并重,协调处理东亚安全事务。     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

美国的中亚经济战略及其影响

冷战结束后，美国中亚战略的重点几经波折和调整，现已趋向成熟稳健，形成了以推动中亚区域合作为中心的经济战略，并取得了显著实效，为美国在中亚的存在提供了前所未有的合法性和现实基础，对中亚局势的走向具有不容忽视的影响。美国的中亚经济战略客观上起到了推动中亚融入国际社会的进程，中国可以顺势而为，尽可能通过多边机制参与美国主导的经济项目。     

U.S. Grand Strategy Following the George W. Bush Presidency

Debates over U.S. grand strategy have devoted a disproportionate level of attention to the War on Terror itself rather than the evolving strategic environment. Challenges including an impending shift in the balance of power, structural deficits, and divided public opinion will significantly impact the policy options available to government leaders, but they have not been adequately addressed. This article analyzes the options available for U.S. grand strategy following the George W. Bush presidency by relating key U.S. national interests with domestic and international policy constraints on the horizon. The analysis concludes that the United States must adopt a defensive grand strategy to rebuild popular consensus, to prevent further strain on the military, and to consolidate its gains in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this strategy will require flexible coalitions, not formal international organizations, because of a significant divergence of security interests and capabilities with its European allies.     

Eisenhower Reconsidered: Policymaking Lessons for Today

President Dwight D. Eisenhower oversaw an unprecedented period of U.S. peace and prosperity. These accomplishments were not all preordained or simply the result of favorable domestic and international conditions. When he became president in 1953, Ike inherited a contentious global and domestic environment. The challenges led many Americans to wonder if the sacrifices made during World War II had only garnered a fleeting peace. Eisenhower's achievements are notable because of this setting and should lead us to explore the methods that he used to navigate the ship of state. In particular, Ike's comprehensive and disciplined approach to policymaking stands out. It allowed Eisenhower to escape the worst aspects of America's partisan politics and guide the nation toward its most vital and enduring interests.     

从美对俄战略看当前美俄的紧张关系

美俄关系是世界上最重要的大国关系之一。美国弱俄、抑俄政策是冷战时期对苏“遏制”战略的继续，意识形态的对抗贯穿美苏和美俄关系的发展过程。近些年来，美俄不断形成相互挑战之势，今年俄格军事冲突又导致美俄对抗势头加剧。但两国不会回到冷战时代，非敌非友的两国关系将会长期保持。     

How Grand was Reagan's Strategy, 1976-1984?

This article disputes the assertions of the new Reagan literature. Drawing upon radio broadcasts, speeches, correspondences, and documents from his presidential library, as well as recently published diaries from his White House years, it argues that Ronald Reagan had no grand strategy in the years 1976-1984. Indeed, throughout this period, he possessed two less-than-grand strategies I label “peace through strength” and “a crusade for freedom.” Each of these contained its own respective set of goals and employed its own corresponding set of tactics. Yet there was no grand strategy for ending the Cold War.     

Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the strategic goal to contain Communism. Human rights and democracy were of secondary importance. In the post-Cold War period, the promotion of human rights and democracy as foreign policy concerns rose in prominence. In the spirit of Andrew Pierre, who once characterized arms transfers as "foreign policy writ large ," this study questions whether the transfer of U.S. arms mirrors America's foreign policy goals. To what extent do U.S. arms transfers reflect a concern for human rights and democracy? As a foreign policy instrument, do U.S. arms transfer patterns mark a transition between Cold War and post-Cold War worlds? To address these questions, I examine the empirical linkage between U.S. foreign policy goals and arms export agreements with developing countries for the years 1981–2002. I use a two-stage model to evaluate the decision-making process. The first-stage addresses whether a country is eligible to receive U.S. arms. If a country successfully passes through the selection stage, it progresses to the second stage where a decision is made about the amount of arms transferred. I use a Heckman model to estimate empirically the determinants of arms at both the initial selection stage and the subsequent amount stage. The findings indicate that during the Cold War years, human rights were not a significant determinant of arms transfers—although democracy was positively linked to U.S. arms in the selection stage. In the post-Cold War period, both human rights and democracy had a meaningful impact in determining the eligibility of a country to receive arms.     

Quiet diplomacy in a television era: The media and U.S. policy toward the republic of Korea

This study examines the role of television coverage in U.S. policy toward South Korea, focusing on the May 1980 Kwangji incident and the subsequent visit of South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan to the White House in February of 1981. It explores these two episodes in the context of major dimensions of U.S. policy toward Korea and the themes developed through sporadic, low‐level coverage of Korea by mainstream American media over the years. The analysis underscores the political impact of television's dramatic visual focus, its use of consistent visual images, its expansion of the geopolitical scope of the policy process, and its personalization of policy. The dramatically different public interpretations of the Kwangju incident and Chun visit in Korea versus the United States suggests that President Reagan's first major state visit, during which he declared that his administration would pursue “quiet diplomacy” on human rights in Korea, while successful within the United States and in the short term, was damaging over the long term.     

导致1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援的诸因素分析

1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援是1965年柬埔寨与美国断交的前奏,它连同柬埔寨与美国断交一起对冷战时期东南亚地区的历史产生了重要的影响。柬埔寨在1963年拒绝美援是邻国因素、美国因素、中国因素和柬埔寨自身因素等要素合力的结果。对影响1963年柬埔寨王国拒绝美援的诸因素的分析将有助于我们较好地理解亚洲冷战的复杂性,更好地理解制约美国亚洲冷战战略得以有效实施的因素。     

In the eye of the storm: Ambassador James Richards' mission to Iraq in April 1957

This article discusses the visit of James Richards, President Eisenhower's special emissary to the Middle East, to Iraq in April 1957 following the pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. An analysis of the Richards Mission encompasses a range of specific issues, including the relationship in Iraq between the US and UK and American assessments of the stability of the Iraqi government. Moreover, this article examines the American strategy for navigating the rising tide of Arab nationalist sentiment in Iraq after the Suez War. This article explores the ways in which US policy-makers privileged the notions of ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in Iraqi political affairs and reflects on the critical dilemmas and contradictions underlying American policy towards Iraq and the Middle East after the 1956 Suez War.     

Chen''s Scrappiing of "NUC" and U.S. Predicament

On February 27, 2006, Chen Shuibian announced his decision to cease the operation of the "National Unification Council (NUC) and the application of its guidelines," which further increased the risk of "Taiwan independence." Chen's campaign for "Taiwan independence," which in essence was an attempt to change the status quo, thus gravely damaging the cross-strait relations. The next day,the White House and U. S. State Department made a separate response. On the one hand, they argued that Chen didn't change the status quo as he only "freezed" instead of "abolishing" the "NUC"and its guidelines. On the other hand, they urged the leaders of mainland China and the Taiwan authorities to go back to the negotiation table. ① Such understatement and seeming evenhandedness by the U.S. shows its acquiescence to the reality of Chen's abolition of the"NUC," and its limited ability to control Chen's activities for "Taiwan independence." In the coming two years, Washington's current Taiwan policy will hardly continue to work, as Chen will steadily promote the modification of "The Constitution" and the "legal independence." The U. S. must make an option between allowing the "Taiwan independence" forces to impinge on its "one-China policy' and clearly suppressing the movement for "Taiwan independence."     

Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency

Following its encounter with insurgent violence in Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has sought to improve the U.S. military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. This effort suggests a potential turning-point in the history of the U.S. military, which has traditionally devoted its attention and resources to “high-intensity” or “conventional” combat. Given this institutional culture, what are now the prospects of the U.S. military ‘learning counterinsurgency’? In many ways, the ongoing reorientation is promising and targeted, informed directly by the U.S. campaign in Iraq. At the same time, Pentagon priorities still reveal a remarkable resistance to change, and this in spite of the radically altered strategic environment of the War on Terror. Given this intransigence - and the eventual fall-out from the troubled Iraq campaign - the ongoing learning of counterinsurgency might very well fail to produce the type of deep-rooted change needed to truly transform the U.S. military.     

Middle East Transformation from the Perspective of U.S. Middle East Policy

The Middle East, one of the most turbulent regions in the world, has embarked on another round of chaos since America waged the Iraq war in 2003, new players vying to fill the power vacuum, entrenched hatred multiplying with new wounds. Ecstasy turned into agony as Americans watched the war unfold. U.S. think tank researchers and politicians, reflecting on the war and U.S. Middle East policy, urged the Bush administration to adjust the policy and break the strategic impasse. Under grave pressure from home and abroad, the White House finally began to respond. Against this backdrop, the year 2007 witnessed the most intensive and extensive shift of U.S. Middle East policy in recent years and a drastic return of realism in America＇s foreign policy. These policy changes rippled in the Middle East, precipitating policy changes of other powers and transformation of the geopolitical landscape. The Middle East, as we can see, is heading toward a new age of pain and growth.     

关于越战期间美国老挝政策的国外成果研究综述

冷战初期，老挝本不是美国东南亚政策的重点问题，但随着越南战争的爆发，美国对老挝的重视程度逐步加深，直至派出地面部队进行干涉。这一问题值得深思。国外针对该领域的研究已硕果累累，但国内的相关研究才刚刚起步。对国外相关研究成果的整理和推介，应有助于推动国内学者在该领域的研究取得更新突破。     

Stopping the war: The Eisenhower administration and the search for an armistice in Korea

This article examines the Eisenhower Administration's approach to ending the Korean War. It seeks in particular to assess the evidence suggesting that the United States was considering using atomic weapons to compel Communist acquiescence to its armistice terms.