美国“印太”军事威慑战略评析北大核心

美国拜登政府推出“一体化威慑”战略，通过强化亚太前沿军事存在、翻新各种作战概念、打造军事集团等手段，强化“印太”军事威慑，企图借此巩固霸权地位。但该战略引发了地区军事化与地区经济化、军事一体化与地区战略自主、威慑止战与威慑致战三大矛盾，不仅冲击地区经济发展与合作、侵蚀地区国家战略自主性，还大大增加地区发生军事冲突的风险，危害亚太地区安全。     

美国对华常规威慑战略的调整

美国战略界认为,中国过去二十多年的军事现代化极大地侵蚀了美国在全球军事上的绝对主导地位,并导致美国对华常规威慑的可信度受到挑战。随着中国常规威慑能力上升,美国战略界鼓吹调整对华常规威慑的理念和战略,提出了“一体化威慑”概念,重视对中国施加拒止性威慑,使中国相信不会在军事行动中实现目标,以达到威慑中国的意图。在大国战略竞争的背景下,美国试图从加强国防科技建设、提升拒止性威慑能力和巩固亚太盟友关系三个方面着手,强化对中国的威慑效用。中美常规威慑能力的此消彼长和常规威慑战略的攻守态势转换,深刻影响着两国战略竞争的形态,也对世界和地区的安全秩序产生了重大影响。中美常规威慑能力的变化,不仅推动美国统筹考虑核力量和常规力量,也推动着中国重新思考核力量和常规力量的关系,并迫使美国调整军控政策,对全球军控体系产生了长远影响。     

美国“一体化威慑”的战略逻辑：以AUKUS的演进为范例

在大国竞争背景下,美国拜登政府正式提出并实践“一体化威慑”战略概念。“一体化威慑”意味着通过跨越领域、区域、冲突域、部门、盟国和伙伴等五个维度的“一体化”调度,统筹“拒止性威慑”“韧性威慑”“直接和集体施加成本进行威慑”三种威慑逻辑,针对特定的竞争对手和安全问题施加威慑。在战略逻辑上,美国以“不对称多极”格局为基础,以海洋特别是西太平洋为主要场域,以中国为主要威慑对象并以“印太”为建构区域,通过“网络化”的作用方式,灵活统筹并“量身定制”地施加威慑。在“印太战略”推进下,“美英澳三边安全伙伴关系”(AUKUS)成为美国实施“一体化威慑”的范例。AUKUS由美国联合最亲密盟友发起,针对美国所谓的战略竞争对手中国,以西太平洋特别是南海、台海、东海为战略前沿,通过将“欧洲—大西洋”引入“印度—太平洋”来加强跨区域威慑,并以“全政府”方式运作,囊括核潜艇、高超声速等先进能力、网络和太空等重要领域,考虑不同冲突形态,不断取得进展。然而,AUKUS的进一步推进将面临诸多“一体化威慑”固有的内在和外在困难,未来仍存在不确定性。     

贸易何以成为威慑手段?

近年来,国际社会中"经济武器化"这一现象的出现吸引了政界、学界和商界的广泛关注。尤其自美国总统特朗普上台执政以来,美国以贸易为手段大肆威慑他国,借助经济压力为手段迫使他国屈服,以实现自身政治经济目的。因此,研究和分析贸易为何能够成为威慑手段,以及贸易作为威慑手段在大国博弈中的作用十分必要。贸易能够成为威慑手段的原因体现在三个方面:一是它直接涉及国家行为体的核心利益,二是能够给其他国家行为体带来重大损失,三是产生的压力可能改变其他国家行为体的计划或行为。此外,在大国战略博弈中,贸易手段发挥着对其他威慑手段的替代作用,对传统威慑手段的补偿作用,以及重塑与维护大国战略威慑体系的作用。当前大国威慑工具的局限与利益多元性之间、理念的单一性与安全挑战的多维之间的张力逐渐扩大,传统威慑工具难以应对日趋走向以科技和经济为基础的综合国力较量。因此,将贸易手段纳入威慑工具箱并加以使用已是大国博弈的必然选择。尤其在大国无战争的今天,贸易作为大国往来的主要媒介,其背后的威慑功能将在大国的战略竞争中发挥着更为重要的作用。     

近年美国网络威慑理论研究述评

网络威慑理论研究是美国新一轮威慑理论研究的重点。美国网络威慑理论研究是顺应美国军方扩大威慑领域的要求而出现的，其目的就是为美国实施网络威慑战略张本，并为完善该战略出谋划策。美国网络威慑理论研究近年主要围绕“归因问题”、如何传递威慑意志与决心、如何进行拒止威慑和惩罚威慑等问题展开。下一步，美国网络威慑理论研究的重点将是：如何对潜在对手进行惩罚报复？如何界定网络攻击在哪些情况下等同于武装攻击？如何解决报复过程中的相称问题？如何对不同行为体做到“量体裁衣式威慑”等。     

美国太空威慑战略调整及其影响

2009年以来,为应对日趋复杂的太空环境,美国开始调整其太空威慑战略,强调通过太空弹性能力、太空系统防御能力和太空国际合作,以增强美国在太空领域的拒止性威慑。美国在太空的战略地位相对下降、对太空的依赖性造成其太空资产的脆弱性,以及报复性威慑在太空难以实施等因素,是美国进行太空威慑战略调整的原因。然而,由于太空领域具有各方脆弱性不平衡、太空攻击难以归因、容易引发其他领域对抗和战争升级的特点,太空威慑相较于传统威慑在实力、决心和信息传递三要素上都存在差异,在目前太空国际规则尚不清晰的情况下更加难以实现。因此,美国的太空威慑战略会造成加剧太空军备竞赛、引发战略误判、挤压中国太空活动空间等影响,最终不利于维护和平的太空环境。     

进攻性联盟、模糊性威慑与AUKUS的战略性扩张

2021年9月15日,美国、英国和澳大利亚建立三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS)。美英澳三国基于追求权力最大化、改变既有国际秩序的扩张性动机,构建进攻性联盟。美国企图巩固印太地区霸权;英国试图提升印太地区影响力,推动“全球英国”构想;澳大利亚希图扩张在印太地区的威慑力,强化南太平洋区域强国地位。AUKUS的威慑功能具有模糊性,主要体现在威慑对象及触发条件的模糊性。其模糊性威慑主要包括模糊性威慑的信号功能、震慑功能、作战功能、信息和情报共享功能、军工合作功能。AUKUS通过模糊性威慑功能实现美国在印太地区的战略性扩张;威胁中国国家安全和阻挠中国统一进程;诱使印度深化与三国战略合作;引发东盟国家意见分歧;加速欧盟防务自主进程;削弱国际核不扩散机制,恶化地区安全形势,对全球及地区安全局势产生消极影响。     

拜登政府太空战略的安全化动向

拜登政府按照安全化逻辑不断充实美国太空战略的既有内涵，形成了覆盖战略指南、优先次序、基础设施、军事能力及至国际合作的完整体系。其动力从表面看来自两个方面：为了节约资源而优先追求太空规范霸权，为了提升威慑效能而强化太空军事霸权；从深层看来自美国重振国际体系霸权的意图。由此，拜登政府太空战略实现了间接—直接目标、规范目标与军事—政治—经济目标的有效整合。其中，拜登政府着重加强两个方面的能力建设，一是围绕太空军控规范、太空和平利用及规范建构联盟建设等提升美国的太空规范能力，二是聚焦优化太空作战体系、强化防御能力和开发前沿战力等巩固美国的太空军事能力。今后，拜登政府太空战略的规范化、军事化和系统化特征将进一步强化，可能会对太空治理产生深远的消极影响。     

自由鹰派与拜登政府对华战略北大核心

拜登政府执政后,秉持自由国际主义战略的自由鹰派全面重掌外交安全领域权力,将修复美国霸权作为优先工作,并据此维持特朗普政府开启的对华战略竞争。相比之前,自由鹰派完善了对华竞争的战略逻辑、细化了相关政策布局、调整了竞争的限度空间,使之更加符合民主党的总体议程,但其政策推进面临内外挑战。自由鹰派主导下的对华战略竞争并不符合中美两国和世界的利益,中美关系健康稳定发展需要美方更加理性务实的政策。     

美国对华拒止性威慑战略论析

拒止性威慑的思想源远流长,作为一种军事战略的拒止性威慑具有广泛性、实时性和受挑战性三个主要特点。拒止性威慑的思路相比惩罚性威慑更具操作性,在信息化战争时代也更具优势。美国战略学界认为,在西太平洋地区中美实力日渐接近的情况下,对华拒止性威慑战略是较优选项。美国对华拒止性威慑战略兴于特朗普政府时期,其主要特点是加强军事系统弹性能力建设与发展新战区导弹防御体系。拜登政府则在“一体化威慑”框架下应用对华拒止性威慑,发展深度防御能力。美国对拒止性威慑战略的理解与应用已经突破了传统意义上偏重防御的拒止性威慑模式。该战略的目标是联合盟友阻止中国在西太平洋地区的快速军事行动,维持和巩固在该地区的军事主导权。虽然美国对华拒止性威慑战略的实践受到了诸多内外因素制约,但其给中美带来的负面影响仍在不断加深,并对地区安全构成巨大挑战。中国需要主动培塑有利于军力发展的良好环境,发展新技术装备,应对美国对华拒止性威慑战略实践造成的军事胁迫,降低各类战略风险。     

Thucydides and Deterrence

Thucydides describes ten attempts at deterrence and compellence. With one partial exception, the use of these strategies fail and generally help to provoke the behavior they were meant to prevent. The narrative and speeches in Thucydides' text indicate that leaders everywhere rely on deterrence and compellence and expect them to succeed. Targets of these strategies nevertheless downplay risks and costs when it is contrary to their desires or needs. When motivated by appetite, actors not infrequently indulge in wishful thinking. When motivated by honor, actors are risk accepting and may welcome threats as a means of demonstrating their courage. When motivated by fear, actors worry about the consequences of compliance, which they reason may be more costly than resistance. Thucydides is the first person to frame deterrence and compellence as a strategic interaction problem and to emphasize the determining importance of motives for the strategic calculus of actors. His analysis has important implications for contemporary conflict management.     

General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory

Since general deterrence necessarily precedes immediate deterrence, the analysis of general deterrence is more fundamental to an understanding of international conflict than is an analysis of immediate deterrence. Nonetheless, despite a few exceptions, the quantitative literature has ignored the subject of general deterrence, focusing almost exclusively on situations of immediate deterrence. My purpose in this essay is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting a recently developed theory of general deterrence—Perfect Deterrence Theory—to a systematic test by examining general deterrence from 1816–2000. The results indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are strongly supported by the empirical record.     

导弹防御与美国延伸威慑政策

对盟友提供的延伸威慑安全保证,是美国维持与盟友关系的重要基础。冷战时期,美国的延伸威慑主要通过核保护伞方式运作。为了应对冷战后新的安全环境,以满足新旧盟友的安全需求,美国开始通过导弹防御合作来提供对盟友的安全承诺与安全保证。这使得美国的延伸威慑从以核保护伞为核心,转变为核保护伞与导弹防御并重的模式。与盟友发展导弹防御合作关系,对美国的延伸威慑体系造成了一定程度的影响。其正面效益是,导弹防御合作使更多盟友能参与集体防务并贡献更多力量,还可增强盟友与伙伴的凝聚力和向心力,巩固美国的军事领导地位。但是,导弹防御系统仍然不具备绝对的可靠性和有效性,而且美国必须在以导弹防御合作促进延伸威慑方面投入更多的成本。如今,美国已开始加大力度,团结盟友进行新一轮的全球战略竞争。在此背景下,导弹防御延伸威慑模式的可持续性也将面临考验。     

Restoring Deterrence

While the strategy of deterrence has faced considerable criticism since September 11, it needs to be reexamined. This article addresses serious challenges to the deterrence strategy. It also considers the deterrence strategy as it relates to states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran and others. Ultimately, it argues that deterrence is a security policy offering a way forward for the United States that is not only more effective because more tailored, but is also more moral than its alternatives.     

Selection Effects and Deterrence

The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self-selection is shown to imply that in a sample of crises, deterrent threats issued after an initial challenge will tend to fail in precisely those cases where they are relatively most credible signals of an intent to resist with force. The product of a selection effect, this paradoxical implication allows a resolution of the debate on the efficacy of deterrence in crises. And because selection effects can arise whenever a historical "case" is the product of choices by actors who also influence the outcome in question, this example from the study of deterrence has broad relevance for empirical research.     

U.S.Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy and China's Coping Strategy

Deterrence and coercion are two kinds of strategies,the latter being more aggressive than the former.The U.S.Asia-Pacific Rebalancing strategy is an important diplomatic legacy of Obama's administration.For the issues involving the Diaoyu Islands,the South China Sea,cyber security,DPRK's nuclear program,and Iran's nuclear program,the U.S.has carded out military deterrence and non-force coercion against China.But generally,these are low-level coercive measures and distinct from the severe economic sanction and diplomatic isolation imposed by the U.S.on Russia,Syria,DPRK and Iran in recent years.Concerning issues where the U.S.and China hold distinct views,there would be less strategic leeway for the two countries.If the U.S.is to strengthen deterrence and coercion towards China,China can respond more actively and effectively,but it will be more difficult to build a new model of China-U.S.major-country relationship.     

Deterrence,uncertainty and cooperative behavior

The paper analyzes deterrence relationships in situations when the relevant forms of behavior are subject to lags such as in the case of foreign interventions and technological arms races. Mutual deterrence is a way of inducing cooperative behavior. Successful deterrence, in the cases considered, can be considered as ways of inducing cooperative behaviors in Prisoners’ Dilemma Supergames, the model used in this paper. It is argued that, in general, deterrence is more likely to be successful and hence cooperative behavior more prevalent in systems where the actors can move between strategies quickly (i.e., are flexible) and which are characterized by low uncertainty. The paper also analyzes the concept of discounting and time preference in the discussion of political phenomena where the concept has no market interpretation. It is analyzed as a rational response to uncertainty.     

Israel's Deterrence Strategy Revisited

During the 2001–2009 period when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and perceived as unilateral, many states strengthened their security cooperation with the United States and facilitated the reach of the us military. This behavior spans a range of actions along a spectrum from reaffirming traditional alliances to far more subtle forms of alignment. This pattern is in large part driven by the actions of regional powers such as Russia and China whose rising power pushes neighboring states to seek the assurance of the United States, and it has distinct implications for the endurance of American hegemony. As those regional powers seek to expand their influence, secondary states may increase their contributions to the maintenance of American hegemony, thus helping to extend it well into the future. They are less prone to do so, however, if the United States follows a strategy of restraint that calls into question its willingness to defend its hegemony. Therefore, a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use it may be what sustains the cooperation from second-tier states that helps to maintain American hegemony.