Resuscitation of a Phantom? On Robert Alexy’s Latest Attempt to Save His Concept of Principle

This paper is my contribution to round three of a longstanding debate between Robert Alexy and me about the principles theory’s concept of principle. In the first round, Alexy—bucking tradition—proposed a nongradualist distinction between rules and principles that divided the ontology of norms into two categorically distinct norm‐types. He connected this norm‐theoretical analysis with a theory of fundamental rights according to which such rights had to be understood as principles and thus interpreted as optimization requirements. In the first round I objected to the norm‐theoretical assumptions and questioned the doctrinal merit of the principles theory approach. Unlike Alexy, I saw no merit in his notion of principle over and above optimization requirements, which by that time Alexy, too, regarded as rules. In round two, Alexy defended his concept of principle by taking refuge in the notion of an ideal ought, which he defined as a command to be optimized. In this second round, I criticized the new attempt to save his view of principles on the ground that the norms Alexy had in mind optimized not commands but states of affairs and thus were ordinary norms or rules according to the misguided taxonomy of the principles theory. Alexy opened round three of our exchange by admitting that my critique of round two was justified and that he had erred in identifying principles as ideal commands to be optimized. He now proposes an index theory of principles. In the paper, I recapitulate the motive and the main points of our debate and scrutinize Alexy’s latest innovation.     

解读阿列克西的宪法权利规范水平效力理论

阿列克西的宪法权利理论是有关公民宪法权利规范司法适用的理论,是有关公民之间宪法权利冲突与权衡的理论,因此该理论必然是有关宪法权利规范在公民之间进行司法适用的水平效力理论。因此,为使该理论能够成立,阿列克西一定要对其宪法权利规范水平效力的途径、内容、程度与合理性等问题进行理论上的建构。他的宪法权利规范水平效力建构的"三层次"说,是在德国的司法实践和学界的"客观价值辐射理论"和"三种模式"建构基础上所进行的整合与重构,具有很大的独特性、涵盖性与合理性。     

Argumentative Representation and Democracy: A Critique of Alexy's Defense of Judicial Review of Legislation

Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value of argumentative representation depends on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities.     

On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison

The formal structure of subsumption may be represented in a deductive scheme, which one might call the "Subsumption Formula." The author argues that there is an analogous scheme for the formal structure of balancing or weighing, which he terms the "Weight Formula." In short, subsumption and balancing have comparable schemata, through which the formal structure of a set of premisses, which warrant the inference to a legal result, can be identified. The relation in the two cases between these premisses and the ensuing legal result is, however, different. The Subsumption Formula is represented by a scheme that works according to the rules of logic, the Weight Formula, by a scheme that works according to the rules of arithmetic. In spite of this difference, the two formulae are alike in that judgments, in both cases, remain the basis of the argument.     

Alexy on Necessity in Law and Morals*

Robert Alexy has built his original theory of law upon pervasive claims for “necessary” features of law. In this article, I show that Alexy's claims suffer from two difficulties. First, Alexy is never clear about what he means by “necessity.” Second, Alexy writes as if there have been no challenges to claims of conceptual necessity. There have been such challenges and Alexy needs to answer them if his project is to succeed.     

Adjudication of Islamic banking and finance cases in the civil courts of Malaysia

The adjudication of Islamic banking and finance (IBF) laws in Malaysia is unique given the Malaysian parallel legal systems. Although IBF is a branch of Islamic law, the civil court has the appropriate jurisdiction to decide the cases. This is due to the fact that banking falls under the items 7 and 8 of the Federal List of the Federal Constitution. The trails of decided cases showed that there are problems in resolving IBF cases in the civil courts. This paper aims to discuss the adjudication of Islamic Banking in the civil courts. The authors employed the method of legal documents analysis in analyzing the IBF cases. The analysis highlighted four obstacles in adjudicating IBF in civil courts, namely; inadequacy of existing legal framework, complications of legal documentation, competency of civil court judges and expert evidence. It also analysed the four approaches adopted by the civil courts in deciding IBF cases; the ‘parties to be bound by their agreement’, the ‘strict adherence to civil law’, the ‘justice and equitable’ and the ‘looking into the substance’.     

Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy's "Special-Case Thesis"*

Abstract
In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a "special case" of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**     

On the Connection between Law and Morality: Some Doubts about Robert Alexy’s View

The paper aims at a critical discussion of Alexy’s conception of the relationship between law and morality, which is known to insist on their necessary connection. After a brief recapitulation of this conception, the author scrutinizes three of its essential elements: the thesis of the dual nature of law, the argument from law’s claim to moral correctness, and the idea of an objective morality. Finally, he sketches his own position which, in some respects, resembles Alexy’s view, but also differs from it in certain relevant points.     

An Antinomy in Alexy's Theory of Balancing

This article argues that Robert Alexy's influential theory of balancing is affected by a contradiction that makes it unfeasible as an instrument by which to explain some aspects of law and legal reasoning it aims to clarify. In particular, I will show that one of the premises of Alexy's theory of balancing is incompatible with its conclusion. Alexy's theory is based upon a sharp distinction between rules and principles. However, as my analysis will demonstrate, its conclusion implies that it is impossible to distinguish between rules and principles. This is because the so-called weight formula and the law of colliding principles (i.e., the two main notions used by Alexy to explain balancing) cancel out any difference between these two types of norms.     

二元规范理论下的法律原则检讨

当下法律原则理论的论争重心,已从"法律是什么"的概念分析,转向了司法实践中的原则裁判。自德沃金以来的"规则-原则"二元规范理论,对实际的司法裁判的解说力和作用力较为有限,也未能解决原则权衡这一关键性问题。"融贯性"命题和"籍由法政策权衡进行裁判"命题,是原则裁判理论的两大基石。但德沃金对融贯性命题的回答过于抽象,而阿列克希依比例原则和权重公式对权衡命题和原则理论的最新推进,却是一种不成功的自反性进化。这种自反性进化和理论反讽,表明作为一种"过度整合式"的裁判理论,原则裁判已然走到了穷途末路。     

Rule‐Intermediaries in Action: How State and Business Stakeholders Influence the Meaning of Consumer Rights in Regulatory Governance Arrangements

The boundaries between public and private actors are increasingly blurred via regulatory governance arrangements and the contracting out of rights enforcement to private organizations. Regulation and governance scholars have not gained enough empirical leverage on how state actors, private organizations, and civil society groups influence the meaning of legal rules in regulatory governance arrangements that they participate in. Drawing from participant observation at consumer law conferences and interviews with stakeholders, my empirical data suggest that consumer rights and, in fact, consumer law, mean different things to different stakeholders tasked with adjudicating consumer rights. Rights afforded consumers who purchase warranties are now largely contingent on first using alternative dispute resolution structures, some created and operated by private organizations with soft state oversight and others run by stakeholders but with greater state oversight and involvement. Using new institutional sociology and regulatory governance theories, I find that stakeholders involved in overseeing and administering these dispute resolution systems filter the meaning of consumer rights through competing business and consumer logics. Because consumer laws mean different things to stakeholders tasked with adjudicating consumer rights, two different rights regimes simultaneously exist in this field. I conclude that how rule‐intermediaries administering private and state‐run dispute resolution systems conceptualize what consumer laws mean in action may have implications for regulatory governance and more broadly, consumers' access to justice.     

When Is a Regime Not a Legal System? Alexy on Moral Correctness and Social Efficacy

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness.     

Taking fundamental rights seriously in the Digital Services Act's platform liability regime

This article highlights how the EU fundamental rights framework should inform the liability regime of platforms foreseen in secondary EU law, in particular with regard to the reform of the E-commerce directive by the Digital Services Act. In order to identify all possible tensions between the liability regime of platforms on the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other hand, and in order to contribute to a well-balanced and proportionate European legal instrument, this article addresses these potential conflicts from the standpoint of users (those who share content and those who access it), platforms, regulators and other stakeholders involved. Section 2 delves into the intricate landscape of online intermediary liability, interrogating how the E-Commerce Directive and the emerging Digital Services Act grapple with the delicate equilibrium between shielding intermediaries and upholding the competing rights of other stakeholders. The article then navigates in Section 3 the fraught terrain of fundamental rights as articulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the aegis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter. This section poses an urgent inquiry: can the DSA's foundational principles reconcile these legal frameworks in a manner that fuels democracy rather than stifles it through inadvertent censorship? Section 4 then delves into the intricate relationship between fundamental rights and the DSA reform. This section conducts a comprehensive analysis of the key provisions of the DSA, emphasising how they underscore the importance of fundamental rights. In addition to mapping out the strengths of the framework the section also identifies existing limitations within the DSA and suggests potential pathways for further refinement and improvement. This article concludes by outlining key avenues for achieving a balanced and fundamental rights-compliant regulatory framework for platform liability within the EU.     

‘Private jurisprudence’ and the right to be forgotten balancing test

Upon receipt of a right to be forgotten request, private actors like Google are responsible for implementing the balancing test between competing rights of privacy and data protection and free expression and access to information. This amounts to private jurisprudence that data subjects, lawyers, and interested parties could, theoretically, game to their advantage. This paper critiques this process and argues two separate, but related points. (1) Search engines have become the sole arbiter of the rights to privacy and data protection under Articles 7 and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, when safeguarding should be a responsibility of state authorities. (2) As private actors face litigation if their decision is not acceptable to the data subject, the right to access information and the public's right to know is compromised. Search engines exert considerable power over access to and Internet usage, yet nevertheless benefit from frameworks that permit a lack of adherence to similar human rights standards as public actors or agencies. As such, empowering search engines as decision-makers over conflicting fundamental rights is problematic. Rather than allow the content of the right to be forgotten to be fleshed out by private actors, the significant body of existing jurisprudence should form the basis for public guidelines on how to implement the right to be forgotten. An analysis of case law of national courts, the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU reveals two related matters: it is possible to reverse engineer how search engines determine which requests will be actioned and those which will be denied. This paper argues a) collectively the body of jurisprudence is of sufficient standing to develop a public and transparent balancing test that is fair to all stakeholders and b) private actors should no longer be resolving the conflict between competing fundamental rights. The paper closes by positing a framework, loosely based on ICANN's Uniform Domain Resolution Procedure for resolving conflict between conflicting cyber property rights that provides transparency and accountability to the right to be forgotten and removes search engines as arbiters of the balancing test in select cases.     

The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl‐Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory.     

Application Discourse and the Special Case-Thesis*

Abstract. Klaus Günther's (1988) book developed the distinction between two kinds of discourse, the foundation discourse and the application discourse. In an article (Günther 1989a) following the publication of the book, he used this basic distinction as the starting point for a criticism of the special case-thesis as defended by Robert Alexy (1978, 32ff., 263ff.; Alexy 1989, 16ff., 213ff.). The aim of this article is to criticize this criticism in its turn and to show that the special case-thesis does not need the reformulation which Günther proposes. It should be clear from the outset that this concerns an internal discussion in the field of discourse theory; certain discourse-theoretical premises are taken for granted. In order to understand Giinther's criticism I will first give a brief account of the distinction he has made.     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification, translated by Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick
Philip Soper, A Theory of Law     

论基础设施权

基础设施的目标在于实现普遍服务和增进公共利益,基础设施所有权的法律特质在于独立于基础设施物化载体和衡平利益相关方权益,并由此生成基础设施权的范畴。基础设施权是由国家保障公民享有的,以实现国家、社会和公民和谐发展为目标的,以基础设施公共产品供应和实现普遍服务为内容的权利体系。基础设施的公共政策和法律规制不仅需要服务于经济增长的目标,更应该以提高普遍服务和增进公共利益为核心价值。     

Fundamental rights and private enforcement in the digital age

This article addresses the shift inthe paradigm of fundamental rights protection on the Internet. More and morethe enforcement of such rights is being delegated to private Internet operators, and the urgent question is how the task of balancing conflicting rights affects the status of Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The article examines the increasing privatisation of fundamental rights enforcementon the Internet, highlighting the impact of this trend. Following the analysisof recent developments, it argues that the pillars governing ISP liability should not be altered. In particular, the early determination that ISPs should not be presumptively saddled with content monitoring tasks should not be called into question. Therefore, the regulatory pressure on ISPs shouldbe lowered, as the spectre of liability, combined with ISPs' increasing role indeciding the proper balance between conflicting rights, unduly burdens the activity of ISPs and generates incentives to delete even lawful content.     

中国破产法实施的法律经济分析

从契约和产权的角度,破产法改变了企业原来的合同束,并根据新的合同束界定利益相关人对企业的产权,产权界定清楚可以激励相关人为提高破产效率去行为。这就是市场化的破产理论和实践的经济学基础。市场化的破产实施方法需要配套的制度以降低实施成本,这种制度既包括人的因素,又包括市场因素。我国破产法的实施效果,也有赖于这两个因素。