历史文化街区保护中需要更多“活化”

正目前地方政府对历史文化名城保护的意识和积极性都很高,但普遍存在的问题是一些历史文化街区难以"活化"利用。表现在:一是某些历史文化街区往往把原住民迁走后,没能形成新的业态或简单复制了"千人一面"的新业态,与本地的历史文脉和居民生活脱钩,大多只剩下建筑景观,文化功能和社会功能难以发挥,变成"空"的建筑物和街区。二是各地对历史文化街区的保护有严格规定,但对保护的层级和"活化"利用的方式没有明确的要求和规定。街区里的原住民虽愿意住在老街区保持原来的生活形态,但     

民主转型下的抗争政治

抗争政治作为人类社会发展的一种行为方式,它既是社会学的重要范畴,也是政治学的发展概念。抗争政治理论作为一种理论发展,它既发展了社会理论,也创新了政治发展理论尤其是民主转型理论。从政治发展的角度对抗争政治进行分析,并把其放入民主转型理论的范式转换中来思考抗争政治的含义、特点和过程,有利于深入地研究和解读民主转型下的抗争政治的相关问题,应该说,抗争政治提供了民主转型的新视角,虽然抗争本身不能直接带来民主转型,但它的出现对于改变人们的政治认同、培育积极的公民意识和构建公民社会,都会产生积极的效果。抗争政治与民主转型的关联性在于：在民主国家,抗争政治是直接民主的价值体现;在威权国家,抗争政治是民主转型的催化剂;抗争政治的三种结果,即被镇压、制度化和民主转型的实现。     

“身体抗争”现象的类型分析

当前我国的"身体抗争"现象分为常规型和非常规型两种,常规型"身体抗争"主要有底线选择型、策略选择型、泄愤型,而非常规型"身体抗争"则主要有政策触发型、影响政策议程设置型。所有的"身体抗争"都是以肉体以及依附肉体的个人生命或人格尊严为载体,通过抗争来维护和捍卫自身或群体利益。不同的是,常规型"身体抗争"大多是围绕个人问题展开的,而非常规型"身体抗争"更进一步,由于所呈现的社会问题具有一定的共通性,所以能够引发社会公众及政府决策者的关注,在解决特定抗争问题的同时,促使政府解决同类社会问题。     

国有企业改制中的工人集体行动的解释框架--以西北某省X市H纺织公司的一场抗争为例

20世纪90年代后期以产权为导向的国有企业改制从根本上改变了中国工人的命运.集体无行动和集体行动理论为分析当代中国工人抗争提供了两种十分鲜明的视角.集体无行动理论认为传统意识形态的灌输、工人阶级分裂性特点和政府制度性补救等措施消解了工人的有组织行动.结合发生于西北某省的一个大型纺织公司工人的一次集体抗争来观察中国国企改革困境及中国工人的抗争策略.急剧恶化的生存现实、相对剥夺感的不断强化以及改制中的种种不公正导致工人的抗争运动越来越激烈,用集体无行动理论已经无法解释现实.我们认为尽管这些抗争在手段和策略上还很不成熟,尽管它离西方意义上的社会运动还有距离,但它已经具备了集体行动的特点,符合西方集体行动理论的解释框架.这些抗争行动要求我们必须更理性探索劳动关系新模式,在政府、资本和劳工三方之间达成新的共识.     

农民环境抗争与政府治理

随着农民维权意识、环保意识的不断提高,他们已经从"沉默的大多数"渐渐觉醒,其环境抗争处于并将长期处于"白热化"阶段。然而,农民的自身缺陷与政府治理问题等多方面因素交织在一起,农民通常选择体制外抗争或体制边缘抗争方式,这进一步加剧了暴力冲突或群体性事件的恶化。研究认为,可以通过一些制度化的方法将环境保护成效纳入地方政府的绩效考核指标体系,在转变政府职能过程中提高农民的自组织化程度,以期达到政府、企业与农民的力量均衡,从而提高政府公信力、强化治理能力,确保政府环境治理的法治导向、民意导向和绩效导向。     

社会抗争行为场域的逻辑:基于政治机会结构与政府学习维度的检视

社会抗争关系到利益表达与维护,作为一种非制度化的政治参与形式,国内的抗争诉求多集中在"权利与利益"方面。社会抗争行为发生在一定的场域之中,场域中包含抗争者、管控者、制度、规则等内容,场域具有非"是非"特征,呈现出一种波动性的"半闭合"状态。社会抗争行为场域的产生离不开政治机会结构,政治机会结构塑造了抗争场域,在场域中放置了政治机会与政治限制。当然政治机会结构是政府"过程学习"的结果,虽然政府有"内生性"学习目标(为人民服务),但是政府的学习也会出现偏差,因而社会抗争行为的场域——政治机会结构——政府的"过程学习",这一衍变过程即是社会抗争行为场域的逻辑所在。展望未来,逐步构建回应性政治,在政治吸纳上做功课,遵循社会抗争行为场域的逻辑,显得尤为重要。     

邻避冲突中社会抗争与政治回应的因果推理——基于京沈高铁事件的力场分析和过程追踪

围绕"具体公共政策中的社会抗争是否催生政府回应""社会抗争如何作用于政府回应"这两个问题,运用力场分析和过程追踪方法对京沈高铁事件进行因果影响和因果机制分析,实现对"社会抗争与政治回应"完整的因果推理。研究发现,在有争议的权威主义国家背景下,社会抗争与政治回应逐渐呈现良性互塑,抗争性政治正朝着回应性政治转变。研究结论认为,社会抗争与政治回应正相关、社会抗争中的政治回应性取决于动员能力和反动员能力的博弈结果、政府回应对社会抗争具有"判例"效应。而有效处理类似的社会抗争事件,应保持政治回应的理性、重视信息技术的作用、变革社会治理的方式等。     

以工会职能转型缓和工人制度外抗争

一、工人制度外抗争暂时不会对社会稳定造成重大影响 理论界将工人阶级政治分为制度外的工人阶级抗争政治和制度内工人阶级参政议政两种类型(汪仕凯,2009).近期在国内多个城市的外资企业接连出现工人罢工、要求加薪事件就是制度外抗争政治的表现.这类抗争暂时不会对社会稳定造成重大影响.原因在于以下几个方面.     

农民工的抗争行动及其对阶级形成的意义——一个类型学的分析

结构力量与结社力量对农民工阶级形成历史进程中抗争行动的表现形式、内容及其性质,具有深远的影响。基于这一判断,本文根据组织化程度和抗争的性质初步构建了一个类型学框架,将农民工的抗争行动划分为四个类型;同时,结合具体的抗争案例,分析了这些初生的抗争行动对农民工阶级形成的可能意义。     

地方政府在社会抗争事件中的“摆平”策略

"抗争政治"是当代中国政治研究中的一个重要解释概念。现有研究大多基于公民及公民社会立场,较少关注抗争事件中另一个重要行动者——地方政府的行为及其内在策略。少数探讨抗争事件中地方政府行为的研究,则主要关注地方政府某些特定的行为模式,注重对微观过程的分析与解释,而较少涉及具体有效的行为策略。当代中国地方政府在应对社会抗争事件时主要运用了"摆平"的行为策略,即地方政府较为被动、消极地履行社会管理职能;根据对特定社会抗争事件是否超出管辖范围的可能性估计,选择性进行应对;在应对社会抗争事件时,运用拖延、收买、欺瞒、要挟、限制自由等方式,尽量实现属地社会表面上的暂时性稳定。这是因为,受到"上下分治"以及"经济发展主义"和"有限任期"、"一票否决"等体制机制的共同影响,地方政府运用制度框架内的方式应对社会抗争的动力较小,甚至无法使用。同时,刚性压制的方式受到了中央的严格控制,并且可能造成更严重的社会抗争。"     

Citizenship,minorities and the struggle for a right to the city in Istanbul

Globalization is generating new forms of citizenship that often go beyond the institutional perception of social identity. These new forms of citizenship are developed in a scalable way to a greater extent than rights and obligations, and are entirely managed by the citizens themselves. To demonstrate empirical support for this issue, the case of minority communities in Turkey constitutes one of the most relevant examples, since citizenship in this country has long been associated with an idea of political loyalty and total allegiance to the nation-state. The main purpose of this article is to show how urban space and urban protest allow minorities to find alternative forms of expression for their collective identity, and to create a new understanding of citizenship beyond the classical definition, being based instead on institutional representation. The aim of this research is to examine the process of urban transformation in Istanbul, how this phenomenon shapes the structure of cities and how it gives rise to social resistance and protest, especially in neighborhoods housing minority communities. In this context, the article focuses on planning movements in Turkey through a comparative study of two urban planning projects and the citizens' protests against them.     

Local government and urban protest in Colombia

This article examines how urban conflict in Colombia is highlighting important features of local government in that country. Four interrelated questions are asked: (a) What is the role of local government in the provision of public goods and services in urban communities? (b) To what extent has local government been the target of urban community protest? (c) Has local government taken on a petitioner role by being a participant in urban community protest? (d) Does urban protest threaten the system of political domination of which local government is an integral part? The article points to certain key features of local government in Colombia that may be built upon in order to create a more progressive, democratic and community-based system of local government. There are, however, powerful political constraints on this occurring.     

Repression,spontaneity, and collective action: the 2013 Turkish Gezi protests

Scholars have identified various conditions that influence the formation of spontaneous collective action. Certain types of opposition strategies and geographic conditions make it likelier for protesters to be able to overcome reactive repression and keep mobilizing after experiencing state violence. As such, it is still unclear why a small protest sometimes diffuses into an unforeseen mass wave of dissent. Through examination of Turkish civil society, this study introduces a framework to explain the emergence of the 2013 Gezi protest, which was the largest in the Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) government-led era of Turkish politics. A sequence of mechanisms including viral diffusion, elite updating/cover-up, public outrage, and coordination are categorized and linked to previously identified antecedent conditions as well as Twitter activity of social movement organizations which took part in the protests. The framework advances our knowledge of repression backfire by identifying its causal mechanisms and classifying a configuration of conditions under which the phenomenon is likely to empirically take place.     

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism: Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

We create a collective resistance game in which elites control the distribution of resources if the masses are compliant. However, if the masses unanimously protest elite allocations, they can capture a greater share of resources for themselves. We study how Chinese villagers, randomly assigned to the role of elites and masses, play this game in repeated interactions under varying information conditions. We find significant variation in the extent to which participants gave weight in their decisions to (1) the amount of the elite allocation and (2) their beliefs about the likely choices of fellow group members. Many individuals made their decisions based primarily on the size of the elite allocation, choosing to protest if the elite offer fell below some threshold level. Only a small proportion of the respondents were attuned consistently to the behavioral intentions of fellow group members in deciding whether to protest the elite allocation. This heterogeneity of preferences among participants has significant implications for their prospects of achieving and sustaining collective action. Knowledge of the amount of resources controlled by elites at the start of the game affected mass calculations of the fairness of distributions and increased the frequency of mass protests. However, the elites exploited the decision rule of many mass members by buying off those individuals with the lowest thresholds, thus preempting or dissolving collective action. This research sheds light on elite–mass interactions under authoritarianism, and in particular on contentious politics in contemporary China.     

Politics and the organization of collective action: The case of Nigeria, 1960–1975

The case of Nigeria provides support for an organizational conception of collective action. Such a conception rests on the notion that collective events—riots, demonstrations, strikes, marches, and violent confrontations—are the accompanying manifestations of routine politics and are instigated by many of the same organizations that sponsor nonviolent, ordinary political and economic activity. It is argued that collective action is organized action; its vehicles are mainly preexisting organizations that determine the location and timing of collective action, select the forms of contention, articulate the issues, and choose the targets of collective protest. It is further argued that insofar as a society's organizational base determines the shape of collective action, then political policies that affect the society's organizational composition will have a corresponding effect on the shape of collective action. That is, policies of organizational repression and facilitation will decrease or increase associated forms of collective action.     

Protesting with the ballot: Diffusion of methods of electoral protest in Spain

This paper shows the pattern of diffusion of a tool of protest – blank and null voting (BNV)– in the context of Spanish national elections. It shows how the 2004 protest mobilization by Batasuna (a Basque nationalist party) predicts null voting by identifying the relationship of this form of protest with both the level of grievance of the population and the political resources of the mobilizers. The paper then demonstrates that this large and visible use of a protest tactic is followed by a heterogeneous diffusion process after the main mobilized protest event and beyond the supporters of the original mobilizer. In the 2008 national election, across Spain, citizens with grievances toward the political system and, most importantly, with political affinity with the initiators were the ones to update their individual protest repertoire with this electoral protest tool.     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Democratic accountability and central bank independence: A response to Elgie

Empirical evidence is presented on the development of (violent) political conflict in 19 West European countries during the 1970s, the early 1980s and the entire post‐Second World War period. It is possible to identify three types of nation‐groups: ‘noisy‐participatory’ states such as the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and more recently Spain and Portugal ‐ and Greece if taken on a per capita base. The group of rather ‘quiet’ democracies consists of the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Luxembourg, with the remaining countries forming the middle, less clearly delineated group. There are two dimensions of political conflict: collective protest, made up of variables such as protest demonstrations, political strikes and riots, and internal war, characterised by the breakdown of the slate monopoly of violence and the organised use of violence by anti‐system groups. A causal model of political protest is presented and confronted with rival explanations. Empirical evidence and theoretical arguments lead to scepticism about accurate predictions of political violence and political instability.     

Voter sincerity and the time-of-voting-decision

This article explores the relationship between vote sincerity and the time at which vote decisions are finalized. It posits that a specific set of competitive circumstances are necessary for insincere voting to occur, and that voters' understanding of these circumstances can be influenced by exposure to information during a campaign. The article introduces a new method of operationalizing a commonly overlooked type of insincere voting: the protest voter. As defined here, protest voters express their political dissatisfaction by supporting an uncompetitive non-traditional party that is not their first preference. Canadian Election Study data reveal that protest voters make up a small, but noteworthy segment of the electorate and that insincere voters tend to make their vote decisions relatively late.