法律解释及其基本特征

在法治社会中 ,如果没有法律解释理论 ,仍可能形成新的专制。法律解释应是法官按照法律的规范意旨 ,运用法律思维方式 ,在法律适用过程中 ,对与案件相关的法律和事实的意义所作的阐明。它有三个基本特征 :法律解释是站在法律的立场上 ,对法律的意义所作出的有效力的解释 ,具有合法性特征 :法律解释具有法律的部分与整体的互动、法律与事实的互动的循环性特征 ;法律解释因把一般的法律个别化而具有创造性特征     

Corpus Linguistics as a Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress,Some Questions

Corpus linguistics is becoming a respected method of statutory and constitutional interpretation in the United States over the past decade, yet it has also generated a backlash from a group of scholars that engage in empirical work. This essay attempts to demonstrate both the contributions and the risks of using linguistic corpora as a primary tool in legal interpretation. Its legitimacy stems from the fact that courts routinely state that statutory terms, when not defined as a matter of law, are to be given their ordinary meaning. Judges have responded to this challenge, with the assistance of the linguistics community, by using corpora to determine which meanings are ordinary. However, legal analysts have not determined exactly what makes one meaning ordinary and another not ordinary. This gap has led to a level of disagreement in the field. Moreover, while linguists who engage in corpus linguistic analysis typically emphasize the importance of context, the legal application is peculiarly context-free, in keeping with legal philosophies that eschew reliance on reference to a law’s purpose and the intent of the legislature that enacted it. This move adds a political dimension to corpus analysis as a means of legal interpretation. Yet, the article concludes that by relying on a blend of general and specialized corpora, the legal system can substantially reduce the problem of contextualization, as some linguists and practitioners have already recognized.

     

美国制定法解释方法向文本主义的回睚

作为美国制定法解释方法的文本主义经历了平白意义规则和新文本主义两个发展阶段。以斯卡利亚为代表的新文本主义对在制定法解释领域长期占据正统地位的意图主义解释方法进行了批判,并对早期平白意义规则进行了扬弃,将文本重新置于制定法解释的中心位置,强调制定法语词的通常、自然与客观意义,并认为文本通常意义的确定无需借助于立法者意图或立法史等文本外材料,而只须根据“普通说英语者标准”,运用词典、语法、解释准则等语言学方面的工具并考虑制定法文本的语境、结构与整体等语义性背景即可确定。     

Practical reason and the ontology of statutes

Conclusion A common working assumption of theories of statutory interpretation is that the object of interpretation is uncontroversial. It is assumed that dispute only centers on the epistemics of interpretation. The assumption is unsound. Theories of statutory interpretation are importantly different from other sorts of theories. The subject matter of other sorts of theories can be identified uncontroversially. In the case of statutory interpretation, the object of interpretation is controversial. What counts as the object of interpretation therefore needs specification. Without the required specification, criteria of evidence and warrant justifying an interpretation are not well-defined.An adequate theory of statutory interpreation must contain both epistemic and ontological components. It must provide criteria for treating information as evidence relevant to, and standards for, interpreting a statute. Providing such criteria in turn requires also giving an account of the object of interpretation — what a statute consists in. Practical reason theories fail to provide acceptable criteria and standards for interpreting a statute. These accounts therefore fail to supply an adequate epistemic components for a theory of statutory interpretation. As to the ontological component, things are less clear. I have argued in sections II and III that this component is partly a matter of substantive political theory. Although practical reason theorists fail to offer a substantive political theory for defining the proper object of interpretation, their accounts are in principle ontologically unobjectionable. At most, practical reason accounts are incomplete. Of course, practical reason accounts might still be defective for other reasons. They may invoke a defective substantive political theory. Or the constraints imposed on properties of a statute or relations between them may not in fact affectuate the goals set by the theory. Such failings would be normative, not metaphysical. Since practical reason accounts are epistemically inadequate and ontologically incomplete, legal theorists should find the accounts less attractive than they do, even putting aside the normative soundness of the accounts.I thank Barry Adler, John Harrison, George Rutherglen, William Stuntz and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I am particularly grateful to Larry Alexander for discussions and comments on previous drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Merger—the name of the FE game

In the Australian legal environment today the overwhelming importance of laws made by Parliament is obvious, yet many first year law programmes pay insufficient attention to the coordinated teaching of statutory interpretation (SI). This project formed part of a collaborative initiative between an educational developer and the coordinator of legal research methods (LRM) to introduce statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study. Our study used a qualitative research framework – a questionnaire was administered to students at two intervals throughout the first semester. In Week 3, 160 students participated in the questionnaire and at Week 4, a keystone module on statutory interpretation using a building block approach was introduced in LRM. Since the nature of assessment in LRM is largely reflection, this unit lent itself well to investigating the language and literacy challenges of statutory interpretation, in particular, to students monitoring their own progress in this regard. The overall aim of the project was to establish a framework for students to build on their knowledge and understanding of statutory interpretation throughout their undergraduate studies, and in the interests of improved learning and teaching outcomes, for staff to be able to document the changes in student thinking. This paper focuses on the preliminary stage of our investigation into the language and literacy challenges involved in introducing statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study.

I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”

(Alice Through the Looking Glass, c. vi.)

After all this long discussion, the question is whether the words “If a man has” can mean “If a man thinks he has.” I am of opinion that they cannot, and that the case should be decided accordingly.

(Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206)     

论目的主义的制定法解释方法——以美国法律过程学派的目的主义版本为中心的分析

目的主义在美国主要指法律过程学派的哈特和萨克斯所提出的制定法解释理论.该理论反对传统制定法解释中的意义论和意图论,强调目的在制定法解释中的优先地位及解释者对制定法目的的建构,要求以能最佳实现目的的方式来确定制定法文本的意义,并对解释施加文本规约意义和“清楚陈述的既定政策”的限制.目的主义的吸引力在于既赋予解释者更新、发展制定法的任务,以合作者的姿态参与公共政策的生产过程,又竭力避免非民选的司法机关作出争议性的价值判断和政策选择.     

物权法定原则

物权法定原则决定了物权法的基本性质与特征,也严格地限制了当事人在创设新型物权、改变既有物权之内容等方面的意思自由。物权法定原则的内涵是指物权的种类、内容、效力以及公示方法由法律规定,原则上不能由法律之外的规范性文件进行规定,也不能允许当事人自由创设物权的种类以及确定物权的内容、效力和公示方法。作者比较了物权法定模式的表述方式和基本功能,并认为我国物权法中物权法定中的“法”应当被主要限定为法律;司法解释应当具有一定的创设物权的功能;判例不能创设物权。当事人关于物权设定的约定违反物权法定原则的法律后果,应当根据不同的情况来确定。     

德国法学方法论

一般认为,对于一门学术型学科而言,一套方法的存在及由此而形成的方法论至关重要。在德国,法律一直以来都是一门学术型学科。作为被称之为"法学"(字面意思是法律"科学",更确切地说是有关法律的学问)的研究对象,法律以具有一套专门的法学方法论为其特征。在德国大学法学院中,法学方法论是一门非常重要的讲授科目,且围绕这门课程有大量的法学文献。这些文献所讨论的是德国法律人如何(或者更准确地说:应该如何)开展法律工作。德语文献相关讨论中的一个特殊之处在于,在概念上区分"法律解释"与"法的续造"。方法论的讨论涉及制定法解释的各种相关要素、先决条件、不同层级,以及法的续造的合法性等问题。除此之外,还应意识到,对于德国法方法论的讨论是在不同的政治发展历程下展开的。基于此,本文从以下五个一般性话题展开对方法论的讨论:第一,德国、瑞士以及奥地利在方法论上的共性;第二,方法论讨论的规范特征;第三,不同法律领域中所出现的方法论上的差异;第四,法教义学与法学方法论的关系;第五,德国所讨论问题的历史背景。     

我国夫妻财产制立法若干问题探讨

新近征求全民意见的婚姻法司法解释(三)草案凸现我国夫妻财产制立法存在诸多问题。我国现行法定夫妻财产制是婚后所得共同制。对法定夫妻共同财产范围的界定应遵循婚后所得推定共有的准则,其法理依据是夫妻之间存在的协力关系。夫妻财产制契约是夫妻之间就采用何种类型的夫妻财产制所订立的协议。夫妻财产制契约与一般财产契约不同,其直接产生夫妻财产法上的效力,即以双方当事人选定的财产制度替代法定财产制的适用。无论法定共同财产制还是约定共同财产制都存有一定缺陷。在我国夫妻财产制结构中增设非常财产制可以弥补共同财产制之不足。     

自然人书面契约取信方式研究

印章文化在我国源远流长,其中公章自古至今为实用而治,私章则经历了一个从实用到艺术的转变过程。我国古代书面契约的取信方式历经变化,但私章讫未成为公认的取信手段。西方国家在法律史上曾有盖印取信的制度,但当今通行的法定取信手段则是签名。我国现行法上的书面契约取信方式兼采签名和盖章。私章自身的内在局限及签名取信的多维优势,决定了签名取代私章的必然。自然人主体书面契约的取信方式统一于签名,是法律体系内部相协调的需要,并可以获得法律解释理论上的有力支撑。     

论行政立法不作为违法——基于法律文本的解析

行政立法不作为既是行政不作为的新形态,也是行政立法违法的主要类型,其不作为违法之构成除应当具备立法义务之外,还必须客观存在着怠于履行立法义务之不作为状态,且已经逾越法定或合理期限。以法律文本为素材,深入解析行政立法不作为之违法构成要件,对于推进行政不作为的类型化研究以及限制行政立法权的滥用具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。     

刑事立法模式的宪法考察

现行刑事立法采取了将所有犯罪规定在一部刑法典中的模式，没有在行政法、经济法等法律中直接规定构成要件与法定刑，导致刑法典中出现大量的绝对空白刑法规范与相对空白刑法规范，并且形成了自然犯与法定犯一体化的立法体例。法律保留原则、明确性原则与比例原则是宪法原则；绝对空白刑法规范违反了法律保留原则，相对空白刑法规范不符合明确性原则；自然犯与法定犯一体化的立法体例不符合比例原则。只有改变现行刑事立法模式，在行政法、经济法等法律中直接规定相关犯罪的构成要件与法定刑，在刑法典中仅规定自然犯，才能使刑事立法模式与宪法相协调。     

School exclusions: Lessons from Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland there are many fewer permanent exclusion from school than in England and Wales. It has been suggested that this may be linked to differences in the statutory schemes which regulate exclusion. This article compares the legal framework for school exclusions in Northern Ireland and England and Wales; provides a comparative analysis of the statistical data in relation to school exclusions; assesses whether the differences in the legal framework may have an impact on the propensity to permanently exclude; and considers whether there are any other non-legal factors which may explain lower rates of school exclusions. The overall objective is to see whether the legal differences which exist have a meaningful effect on the overall rate of school exclusion and to extrapolate best practice. In particular, the analysis focuses on experience of the statutory pre-expulsion consultation procedure in Northern Ireland, which has no equivalent in England and Wales.     

Muslim marriage (non) recognition: implications and possible solutions

Differences between traditional Muslim marriage practice and the statutory formalities required for entry into a legally recognised marriage in England and Wales have resulted in serious question-marks hanging over the legal status of a seemingly significant proportion of Muslim marriages. This article places the spotlight on the vulnerability of spouses who remain unaware of the lack of legal status which may attach to their marriage or who may have been misled by their spouse as to the latter’s intention to obtain legal recognition for the marriage. The article first considers the statutory formalities required under English law for entry into a legally recognised marriage before drawing on the most up-to-date empirical research to highlight the apparently widespread non-compliance with the formalities within the Muslim community. The article then reflects on the various practical implications which may arise for parties to an unrecognised Muslim marriage before considering how the situation may be ameliorated.     

Levels of Generality in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

The level of generality or of abstraction used to describe a precedent, a right, or the legislative intent behind a statutory provision or constituent purpose behind a constitutional provision can have a decisive impact on the outcome of a case. Characterising it in narrow terms has the effect of reducing the scope of decision of a judgment; conversely, a broader characterisation provides more leeway for a judge in a case to encompass its facts within the precedent, right or purpose in issue. The issue raised by the level of generality problem is the extent to which courts have a discretion or freedom of manoeuvre as to the level of generality they decide upon, and thus whether generality and abstraction are manipulable in the hands of judges and are not really predetermined by the legal sources in question or an established judicial method of interpretation. Uncontrolled judicial discretion of this kind is problematic from the point of view of the rule of law and democracy, especially when adjudication concerns constitutional provisions, the equivalent in the EU being interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of the EU Treaties; reversal of ECJ interpretation through Treaty amendment is particularly difficult to achieve because it requires unanimous coordination by the Member States. This article examines two alternative ways of determining the correct or appropriate level of generality issue in ECJ interpetation, coherence or the legal traditions of the Member States, and argues in favour of the latter as a less subjective method. Application of the two alternative approaches is tested in two areas of EU law, state liability and criminal law.     

禁止权利滥用的法理分析

禁止权利滥用是在法权观念的变迁过程中 ,由观念发展到判例 ,再发展到成文法上的一项基本原则的 ;禁止权利滥用原则负载了“社会本位”权利观的价值 ,在民法上成为一般条款 ,是指导、评价民事主体正当行使权利、立法以及法律解释和补充的准则 ,也是赋予司法裁量权的依据。基于禁止权利滥用原则是权利社会性的要求 ,因此 ,权利滥用者对其行为应承担不利的法律后果。     

Minimal Semantics and Legal Interpretation

In this paper I will tackle three issues. First, I aim to briefly outline the backbone of semantic minimalism, while focusing on the idea of ‘liberal truth conditions’ developed by Emma Borg in her book ‘Minimal Semantics’. Secondly, I will provide an account of the three principal views in legal interpretation: intentionalism, textualism and purposivism. All of them are based on a common denominator labelled by lawyers ‘literal meaning’. In the paper I suggest a novel way of viewing this common denominator as almost identical to the Borgian ‘liberal truth conditions’, at least at a conceptual level. In the third section I will focus on the conceptual similarities between the two ideas. I intend to depict that, although legal theorists do not admit it explicitly, they treat literal legal meaning as minimal propositional content that can be ascribed liberal truth conditions. There are two main objections to liberal truth conditions: their under-determinacy and unintuitive character. Both objections can be applied to ‘literal meaning’. However, the idea of liberal truth conditions gives an adequate account of what lawyers call literal meaning and is helpful in explaining the mechanism of understanding of provisions and reasons leading to the necessity of statutory interpretation.     

Medico-legal knowledge of general practitioners: disjunctions,errors and uncertainties

This article discusses a survey of Victorian general practitioners which investigated doctors' legal knowledge, the impact of law on clinical practice, doctors' current medico-legal information sources and their legal education needs and preferences. Knowledge of legal standards was investigated in relation to three areas: disclosure of risk; ownership of, and access to, medical records; and proxy decision-making. Additionally, the impact of statutory reform in relation to proxy decision-making was explored. Further, doctors' past experience of medico-legal education, current sources of medico-legal information and preferences concerning future medico-legal information were explored. Results indicated that overall, respondents had a very inadequate understanding of relevant law and that relevant statutory standards have had little impact on clinical practice. Professional bulletins and journals were identified as major current legal information sources, whilst printed materials, seminars and conferences were preferred sources of legal information. The authors conclude that there is a significant disjunction between legal standards and doctors' awareness of those standards, thereby creating a significant source of liability for doctors. Results highlight an urgent need to develop legal education programs for general practitioners based on doctors' identified needs and preferences.     

A Survey: Children’s Rights Post Termination of Parental Rights and Pre-Adoption

This survey of the statutory provisions and case law of all 50 states and the District of Columbia includes the rights of children to parental support, inheritance, and familial association remaining upon termination of parental rights. A majority of states terminate all the child’s rights at the time parental rights are severed. However, a number of states by explicit statutes or statutory construction have determined that a child’s rights to parental support survives termination of parental rights. This survey examines the prevailing law in each state and suggests statutory reforms to protect the legal status and rights of children.     

Courting the Environment – A Comparative Analysis

Statutory interpretation is of central importance to the daily work of all judges. This paper explores the reasons why statutory interpretation is necessary and then considers how judges have explained the way in which they carry out this task. It examines how judges consider the text, the context and the purpose of statutory provisions. It also looks at how human rights instruments can be used as an interpretive tool. It then considers the issue of whether judges can ‘fill in gaps’ in a legislative scheme and whether there is a Rubicon which judges cannot cross in the interpretive process.